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# CURRENT NEWS SPECIAL EDITION



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Chemical Weapons

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FG IAI/DO-0



# Link AIDS to CIA warfare

By J. DANIELA BROWNE  
Amsterdam News Staff

A prominent Physician has charged that the spread of AIDS epidemic in some part of Africa is the largely to bacteriological and chemical experiments conducted over the years in these areas by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Dr. Nathaniel E. Lehrman of Brooklyn, N.Y., said he based his accusation on an article published in the magazine section of the New York Times on Aug. 2, 1981 on CIA activities in Zaire, the former Belgian Congo.

The Times article notes that a chief CIA scientist was sent to Zaire in 1960 with biological materials for possible use in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, then prime minister of that country.

According to the article, the scientist checked with the army chemical corps at Fort Detrick, Maryland, on substances that would either kill Lumumba or incapacitate him so severely that he would be out of action.

It was also noted in the Times article that the scientist chose a chemical that was supposed to produce a disease that was indigenous to Zaire and could be fatal.

Dr. Lehrman said similar experiments are being conducted openly on Western homosexuals, drug addicts, and African-

Americans.

He said that there is no natural or artificial way to focus on infectious disease so precisely, but focusing could easily be produced by chemicals in a modern, aerosol version.

Accusing the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta of being party to the CIA bacteriological warfare, Dr. Lehrman said the agency has refused to look into the possibility that AIDS is caused by these ongoing CIA chemical experiments.

Dr. Lehrman was also highly critical of a recent report by the Disease Control Center which states that outside of Europe and America, the only continent with a high number of AIDS cases is Australia. He said that report is biased and has racial overtones.

A former director of clinical psychiatry at Downstate Medical Center in Brooklyn, Dr. Lehrman has called for more aggressive research to find the main cause of the dreaded AIDS disease.

Dr. Lehrman said researchers have put the public under the impression that discovery of an AIDS vaccine is imminent, but such a vaccine would have little or no effect because the major cause of the disease is not the immune suppression of the relatively mild virus but rather other non-infectious factors.



Philadelphia Inquirer

2 December 1985

pg. 1

# A lethal stockpile ages in Ky.

By Eric Harrison  
Inquirer Staff Writer

RICHMOND, Ky. — Except for the barbed-wire fence that surrounds it, the Army's Lexington-Blue Grass Depot, from most vantage points, is indistinguishable from the rest of this region's rolling farm land.

A portion of its 15,000 acres is used for grazing, and cattle and grassy meadows are almost all that can be seen from the roads that ring the compound.

The pastoral scene is deceptive, though. For deeper into the depot's reaches, in earth-covered, steel-reinforced concrete igloos, is a stockpile of lethal chemical weapons. What to

do with those 70,000 aging M-55 nerve-gas rockets has the Army in a quandary.

The obsolete rockets, buried 1.6 miles inside the depot's northern fence, are out of sight; but for an increasing number of people who live nearby, they are rarely out of mind.

That is because the rockets make Madison County — located south of Lexington near the Kentucky Bluegrass, an area famous for its thoroughbreds and show animals — potentially the most dangerous Army stockpile in the country.

U.S. Rep. Larry J. Hopkins (R., Ky.), speaking on the floor of the House earlier this year, called the stockpile of 20-year-old rock-

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NEXT PAGE

## PROPOSED CHEMICAL ARMS FUNDING HARMS SUMMIT ACCORD

LD040145 Moscow TASS in English 2058 GMT 3 Dec 85

["Chemical Weapons Must be Banned" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow December 3 TASS -- TASS commentator Vadim Biryukov writes:

The U.S. newspaper PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER reported that the U.S. Congress is considering a bill envisaging the appropriation of nearly 1,100 million dollars in the 1986 financial year to the programme of modernization of chemical arms. The Pentagon intends to spend those funds on research and development of new highly toxic chemicals for warheads, manufacture of vaccines and antidotes, sensors, protective clothing, shelters and computer programmes imitating combat situations with the use of chemical weapons. The Pentagon also intends to use those funds to start the production of the 155mm shells and 200-kilogram "Big Eye" bombs with nerve gas.

The newspaper's reports indicate that the military-industrial complex of the USA has concrete plans for perfection and manufacture of new particularly dangerous types of chemical arms and is not going to give them up. Meanwhile the joint Soviet-U.S. statement on the results of the Geneva summit meeting says: "In the context of discussing security problems, the two sides reaffirmed that they are in favour of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter."

The historic significance of the Geneva meeting is known to all, but its long-term significance will be manifested in concrete deeds and depends on the readiness of the sides to act on the basis of the joint statement adopted in Geneva. The time has come to pass on from words to deeds and to take practical steps to prohibit and destroy stockpiles of chemical arms. But certain circles in Washington are striving to bring pressure on the American legislators and to achieve the appropriation of funds for the production of new types of toxic warfare agents.

Trying to convince the U.S. Congress that the stockpiles of chemical arms existing in the USA become "obsolete" or are "insufficient", the U.S. military-industrial complex is above all concerned over its profits. The monopolists little worry about the circumstance that the U.S. tax payers will have to produce more toxic agents while the U.S. arsenals contain at least 150,000 tons of toxic agents, the amount which is enough to kill all the population of the earth several times over.



Kentucky...CONTINUED

ets "a ticking time bomb" — a threat both to the military base and to the populous communities near it. But few local residents knew the danger existed until about two years ago.

"There had been no major accidents and so people didn't worry," said Clifford Kerby, who is mayor of Berea, a town about six miles south of the depot. "Most people didn't even know what was stored over there."

That changed with the release of a scientific study that called the rockets, which contain two forms of nerve gas, BG and VX, the most dangerous items in the nation's supply of aging chemical weapons. Soon after that, the Army proposed building a \$42 million incinerator at the depot to destroy the weapons by burning them. That idea brought strong opposition from residents, and the concern has risen steadily since then.

If an incinerator is built here, said Kerby, who chairs a task force appointed by Hopkins to study the problem, he wants it dismantled after the 70,000 rockets are destroyed. That way there would be no chance of chemical weapons from other parts of the country being trucked here for disposal, said Kerby.

"We don't want to become a toxic waste dump," he said.

But another group, Concerned Citizens of Madison County, doesn't want the incinerator built at all.

"We've got 17,000 students, in college through kindergarten, within three or four miles of where the material is being stored and of where the incinerator would be," said Kathy Flood, a member of the group.

Her group argues that the incineration process is too new and unproven to be used in a heavily populated area.

A bill passed by both houses of Congress last month, and now before a conference committee to resolve differences, authorized production of a new generation of chemical weapons, so-called binary weapons that the Army says may be more safely stored and handled. They contain two chemicals, neither of which is lethal until the shell explodes and the chemicals mix to form a deadly gas.

The legislation also requires that the old weapons — which include 400,000 nerve gas rockets stored in five locations in the United States and other types of chemical weapons in three other U.S. locations — be destroyed by 1994.

For the people of Madison County who wanted to be rid of their nerve gas stockpile, the bill was hardly the end of their troubles.

The Army has until July to report to Congress on possible ways to destroy the weapons. So far, the options appear limited.

The one favored by Madison County's concerned citizens group is for the rockets to be transported to an Army incinerator in Tooele, Utah, or to a new incinerator to be built in another part of the country. But that plan has drawbacks.

"There are 42 states that don't have any [nerve gas] and they're all saying you're not bringing that through our states or over them," Kerby said. "I don't blame them one damn bit."

The other option is to build either a temporary or permanent incinerator here.

The problem with that is that, of the eight areas where chemical weapons are stored in the U.S., Madison County, with 53,000 people, is the most densely populated. Richmond, which almost touches the depot's northwest border, has 22,000 residents. And Lexington, with 204,000 people, is located only 25 miles to the north, within possible reach of gas if it were to escape.

That density makes the Lexington-Blue Grass Depot the most potentially dangerous of the eight U.S. locations where chemical weapons are stockpiled, according to a study commissioned by the Army and released a year ago.

"Our biggest fear is that one of the igloos might explode," Kerby said.

"If one of them did explode and release the gases into the atmosphere, it would be a major disaster. Nobody knows what would happen."

The fear of an explosion was made more real in June, when an igloo containing TNT and artillery propellant exploded at the depot, about two miles from where the nerve gas is stored.

An Army investigation revealed that the explosion was caused by "human error" and poor record keeping — the explosives should never have been stored in the same igloo as the propellant.

"It was a violation of our standard operating procedure and of our record-keeping practices and policy," said Kathleen Whitaker, spokeswoman for the depot.

But since the explosion, she said, the Army has corrected weaknesses in its system for storing "conventional" materials, such as high-power explosives and artillery propellants.

"Nerve-agent storage has always gotten prime attention and prime monitoring," Whitaker said. "Nerve

agents are treated with much more sensitivity than conventional storage."

For many of the locals, such assurances offer little consolation. Several incidents at the depot in the last few years have lessened public confidence.

In addition to the explosion, the incidents included the Army's initial denial six years ago that it was responsible for a noxious cloud of fumes that was released during an accident, causing 45 people to be hospitalized (the Army subsequently admitted responsibility) and a kidnapping and shooting incident last year involving a berserk security guard.

"It has been a very, very poorly run depot," said Flood, of the citizens group.

While the citizens group is adamant that the nerve gas should be incinerated elsewhere, Kerby said his task force cannot make a recommendation until the Army completes its studies. He indicated, though, that incineration in Utah or at another location might not be possible because of opposition from other states.

A preliminary report on the feasibility of transporting the rockets safely had been scheduled to be made public next month. The release date has been pushed back a month, however.

Kerby said Army officials have told him that their preliminary studies show that while the fuel contained in the rockets has remained stable, "the nerve gas is degenerating faster than they thought it would. Some of it has begun reacting with the aluminum casings, creating a gelatin substance."

That deterioration will make it more difficult to handle and to burn, he said.

Whitaker, the Army spokeswoman, said much of the gas stored at the depot was manufactured in 1962 and 1963. The last batch delivered there was made in 1969, before President Richard M. Nixon stopped production of the weapons.

Before 1970, when Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act, the Army disposed of obsolete chemical weapons at sea by sinking ships loaded with the deadly cargo, Whitaker said. That is no longer possible.

In addition to the 70,000 nerve gas

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*...like missile warheads, artillery rounds, chemical mines, etc.*

SPECIAL EDITION -- CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Kentucky... CONTINUED

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If an incinerator is built here, said Kerby, who chairs a task force appointed by Hopkins to study the problem, he wants it dismantled after the 70,000 rockets are destroyed. That way there would be no chance of chemical weapons from other parts of the country being trucked here for disposal, said Kerby.

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Miami Herald

7 December 1966

Pg. 1

# MD: U.S. hid Japan's experiments on POWs

By AARON EPTHEIN

Miami Herald Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — A former top aide to Gen. Douglas MacArthur said Friday that the U.S. government has been covering up a dark secret for 40 years.

In 1945, American military authorities in Tokyo hastily agreed not to prosecute thousands of Japanese scientists and researchers who later were discovered to have used Americans and other World War II prisoners of war as human guinea pigs in germ warfare experiments.

Dr. Murray Sanders, 75, a former lieutenant colonel who was a wartime adviser on biological warfare and now lives in Delray Beach, admitted sorrowfully that he had participated in preventing the Japanese experimenters from being prosecuted and punished.

"I feel terrible about it," said Sanders, a former director of the department of microbiology at the University of Miami, from 1952 to 1960.

He said that "if we had known they used human guinea pigs, I doubt we would have given immunity. . . [but] we didn't have the foggiest notion."

With the benefit of hindsight, "I would have been very happy to be part of the firing squad [for the Japanese scientists]."

Last year, an American scientific publication — the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists — quoted a 1956 FBI memo as saying that U.S. authorities knew about the human experimentation but agreed not to prosecute in exchange for Japan's scientific data on germ warfare. Sanders said the decision was made to protect Emperor Hirohito from being implicated.

Sanders, who is ill, spoke haltingly at a news conference called to promote legislation that would provide belated compensation for an unknown number of American prisoners of war victimized by Japanese germ warfare experiments.

The bill's sponsor, Rep. Pat Williams, D-Mont., charged that hundreds of "tormented, ill, broken" American prisoners of war were "sold out, ignored, shunned . . . not by the Japanese government — but by their own."

Details of the Japanese germ warfare experiments on humans have been published in Japan for years and were contained in a recent Japanese best-seller, *The Devil's Gluttony*, by Seiichi Mori-

mura. A British television documentary on Unit 731, as the Japanese human experimentation program was known, was broadcast Thursday night on ABC's 20-20.

But the U.S., British and Japanese governments continue to deny the experiments took place.

The U.S. government has refused compensation, medical treatment and psychological counseling to American POWs who were captured in 1942 after the Bataan Death March in the Philippines and taken to a Japanese experimentation camp at Mukden, China.

Various biological and chemical experiments were performed by Unit 731 on Soviet, Chinese, British, Australian and American prisoners, Williams said.

The Mukden camp was 350 miles north of a chemical and biological laboratory where, Williams said, humans were guinea pigs for injections, dissections, blood and feces tests, and freezing of body parts. They were deliberately infected with typhoid, cholera, plague bacillus and dysentery, the congressman said.

The U.S. government denies that such events took place, Williams said, because it is unwilling to admit that "America's Far East military command cut a deal. In exchange for the terrible scientific information gathered at the camps, our military granted immunity from war crimes prosecution to the Japanese."

"The U.S. military purchased exclusive possession of Japan's expertise at using germs as lethal weapons. The price paid was the health, the life, of American POWs. . . ."

Gesturing toward Sanders, Williams added: "We not only have the smoking gun but the U.S. military officer who was there when it was fired."

Murmured Sanders sadly: "I was the gun."

After the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, Sanders said he landed in Yokohama with a "top-secret mission" — to get to the bottom of "the grapevine of intelligence" that Japan had an active germ warfare program.

Over a 10-day period, he said he questioned a Japanese colonel named Dr. Naito who finally wrote and gave him a 12-page document — Sanders held up the yellowed papers — that acknowledged the existence of a Japanese biological warfare program. Hirohito's name was at the top of an organizational chart contained in the weathered document.

At the bottom of the last page, Sanders had appended this notation: "I have asked Dr. Naito whether prisoners were ever used as experimental 'guinea pigs.' He 'vows' that this has not been the case."

"The main reason for keeping silent," Sanders recalled, was that "we did not want to involve the emperor. . . . If at that point the emperor was brought in, we would have had a lot of dead Americans and the war would have to be fought all over again."

"I wouldn't say it was a sellout. We did the best we could."

After the war, Sanders was a professor of bacteriology at the University of Miami (1948-52) before becoming director of the department of microbiology. He also served as research director at Variety Children's Hospital in Miami (1952-63).

He also headed the biological sciences department at Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton (1962-65) and was medical director of Pan-Am Pharmaceuticals in Fort Lauderdale (1960-62).



WASH TIMES 12/9/85 Pg.4

## Syria said to have offered chemical weapons to Iran

By Tom Diaz  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Syria agreed to supply chemical weapons to Iran earlier this year, but has apparently backed away from the agreement — at least temporarily — according to intelligence sources.

Had the deal gone through, it would have represented a major escalation of weaponry in the Middle East. The Israeli government is known to have been seriously concerned about the transaction.

One U.S. analyst said transfer of chemical arms to Iran would probably set off a chain reaction as other nations in the region scramble to arm themselves with the "poor man's atomic bomb."

However, he said, it was possible that Syria could go through with the transaction at practically any time, and for that reason U.S. officials remain concerned about the matter.

"You could write tomorrow that Syria has not given chemical weapons to Iran and be wrong," he said of the situation's uncertainty. "Or you could write that it has and also be wrong."

It is not clear why the Syrians decided not to go through with the agreement, which was apparently firm as late as last summer. But speculation centers on the possibility that the United States applied diplomatic pressure on Syrian leader Hafez Assad, with whom extensive contacts were made during attempts to resolve the hijacking of a Trans World Airlines plane last June.

The situation is complicated by internal divisions within the Iranian leadership and by the reluctance of the Soviet Union to see chemical weapons spread on its Middle Eastern borders.

One intelligence source said Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and other Iranian religious leaders generally oppose the use of chemical weapons. But the Iranian military strongly favors developing a chemical weapons capability, and may have already done so to a limited extent.

One analyst said the Soviets — in contrast to their generally enthusiastic attitude toward production and use of chemical weapons — fear that the spread of chemical weapons in the region could boomerang against them. For example, he said, if Iran acquires a chemical weapons production capability, the weapons could be transferred to the Mujahideen resistance fighters in Afghanistan for use against the Soviets themselves.

Administration officials generally are reluctant to discuss Syrian chemical warfare capability in detail.

"The Syrians have been interested in

chemicals for years," Douglas J. Feith, deputy assistant secretary of defense for negotiations policy, said in a recent interview. "They do have a production capability for nerve agent."

Mr. Feith declined to elaborate, but an intelligence source said the Syrians have the most advanced chemical weapons capability in the Middle East.

The capability is seen by U.S. officials as a dangerous wild card in the Middle East that, if played, could radically upset the balance of power in unpredictable ways.

It has been known for some time, for example, that the Iranian military has been interested in acquiring chemical weapons. Iranian troops have suffered Iraqi chemical weapons attacks over the last two years in the festering war between the two countries. The attacks have been well-documented, especially since some Iranian troops have been treated in European hospitals.

"Iraq was the first nation in history to use nerve agent in war," Mr. Feith said.

He said the Iraqis have been producing mustard gas and the nerve agent Tabun, and can deliver chemical munitions through bombs, mortars and artillery shells. Another source familiar with the matter said the Tabun produced by the Iraqis is "not as toxic as ours" but is nevertheless extraordinarily lethal.

Mr. Feith said that because the Iraqis "seem to be reasonably well satisfied with the military results of their use," the temptation is stronger for other Third World nations to resort to such weapons.

"It wasn't as if they used it and it didn't work," he said. "That might have discouraged other countries."

He said the Iranians are "definitely interested in acquiring a production capability and may have already begun."

Although the extent, if any, of Iranian production capability is not clear, Mr. Feith said the Iranians have "some capability from collecting unexploded Iraqi munitions."

Another Pentagon expert on the subject said in an interview that a chemical warfare cannister is "basically a container for liquids."

"You couldn't shoot the thing again," he said. "But you could drain it and put it into another container."

He said chemical artillery rounds basically are like conventional shells, except that the round must be designed so as to burst the casing and disperse the gas.

"There are unique things about handling chemicals, but the transaction is not all that difficult," he said. "White phosphorous, for example, has to be sealed tight because it reacts to air. If you can do that, you can put a chemical in the same round."

However, another expert in the field discounted the Iranian ability to mount a battlefield capability from Iraqi misfires. He said the likelihood of fatal accidents was high in any attempt at such makeshift production.

Staff writer Bill Kritzberg contributed to this article.



WASHINGTON POST

29 DECEMBER 1985

Pg. B7

*Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta*

# Fiction From the Kremlin

When the hard-eyed schemers in the Kremlin are stung by truthful reports on their deadly mischief, they respond by cranking up their \$4 billion-a-year "dezinformatsia" machine to produce diversionary lies. One truth they have been most determined to conceal if possible, distort if necessary, and deny at all costs is their ruthless testing of chemical weapons on tribesmen in Afghanistan, Laos and Cambodia.

We've checked with chemical experts who had collected evidence on the scene. We've studied hundreds of pages of classified reports never made public. We went to Southeast Asia to interview survivors of the attacks.

The Soviets' disinformation campaign was as diverse as it was fantastic. The KGB planted stories that the CIA had caused an epidemic of dengue fever in Cuba; that a University of Maryland malaria research laboratory in Lahore, Pakistan, is a germ-warfare facility; that chemical and bacteriological weapons at a U.S. military base caused 80 infant deaths in Naples, Italy; and that the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, where an accidental release of poisonous gas killed so many people, was really an American chemical-weapons factory.

Some other examples:

■ Marking the anniversary of the Soviet shoot-down of an unarmed Korean Air Lines plane, Radio Moscow revived the Kremlin's original line that the passenger plane was on a spy mission for the United States, and added a new twist: the plane was blown up not by a Soviet interceptor's rocket as the Russians had acknowledged, but by a U.S. bomb on board the airliner, supposedly detonated to prevent the Soviets from proving their charges of espionage. The Soviet broadcasts even charged that the United States had impeded efforts to recover the plane's wreckage and "black box."

The KGB's charges were based largely on reports by "the prominent Japanese military expert and journalist Akio Yamakawa." But Yamakawa had been unmasked as a KGB agent years earlier.

■ Waving an apparent West German embassy cable as proof, a Ghanaian official charged at a press conference that the U.S. Embassy in Accra was trying to overthrow the government of Lt. Jerry Rawlings. West German officials supplied

proof that the cable was a fake within two days.

■ Hoping to discredit Italian authorities' charge that the Bulgarian secret police (and probably the KGB) had engineered the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II, Soviet disinformation experts faked a pair of cablegrams purporting to be from the U.S. Embassy in Rome to the State Department. The first proposed a campaign to implicate the Bulgarians; the second indulged in some self-congratulatory crowing about the campaign's success.

Although the United States is a favorite target of the KGB's forgers, it's not the only one. Our sources listed at least 25 countries where Soviet disinformation documents have been identified. Nor does the Kremlin's fiction factory respect high rank. In October 1981 a phony letter bearing the signature "Ronald Reagan" was sent to King Juan Carlos explaining how urgent it was for Spain to join NATO—meddling that, if authentic, could have infuriated the sensitive Spaniards and killed the NATO membership initiative.

And in May 1983, the Russians moved from the printed forgery to the electronic field, splicing together snippets of public utterances by President Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher into a supposedly intercepted telephone conversation between the two leaders. On the resulting tape, assiduously leaked by the KGB to favored European outlets, Reagan appeared to be criticizing Thatcher's handling of the Falkland Islands war with Argentina, accusing her of needless escalation of hostilities. The Soviets were trying to stir up a little mischief—two weeks before the British elections.


We have been recipients of KGB disinformation documents. On Nov. 11, 1981, we received a mailgram that purported to be from the Swedish ambassador in Washington. It informed us that, as a matter of conscience, the ambassador was disassociating himself from his government's decision to allow a U.S. satellite-tracking station at the Karlskrona naval base.

If such a decision had, in fact, been made, it would have been a startling departure from Sweden's long-cherished neutrality. A call to the Swedish Embassy confirmed our suspicion that there had been no such decision.

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airial grasp, cluster bombs, missile warheads, artillery rounds, chemical mine, etc.



# CURRENT NEWS

## SPECIAL EDITION



28 Feb 1989 CHEMICAL WEAPONS No. 1781

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*aerial grasp, cluster bombs, missile warheads, artillery rounds, chemical munitions, etc.*



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# US Case Against Libyan Plant Gains Support

By E. A. Wayne  
and Gary Thatcher

Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON and PARIS

**T**HE United States tried to make its case that Libya can produce chemical weapons, at this week's international conference in Paris.

But it has yet to rally the degree of support it seeks.

"The problem we face," says a well-placed US official, "is that many people are still engaging the evidence by looking at what they see as US intentions. We need to get them to look at the evidence itself. If they do, we're confident about what it says."

Washington did not come away empty-handed, however. Britain weighed in with independent information that Libya is indeed building a chemical-weapons plant. West Germany moved to tighten its export-control laws, and reports from Bonn say the Germans are finding evidence to support US claims that German companies are involved in the disputed Rabta chemical-weapons plant. The Soviets said they would look into the issue, even if they did not accept as conclusive the evidence they were shown.

The unpredictable Col. Muammar Qaddafi sent messages to Washington this week repeating his offer to let the US inspect the Rabta facility and expressing the hope for better relations with the Bush administration, well-placed sources say. But those gestures were matched by public threats to retaliate if the US takes any action against Libya and no concessions on his claim that it's a pharmaceutical plant.

The US response to Colonel Qaddafi is that Libya's behavior, not its words, is what counts. Washington says it will accept

only dismantlement of the plant. "This is a batch plant," says one specialist. "It can produce different products, from legitimate chemicals to nerve gas, in batch lengths ... from three hours to 15 days. ... This means dismantling is the only reasonable way to verify its peaceful use."

The US intends to continue a "major educational effort," a senior US official says. The goal is to raise the economic and diplomatic costs to Libya of its chemical-weapons (CW) efforts.

"Anything you do unilaterally won't work in and of itself," he says. "Sure we could bomb, but Qaddafi can always pull back for a while and reemerge. The real solution is to educate other countries to work with us. So we're going to keep going at the Europeans ... and the vulnerable ones" in Africa and the Mideast.

This will be tough. "But even if we are only 60 to 70 percent effective," a ranking Middle East specialist says, "it can raise the costs so high that it doesn't pay the companies or the countries to get involved. No one wants the publicity that their companies are engaged in illicit behavior or contributing to a CW capability."

The reasons it's so hard to convince friends, neutrals, and others to join the effort are complex. For many European allies, Libya offers the prospect of lucrative commercial sales. One key ally is reportedly even considering a military sale to Tripoli and allegedly served as host for a Libyan shopping delegation recently.

For many Africans, Libya is a powerful neighbor and a potential sugar daddy they don't want to alienate. For example, Tripoli recently sent Sudan and Somalia desperately needed money and military aid.

**F**OR some in the Mideast, it's a question of standing by an Arab brother, even if you dislike and mistrust him, against a superpower. Most Mideast countries are not buying the US claim that last week's dogfight over the Mediterranean was not linked to the chemical plant and the long-

standing US-Libyan feud. Allied skepticism, a US diplomat adds, is fueled by the perception that the paranoia in the US-Libyan relationship comes from both sides. "They say we're making him a bigger threat than he is by all this attention," says the senior official. "And it's clearly a thin line between applying pressure and going too far."

Washington intends to try to overcome allied foot-dragging by putting its intelligence on the table privately, at first, but publicly if need be.

The US has compiled an impressive amount of information, US sources say. By last September, US experts felt they had enough evidence to assert conclusively that the plant was intended to produce chemical weapons.

Washington got solid information from knowledgeable people at the plant who put two and two together after looking at the plant and a nearby Japanese-supplied metallurgical unit, which was designed to build gas canisters. Other sources then provided photos and detailed information on lot numbers for precursor chemicals and other raw materials, and on types of equipment involved. Britain independently collected similar information.

"While the precursors could be used for other products," one informed source says, "when combined with the types of seals, filters, and extractors in the plant and the configuration of the operation, the signature was clear. ... We went over the evidence from every angle and concluded we had an iron-clad case."

The US believes the plant can produce mustard gas and a nerve agent like sarin.

The US also began to track down who was supplying the complex. It found the Japanese involvement limited largely to the metallurgical unit. But the investigation uncovered a large network of dummy and mail-box companies as well as convoluted shipping routes. The net

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court of law, but the government was pressing ahead with its inquiries, Mr. Ost said.

Finding "useable evidence" was a major problem, an official of the Bundesnachrichtendienst, West Germany's secret service, said.

[Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany has conceded that the United States government did, after

### CASE...CONTINUED

stretched as far as Hong Kong, India, and Senegal, as well as through Greece, Switzerland, and Italy. Recently, the US passed evidence on five West German companies to Bonn, but they say entrepreneurs from other European and Middle Eastern countries are also involved.

While continuing to hammer away on the need to get rid of Libya's capability, Washington will also redouble efforts to keep track of Libyan maneuverings and possible subterfuge to hide its capabilities, officials say. The US is already carefully watching several other Libyan sites.

Given these tensions, and continuing disagreements over terrorism, no one in Washington is predicting any near-term improvement in US-Libyan ties.

Daily Telegraph said. [Herr Mollemann is not going my instigation, nor was the visit discussed with me in advance, and consequently I don't see him traveling just yet," Mr. Kohl said. [Libya's ambassador to the United Nations formally acknowledged the first time yesterday that West German firms had helped build the Rabta plant but reasserted it was signed to produce only medical equipment. Reuters news agency reported from New York.

[The West Germans did help not only on this plant but on other plants also," Ambassador Ali T. said on the CBS television show "60 Minutes" Monday.

[Mr. Treiki said Libya would not sign any international accord banning the use of chemical weapons and allowing surprise on-site inspection of chemical plants. He asserted Libya's current right to produce chemical weapons but said it has no intention of doing so.]

A spokesman for Mr. Genscher said the minister feared the effect the affair could have on West German diplomacy. Mr. Genscher favored penal sanctions making such involvement a criminal matter, he said the spokesman.

The opposition Social Democratic Party has called for penalties of up to 15 years' prison for illegally exporting chemical weapons equipment or technology. A spokesman said the country's industrialists have rejected such measures as unnecessary.



# Chemical arsenal growing

## Pentagon increases its own stockpiles during controversy

By JAMES McCARTNEY  
*Knight-Ridder Newspapers*

WASHINGTON — While demanding that Libya refrain from making deadly chemical weapons, the United States is manufacturing thousands of its own, most of them nerve gases, a drop of which causes excruciating death.

U.S. arsenals are churning out hundreds of thousands of 155mm artillery shells designed to hold nerve gas in a program that private experts estimate will eventually produce a stockpile of 1.2 million shells. The Pentagon's own figures are classified.

The Pentagon also has plans to begin full-scale production next year of a new 500-pound nerve gas bomb called the Bigeye, to be dropped from aircraft, according to official spokesmen.

Private experts say the plan calls for 44,000 Bigeye bombs, for strikes deep behind enemy lines.

In addition, the Pentagon plans to begin formal research and testing of

that VX, the Navy told Congress and suspended testing for five months to fix the defects. It then t-dropped 48 more bombs in 1977, resulting in Reagan's certification that the Bigeye was ready for manufacturing.

The certification freed a previously authorized \$90 million to build and equip a QL production and Bigeye "filling" plant at an weapons depot near Pine Bluff, Ark.

Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci acknowledged in a letter to the House Operations Committee that "operational reliability reveals several points below . . . that in a mature weapon," he reported starting production late.

Carlucci declared last May that the test program had been "so poorly that no definitive conclusions could be drawn. It was at the Navy had used and loose definitions of reliability said continuing defects in the deadly chemical to the bomb to explode before reaching its target."

Air Systems Commanders Com- manded that these techniques have been resolved, added that "additional research is scheduled to verification."

explained before the Senate that "it is truly that previous [Defense] analyses have and that DOD's own calculations are

for short-range use in the field, up to about 15 miles. The et system is for a 15 and 30 miles. can be dropped and can fly.

The kind of new American chemical attacks the nervous system of your body out of control, spokesman said, "until you die."

The Reagan administration weeks has been widely publicized campaign to keep Libya chemical weapons plant 35 miles south of Tripoli.

Secretary of State Shultz and others warned that Libya's Moammar Gadhafi terrorism and military weapons. President Reagan said in December that he was discussing the possibility of a military strike against the Libyan

Libyan Foreign Minister Ibrahim Azouz Al-Talhi about U.S. consistency in a conference in Paris last week. A member of the international community proclaimed "others?" he asked.

Some American officials vocates agree.

"We are not going to have clean hands," said the executive director of the National Livable World, a group that supported environmentalists.

"The U.S. position is that we say, don't do what we don't want others to do," said a group of seven religious organizations.

The proposed new et, which was made day, calls for \$20 billion spent on offensive operations in the next two years for about \$1.2 billion all chemical warfare.



Everything we do is open, said Col. David Huxoll. "All our findings, all our research. What we are doing is creating vaccines . . . It is one of the most important contributions the United States government has ever made.

"No one is creating novel agents," Huxoll added. "That

one of the most detrimental things we could ever do."

Nonetheless, most of the scientists at yesterday's meeting expressed skepticism at the government's claim of candor.

Dr. Jay A. Jaconson of the University of Utah Medical School in Salt Lake City, said people in his state of all political persuasions have had a 30-year battle with

now biological weapons tests in the atmosphere.

"The majority of the over 100 institutions involved in the US Biological Defense Research Program were not mentioned in the U.S. (government) report," added Professor Erhard Geissler of the Academy of Sciences of the German Democratic Republic.

BOSTON GLOBE

17 January 1989

Pg. 8

# Chemical weapons ban would be hard to verify, specialists say

By Richard Saltus  
Globe Staff

• SAN FRANCISCO - Verifying compliance with a proposed ban on chemical weapons would pose the most difficult challenge in arms control history, and in this country could conflict with privacy rights guaranteed by the US Constitution, authorities said yesterday.

Officials from the United States, the Soviet Union and West Germany yesterday described current efforts by nations involved in the Geneva disarmament conference to devise a verification scheme in the wake of the Jan. 11 declaration by 145 nations that they would seek a global ban as soon as possible.

Verification problems loom large. For example, given that a plant manufacturing laundry detergent could make poison gas with only two extra steps, or that toxic weapons can easily be made underground in small facilities, checking compliance with such a treaty is "not hopeless, but not easy," said Robert Mikulak of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The US government called for such an accord because it believes international condemnation has been insufficient to halt occasional use of the weapons. The most recent alleged use was by Iraq in its war with Iran.

A number of the 15 to 20 nations that admit they maintain stockpiles of chemical weapons - including the United States and the Soviet Union - are continuing negotiations on a 100-page draft

treaty, but there are major differences over verification provisions, said the representatives.

## Addressed scientific meeting

The three negotiators and three other experts, speaking at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, agreed that cheating will be impossible to detect with 100 percent certainty, for a number of reasons:

- As with the Libyan chemical plant said by US officials and others to be aimed at producing poison gas, virtually any chemical facility could also make weapons. Common industrial chemicals can be the raw material of lethal weapons, said Mikulak.

- "Verifying that this does not occur - that's hard," he said. "You can't inspect 50,000 chemical plants."

- The proposed treaty would allow nations to demand immediate inspections of suspect facilities. But Edward Tanzman, a constitutional lawyer at the Argonne National Laboratory, said that, at least in the United States, a company might argue that such an inspection was an unlawful invasion of privacy. Motives could include fear that violations of environmental laws would be discovered, or concern about trade secrets, said Tanzman.

- Scientists doubtless will design new chemical agents whose existence would not be suspected based on present technology.

For such reasons, some defense experts argue that a chemical-weapons ban is unverifiable, and that nations should therefore be allowed to maintain poison-gas stockpiles as a deterrent.

## Deterrent effect disputed

But Matthew S. Meselson, a Harvard University biochemistry professor and a government consultant on chemical-arms control who organized the session, said, "It's hard to see how maintaining 30,000 tons of mustard gas" and other chemical agents, as the United States does, "has done anything to discourage Libya" from constructing what could be a chemical-weapons facility.

And he said the United States would be far better off accepting whatever level of cheating might occur under a treaty than facing the unconstrained proliferation of chemical arms.

Nikita P. Smidovich of the Soviet Foreign Ministry described an experiment carried out in a town near the city of Gorky, a simulated inspection of a chemical facility to determine the effectiveness of detection methods. He said the results will soon be reported in Geneva. Thirteen other countries, including the United States, are conducting similar experiments.

Smidovich, while acknowledging the problems with verification and inspection, said Soviet officials are optimistic about concluding a treaty in the near future, and he urged that the nations involved adopt an "artificial deadline" if necessary.

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denied there was any evidence that West German companies had provided plans or supplies for the chemical complex.

But Washington has pressed Bonn with evidence in support of its charges that West German firms have helped set up the plant and that it was designed to be a major producer of poison gas. In recent weeks, statements from West German officials grew contradictory. And last Friday, Friedhelm Ost,

undertake a public investigation of Imhausen-Chemie because intelligence sources would be compromised.

Also, Stoltenberg said, early West German intelligence reports concerning the Rabta plant "were so vague that, for legal reasons, the launching of executive measures was not justified."

According to U.S. officials, part of the information concerning Imhausen-Chemie, which is now under a formal criminal investigation

Antwerp magistrate Walter de Smedt said that a second man has been arrested in the case and added, "We are sure that huge amounts of chemicals have been sent to Libya."

According to West German press reports, there is a connection between the Belgian shipping firm, Cross Link, and West German chemical manufacturers.

OAKLAND TRIBUNE

18 January 1989

Pg. 2

## Scientists warn of biological weapons research

By Roland DeWolk  
The Tribune

SAN FRANCISCO — With international tensions mounting again over chemical warfare, a group of scientists meeting here yesterday warned that the more insidious form of biological warfare is being prepared in laboratories around the world, including those in the United States.

Several members of a panel at the convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Science said such research should stop immediately, or at least be taken out of the hands of the military.

Panel members said the rapid development of new biological weapons such as fatal viruses

has outpaced a 1972 agreement by 112 nations not to make the deadly substances.

The biotechnology experts warned that terrorist organizations soon will be able to create these new killers and use them randomly against military and civilian populations.

The biological weapons are being produced in at least 10 nations, said Barbara Rosenberg, of the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center of New York, panel moderator.

Work being conducted in Department of Defense laboratories in Maryland is contributing to the problem, said Keith R. Yamamoto, a professor at the University of California at San Francisco.

Although the U.S. research is principally for the development of vaccines against these new biological weapons, Yamamoto said that with every new vaccine, the possibility of creating still another killer is possible through simple lab methods.

"What this means," he said, "is that there is an infinite number of new biological agents. The possibility of (U.S. policy) working is really a bankrupt notion."

The head of the United States biological warfare project was also at the meeting and defended the national policy that has seen a fivefold increase in spending between 1981 and 1986.

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Because the inspection provisions of a chemical-weapons ban would require signatories to relinquish some traditional notions of national sovereignty, said Smidovich, a treaty would mark "a breakthrough in disarmament, verification" and might lead to better verification of nuclear arms treaties as well.

ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT ABC-TV  
6:30 P.M. JANUARY 17

# Iraqi Germ Warfare Capability

PETER JENNINGS: The most chilling words in any language, germ warfare. An ABC News investigation has uncovered the fact that Iraq, which has recently been one of the most militant governments in the Middle East, is manufacturing biological weapons. These are weapons of war which if introduced into the water supply or into the air would infect people with illnesses such as typhoid, rabbit fever, anthrax, botulism, cholera, all of which are potential killers.

This news comes in the midst of enormous concern about chemical weapons. But consider this: None of the governments which know the Iraqis have biological weapons has made a public case about it.

Here's ABC's Charles Glass.

CHARLES GLASS: Short of nuclear war, it seemed nothing could be as horrible as the effects of chemical weapons. Since Iraq first used them against Iran in 1983, Iran says the deadly gases have left 45,000 dead and wounded.

When Iraq turned the chemical weapons on its own citizens in the Kurdish village of Halabja last year, 5000 people died.

Now, U.S., Arab, and Israeli official sources tell ABC News Iraq has gone one step further beyond chemical weapons into the more deadly realm of biological warfare, developing the ability to infect its enemies with cholera, typhoid, anthrax, or other diseases. These living organisms could kill far more people, more painfully and more efficiently, than even chemical weapons.

ANTHONY CORDESMAN [defense analyst]: Regardless of where you would go in the Middle East, or, for that matter, which Western intelligence agency you would talk to, they would all confirm that Iraq has biological agents in actual production and is stockpiling them for military use.

GLASS: Intelligence sources in Washington and the Middle East tell ABC News the center of Iraq's biological warfare program lies 35 miles southeast of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, here near the village of Salman Pak. These sources say the Salman Pak installation includes underground facilities carefully sheltered against attack.

Using technology and materials that are widely available on the international market, the weapons developed here could annihilate populations of entire cities.

In practice, they might work like this: Less than one pound of certain bacteria, like tularemia, dispersed near the Empire State Building could spread a cloud of germs over one square mile, rising to a height of 325 feet. Within five days, as many as 400,000 people could die, and later more could suffer lingering deaths from the germs.

PROFESSOR JONATHAN KING [MIT]: They spread, they move



out, they increase. Once they're established, you can't clean it up, can't get them back.

GLASS: Today Iraq officially denied it possessed a biological weapons program.

DR. ABDUL RAYAK ALHACHIMI [Iraqi Ambassador to France]: We don't have such a thing. We don't have biological weapon.

GLASS: However, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has publicly announced his country is developing a super weapon. U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources believe this could be a missile which would carry the germs all the way to large cities in Iran and Israel.

CORDESMAN: I think what they want is something which is so decisive that no one can challenge them again to the kind of war they had with Iran.

GLASS: In 1972 most of the world outlawed the development and stockpiling of biological weapons. Some countries, including the United States, conduct research for ostensibly defensive purposes. Experts believe ten or more countries are experimenting with offensive biological technology. But there is particular concern about Iraq because it has repeatedly violated the 1925 protocol banning the use of chemical weapons.

Israel today had a warning for its neighbors. Libya...

JENNINGS: ...come back here for a second. Charles Glass is over there on the other side of the building and we have a little difficulty communicating.

Charlie, what happens if you bomb these installations where the Iraqis have such weapons?

GLASS: Peter, the danger of bombing is that the weapons, the biological weapons, may be dispersed. There's no guaranty

that in a first strike everything would be destroyed, so that it would have to take perhaps two or three or four strikes to get everything on the site.

One of the problems in Iraq, of course, is that it is believed that many of the biological agents have been stockpiled in different places around the country.

JENNINGS: Charlie, the Israeli antenna on a subject like this is usually very acute. What's the Israeli reaction been so far?

GLASS: So far, Israel has admitted that they know about the plant. They have not chosen to go public with it because they were hoping that the United States would take the lead on this issue.

JENNINGS: Have the Iraqis -- have the Israelis put any sort of threat to the Iraqis themselves?

GLASS: The Israelis didn't directly threaten Iraq. But one senior Middle Eastern official told ABC News that the United States carried a warning from Israel to Iraq saying that Israel would bomb the facility that the Iraqis have for research and development of biological weapons.

JENNINGS: Okay. Charles Glass, thanks very much for that report.

The White House said today it would not confirm this report. It would not discuss it with us, as we had requested. But it said it would not steer us away from the results of our investigation.

Joining us now is our national security correspondent, John McWethy, who is at the State Department.

John, what does the State Department know about this? I assume it does know.



19 January 1989

Pg. 1

# 3 nations join US in Libya gas claims

JOHN MCWETHY: Well, Peter, there is a series of intelligence findings on this. However, American diplomats are saying until they have enough intelligence that they can actually go public with this, they do not want to make a public or an official protest to the Iraqis. They want to keep it fairly low-profile.

You have to understand that Iraq is a very different country than Libya, where the United States has been able to publicly go after them, and also militarily, I might add, on different occasions. Iraq is a country which has positioned itself in the center of a bloc of so-called moderate Arab countries. The United States would risk a great deal if it goes after Iraq without extremely convincing evidence that it can present in public.

JENNINGS: And, Jack, what do you think it'll take to convince the State Department if two other American agencies believe it to be the case?

MCWETHY: Well, it's a toss-up, Peter. In order to convince the State Department, the State Department officials say you've got to be able to have evidence you can go public with. And that is the key. A lot of the intelligence that has been gathered is material which the U.S. will not go public with because it will reveal how they got it.

JENNINGS: Okay. John McWethy at the State Department.

From Sentinel wire services

France, Canada and Egypt joined Friday in supporting US contentions that Libya is capable of manufacturing poison gas in a factory southwest of Tripoli.

Their expressions of support to Secretary of State George P. Shultz before an international conference on chemical weapons bolster the US case against Col. Moammar Gadhafi's government.

Saturday's opening of the session in Paris is likely to be tense, because Libyan Foreign Minister Jadallah Azzuz al-Talhi will attend and because Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze criticized the United States.

Tension between the US and Libya has been growing over the chemical arms issue and because of the dogfight Wednesday in which US warplanes shot down two Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean Sea.

At a meeting of the United Nations Security Council Friday, US Ambassador Vernon A. Walters displayed blurred photographs showing what he called a heavily armed Libyan MIG and said US warplanes shot them down in self-defense.

Libya's envoy said the photos were doctored. "It is completely fake. It is untrue," said Libyan Ambassador Ali Sunni Muntasser.

Walters later asked reporters, "Do you think this is a bouquet of roses hanging under the wing?"

A senior US official accompanying Shultz said French Prime Minister Michel Rocard, Canadian Foreign Minister Joe Clark and Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmet Abdel-Meguid all told the secretary in separate meetings that they did not doubt the facility at Rabta was engaged in producing chemical weapons.

"We are not skeptical," Clark told reporters. "We believe the capacity is there to produce chemical weapons."

"We are not skeptical," Clark told reporters. "We believe the capacity is there to produce chemical weapons."

Shevardnadze said on arriving in Paris the US action against the jets "poisons the atmosphere on the eve" of the international conference, aimed at reinvigorating a 64-year-old treaty banning chemical weapons use but leaving open the question of their manufacture.

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WASHINGTON POST

19 January 1989 Pg. 36

# Official Denies Iraq Has Germ War Plant

By David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writer

## CLAIMS...CONTINUED

Shevardnadze suggested the US claims about the Libyan facility were inappropriate, saying that "without proof, no government has the right to present such accusations."

US officials said Shultz plans to present additional supporting evidence to Shevardnadze in a meeting scheduled for Sunday.

Britain gave its support to the US Wednesday, saying an independent investigation led to the conclusion that poison gas was under development at the Libyan plant.

Still, West Germany and several other countries, where firms are suspected of assisting Libya, were skeptical.

Shultz will meet Saturday with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, but the spokesman for Chancellor Helmut Kohl complained about how Washington and US news media have treated the dispute.

US treatment of the affair, especially the way the news media has handled it, had "not been useful," spokesman Friedhelm Ost said.

Gadhafi has insisted that pharmaceuticals were being manufactured at the complex 60 miles southwest of the Libyan capital. But Shultz contends he has adequate evidence to support the US allegation.

In Libya, officials said the government has fortified its defenses around the factory and has sent large numbers of civilians there in what appears to be an effort to deter the US from attacking it.

The officials said busloads of civilians had been converging on the factory for the past several days "to defend their achievements, even if it means sacrificing themselves."

Iraqi Ambassador Abdul Amir Anbari yesterday denied reports that his country has built a biological warfare plant. He warned that Iraq would retaliate if Israel attacked the site as it did an Iraqi nuclear installation in June 1981.

The ambassador was reacting to an ABC News report Tuesday and other recent allegations that Iraq has begun production of biological agents at a plant in Salman Pak, 50 miles southeast of Baghdad on the Tigris River.

"It's totally false and unfounded" and is an effort "to cover up what the Israelis are doing to prepare for an attack," Anbari said. "Iraq would not take it [an attack] without retaliating."

He added, "If there is reliable evidence, the world is entitled to know. Up to now, there is not a shred of evidence."

Anbari described Salman Pak as a riverside summer resort town popular with Baghdad residents, particularly newlyweds. "There is no laboratory at all," he said.

State Department spokesman Charles E. Redman refused to confirm the reports but lent credence to them by saying, "We do believe that some nations are at work on a biological warfare capability. I can't identify them further for intelligence reasons."

"But regardless of what country is involved, we call on all nations to comply with international agreements banning these weapons," he added, referring to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention that bans development, production, stockpiling, possession or transfer of such weapons.

Iraq is among the 111 signers of the treaty.

Robert M. Gates, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence

Agency, said last October that the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons may constitute "the most immediate threat to world peace" today. Biological agents are living organisms that provoke virulent diseases like plague, anthrax and botulism.

CIA Director William H. Webster has said "at least 10 countries" are working on producing biological weapons. He did not name the nations, but U.S. officials and analysts say Israel, Syria, Iran and Iraq are among those with active research programs.

An Israeli official in Jerusalem was quoted by Reuter news agency yesterday as saying Israel believes Iraq has developed "a military biological capacity" but has not started "to manufacture actual biological weapons nor, more importantly, have they yet acquired any airborne weapons, such as sophisticated missiles, to deliver the bacteria they worked on."

U.S. officials also said they believe Iraq is developing biological agents but that they do not want to get into another public feud with the Iraqis. The United States accused Iraq of using chemical weapons against its Kurdish population in August.

Those allegations led the Senate to pass a bill last fall imposing stiff economic sanctions on Iraq, overriding strong State Department opposition. The bill was later watered down, but the House and Senate were unable to agree on a final version and none was passed.

Sen. John S. McCain III (R-Ariz.), in a paper issued in October, said it "seems" Iraq has a research center for chemical and biological weapons at Salman Pak. "This center includes underground and heavily sheltered facilities and is known to work on nerve gas research. It is unclear whether it is to be the center of Iraq's biotoxin effort."



# Official Denies Iraq Has Germ War Plant

By David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Iraqi Ambassador Abdul Amir Anbari yesterday denied reports that his country has built a biological warfare plant. He warned that Iraq would retaliate if Israel attacked the site as it did an Iraqi nuclear installation in June 1981.

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# Israel vows action against Iraqi germ research

FROM COMBINED DISPATCHES

JERUSALEM — Israel said yesterday it has confirmed that Iraq has developed the capacity to produce biological weapons and warned it will "take all necessary measures."

Iraq denied the charge, and warned it would retaliate against any Israeli action.

"We know they have developed a military biological capacity. They have completed the research and development phase for this type of warfare," Reuters News Agency quoted an unnamed Israeli official as saying.

"They may have samples but have not started to manufacture actual biological weapons nor, more importantly, have they yet acquired any airborne weapons, such as sophisticated missiles, to deliver the bacteria they worked on," he said.

The official said Israel also knew of Syrian research in the field, which was less advanced than Iraq's, while Libya had tried to buy biological warfare know-how.

Two U.S. television networks said Tuesday that Iraq was developing weapons to spread cholera, typhoid, anthrax and other diseases.

ABC News quoted U.S. and Middle East intelligence sources as saying the biological weapons operation is at the village of Salman Pak, 35 miles southeast of Baghdad, and that it included underground facilities "carefully sheltered against attack."

The networks said Israel had warned Iraq to desist or face an attack like that by Israeli jets in June 1981 which destroyed Iraq's Osirak atomic reactor. Israel said then the reactor was built to develop nuclear weapons.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Mordechai Amihai denied that Israel had issued such a threat. "There is no truth in the report about threats against Iraq," he said.

"But if the information about biological warfare development is true, then it only provides further proof of the lack of responsibility of the Iraqi government," he told reporters. "Israel is very sensitive to its security and will take all the necessary measures to guarantee its security."

The U.S. State Department yesterday confirmed reports that some countries were involved in biological warfare but refused to identify them, saying to do so would reveal intelligence-gathering methods.

Said spokesman Charles Redman, responding to questions on the reports about Iraq: "I'm not going to be specific on any particular country. The United States is very concerned about the spread of this particular horrible form of warfare in the world."

In Baghdad, Iraq denied producing biological weapons and warned Israel against any attempt to attack its facilities.

The Iraqi News Agency quoted a spokesman of the Education and Media Ministry as saying Iraq does not produce biological weapons and does not need them for defense. "Israel should not imagine that what happened in 1981 ... could be repeated. Iraq is perfectly able to defend itself and retaliate in case of any aggression," he said.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has said Iraq is developing a "super weapon." ABC News said U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources believe the "super weapon" is a missile capable of carrying biological bombs to cities in Iran and Israel.

Meanwhile, Israel also formally protested yesterday cooperation by West German firms in the construction of an alleged chemical weapons factory in Libya.

The protest came from Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens, who summoned West German Ambassador Wilhelm Haas to the Foreign Ministry here. The issue also is expected to arise during four days of meetings in Bonn between German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and visiting Israeli Finance Minister Shimon Peres which began yesterday.

"We would be tough on any government that would assist Libya to build such a factory," an Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman told reporters. "But, of course, in this case there are historical connotations which we cannot ignore, namely German help to radical Arabs to build weapons to kill Jews."

In Bonn, Mr. Kohl faced one of his gravest crises as the parliamentary opposition angrily accused him of conniving in "the business of death" by failing to crack down on West German firms that helped build the Libyan plant.

Social Democrat (SPD) Deputy Norbert Gansel accused Mr. Kohl in the Bundestag of arrogance and of damaging Bonn's international reputation by brushing aside U.S. allegations of German involvement in building the factory near Tripoli.

Mr. Gansel said Mr. Kohl had shirked the special moral responsibility weighing on all West Germans because of Germany's Nazi past. "The Jews will not forget, the Americans have not forgotten and the Germans are not allowed to forget," he said. "German-American relations have never been so severely burdened as today."

"You, Chancellor Kohl, are politically and personally responsible that the world and West German public had not been informed," he said.

Fidgeting with his pen and mopping his brow, Mr. Kohl did not leave the government bench to address Parliament.

Chancellery Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble admitted earlier in the debate that Bonn had intelligence reports about a suspected Libyan poison gas plant at Rabta as early as August 1987. The first indications of West German involvement at the plant came in May 1988.

He said the intelligence reports led Bonn to assume that Rabta was equipped to manufacture chemical weapons. "But the West German government and West German authorities must abide by German law and nothing else," he said.

Until last week, Bonn denounced U.S. allegations of West German involvement as a "concerted smear campaign." Diplomats said Mr. Kohl had even sent a message to Washington saying he would not allow West Germany to be treated like a "banana republic."



WASHINGTON TIMES

19 January 1989

Pg. 4

# Biological weapons made in Soviet Union, report says

By Bill Gertz  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Soviet Union was producing lethal biological weapons at several clandestine facilities at least as recently as 1987 and transferred some of the arms to Asian countries, according to a secret Reagan administration report.

The report, prepared a year ago by U.S. intelligence agencies for the National Security Council, comes amid evidence that Iraq is developing biological weapons with the help of Soviet technology, said U.S. officials who declined to be named.

The NSC report lists nine facilities in the Soviet Union that were identified as possible biological and related toxin weapons plants. The locations are under heavy military guard.

"Two facilities have been confirmed (seven are suspect) as BW [biological weapons] research, production and storage facilities at Sverdlovsk and Zagorsk," the report states.

The Sverdlovsk and Zagorsk plants are described as highly secured facilities that have isolated areas with bunkers and revetments "indicating that these sites are designed for weapons assembly and storage," according to the report.

"The suspect sites are known to be engaged in biological/pharmaceutical research and/or manufacturing," the report stated.

"The continued construction at some of the suspect biological war-

fare research, production, and storage facilities, and continued intelligence reporting on the existence of a Soviet BW program... have given rise to additional serious concerns about Soviet compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," the report states.

The Soviet Union is a signatory of the 1972 convention, which bans development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons.

The biological weapons sites were identified as the Cantonment 19 laboratory of the Microbiology and Virology Institute in Sverdlovsk, where an outbreak of anthrax believed to be part of the biological weapons work occurred in 1979, and the Scientific Research Institute of Sanitation in Zagorsk.

Six other locations — Omutninsk, Aksu, Pokrov, Berdsk, Penza and Kurgan — were identified as suspected biological weapons factories and contained identical security and storage features as the confirmed sites.

"Ongoing construction at most of these facilities demonstrates continuing Soviet commitment of resources to their BW program," the report states. "Moreover, improvements made to the BW proving ground on Vozrozhdenaya Island indicate the Soviets plan continued use of this area."

Among the biological agents believed to be under production in the Soviet Union are anthrax, botulinum, which causes botulism, and toxins associated with the "yellow rain" poison attacks against anti-govern-

ment rebels that have been confirmed by U.S. intelligence agencies in Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan, the report states.

The Soviets are accused by the administration in the report of transferring the weapons, or technology used to produce and deliver them, to Laos and Cambodia, and using the weapons in its war against Afghan resistance forces, the report states.

The report reveals that Soviet technicians are "directly involved" in supporting biological and toxin warfare in Laos and Cambodia and that toxin warfare operations by Soviet troops against mujahideen rebels have been confirmed in Afghanistan.

A U.S. biological warfare expert said the United States produces no similar weapons and has destroyed all stocks, although research on countering biological weapons is part of an active Army program.

A State Department official, who declined to be named, said the administration believes the Iraqi government is working on a biological weapons capability that would give the Middle East country the ability to attack targets with cholera, typhoid, anthrax and other deadly viral diseases.

"Only the Soviets have the advanced biological warfare technology that is now detected in Iraq and Libya," said one administration official. "We believe therefore that the Soviets were the source of this plague."

BALTIMORE SUN

20 January 1989

Pg. D-1

## Aberdeen dumping described

Ex-worker testifies she acted on orders

By Karen E. Warmkessel

A former employee at the Aberdeen Proving Ground's chemical weapons research plant testified yesterday that she dumped chemicals into a sump at the plant at the direction of the plant's manager, Carl E. Gepp.

Gail Janes, a technician at the now-closed "pilot plant" at the Harford county installation, told a federal court jury that she collected about 25 boxes of bottled chemicals and



PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

21 January 1989

Pg. 3

## Secret papers discovered in nerve-gas case

Associated Press

NEWARK, N.J. — Secret national-security documents were found on the desk of a Korean-American businessman charged with trying to export deadly nerve gas, possibly to Iran, a federal prosecutor said yesterday. A federal magistrate then revoked the man's bail, at the government's request.

The papers, in English and Korean, and marked confidential and classified, were discovered in the Summit office of Juwhan Yun, Assistant U.S. Attorney Anne Singer said. Asked by U.S. Magistrate Ronald Hedges whether espionage was involved, Singer declined to comment.

The documents must have been in Yun's possession "either for transmission to a foreign government or supplied by a government other than the United States for some purpose connected with the charges," Hedges ruled.

Singer and Customs agent Frank P. Veptura, who testified about the documents, declined to discuss their contents, saying the contents were not relevant to the bail revocation hearing involving Yun, 48, of Short Hills.

Ventura said intelligence officials from Fort Monmouth, N.J., identified the documents as coming from the Joint Electronics Warfare Command. The officials said the documents concerned national security.

"He was apparently in the process of using them," Singer said.

The disclosure and the revocation of bail came just as friends of Yun were about to post property as security for his release.

Hedges, saying he was concerned that a foreign government might try to spirit the defendant out of the country, subsequently agreed to the government's request that he cancel the \$2 million bond set earlier in the week for Yun.

Singer said Yun would be likely to flee because the documents indicated possible ties with foreign governments. Those governments may have an interest in keeping the case from going to trial, she said.

Yesterday, she said the discovery of the documents might expose Yun to a more serious charge of unauthorized possession of secret documents, which carries a 10-year prison term and a maximum fine of \$250,000.

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Analysis of liquid taken from that sump in February 1986 revealed hazardous chemicals such as benzene, methyl sulfide, methylene chloride, and chloroform, according to evidence presented during the trial. They are all solvents, substances which are used to dissolve other materials.

The testimony is part of an effort by federal prosecutors to prove that employees at the deteriorated U.S. Army chemical weapons research plant routinely dumped hazardous chemicals into the sumps, which flow into the Aberdeen Proving Ground's sewage treatment plant.

Under federal environmental law, hazardous waste cannot be treated or disposed of without a permit, which the pilot plant did not have. Prosecutors are alleging that some of the chemicals could not be properly treated by the sewage treatment

SPE

WASHINGTON POST

## Lawmakers Plan Chemical Weapons Curbs

### Bills Would Target Nations, Companies

Associated Press

Legislation to penalize nations that use chemical weapons and private companies that help produce them will be introduced this week, Republican and Democratic senators said yesterday.

The proposed action was announced at a hearing in which senators cited reports that the West German government had looked the other way while German industries helped Middle East nations obtain chemical warfare capability. A U.S. official said West Germany is now addressing the situation.

Senators also were told that the Soviet Union is stockpiling biological weapons in violation of a 1972 agreement banning them worldwide.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) said he will soon introduce a bill to require U.S. diplomatic and economic sanctions against any nation using chemical or biological weapons. He said the legislation will ask other nations to do likewise.

Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) said he will sponsor companion legislation to invoke sanctions against companies of any nationality that supply chemical warfare equipment and technology to Third World nations.

"I have every reason to believe that, in the end, the Congress and the administration will see the wisdom of both approaches," Helms said.

Helms and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee complained about reports that West German officials ignored the situation while German chemical firms



ABERDEEN...CONTINUED

According to prosecutors, the dumping of the chemicals in 1983 occurred during efforts to clean another building which was shut down in 1978. Army safety inspectors told the plant's managers in November 1982 to remove all the chemicals, saying they created "a hazard of a critical nature."

The managers promised to comply by March 1983, but, according to testimony this week, a safety inspector found chemicals still stored there in September 1985.

Elaine A. Sander, an occupational safety and health specialist for the Chemical Research and Development Center, which operated the plant, testified Wednesday that she did not note the violation because she believed plant officials were making "progress."

Ms. Sander testified that the plant was cited repeatedly by Army safety inspectors for violations, some of which were deemed serious or moderate hazards.

The violations included old rusty drums lying on the floor of the plant, "acids, flammables and other chemicals stored everywhere," bottles improperly stored or unlabeled, pipes leaking onto the floor, a drain with no cover and excess equipment "strewn everywhere," according to her inspection reports.

Ms. Sander told the jury that in October 1985, she found 1,500 canisters of DF, a component of a nerve agent, in a deteriorated first floor laboratory with cracks in the walls "that you could see through to the outside" and a buckled door frame.

"I didn't think it was a safe area to store such a large quantity" of chemicals, she said, although she was ultimately overruled.

The managers told the safety inspectors that they were taking steps to correct the problems at the plant and surrounding buildings.

The defense sought to show that the number of violations dropped from 95 in 1982 to eight in 1985.

poured some of them into the sump — a holding pit that empties into the plant's sewer system — and flushed the jars out with water. She testified that she did not know what the chemicals were.

Her testimony came at the trial of her former boss, Mr. Gepp, and his two immediate superiors, Robert E. Lentz and William C. Dee. All three are civilian managers at the proving ground who are charged with mishandling hazardous waste at the pilot plant compound from 1983 to 1986.

Ms. Janes said that the chemist who oversaw the clean-up placed other jars of chemicals off to the side and "told us to leave them alone," she told the jury. It was not clear yesterday what became of those chemicals.

Two former mechanics at the plant have also testified that they washed out drums of chemicals over the sump. One of the witnesses said the drums each contained five to 10 gallons of leftover chemicals and that such washings were routine at the plant.

Analysis of liquid taken from that sump in February 1986 revealed hazardous chemicals such as benzene, methyl sulfide, methylene chloride, and chloroform, according to evidence presented during the trial. They are all solvents, substances which are used to dissolve other materials.

The testimony is part of an effort by federal prosecutors to prove that employees at the deteriorated U.S. Army chemical weapons research plant routinely dumped hazardous chemicals into the sumps, which flow into the Aberdeen Proving Ground's sewage treatment plant.

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PHILADELPHIA

21 January

# Secret discov nerve-

Associated Press

NEWARK, N.J. — Documents were found in a Korean-American's home, trying to export documents to Iran, a federal prosecutor said. A federal magistrate judge, at the government's request, ordered the documents sealed.

The papers, in English, marked confidential and covered in the Summer of 1985. Assistant U.S. Attorney General asked by U.S. Magistrate whether espionage was involved, declined to comment.

The documents were in possession "either for the foreign government or for some other purpose connected with espionage," Hedges ruled.

Singer and Customs Inspector, who testified about the documents, declined to discuss their contents were not relevant to the hearing involving Hills.

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Singer said Yun would be released because the documents in the case have an international character. She said the documents might expose Yun to a charge of unauthorized disclosure of secret documents, which carries a prison term and a maximum fine.



## W. Germans Say Libya Can't Make War Gases

BONN, West Germany — U.S. and West German intelligence services believe Libya is so far unable to manufacture poison gas and are making efforts to ensure it never will, Bonn security sources said on Thursday.

The sources said that despite being supplied by foreign firms, especially West German, Col. Moammar Khadafi's government still lacked some technology to produce chemical weapons at its factory at Rabta, near Tripoli.

Meanwhile, West German investigators released the names of two more companies whose records were seized in a widening probe of suspected West German involvement in the building of a purported poison gas factory in Libya.

The two firms are the Pea-Tsao shipping company in Hamburg and an Imhausen-Chemie subsidiary, GFA Co. in Bochum. Imhausen-Chemie was one of the companies searched in a Wednesday raid.

# Libya produced gallons of poison, U.S. officials say

By Bill Gertz  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A chemical plant in Libya has produced several hundred gallons of lethal poison and U.S. officials are concerned that Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi may supply it to his allies or to terrorists.

The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, also said Col. Qaddafi has stepped up efforts in recent weeks to disperse the weapons already produced at the Rabta facility, as well as the chemicals needed to make them, to other locations. They did not specify where.

Libyan military forces also have brought in pharmaceuticals from nearby hospitals to the Rabta facility in an apparent effort to bolster

Col. Qaddafi's claim that the plant is benign, the officials said.

Evidence of Libya's capability to produce the poison contrasts with reports last week that the CIA and the West German authorities concluded that the desert factory is not capable of producing the lethal arms.

State Department spokesman Charles Redman said last Thursday that the plant "is not capable of production."

Mr. Redman said current efforts by the United States to prevent Libya from getting foreign assistance were aimed at preventing the Qaddafi regime from producing "any operational or full-scale quantities" of chemical weapons.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

## Jordan Seeking Chem. Warfare Delivery Systems

Jordan's new Chief of the Royal Hashemite Court, Field Marshal Sharif Zayd ibn Shakir, has been actively seeking to buy chemical warfare delivery systems for the Royal Jordanian Armed Forces, according to highly reliable sources. These sources said that Field Marshal Shakir, who was promoted to his Court post and named adviser to the King for the affairs of the Arab Army from his earlier post as C-in-C of the Armed Forces, was looking for whatever types of systems were available, whether land-force or air delivered. Jordan apparently does not want to follow Iraq's piecemeal assemblage of systems adapted for chemical weapon delivery systems, but, if possible, acquire dedicated systems. The move comes at a time when Arab states clearly boycotted the Paris chemical weapons statement this month outlawing such weapons. The Arab states have stated that they feel CW systems are their answer to Israel's nuclear weapons capacity. For this reason — rather than for any love of Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi — most Arab states have not criticized Libya's CW build-up, even though it is a cause for Arab, African, European and Israeli concern.

## Chemical Agents "Definitely Used" in Zia Assassination

Highly-placed sources, involved in the analysis of the C-130 crash which killed Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq last August, confirmed that chemical agents had been used to cause the crash. They were not, however, loaded aboard the aircraft in the crates of mangoes and oranges which were added just before the aircraft took off. The chemical agent "almost certainly" was released in the cockpit, possibly disorienting the flight crew (rather than killing them outright). However, the mangoes and oranges absorbed a number of chemical agents which can only have come from a chemical weapon, and not from other gases associated with the crash. These have been identified by the analysts who are now working on identifying what type of compound and dispersal system was used in the cockpit.



the use of poison gas.  
Senator Claiborne Pell, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, announced today that he would introduce

sanctions to companies that knowingly contribute to the spread of chemical weapons. Such legislation is supported by Senator Bob Dole, the minority leader, and other key Republican Senators.

that intelligence estimates put the figure closer to 300,000 metric tons of "chemical and biological agents."

The Ministry of Defense said it had not seen the newspaper report and could not comment.

The newspaper said Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would raise the issue with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachov when he visits Britain.

factory at Rabta, near Tripoli. Meanwhile, West German investigators released the two more companies whose records were seized in a probe of suspected West German involvement in the bulk of the alleged poison gas from Libya.

The two firms are the shipping company in Frankfurt, an Imhausen-Chemie GFA Co. in Bochum. Imhausen-Chemie was one of the firms searched in a Wednesday

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

30 January 1989

Pg. C10

## Senator: Iraq bacteria came from U.S.

By David B. Ottaway  
*Washington Post*

WASHINGTON — State Department officials are investigating congressional allegations that Iraq obtained from the United States deadly bacteria that it may be using to develop biological weapons.

"People are concerned, interested and taking it very seriously," one official said. "It's just a matter of getting something to work with."

The State Department has been unable to confirm a charge by Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz.) that a sample of tularemia, commonly known as "rabbit fever," was sent to Iraq.

McCain, in a speech last week, said that "we know that Iraq has already misused international agreements to obtain tularemia virus from the U.S. ... We have every reason to assume that Iraq may soon weaponize two of the three most lethal biotoxins — anthrax and tularemia."

In a letter to Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, McCain outlined the charges and evidence he has to substantiate them, according to McCain's office. But McCain has refused to divulge any evidence publicly.

The Bush administration, like its predecessor, is known to be con-

cerned about the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons among Third World countries. The CIA also has been seeking to promote awareness of the growing danger of these weapons, estimating that 20 nations are trying to develop chemical weapons and that 10 are developing biological weapons.

A State Department official conceded Friday that Iraq might have obtained the tularemia bacteria from a U.S. culture collection center before export licenses were imposed 10 years ago on bacteria, fungi and protozoa. "It could have happened a long time ago and it would have been perfectly legal," he said.

DEFENSE AND

## Jordan S

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## Chemical

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# Documents tied to nerve gas suspect called 'critical to defense of the U.S.'

By ROBERT RUDOLPH

A cache of secret documents found in the Summit office of a Korean-American New Jersey businessman linked to a plot to ship nerve gas bombs and missiles to Iran contains information "considered critical to the defense of the United States and our allies," U.S. authorities disclosed yesterday.

Authorities revealed the documents relate to the "capabilities" and "vulnerabilities" of state-of-the-art defense systems and said the "disclosure of this information can potentially do serious damage to national security."

The nature of the material was made public yesterday in Newark during a hearing on the possible release of the suspect, J.W. Yun, from custody.

Yun, a resident of Short Hills, has been ordered freed from prison on \$2 million bail and placed under house arrest, but the federal judge who ordered the release has delayed the effect of his order until tomorrow afternoon to give authorities time to appeal.

Federal authorities said they will continue to seek to have Yun detained, charging that "nothing but keeping him behind bars" will be satisfactory.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Anne Singer charged that there is increasing evidence that Yun has relationships with high-level foreign officials who may attempt to help him escape from the United States.

Stressing that Yun is accused of dealing with persons trafficking in sophisticated arms systems, Singer declared: "These are not nice people we're talking about here."

In a letter delivered to the court, Singer charged that Yun is accused of "dealing for profit in weapons of death and destruction."

U.S. District Judge H. Lee Sarokin, who ordered Yun's release under house arrest said yesterday, however, he is satisfied that despite the new disclosures, restrictions placed on Yun would be sufficient to ensure that he does not flee.

According to documents made public yesterday, the materials seized from Yun's office "relate to the capabilities of U.S. Army electronic warfare systems such as the ability of the United States to intercept and locate potential enemy signals."

Singer said the seized materials, which were stamped "secret" and "classified," also provide information on deployment strategies of electronic warfare systems, as well as the operating frequencies of U.S. military equipment.

John Walker, deputy director of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Directorate of the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, reported that the materials also contain "feasibility studies of electronic warfare and other specialized warfare systems for the years to 1992 and beyond."

A memo prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff states: "Compromise of reference would reveal specific characteristics, capabilities and vulnerabilities of various U.S. electronic warfare systems. Each system is described in detail and compared with known enemy threats. Revelation of that information would not only compromise specifics of our (electronic warfare) capabilities, but would also reveal detail of our knowledge of enemy threat."

The documents, found on a desk in the office of Yun's export company, Komex International, were described as being in both Korean and English and refer to the jamming of enemy signals as well as the means of obtaining information on troop deployment and numbers and location of enemy forces."

At the same time, a report by the FBI disclosed that Yun has been the subject of foreign counterintelligence investigations by that agency, and that the FBI had received information that he had sought to purchase military items including night vision equipment, fighter planes, tank parts and TOW missiles.

In addition, the FBI report said Yun had contact with officials from countries "that are of counter-intelligence interest to the FBI," and possession of official documents from a third such country.

Singer said she was not permitted to identify which countries were involved.

At the same time, the FBI report charged that Yun "appears to have had

contact with individuals in, or associated with, branches of the United States military and military installations abroad."

Yun is accused of conspiring to ship Stinger and TOW missiles, and state-of-the-art grenade guns to Iran along with tons of outlawed nerve gas, known as "Sarin."

He is accused of conspiring with a British arms merchant, identified as Charles Caplan, for whom authorities have issued an arrest warrant.

Singer said Justice Department officials are scheduled to confer with U.S. intelligence officials to determine if espionage charges will be lodged against Yun as a result of the new disclosures.

In arguing for Yun's detention, Singer has maintained Yun openly admitted to an undercover agent that he had "international contacts in various foreign governments," including Yugoslavia, China and South Korea, and was in the process of planning a round-the-world trip with stopovers in Iran and the People's Republic of China when he was taken into custody.

Singer said authorities have been unable to account for Yun's source of income and noted that he has extensive real estate holdings including a \$650,000 home in Short Hills, a \$400,000 condominium near Lincoln Center in Manhattan, and property in Arizona.

In directing Yun to be released on bail, Sarokin held that the suspect "should not be punished by confinement" unless he is proven guilty of the charges. Yun has been in custody since his arrest by U.S. Customs Agents on Jan. 12.

"Nothing is more abhorrent to our free society than the specter of persons accused of crimes being confined in prisons before trial and conviction," Sarokin said in an opinion released yesterday in Newark. "The right to be free on bail before trial is what distinguishes our democracy from totalitarian governments."

In granting Yun's release, Sarokin charged that "despite the notoriety which this matter has received and the serious nature of the charges," the suspect is "entitled to the presumption of innocence and his liberty."


CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



Containers with chemical weapons produced at Rabta were transferred to Somalia recently, the officials said, possibly for use against anti-government rebels there. The transfer was not the same as the shipment of nerve agents from Libya to Somalia last October.

chemical weapons daily when it is fully operational.  
"It's the largest plant of its kind in the third world and it would go way beyond what they'd need for deterrence," the official said. "This plant is for aggressive purposes."

In other developments yesterday:  
• The West German chemical company Sigma Chemie said it has



PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

31 January 1989

Pg. 6

# Two charged in poison gas probe

By Valerie Meehan  
Associated Press

BALTIMORE — An American businessman and a Dutch national were charged with illegally exporting a poison gas component, produced in Baltimore, to Jordan for suspected use by Iraq, federal prosecutors said yesterday.

Nicholas J. Defino, 64, of New Jersey, surrendered yesterday to Customs Service agents, U.S. Attorney Breckinridge L. Willcox said. Defino was released on bond after appearing before a U.S. magistrate.

Defino and Dutch citizen Frans van Amraat, 46, who was apprehended in Milan, Italy, on Thursday, were charged with conspiracy, listing pho-

ny destinations on export documents and violating U.S. export laws. Van Amraat, the European agent for Nù Kraft Mercantile Corp. of New York City, is awaiting extradition.

The two men, charged in criminal complaints released yesterday, are accused of shipping thiodiglycol, manufactured by Alcolac International Inc. of Baltimore, to Belgium and then to Jordan in late 1987 and early 1988.

From Jordan, federal prosecutors believe, the chemical was transported to Iraq.

Prosecutors announced yesterday that Alcolac had agreed to plead guilty to one count of knowing violation of export laws in connection

with the export of thiodiglycol.

The lubricant, used in the manufacture of inks and textiles and sold under the brand name Kromfax, produces lethal mustard gas when combined with hydrochloric acid.

Federal officials said they believed that the chemical had been illegally shipped to both Iraq and Iran by separate agents and separate routes during 1987 and 1988.

Last year, a West German man, Peter Walaschek, pleaded guilty to purchasing the component of mustard gas from Alcolac and shipping it via Greece and Singapore to Iran. Walaschek fled to West Germany and is now the subject of extradition negotiations.



1 February 1989

Pg. 19

# New Evidence Strengthens Suspicions of Firm's Links to Libya

By Robert J. McCartney  
Washington Post Foreign Service

**OFFENBURG, West Germany, Jan. 31**—Testimony from important new witnesses and examination of confiscated documents in the past week have strengthened prosecutors' suspicions that the West German chemicals firm Imhausen-Chemie GmbH made shipments to Libya, the two state prosecutors presiding over the inquiry said today.

But the prosecutors warned in an interview that it may be very difficult to prove that Imhausen helped the government of Moammar Gadhafi build a factory designed to make chemical weapons, as the United States has alleged.

"I don't think Mr. Gadhafi will come and testify as to whether it is a poison gas plant. It's not in operation yet. . . . One can't be sure what kind of factory it is," Werner Botz, the chief state prosecutor in Offenburg, said. Offenburg is in southern Germany near Lahr, where Imhausen is based.

In a related development, a West German state-owned company said that Imhausen tricked one of its subsidiaries into supplying blueprints for the controversial plant at Rabta, Libya, by saying that the plans were for a pharmaceuticals factory in Hong Kong.

The state-owned steel group Salzgitter AG previously had denied that it had had anything to do with the Libyan plant.

It issued that denial a week ago after the West German weekly magazine Stern reported that an Imhausen employee told investigators that Salzgitter employees knew the plant was in Libya, not Hong Kong, and knew it was designed to produce highly toxic substances, not pharmaceuticals.

The U.S. allegations of West German corporate involvement in the Rabta plant have caused some strain in U.S.-West German relations and deeply embarrassed Chancellor Helmut Kohl's government. The Bonn government has drawn sharp criticism from the international and domestic news media, and from the left-of-center political opposition, for lax arms export controls that have permitted suspected illegal shipments by West German companies of chemical weapons manufacturing equipment and raw materials to Libya, Iraq and Iran.

Bonn also has been criticized for what appeared to be its slow reaction to the U.S. allegations, which the West German government learned about at least as early as last May. The first criminal investigation in the case was begun only this month, after the U.S. allegations were made public at the start of the year.

Six days ago, in what was by far the biggest police action in the affair, customs and judicial agents raided offices of Imhausen and two companies closely linked to it, and residences of 12 executives of the three firms. They confiscated more than 70 crates of documents.

Examination of those documents and testimony from several new witnesses have "strengthened our grounds for suspecting that Imhausen made deliveries to Libya," H. Juergen Collmann, the prosecutor assigned to the case, said. Imhausen previously has denied that it had any dealings with Libya. It declined to comment today.

"We have spoken with some important people" in the past week who provided new information in the inquiry, Collmann said. He would not identify them.

Collmann and his boss, Botz, emphasized that it would take weeks or months to finish examining the documents. Ultimately, they said, it might be impossible to gather enough material to justify filing charges against any West German companies or executives.

West German law prohibits deliveries of equipment, plans or raw materials suitable for producing chemical arms.

Investigators suspect that Imhausen employees long ago may have hidden or destroyed incriminating documents, Botz said. "After all the stories in the media this month, somebody may have hidden them well," he said.

Today's statement by Salzgitter added to a growing body of data suggesting that several West German companies may have unwittingly supplied equipment or plans for the Libyan plant. It appears that Imhausen used the Hong Kong pharmaceuticals factory as a cover, buying goods that ostensibly were destined for Hong Kong but actually went to Libya.

The Hong Kong factory has the same name, Pharma 150, as the Libyan plant. It is being constructed with assistance from a Hong Kong company that has worked with Imhausen. Libya has said that the Rabta factory is to make only pharmaceuticals.

"As a result of the investigation of the last few days, we must now make clear that, contrary to our previous conviction, Salzgitter Industriebau, subcontracted by Imhausen-Chemie for part of the engineering [for the Pharma 150 plant], was obviously deceived," Salzgitter's statement said.

The company found a letter from Imhausen, dated February 1985,

## DOCUMENTS . . . Con't

Under terms of the release order, Sarokin directed that Yun be confined to his home, and an electronic monitoring device be used, if possible. He also directed that all international communication by Yun be monitored by the U.S. Attorney's Office.

Sarokin said the release will enable Yun to confer more easily with his lawyer, and at the same time "taxpayers are spared the expense of maintaining defendant in a penal institution already overflowing with persons who have been found guilty of crimes."



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West Germany's giant electron-  
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ere is a long list of firms that  
ly made deliveries" for the  
plant, prosecutor Botz said.  
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er there was any criminal ac-  
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AL OF COMMERCE

ary 1989 Pg. 9B

# Chemical Weapons Talks Show Progress

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after a well-publicized  
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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

2 February 1989

Pg. S957

### A COCOM FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, the revelations of the past month have made it abundantly clear to all that the supplies of materials and technology related to the production of chemical and biological weapons must be controlled. It is absolutely vital that international trade be cleansed of this merchandise of death.

Wanting it to happen and making it happen, however, are two different things. Anyone who has considered the chemical and biological weapons production problem recognizes that controlling it will be very complex. Nearly every chemical precursor to chemical weapons production is a dual use item. That is, the chemicals which must be controlled also have common application in the pesticide and other fields. It has even been reported that the chemicals in ballpoint pen production could be misused.

Not only is it clear that this area is technically complex, it is equally clear that a unilateral American embargo of these materials and technology will not be sufficient. On January 24, Gen. William Burns told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that it is hardly accidental that the names of firms alleged to be involved in this vile trade are not U.S.-based. Our export control system, while not perfect, has been fairly effective.

In order to control the supplies of chemical and biological agents, we must have the cooperation of all the potential suppliers. The suppliers must agree on what is to be controlled. Inevitably there will be differences of opinion to be resolved. Since technology does not stand still, discussions of technical experts on this subject should be more or less continuous. As a practical matter, the experts will need a regular place to meet and some sort of clerical assistance, copying facilities and the like.

The Coordinating Committee for Export Controls, known as Cocom, performs a similar function today in the field of strategic trade. It is composed of 16 major suppliers of high tech equipment, including the United States, and meets regularly in an annex of the American Embassy in Paris. Cocom has a small clerical staff and the usual office machines.

Currently there is no regular organization for the control of chemical and biological weapons. There is an informal organization, known as the Australia Group, which has met infre-

quently, has no regular meeting place and no assigned clerical staff.

This week, therefore, I wrote to President Bush proposing that the supplier nations should meet with a view to creating a Cocom for the control of chemical and biological agents. Such an organization would be small, perhaps modeled on Cocom, established in one of the supplier countries, and would contain a small clerical staff. It would be a place for experts to meet, discuss the latest technology and reach a mutual accommodation on what should and should not be controlled.

Mr. President, if we are serious about slowing down the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, we must become serious about an organization of supplier countries to limit the trade in materials and technology necessary to produce such weapons. Failure to do so will send a dangerous message about our lack of resolve.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my letter, dated January 31, to President Bush be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, DC, January 31, 1989.

Hon. GEORGE BUSH,

The President, The White House, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The shocking revelations of the past few months have made it abundantly clear that the supplies of materials and technology necessary to produce chemical and biological weapons must be controlled. It is absolutely vital that international trade be cleansed of this merchandise of death.

Given the complexity of the subject matter and the need for uniform standards of control, consultation and cooperation among the leading supplier nations must be a high priority. However, unlike the area of strategic trade which is coordinated by COCOM, there is no regular meeting place for international coordination of controls on chemical and biological weapons. The Australia Group has met infrequently, and has neither an established location nor the clerical staff to assist the work of experts in the field.

I hope, therefore, that you will consider calling the supplier nations together at some suitable location with the intention of creating a COCOM for the control of chemical and biological agents. Such an organization should be small, perhaps modeled on COCOM, established in one of the supplier countries, and should contain a small clerical staff. It would be a place for experts to meet, discuss the latest technology and reach a mutual accommodation on what should and should not be controlled.

If we are serious about slowing down the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, we must find a mechanism, such as an organization of supplier countries, to limit trade in materials and technology necessary to produce these weapons. Our resolve and determination on this matter is crucial to stopping the spread of chemical and biological weapons.

Sincerely,

LARRY PRESSLER,  
U.S. Senator.



## TALKS...CONTINUED

U.N. Disarmament Conference when a new session begins Feb. 7 after a five-month recess.

They include Libya, accused by the United States of building a chemical weapons plant, Syria, Tunisia and North and South Korea.

"The Paris conference provided a boost and will have an influence on the chemical weapons part of

the disarmament conference," said Italian Ambassador Aldo Pugliese, who will chair the winter session.

Mr. Pugliese told reporters he could not foresee when the draft treaty would be completed, adding that verification was among the technical issues blocking the accord.

Conference Secretary Milgan

Komatina of Yugoslavia said: "We have to find a balance between verification and confidentiality," adding that industrial secrets of chemical firms had to be protected.

The draft treaty provides for spot checks to verify compliance. "One has to avoid possible misuse of these so-called challenge inspections," he said. (Reuter)

BALTIMORE SUN

4 February 1989

Pg. 2

## Bonn seizes Libya-bound chemicals

BONN (Reuters) — West German customs police have seized 255 tons of a chemical bound for Libya that could be used to manufacture poison

gas, a government spokesman said yesterday.

It was the first reported seizure of a chemical shipment to Libya since a scandal erupted a month ago over the role of West German industrial exporters in the building of a suspected poison gas factory at Rabta, in the Libyan desert.

A Finance Ministry spokesman said that 17 containers of the chemical hexamethylene-tetramine made by the West German industrial firm Degussa AG were confiscated by customs Jan. 20 in the North Sea port of Bremerhaven.

"The chemical can be used in the production of fertilizers or disinfectants, but also could be used in the production of [gas] explosives," said the official, whose ministry controls the customs police.

A Degussa spokesman said the chemical was destined for a fertilizer factory in Libya and had been supplied for that purpose to Libya since 1983. The substance did not require an export license, he said.

"We have become more sensitive regarding exports to Libya in light of recent events," an Economics Ministry spokesman said.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

8 Feb 1989

Pg. 8

## Geneva Disarmament Talks Open With Focus on Chemical Weapons

By WILLIAM TUOHY, Times Staff Writer

GENEVA—The 40-member U.N. Disarmament Conference opened its 1989 session here Tuesday with top priority given to seeking a global ban on chemical weapons.

Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar sent a message to the delegates calling on them to conclude "as promptly as possible" a worldwide prohibition against chemical warfare. The current session of the conference has been given a special impetus by last month's special meeting in Paris on controlling toxic weaponry, at which 149 nations supported a universal chemical arms ban.

In his remarks Tuesday, the senior U.S. arms negotiator, Ambassador Max L. Friedersdorf, emphasized the need to draft an effective treaty on chemical weapons.

But he said that reaching a global agreement requires patience and added that President Bush considers such a treaty a high priority in his new Administration.

Later, in an interview, Friedersdorf outlined some of the problems facing the negotiators and warned that no quick resolution is in sight. Rather, he suggested, a meaningful treaty cannot be drafted before the end of next year.

The major obstacle, he said, is the "tremendous problem" of verification—applied to both production and stockpiling of poison gas.

"Verification," he said, "is, in this case, enormously more difficult" than that of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed by the United States and Soviet Union in December, 1987. "And we don't have an answer yet."

Verification, in the U.S. view, is a scientific guarantee that a country is not breaking a treaty ban by producing or hiding poison gas weapons.

As verification procedures now exist, said Friedersdorf, "I couldn't recommend a treaty to Congress."



NEW YORK TIMES

6 February 1989

Pg. B9

# Army Tests Defenses Against Biological Weapons

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE

The United States Army laboratories responsible for defending American troops against biological weapons are testing potential treatments on volunteers in China and Argentina, the laboratories' commander has disclosed.

Col. David L. Huxsoll, commander of the Army's Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md., said in an interview that his organization has also tested disease therapies in Liberia and South Korea and has supplied emergency pharmaceuticals to Egypt and other countries.

Critics charge that Army biological warfare experts ought not play any role in public health programs. In January, at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Colonel Huxsoll was confronted by civilian scientists concerned that an international race for new biological weapons may begin.

American biologists at the meeting, including Dr. Keith R. Yamamoto of the University of California at San Francisco, argued that field trials like those under way in China and Argentina should be managed by the National Institutes of Health rather than the Defense Department.

## Question of Military Oversight

Research funds would be used more efficiently by the civilian agency, Dr. Yamamoto said, and trials would not arouse suspicions that military research was masquerading as public health.

But Colonel Huxsoll said in a subsequent interview that the Army remains responsible for protecting American troops against both natural diseases and biological warfare agents. He said it would be wrong for the armed forces to yield this responsibility to any outside agency.

If an enemy were ever to use biological weapons against American forces, the Army believes, such weapons would probably be based on organisms or viruses already known to scientists. Among the possibilities are variants of diseases that ravage many underdeveloped countries but are rare in industrial nations.

To develop defenses against such diseases, scientists must test vaccines and drugs in areas where the diseases are endemic.

"It would be absurd for us to create disease-causing organisms just to test therapies we develop," Colonel Huxsoll said. "We therefore conduct tests in cooperation with the host governments of countries where diseases are already claiming victims. It is in the interest of both the United States armed forces and the peoples of other coun-

tries to find defenses against lethal or incapacitating diseases that occur naturally but which might also be encountered in warfare."

One nation cooperating with the Army is China, which charged in the 1950's that the United States had used germ-warfare weapons against North Korean and Chinese troops. The United States has denied the charge.

The current testing program in China is managed jointly by Hubel Province Medical University and the United States Defense Department. The trials have been carried out on more than 200 hospitalized volunteers suffering from a group of diseases known as hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome. A victim is rapidly felled by vomiting and fever, sometimes followed by kidney failure that leads to death.

Some patients were treated with an antiviral drug called ribavirin, while others served as a control group. Colonel Huxsoll, who holds a doctorate in microbiology, said the test so far suggests that ribavirin sharply reduces the death rate from the disease. Ribavirin is made by ICN Pharmaceuticals of Costa Mesa, Calif.

"We have found," he said, "that if a patient is treated with the drug within four days of developing symptoms, his or her chance of dying is only one fifth what it would be with no treatment. Treated survivors also recover much faster."

In the Korean War, many soldiers, including Americans, were infected with the hemorrhagic fever and some died. The disease still is found in Korea, but the majority of its victims, 100,000 cases a year, are in rural areas of China. It is spread largely by rats.

The Army's testing program in China, which began two years ago, was in response to a Chinese initiative, Colonel Huxsoll said.

"We had been doing some work with that virus and the drug ribavirin in animals," he said, "and the Chinese recognized the importance of the work and approached us."

A different type of test began in Argentina last fall, in which about 6,500 volunteers, most of them farmers, are participating. The United States Army and the Argentine Government are inoculating part of this group with a vaccine developed at Fort Detrick against Junin virus, a disease also called Argentine hemorrhagic fever. Although many symptoms are similar to those of hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome, the Argentine disease is caused by a different virus.

The Argentine disease and a Bolivian hemorrhagic fever are caused by closely related viruses. They are

spread by rat urine, particularly in the harvest season, which in the Southern Hemisphere peaks in May. Depending on the virulence of the strain and other factors, the death rate of victims can reach 30 percent, Colonel Huxsoll said.

The current treatment for Argentine and Bolivian hemorrhagic fever is a serum administered to a patient after the disease has been diagnosed, and this treatment is quite effective. The vaccine would render people immune before they become infected.

The trial will continue for several years, Colonel Huxsoll said, and will be extended to many more volunteers to improve the statistical basis of the test. But by the end of the harvest period four months from now, Army experts expect to observe a clear difference between vaccinated and unvaccinated volunteers. The vaccine has already passed initial safety tests on animals and a small number of humans in the United States.

Limited trials of ribavirin were carried out in Liberia in the early 1980's as a therapy against Lassa fever, a dangerous virus also spread by rats. The tests were promising, Colonel Huxsoll said, and larger-scale trials are planned.

## Critics Suspicious of Research

Still, critics remain suspicious of the Army research. At the meeting last month of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Dr. Erhard Geissler, an official of East Germany's Central Institute for Molecular Biology, said that in 1943 and 1944 the Nazis developed biological weapons while calling their program "defensive research." That is why, Dr. Geissler said, his Government is suspicious of all defensive biological warfare research, including that of the United States.

At the conference, Colonel Huxsoll denied that his organization's defensive research has any offensive application. He said that all the work conducted at the Fort Detrick laboratories is unclassified and is solely intended to protect people against disease.

The United States, for its part, is one of 111 nations, including the Soviet Union, that have ratified the Bacteriological and Toxin Weapon Convention of 1972. The treaty prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. But it does not prohibit research and development of defensive measures against biological agents.

Colonel Huxsoll noted that vaccines developed at Fort Detrick have been used not only to immunize patients abroad, but have protected Americans at home.



1989

ENZIE PAPER II

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE –  
THREAT OF THE FUTURE

by Evelyn le Chêne

*Introduction*

There is little doubt that the signing of the INF Agreement between the superpowers elicited renewed anxiety in NATO regarding the Soviet Union's overwhelming superiority in chemical and biological weaponry (CBW), their means of delivery, and on-going research into "genetic engineering".<sup>1</sup> Of particular concern is Soviet development of a range of hallucinogens and psychochemical agents for application against civilian targets. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's conditional offer in January 1989 that the Soviet Union "will begin in 1989 the elimination of its chemical weapon stockpiles" introduced a new dimension. Verification problems remain to be overcome, and so do the dangers of proliferation.

The recent United States and British intelligence reports that Libya has constructed a new facility to produce CBW brings into sharp focus the proliferation of these weapons within the developing world and the awesome possibility of terrorist acquisition. CBW is viewed as "the poor man's atomic bomb". It is currently possessed by fifteen countries – some say it could be as many as twenty-four – among which are nations the West has little or no cause to trust: Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

Since the end of the Second World War, it has been the norm for the West to believe that CBW is so abhorrent that it constitutes its own deterrent. As a result, we have been slow to react to new developments. Part of the reason was our fixation with the "nuclear arms race", which tended to obscure developments in the East Bloc of a different nature. Irrefutable evidence of the use of chemical warfare agents in Afghanistan, Angola, the Iraq-Iran conflict and more recently against Iraqi Kurds has slowly forced a change of attitude, and there are now signs of serious reappraisals of the situation within the Western Alliance. The news media have also pushed for action.

In August 1988, Britain sponsored a UN Resolution threatening action against any nation using chemical weapons. One month later the United States Congress voted for an unprecedented range of sanctions against Iraq for its "genocide against the Kurdish population".

In Geneva the forty-nation Conference on Disarmament is locked in one of the most intractable problems in the history of arms control: defining what constitutes chemical warfare agents in order to formulate a policy and treaty for their han-



ning. Any agreements that may emerge will be constrained by two major impediments – the problem of verification; and the difficulty of mobilizing the political will to take effective measures against treaty violators. The Meeting in Paris at which Shevardnadze spoke was intended to accelerate the work at Geneva. Unless and until a fully effective control regime comes into being, covering the Third World as well as industrialized powers, the threat can only be countered effectively if governments in the North Atlantic Alliance:

- Recognize the political and strategic implications of doing nothing;
- Provide increased resources to the military and other agencies;
- Institute educational programs for the civilian population and create a separate division within Civil Defence structures;
- Plan and provide communal shelters for the civilian population including provision of protective clothing; and
- Find the courage to do what must be done.

Failure could undermine NATO's credibility and lead to the further destabilization of the developing world.

Some of these ideas were presumably in British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's mind when, immediately after the signing of the INF Agreement in November 1987, she addressed a plea to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. In this she said:

remember, we too have fears... so show your good faith by withdrawing and destroying your massive stockpile of chemical weapons along NATO's borders.

Presumably, Mr. Shevardnadze's initiative is an answer to this plea. Like so much else in the current phase of East-West relations, it is impossible to know whether it can be taken at face value as evidence of a sudden reversal of Soviet military (and, indeed, political and ideological) policy, or if it is a manoeuvre to disarm Western fears and make it impossible for Western governments to take the measures listed above. We are entitled to be hopeful; we are obliged to be cautious.

#### Historical Background

Paradoxically, the threat the West is just waking up to, CBW, is one of the oldest weapons in the history of mankind. Its use goes back as far as 2,000 BC when the Indian epic *Ramayana* tells of the 'Sammahonastra' – projectiles producing stupor or hypnosis, and arsenical and alkaloidal 'smokes' were understood during the Sung dynasty. At least one of the chemical tactics propounded in Leonardo da Vinci's 15th century *Notebooks* is copied from the *Histories* of Polybius. Chinese scientists wrote of toxic projectiles in the 11th century and the Moors used poisoned arrows in Spain in 1483. Sulphur was resorted to at Sevastopol during the Crimean war. Biological warfare is just as ancient, dating back to 600 BC when the spreading of disease and pollution of water sources under siege conditions led to surrender.

We tend, however, to think of Chemical Warfare in the context of the First World War.<sup>2</sup> It was first used on April 22, 1915, by the Imperial German Army against French forces at Ypres. It was a crude mustard gas (vesicant) that left approximately 5,000 dead and 10,000 injured. Before the global conflict ceased, all nationalities were to suffer the effects of diverse chemical warfare agents: Russia losing almost 100,000 with a further million and a quarter injured. Gas was used between the world wars: in Ethiopia by the Italians and in China by the Japanese. At the onset of the Second World War, Germany had developed a new and highly toxic nerve gas, TABUN, at its research and development plant at Dyrnforth, Silesia. By the end of the war, another nerve agent even more lethal had been developed, SARIN. All CW agents, complete with research information, were removed from Germany by Soviet occupation forces and transferred to the USSR where they formed, and still form, the basis of Soviet Chemical Warfare potential and knowledge.

#### The Soviet Concept of Chemical Warfare

Until the late 1970s the West tended to associate Soviet chemical warfare and weaponry with their nuclear war-fighting doctrine. From 1980, however, it became clear that chemical and biological agents within the Soviet arsenal had applications under conditions short of nuclear conflict. A leading Soviet authority remarked that:



According to experience of a number of exercises, chemical weapons were adopted from the very beginning of combat operations in combination with conventional weapons.<sup>3</sup>

Since that time, CBW has been fully incorporated within the spectrum of Soviet "conventional" armaments.

Soviet attitudes to CBW were probably influenced by the obvious "flexibility" of the weapons due "not only to their high toxicity but also to the relative ease with which they can be synthesized, their low cost, and the possibility of obtaining them in a large quantity and using them in delivery means of all types, such as aerial sprays, cluster bombs, missile warheads, artillery rounds, chemical mines and so on".<sup>4</sup>

This was a theme taken up by Marshal Ogarkov who saw CW as "a means of armed struggle... capable even in non-nuclear war of rapidly destroying all life over an enormous area".<sup>5</sup> Soviet strategy in using CBW would be to accelerate an offensive in its initial stages or to regain the momentum in the event of stalled progress.<sup>6</sup> In the first wave it would be used to neutralize NATO's airfields, naval bases and seaports, command and control facilities, and storage depots. Being an "area cover" weapon, CW is seen as useful in depriving NATO of a timely response to aggression:

under these circumstances, he (NATO) will have difficulty in setting up and preparing for use, nuclear and chemical weapons.<sup>7</sup>

The psychological impact on defending forces is also seen as a pertinent factor, as would be the choice of agent – the persistent or non-persistent varieties – to be used depending upon battlefield requirements.

The central role of CW in recent Soviet strategic planning for achieving a quick victory in a non-nuclear assault on Western Europe was indicated during the DRUZHBA '84 Warsaw Pact exercises in Czechoslovakia. In these exercises, CW attacks were simulated against NATO's anti-tank defences. Once breached, elite formations – "Operational Manoeuvre Groups" (OMG's) and helicopter forces, would be committed to operations in the NATO rear. A massive "conventional" wave would then follow through.

There have been similar exercises since that time with simulated CW attacks incorporated in the program. More pertinently perhaps, there is increasing evidence that the Soviet

Union has resorted to chemical weaponry in regional conflicts in which it is either directly or indirectly involved. Brigadier Watay, former Chief of the Chemical Department of the 99th Rocket Regiment stationed in Afghanistan stated after his defection to the West:

The Russians used chemical weapons at a time when their strategic tactics and the operations of their air and ground forces did not bear fruit and they failed to beat back the Mujahideen and break through their defences.<sup>8</sup>

*Spetsnaz* troops – the USSR's elite special forces – have received training in chemical/biological warfare for sabotage purposes, especially when "intentional, covert contamination of specific objectives is required".<sup>9</sup> Nor is the idea of CBW use for covert operations (sabotage) new. As far back as 1971 at a Warsaw Pact meeting in East Germany – more than two years after President Nixon's halting of US CW production – it was established that "under combat conditions they (CBW agents) can be used as an aerosol or in a solid or liquid state in mixed elements of ammunition: they can also be used for sabotage purposes".<sup>10</sup>

One analyst has concluded that Soviet CBW strategy towards the United Kingdom might "create maximum problems for the population, initially through blackmail and then by causing dislocation to public services, rail, port facilities, communications and power".<sup>11</sup>

The agents to be used for this purpose could include hallucinogens and psychochemical agents developed in the Soviet Union specifically for application against civilian populations. As the analyst points out:

The USSR has shown great interest in the use of hallucinogens and other anti-personnel agents against populations, therefore we may expect to see a very selective and clinical employment of CBW using the latest technology in this area, particularly psychochemical agents to cause civilian panic.<sup>12</sup>

*Spetsnaz* training has included application of low level hallucinogens and high-level bio-contaminants for creation of this civilian panic.

The psychological reaction of the target population (military or civilian) to a CW attack is the key issue in this Soviet

CBW strategy. Militarily, the defender's ability to fulfill his task and counter an offensive would be greatly reduced given the

**C**hemical Troops – KvH. There are currently 100,000 fully trained KvH of which 45,000 are attached to regular Soviet and Warsaw Pact units. Training takes place in



CBW strategy. Militarily, the defender's ability to fulfill his task and counter an offensive would be greatly reduced given the cumbersome protective clothing they would be obliged to wear. The heat factor, awkwardness of movement, diminution of flexibility with weapon and tool operation and reduced communication factors, all have their role in establishing a feeling of "isolation" and vulnerability. Combat effectiveness of military personnel under these conditions rapidly deteriorates and between 30 and 50 percent of their battle readiness would be forfeit after approximately two hours.

The effectiveness of CBW in an initial phase of conflict is dependent to a large degree on the psychological and physical resilience of the defending forces. Soviet thinking appears to be that general public opinion in the West will succumb to the intimidatory nature of such an attack on NATO forces with a subsequent collapse of morale among the military.

As for our civilian populations, the Soviets "are well aware of the total lack of any credible civil defence measures or precautions, not just in the United Kingdom, but across the whole of NATO".<sup>13</sup>

It was against a background of a virtual Soviet monopoly of modern CBW capability that Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking" came on the scene. The excitement and hopes raised by Glasnost and Perestroika, the INF Agreement, and the general easing of East-West tensions have created a climate of opinion in NATO countries where military threats are simply not taken seriously by electorates. Consequently, the fact that the Soviet Union continued to develop, manufacture and deploy its CBW, unattached to any "linking" Treaty within ongoing disarmament talks, was a point that few governments in the West had the political will to acknowledge and confront. Now that the USSR has conditionally committed itself to destroying CB stocks, will Western leaders be content with reassuring statements, or will they push for the severe verification regime necessary to ensure that, after destroying quantities of older stocks, the Soviets do not conceal a war-winning quantity of the most modern concoctions? In short, will the Paris Meeting of January 1989 prove to have been a breakthrough for international security, or for the unilateral disarmament of the West?

#### *Soviet Organization and Potential*

**C**hemical Troops – KvH. There are currently 100,000 fully trained KvH of which 45,000 are attached to regular Soviet and Warsaw Pact units. Training takes place in more than 200 facilities and includes protection techniques and decontamination. Officers receive a four to five year instruction period in either the Timoshenko Military Academy for Chemical Defence or Higher Military Engineering School of Chemical Defence. "Realistic" field training includes simulated offensives using mustard gas substitutes.<sup>14</sup> All Soviet chemical detection kits captured in the Middle East and Afghanistan were equipped to detect gases known to be in Soviet and Warsaw Pact arsenals only, as are the medical antidotes carried by their troops. General V.K. Pilalov was head of all CBW activity when he described these forces as "special troops designated for chemical warfare support of armed forces combat formations".<sup>15</sup>

*Soviet CBW Potential.* The Soviet Union has ten CW agent production centres, all in the west of its territory, and nine chemical weapons depots more widely dispersed west-east. Storage sites for operational areas face NATO positions and are in Czechoslovakia (with nine), East Germany (nine also) and Poland with four sites, three of which are seaward oriented. Further south, to complete the cordon, there are five sites in Hungary, four in Rumania and one in Bulgaria. The depots are organized for sophisticated distribution.

Chemical agents, stored in drums, are delivered by rail, tracks for which run into the depots from production centres. In the same complex chemical support vehicles assume liaison with KvHs, the Soviet chemical formations. Storage sites themselves are juxtaposed delivery systems and most CW agents are destined for incorporation into a delivery system "on the spot". Delivery is possible in any artillery weapon of 100 mm calibre or greater, from missiles and rockets, mortars and mines to bombs, spraying from the air and shelling from sea. The advent of the Soviet Typhoon class submarine and the military build-up in the Kola Peninsula bring the United States and Canada within range of chemical and biological attack from submarine-launched cruise missiles.

A statement made by the US Department of Defence in 1985 had this to say:

The USSR is better prepared to conduct operations in a chemical environment than any other force in the world. Soldiers receive extensive chemical de-



fence training. Most combat vehicles are equipped with a chemical protection system and a chemical detection alarm system. Chemical defence troops with specialized detection and decontamination equipment are found throughout the ground forces... Their continued testing of chemical weapons, the enlarged storage capacity of chemical agents and weapons, and the existence of active production facilities are indicators of a serious weapons program.<sup>16</sup>

**Chemical Agents.** There are eight basic categories of chemical warfare agents, namely:

- Choking agents such as Phosgene and Diposgene;
- Nerve agents, Tabun, Sarin, Soman and VX;
- Blood agents, Cyanogen chloride and Hydrogen cyanide;
- Blister agents, also known as Vesicants. These include all the "mustard" range, and Lewisite;
- Respiratory irritants (persistent) such as Diarylchloroarsine;
- Vomiting agents, Adamsite, Diphenylchloroarsine and Diphenylcyanoarsine;
- Lacrymatory agents such as Chloroacetophene and O-Chlorobenzylmalonotrile - CS;
- Incapacitating agents.

There are an estimated 300,000-400,000 tons of CW agents stockpiled, particularly within the range of the four most toxic - vesicants, nerve, blood and choking gases.

**Biological Agents.** The Soviet Union has a biological warfare test and evaluation centre on Vozrozhdeneniya Island in the Aral Sea and at least three Research and Development Institutes for biological warfare of which the Institute of Molecular Biology, some thirty km southeast of Novosibirsk, is largest, employing up to 2,000 scientists and technicians. It was from the Microbiological Research Institute in Sverdlovsk that a major leakage of anthrax dry spores occurred in 1979. As much as 22 lbs. (10 kg.) were released contaminating an area four or five kilometres in radius and reportedly leading to the deaths of approximately two thousand local inhabitants.

the new bacteria can be "programmed". The result is the spectre of "an organism owned by one aggressor nation which can produce it and its protective antiserum for its troops and population in large quantities at relatively small cost"<sup>17</sup>

It has taken decades of research for Soviet scientists to arrive at the level they have in all three biological ranges. As far back as 1971, the role that the State saw for such weapons within the future arsenal, was discussed during a Warsaw Pact scientific conference in East Germany. There it was reported

The rapid development of biological engineering will make it possible in just a few years to produce synthetic or partially synthetic toxins on a large scale. Such toxin agents represent a combination of the hitherto chemical and biological weapons.

Five years later the development had taken place and was already incorporated in Soviet Military Technology published in the Military encyclopedia. Other points from the Conference were:

Achievements in biology and related sciences (biochemistry, biophysics, molecular biology, genetics, microbiology and experimental aerobiology) have led to an increase in the effectiveness of biological agents as a means of conducting warfare. Improved

There are three categories of biological weapons. The first group are those organisms found in nature, alive and capable of reproducing themselves. Living viruses found in nature include yellow fever, smallpox, typhoid, plague, diphtheria, cholera, dysentery and anthrax. Of these, Soviet research appears to be concentrating on anthrax as it exists in active phase and in dry spore form, can be absorbed through the skin or by inhalation, and is as lethal to man as to livestock. The second category is the toxin range produced by bacteria and directed toward a specific human target. Thirdly, there are the microbiological organisms produced by genetic engineering. This latter group provides "model" agents to produce predetermined effects, be it to kill or temporarily incapacitate. It is also within this range that hallucinogens and psychochemical agents are to be found.

Of all the ranges mentioned, by far the most to be feared is the development in genetic engineering. By splicing DNA from an organism into another of grown controllable bacteria,



methods of obtaining and using them have resulted in a qualitative reexamination of the very concept of "biological weapons", and

Neurotropic toxins are toxic proteins which are primarily of the life cycle of micro-organisms. The neurotropic toxins are the most toxic chemical substances... Under combat conditions they can be used as an aerosol or in a solid or liquid state in mixed elements of ammunition; they can also be used for sabotage purposes.

*Protection of civilians in the USSR.* Protection of the civilian population in the USSR against chemical warfare attack is a longstanding commitment. From the age of eight years, all children are trained in "what to do", i.e. to mask up and seek shelter in communal centres.

If the Soviet Union is serious about abandoning CBW, a weapon system in which she has invested so heavily and in which she enjoys so commanding a lead, she will presumably dismantle the entire research and development, production, storage and supply apparatus, the civil defence program, as well as the KvH specialist troops.

#### *The Vulnerability of NATO*

President Reagan's decision to authorize the development and production of the Binary System in 1986 resulted from the evidence of Soviet build-up in CBW capability. The timing of this decision was crucial given that stockpiled chemical weapons have a shelf-life of only twenty years. With President Nixon halting all production in 1968, unless Reagan had made his decision, no nation within the military structure of NATO would have had a deterrent in kind. Nonetheless, even were the Soviet Union to forego further development and production, it would take the United States twenty years at current rate to lift its stocks to parity with the Soviet Union.

US stocks rapidly becoming obsolete are mainly at the Toole Army Depot in Utah. There is a small amount under US control in West Germany. This supply is due to be destroyed and there are no plans to stockpile new sources in Germany. Indeed, due to the hesitancy of all European NATO partners, the United States will not be deploying the Binary System in Europe at all, even if there is no treaty.

development in genetic engineering. By splicing DNA from an organism into another of grown controllable bacteria,

Great Britain abolished production of chemical warfare in 1948 and two decades later the Labour Party Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, underlined the fact by dumping Britain's remaining stock of 20,000 gas masks in the North Sea.

France, the only other independent nuclear nation in Western Europe, does produce a small amount of chemical warfare agent but is not in the integrated NATO structure and would not be obliged to react were any of its EEC or NATO partners so attacked.

Great strides have however been made in prophylaxis: the development of antidotes has gone ahead, and NATO's protective clothing is certainly superior to anything to be found within the Warsaw Pact. This consists of protective jacket and trousers, overboots, gloves and mask. The British S.10, developed at Porton Down, is perhaps the best of its kind and includes communication and drinking attachment. NATO's ability to detect the presence of toxic agents is advanced, as is the medical care of those affected by CBW. Yet none of these undeniable "good points" suffice to protect either our forces from threat or actual use of CW against them, or our civilian population.

There is no nation within NATO that has its civilian population protected against the effects of CBW. There is no provision for funding of clothing or medical care and, importantly, no structure per se within Civil Defence Organizations for this explicit purpose. Therefore there is a lack of training, understanding, and of course, facilities.

There are only two countries in Europe possessing what is required. Both are so-called "neutral nations": Sweden and Switzerland.

NATO's military ability to withstand CW attacks and to pursue a counter-offensive is impressive and sufficient to force hesitation on the part of the potential enemy. The vulnerability lies much more with the total lack of protection of the civilian populations. This fact diminishes NATO's ability to "protect" and could be a key consideration in any Soviet strategic planning.

#### *Proliferation*

Of no less concern to the West must be the proliferation of chemical and biological warfare agents within the developing world and the risk of such falling into the hands of terrorists and nations over whom we have little or no



control. In this context, the United States submitted two reports providing details of Soviet provision of CBW agents to developing nations which were known to have been used in conflict.<sup>18</sup> There have been other reports of CBW use, some confirmed, all with at least circumstantial evidence:

- Iraq's use of Tabun confirmed by Sweden;<sup>19</sup>
- Thailand's complaint against Vietnam in 1985;<sup>20</sup>
- Libyan use in Chad;
- Libyan use in Northern Uganda in support of the pro-Moscow government; and
- Cuban use against Jonas Savimbi's UNITA forces in Angola.<sup>21</sup>

The most recent evidence of chemical weapon usage against civilian populations is that of Iraq against the Kurdish minority.

Egypt has a potential as does North (and possibly South) Korea. But of all the nations acquiring or having access to CBW within the developing world, the most alarming for the West must be Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya.

Iraq has its own production centre some forty miles outside Samarra and its own "test grids". According to the influential *RUSI Newsbrief*, the installation extends over a surface of 25 sq km and has the ability to produce 1,000 tons of poison gas per year.<sup>22</sup>

Iran has had access to chemical weapons for some time and avowed publicly before the Iraq-Iran cease fire, to produce and use them. A reported agreement, said to have come into effect early in 1988, to provide Libya's Kaddafi with chemical weapons in return for deliveries of missiles, would indicate that Iran is already producing.<sup>23</sup>

Syria was reported in the spring of 1988 to have received a visit by General Pikalov, Commander of Soviet Chemical Forces, and that subsequently Syrian Frog and Scud missiles were armed with payloads of Vx – the highly toxic nerve agent. If this is confirmed, it will illustrate a new policy direction from Moscow far removed from the spirit of the Paris Meeting and present a risk of major destabilization in the Middle East and Gulf area.<sup>24</sup>

*Libya. Colonel Kaddafi is alleged to have used chemical agents*

in Chad against Hissene Habre's defenders and to have been involved in Uganda in like manner. Libya does have a production capability in Matan-as-Sarra and, more recently constructed, at Rabitah, 55 kilometres southwest of Tripoli, although there is no confirmation of actual manufacture. All four nations support, supply and harbour international terrorists.

The portent of CBW in the Middle East is not new: Egypt had the potential as early as 1950, perfected by importing East German technicians, and "field tested" in the Yemen Civil War. Since that time, the Arab world has divided into two camps, the pro-Iraq (Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf States) and pro-Iran (Libya and Syria). Both camps have developed their missile arsenals and both have opted for acquisition of CBW. It was to be Iraq's use of chemical weapons, however, that introduced them to inter-Islamic conflict. Initially they converted "smoke" ammunition to chemical munitions; then they were supplied with Soviet-made chemical weapons, including diversified delivery systems. By 1985, Egypt had assisted Iraq in converting a pesticide plant at Samarra into a nerve agent facility – making Iraq the principal producer of toxic chemicals in the region. In the volatility of the Middle East, it is difficult to believe that once such weapons are introduced they will not become the norm. It is a pattern that risks recurring throughout the developing world. How to contain its implications will be a major problem not only for the West but eventually for the Soviet Union as well.

### Industrial Disasters

Most thought is given to the military and subversive application of CBW and its effect upon the military and civilian population. The question of commercial (industrial) disasters must also be taken into consideration, however. No better example of the problem can be given than the tragedy in Bhopal. There on December 3, 1984, about forty tons of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) – an intermediate in the production of insecticide – leaked into the atmosphere.

More than two thousand people died within two days in and around Bhopal and a further twenty thousand were seriously afflicted with lung lesions. There were no textual guidelines for such an occurrence and even the US company concerned, Union Carbide Corporation, was at a loss. Since that time there have been several industrial accidents.

the most recent being in France in 1987, in the Soviet Union in January 1988, when a train carrying...

High winds...



the most recent being in France in 1987, in the Soviet Union in January 1988, when a train carrying hazchem derailed, and in Poole, England, in June 1988. In all cases, hundreds of people were evacuated and although evacuation was conducted in an orderly and controlled fashion, the lack of comprehensive parameters within which to conduct the work or any centralized backup for such specific incidents became painfully obvious. Should evacuation be required under a wartime situation, Civil Defence (volunteers), Fire Brigades and Police would be unable to cope with the situation.

### *Protecting the Civilian Population*

**I**n 1982 the Swedish Government issued the following decree:

The civilian population should in the first case be protected from the effects of conventional weapons. The Defence Committee considers that the continuing armament concerning chemical weapons has increased the risk of these weapons being utilized. Increased attention should therefore be paid to protection against chemical weapons and noted when framing a total defence strategy in conventional war. In order to limit damage, ability to detect, give alarm and to command, as well as knowledge of the effects of these weapons, should be aimed at.<sup>25</sup>

Effective protection of the civilian population is dependent upon plans having been made and implemented based on likely scenarios that may have to be faced. It is perhaps pertinent that we consider such a hypothetical situation here. Let us imagine a toxic cloud. As it moves downwind it mixes with ever increasing amounts of air, becoming larger and more dilute. Diffusion of the vapour vertically and at right angles to direction of motion reduces the exposure to someone standing in its path. Diffusion forward and backwards along the direction of travel in general does not reduce the amount inhaled by someone in the path of the cloud.

The rate of vertical and lateral mixing of the toxic cloud with the surrounding air can vary enormously depending on weather conditions. A bright sunshiny day promoting convection of the atmosphere close to the ground, will cause rapid vertical mixing. A turbulent wind will promote lateral mixing.

High windspeeds also reduce the time that a person is immersed in a passing cloud and directly reduces the amount he or she will inhale for a given quantity going by. The worst conditions providing the greatest threat to people at the greatest distance downwind occur under conditions of light, steady winds, a clear night with cooling of the ground to cause vertical stability in the atmosphere and the existence of a temperature inversion not too far above the ground to trap the chemical close to it. Conditions very similar to this were responsible for the casualties at the Bhopal incident.

*A Warning System.* Evaluation of what is happening is a major priority when considering evacuation. Evacuation is a way of increasing the distance between the population and a hazard and is the counter-measure to toxic chemical releases. It is very effective for slowly developing hazards. Slowly developing hazards can include a relatively small leak of a volatile toxic chemical or a large spill of low volatility but highly toxic substance. Or again, a progressive accident such as a fire, which does not at first cause release of toxic chemicals but has the potential of spreading to nearby equipment, tanks and drums containing toxics.

Of course it is evident that there must be an adequate warning system of an attack or hazard. Some chemicals have a strong odour and lower degree of toxicity, such as chlorine and hydrogen sulphide, and would be easily detected. It is the physiologically undetectable agents at low but lethal concentration, such as nerve agents, that would be most worrying. If the agent is released subtly through unobserved corroding of a storage cylinder, or clandestinely – as by a terrorist or saboteur – the only indication that something was amiss would be people collapsing.

Detection apparatus has been developed to very high standards. Particularly is this the case with the British CAM (Chemical Agent Monitor). Hand held, it is specifically developed for the military and, apart from Switzerland and Sweden, no nation outside the Warsaw Pact bloc has any detection and alarm provision for the civilian population.

*A Protective System.* The bottom line of protection must be the ability to provide shelter, protective clothing (including respiratory aids) medical assistance and alarm systems. These factors are vital whether evacuation is to take place or not.

All are within the realm of possibility. Portable shelters for from five to twenty five people already exist, as do



prophylaxis (medical antidotes) and protective clothing. None has been included in any structure within NATO nations' Civil Defence. Nor is there any information on procedure for public distribution or specific training sessions for Civil Defence organizations, Fire Brigades and Police on whose shoulders will fall the awesome responsibility of care and evacuation in time of crisis.

### *Banning Chemical and Biological Weapons*

**E**fforts to achieve a definitive ban on the production and possession of chemical weapons have been ongoing for ninety years. The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 stipulated that the contracting powers agreed to "abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases".<sup>26</sup>

The Hague Conference eight years later outlawed the "use of poisons". Use of chemical weapons in the First World War, however, brought clearer definitions in the prohibiting directives incorporated in the texts of Resolutions taken at the 1923 Conference of Central American States and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, supported in 1932 at the League of Nations General Disarmament Conference. Post Second World War saw the issue raised again at the Disarmament Commission of 1953, the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament of 1960, the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament 1962 and all meetings of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva since 1969.

Despite such efforts, as analyst Hugh Stringer indicates, agreement to date remains that established in Geneva in 1925 prohibiting "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices".<sup>27</sup>

The Geneva Protocol is ratified by 118 nations.

The question of effective control of biological weapons promises to be even more difficult. To a certain extent any negotiations on this problem have been overtaken by events, particularly the emergence of Soviet research and development in "genetic engineering". The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, concluded in 1972 and signed by 111 nations, including the Soviet Union, states that the agreeing parties will never develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise ac-

quire or retain microbial or other biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, or weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

The same regulations oblige signatories

not to transfer to any recipient, and not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organizations, to manufacture or otherwise acquire such agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery.

In all those cases the Soviet Union is in violation.

Developments nevertheless took place between 1972 and 1977 when the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament concentrated on banning chemical weapons. A British proposal tabled in 1976 was followed by the Soviet Union and United States agreeing to bilateral negotiations, which were halted in 1980 after verification disagreements between the two parties. It is significant in this context that the Soviet Union only began to show signs of "willingness" for international, then bilateral, talks when it became apparent that Western apprehension about Soviet activities in this field threatened reaction and, in the case of the United States, augured the onset of the US Binary System.

The forty-nation Conference on Disarmament reconvened in 1982 and established the basis for ongoing negotiations comprising:

- A declaration of current chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities by all States party to the Convention;
- Agreement to destroy over a ten year period all chemical weapons and production facilities;
- Verification of the stockpile declaration and destruction;
- Verification that certain industrial chemicals are not being diverted into secret military stockpiles;
- Monitoring of small-scale approved production facilities for protective purposes; and
- Establishment of appropriate international bodies to oversee implementation of the Convention.



The recurrent theme here is one of verification. The West's request that on-site verification should be possible within twenty-four hours notice was immediately dismissed by the Soviet delegate, Viktor Issraelyan, as "provocative".

The visit by specialist teams from within NATO to the Shikhany Proving Grounds in the Soviet Union in 1988 is nonetheless a step forward, even given that the items for examination were old stock and that the Soviets admitted to stockpiling only 50,000 tons – a fraction of what they are known to possess.

There are three major obstacles to obtaining a true and workable ban on both chemical and biological agents. First is the question of how to define what constitutes a chemical and biological agent and how to eliminate certain elements within them that are utilized either in commercial practice or as basis for prophylaxis in the civilian field. Second is the problem of verification. Given that both chemical warfare agents and biological toxins can be produced in areas similar to industrial requirement and given that chemical agents can be produced in a small area and easily dissimulated, the possibilities of "hiding" are increased in nations which do not enjoy freedom of the press. Even were some solution found to both problems, the third would remain the most intractable: how to implement sanctions against violators.

All these points were cogently put by a US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report:

Given the many technical as well as political difficulties which remain to be resolved, conclusion of a chemical weapons prohibition is not likely to occur in the near term. Verification issues will be difficult to resolve and will require prolonged negotiation. Until the verification and other issues are satisfactorily resolved, an effective and comprehensive chemical weapons prohibition which fully protects U.S. and Free World interests will not be possible.<sup>28</sup>

It seems unlikely that Mr. Shevardnadze's gesture will fundamentally alter this situation, although it may increase pressure on Western negotiators to accept a less than satisfactory arrangement.

The offer was made during the opening session of the 149-nation Paris Summit Meeting on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, and it was conditional on reciprocation by the United States. It was not a difficult manoeuvre for the USSR, given

the enormous publicity generated by the conference, constant international tension between the United States and Libya over Rabitah, and in the light of the huge disparity in stock levels between the two superpowers brought about by Soviet production throughout the years covered by the Nixon Moratorium. It is generally perceived that the Soviet Union's proposal would have justified Western optimism had it incorporated a truthful acknowledgment of Soviet stock levels, instead of reiterating the 50,000 tons figure. It is only when both sides trust the figures of the other that negotiations can progress towards abolition.

### Conclusions

Political considerations arising from the promise of Glasnost and the relaxing of tension concerning nuclear conflict, have served as a brake to planning for protection against the threat that will take the place of nuclear arms as we go into the 1990's – chemical and biological warfare. In these the Soviet Union has a vast arsenal, well trained forces and decontamination procedures that ensure pursuance of advance in contaminated battlefield conditions, and a program of civilian protection. It has violated commitments under treaties of which it is signatory by providing such weaponry to other nations and has resorted to the use of toxic substances in areas of conflict.

The Western Allies may well find themselves in a "cleft stick" – wishing to protect the civilian population yet not knowing how to introduce the subject to the public during a time of Glasnost and after undeniable success and progress in negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear disarmament and other issues. In this respect, there is a danger that the hype produced by the Paris Conference will lead to a false and dangerous assumption of security and optimism. For a long time to come, the West must temper its optimism over East-West relations with the caution that history shows to be essential.

The proliferation of CBW in developing nations could eventually prove a more intransigent problem and risk than that of Soviet possession and intent. Specially dangerous is the portent of usage of CBW in inter-Third World conflict and acquisition of these weapons by terrorist organizations.

Finally, in listing the threats, there is the increased risk of industrial or natural disasters as the world gears itself to more advanced technology and production and manufacturing pro-



cesses.

For all these reasons, it is vital that Western governments embark on a program to protect their civilian populations against CBW – the threat of the future.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Recent sources in this field include: M. Dabros, "Canada's Chemical Warfare Policy", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1988; Joseph D. Douglass, Jr and Neil C. Livingstone (i) *America The Vulnerable Atom Bomb*, National Security Paper No. 1 (Cambridge, Mass: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc, 1984); Manfred Hamm, *Chemical Warfare: The Growing Threat to Europe* (London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1984); John Hemsley, "The Soviet Bio-Chemical Threat: The Real Issue", *RUSI Journal*, Vol 133, No. 1, Spring 1988; Amoretta M. Hoeber, "The Chemistry of Defeat: Asymmetries in US and Soviet Chemical Warfare Postures", *Special Report* (Cambridge, Mass: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc, 1981); Mark C. Storella, "Poisoning Arms Control", *Special Report* (Cambridge, Mass: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc, 1984); Hugh Stringer, "Deterring Chemical Warfare: US Policy Options for the 1990s", *Foreign Policy Report* (New York, London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986); *Soviet Chemical Weapons Threat* (Washington, DC: Defence Intelligence Agency DST-1620F-051-85, 1986); *Soviet Biological Warfare Threat* (Washington, DC: Defence Intelligence Agency DST-1610F-057-86, 1986).
- <sup>2</sup> See, for instance, *Toronto Star*, 7 January 1989, p. A10: the reporter's history begins in 1915 and includes unfounded propaganda accusations of US and UK use.
- <sup>3</sup> Colonel G. Alksnis, *Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* (Moscow), No. 1, January 1980.
- <sup>4</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel F. Vladimirov, *Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No. 7, July 1983.
- <sup>5</sup> Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Ogarkov, *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976-80), Vol. 8, p. 372.
- <sup>6</sup> Stringer, cited, p. 56.
- <sup>7</sup> Colonels Yuri Kudachkin and A. Polyak, *Voyennij Vestnik*, May 1983.
- <sup>8</sup> Brigadier Watay quoted Yossef Bodansky, *Soviet Chemical Warfare – Introduction to Use in the Third World* (New York: unpublished paper, 1986).
- <sup>9</sup> A.N. Kalitayev, G.A. Zhivet'yev and V.V. Myaskinov, *Defence from Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Handbook* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984), p. 111.
- <sup>10</sup> E.B. le Chêne, *Chemical Warfare Agents: Protection of the Civilian Population, a Feasibility Study* (London: February 1988, Private paper for restricted circulation), Emphasis added.
- <sup>11</sup> Hemsley, cited, p. 59.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid, p. 60.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid, p. 61.
- <sup>14</sup> J.P. Perry Robinson, "Chemical Warfare Capabilities of the Warsaw and North Atlantic Treaty Organizations: An Overview from Open Sources", in *Chemical Weapons: Destruction and Conversion* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1980), p. 35.
- <sup>15</sup> General V.K. Pikalov, *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976-80), Volume 8, p. 372.
- <sup>16</sup> *Soviet Military Power* (Washington, DC: US Department of Defence, 1985), pp. 71-72.
- <sup>17</sup> Martin Elliot Silverstein, "Chemical and Biological Defenses for the Civilian Population", paper to Conference of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 1 September 1986, p. 9.
- <sup>18</sup> *Special Reports* Nos. 98 (March 1982) and 104 (November 1982) (Washington, DC: US Department of State).
- <sup>19</sup> UN Security Council Document S 16433, 26 March 1984; Report "The Growing CW Threat" by the Swedish National Defence Research Institute, Spring 1986.
- <sup>20</sup> *NBC Defense and Technology* (New York) May 1986, p. 40.
- <sup>21</sup> Report by Aubin Heyndrickx, Head of Toxicology, University of Ghent, submitted to the United Nations Secretary General, March 1988, following investigations in Angola by E.B. le Chêne and Heyndrickx's team, 1986.
- <sup>22</sup> *RUSI Newsbrief*, June 1988, Vol. 8, No. 6, pp. 46-48.
- <sup>23</sup> *Washington Times*, 8 April 1988.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>25</sup> Tjorneryd and Svennerstedt, paper, "Swedish Civil Defence Administration", at Second International Symposium on Chemical Warfare Agents, Stockholm, 1986.
- <sup>26</sup> J.B. Scott, *The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907* (1915) pp. 225-226, cited Stringer, p. 22.
- <sup>27</sup> Stringer, p. 23.
- <sup>28</sup> "US Arms Control", *Annual Report of the US Arms Control Disarmament Agency*, Washington, DC, March 1984, pp. 186-187.



CBS News Nightwatch

WUSA-TV

January 4, 1989

2:30 A.M.

CBS Network

Washington, D.C.

## Chemical Weapons Proliferation

SCOTT SIMON: You've seen the footage of the devastation caused by chemical weapons on human beings: the burned skin, burned eyes and nasal passages, and the dead. Their use was dramatized last September when the United States charged that Iraq had used poison gas against Kurdish villages. There are estimates that the manufacture of chemical weapons in the developing world is exploding, despite the fact that they're banned under international law.

President-elect George Bush has vowed to combat what he calls "this terrible scourge," once in office. Action in that regard may already be in the works. Secretary of State George Shultz, according to published reports appearing Tuesday, is expected to propose giving the United Nations Secretary General more power to investigate the use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world. The United States also has protested to West Germany, alleging that a company there helped Libya build a chemical weapons plant.

Two people who know a great deal about these so-called poor man's nuclear weapons are with us now. Elisa Harris is a guest scholar at Brookings Institute in Washington. She's a specialist in chemical and biological weapons and arms control. And Seth Carus is a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He's written a recent scholarly paper outlining which Middle Eastern countries manufacture chemical weapons.

And thank you very much for being with us.

Let me ask you both. Do you think the case that Libya has a chemical weapons facility about to go on line is good? Do you think it's true?



SPECIAL EDITORIAL

W. SETH CARUS: I think it's a very solid case. The U.S. has been developing the information on this for a long period of time. And I suspect as long ago as a year we pretty much had the outlines of what was happening.

The reason it's taken so long to make it public is that the U.S. was trying quiet diplomacy to try to convince our allies to, basically, clamp down on these activities. The quiet diplomacy didn't succeed. And as a result, the U.S. has gone public.

SIMON: Allies like and including West Germany?

CARUS: Especially West Germany.

SIMON: Let's return to that.

Miss Harris, do you have any reason to doubt the United States' case? And we raise it because, of course, the United States has proven to have unreliable information in the past about chemical weapons.

ELISA HARRIS: I think it's precisely because the United States has been burned, if you will, on other chemical-weapons-related issues -- in the case of the use of Yellow Rain in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, for example. Those allegations have subsequently been called into question by scientists and others in a position to make good judgments. So I think it's precisely because its allegations have been questioned in the past that the U.S. has been very careful in the case of Libya and in its other statements about potential proliferators in the Third World.

So, although I don't have access to intelligence information, I have no reason to doubt the U.S. charges with respect to the Libyan facility. Despite what Muammar Qaddafi says, it appears that this is in fact a chemical weapons production plant.

SIMON: What about the West German participation in it? Is it not possible that this could have been stopped a year ago,



have started in the first case. ... to think that if  
This isn't the first time the United States has had

serious problems with West German companies. The Iraqi chemical  
production capability was largely the creation of German  
companies. This is very well documented. And yet the Germans,  
to this date, have not prosecuted a single company or individual  
associated with that effort.

HARRIS: I'm not sure that's actually accurate. I know  
that there are 12 West German companies that are under  
investigation at this time for having violated German export  
control laws concerning the provision of chemical materials to  
Iraq. They did, in fact, in 1984 try and stop one of their  
companies, called Kolb, from providing material to Iraq. And the  
German government lost that particular suit in the courts.

So, they have in fact tried to prosecute some of these  
companies that have violated export controls.

The other thing I think one has to bear in mind is that  
this is not just a West German problem. There are other  
countries whose companies have been involved in supplying Iraq,  
as well as Libya, and other countries in the Third World who've  
developed chemical weapons, countries such as Holland. U.S.  
companies have been implicated in, wittingly or unwittingly,  
supplying chemicals to some of these countries.

Throughout NATO and, in fact, in much of the Warsaw Pact  
as well, there are companies that have been involved in the  
proliferation of CW capabilities in the developing world.

SIMON: A casual observer might note that this seems  
like something that's pretty easy to stop. Can't you, even in  
Western democracies, enjoin private companies from selling that  
kind of material anywhere?



CARUS: It's not that easy. But I mean you can take steps. In the case...

SIMON: Well, tell us why it isn't that easy. Some of these chemicals have legitimate purposes? Is that it?

CARUS: Many of these chemicals are used routinely for perfectly legitimate chemical purposes. In fact, one of the major chemical agents -- it's not used a lot, but it has been used in the past -- is a chemical called phosgene, which in fact is produced commercially in enormous quantities in the United States for other reasons.

So, the chemical industry is so large and so diverse that the chemicals that you need to make chemical agents, the precursor chemicals, are routinely available. And there are a lot of ways of getting hold of those chemicals. If you can buy them, you can often make them yourself.

So, it's a difficult process. The fact that we've failed is not a result of, necessarily, the fact that we haven't tried. It's, in part, a result of the fact that it is an intractable problem.

But there are -- I mean there are things you can do. Unlike the West Germans, for example, the Dutch clamped down on people who were trying to sell chemicals. And in fact, the Belgians, after an American company there sold a precursor for mustard gas, actually forced the company to stop making that chemical.

So, you can take steps. And I don't think the U.S. has any problem with the Dutch or Belgians, even though chemical agents' precursors have come from there, primarily because the countries have worked to bring the activities of their companies under control.

I really think the problem we have with the West Germans is that, you know, despite the fact there was an investigation a year ago into 12 or 13 companies, nothing's come of it since



then. Despite the fact that the Germans were unable to prevent the transfer of manufacturing equipment years ago, the Germans have still not taken steps to change their laws or enforcement mechanisms.

SIMON: We want to move on to some other aspects on the question in a moment, if you'll stay with us.

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SIMON: Back on Nightwatch, talking about chemical weapons and the recent decision to ask the United Nations Secretary General to become instrumental in trying to investigate the possibility that chemical weapons plants are about to come on line.

Let me turn to you and ask you if that strikes you as a practical idea. Does the United Nations maintain the kind of surveillance capability that can do that?

HARRIS: Well, it's a very practical idea, and in fact it's a practical idea that's already been implemented. For several years, the U.N. Secretary General has had the authority given to him by the members of the United Nations to send investigative teams to areas where there are reports of chemical weapons having been used. He's created a list of experts to carry out these investigations. They have developed procedures for doing the inspections. They have a list of laboratories that will analyze samples brought back from conflict areas.

So, there's nothing new in what was discussed in the morning papers.

SIMON: But let me ask question, though. I mean I think I understand how you can bring evidence back that chemical weapons have been used. But on the other hand, if you're investigating a facility that allegedly is about to become a chemical weapons facility, surely that facility can be dressed up for the day of the inspection.

HARRIS: Well, it can...



SIMON: So that the evidence is conclusive.

HARRIS: It can, depending on how much notice is given. If you get an inspection team in there within 24 hours, I should think, especially if it's already been involved in producing chemical warfare agents, the inspection team should be able to uncover evidence of that having taken place.

Getting back to your earlier question about whether this U.N. role is a way to get at the problem, that's one way of getting at the problem. That's already been underway for several years. But if we want to deal with the Libyan problem more immediately, there are two things that can be done, it seems to me. One is to continue to put pressure on the countries whose companies have been involved in helping to construct that facility, make it clear to those governments that their companies have got to stop providing the chemicals and the equipment that would enable that facility to go into full-scale production. It's now or never. They've got to put a complete and total ban on these supplies to Libya.

The second thing that can be done can be done by Libya itself if it wants to avoid a military strike against this facility. And that is for Libya to open up that facility to international inspectors, not a one-time inspection, but on a continuous basis.

SIMON: Well, what if it is a chemical weapons plant? They won't do it, then.

HARRIS: Obviously, they won't. I mean Qaddafi has said that this is a pharmaceutical factory. The German company, Imhausen, that's been implicated in being involved in the construction has said they were making plastic bags. All the same, we've got air defenses around the facility. So it seems to me that it must be making chemical weapons. And Qaddafi, presumably, would not allow this sort of continuous inspection, for that reason.



...AL WEAPONS  
a military strike, is that the United States raises the possibility of  
facility like this?

HARRIS: I think it's a last-resort measure. It seems  
to me that the first two things I mentioned ought to be pursued  
first. We ought to try and persuade our allies and have the  
Soviet Union persuade its allies to stop providing the material  
to Libya. That's got to be the first step.

And the second step is, if Qaddafi really wants to  
avoid...

SIMON: But let me point out, material is already there.

CARUS: Well, but I think...

SIMON: If they come on line tomorrow, aren't those  
options neglected?

CARUS: Well, I think -- actually not. I think, first  
of all, that it's not complete. They still need more assistance.  
They still need more chemicals.

The second thing is that a factory of this kind consumes  
itself. You're using very corrosive materials and you periodi-  
cally have to, essentially, rebuild the factory. So that if you  
can cut off the technical support, even if they can go on line in  
a limited way, eventually they're going to run out of steam, just  
because the factory is going to fall apart.

But I think that the reason the U.S. is going so visibly  
public is because we believe that if we can put a halt to it now,  
we can prevent the plant from going on line.

SIMON: Chemical weapons, of course, have been called  
the poor man's nuclear weapon. They are considered to be  
relatively inexpensive to construct. I guess their production is  
considered sometimes relatively easy to conceal. And their use,  
of course, has devastating effect, particularly against  
civilians, as opposed to soldiers.

That being noted, there are people in some of the



countries who have been involved with these weapons who will say, "Look. The Western World has no license to give us a lecture about chemical weapons as long as they have nuclear weapons, which have taken far many more lives and have demonstrated themselves to be the most devastating weapon conceived of in this century."

How do you answer that question?

HARRIS: Well, it seems to me that Third World countries actually make two arguments. One is that these are, in fact, our weapons of mass destruction, because we can't acquire nuclear weapons, both because of the difficulty in acquiring the material and because of the technical skills required. Chemical weapons are the alternative for Third World countries. That's one point.

The second thing I believe one has heard from Third World countries, and will hear increasingly, is that there is nothing in international law that says that Third World countries can't possess chemical weapons. The 1927 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons, not the possession. And in fact, the United States not only possesses chemical weapons, but has been building new ones since December of 1987. The Soviet Union also has...

SIMON: The United States does possess chemical weapons.

HARRIS: We have a very substantial stockpile, and that is being added to as of a year ago.

The Soviet Union also has a substantial stockpile of chemical weapons.

So, in effect, we're saying that there's a -- it's all right for superpowers to have these weapons, but it's not all right for the Third World to have them. And that does not go down well in the Third World.

SIMON: How do we meet that argument, both that if the United States possesses chemical weapons and if the United States possesses even more devastating weapons -- do we put developing



countries in the position of saying that these things need to be developed for our own self-defense?

CARUS: Well, I think right now the U.S. position is that ultimately we would like to have a world in which nobody has these weapons. The bottom-line position of the United States is that we should change the international law so that the possession and manufacture of any chemical agent is proscribed, a strengthening of the existing one.

I don't think that we're more concerned about the Third World than we are about, say, the Soviet Union. It's a general concern. And I think ultimately the United States would like to be in a position where we don't have them either.

SIMON: Okay. Thank you very much.

LONG ISLAND NEWSDAY

18 January 1989

Pg. 57

## It Won't Be Easy To Police a Ban On Poison Gas

By Charles C. Flowerree

**I**RAQ'S USE of chemical warfare and the strong suspicion that Libya has constructed a poison gas plant have awakened world concern about the ominous threat of these abhorrent weapons. Accompanying that concern is an underlying fear that there is little the United States or its friends can do to halt the spread of chemical weapons to countries that operate outside the norms of acceptable international behavior.

The brouhaha over the Libyan revelations and the U.S. downing of two Libyan jets earlier this month tended to obscure the original purpose of last week's Paris conference on chemical weapons. In his United Nations speech in September, President Ronald Reagan said: "It is incumbent upon all civilized nations to ban once and for all, and on a verifiable and global basis, the use of chemical and gas warfare."

The operative word here is "use." In the absence of an international treaty banning the manufacture and possession of chemical weapons, the only relevant instrument is the solemn but toothless Geneva Protocol of 1925 outlawing the use of chemical weapons,



Charles C. Flowerree, a retired ambassador, had extensive experience with efforts to ban chemical weapons while serving in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1977 to 1980 and as U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 1980 and 1981.

to which some 123 nations, including Iraq and Libya, have subscribed.

The protocol says nothing about manufacturing chemical weapons and equipping armed forces with these weapons. Rogue nations as well as responsible members of the world community can do so without violating any international statutes.

Indeed, many parties to the protocol, including the United States, have reserved the right to respond in kind to a chemical attack.

The Libyan development was a diversion from the original purpose of the Paris conference, which had been stimulated by Iraq's use of chemical weapons in its war with Iran and, reportedly, against its own Kurdish population. The fact that Iraq escaped from these transgressions with only the diplomatic equivalent of a slap on the wrist (in part because the West and most of the Arab states did not want to see an Iraqi defeat) made some sort of concerted international expres-



# The Gas Truth Leak

Pg. 10

The truth about that poison gas plant in Libya continues to leak out, much to the embarrassment of West Germany. Contrary to Chancellor Helmut Kohl's initial indignant denial that West German firms have contributed to the project, his government now admits there is evidence that German companies are involved. In fact, one of the alleged participants is a state-owned firm.

Exactly what the Bonn government will do to rectify this shameful situation is not entirely clear. The Reagan administration seems certain that West Germany and other European countries will cooperate to see that Libya does not receive the equipment and expert advice it needs to complete the plant. Were Libya to receive such assistance immediately, it could begin producing poison gas within the next few months.

Bonn's admission about German involvement in the project has justified the "media campaign" that the Reagan administration supposedly inspired against it. Mr. Kohl reportedly believes the president leaked information about the plant to generate public pressure against German participation. If Mr. Reagan did that, he performed a great service for mankind. Had their role not been publicized, would the German

companies' activities have gone unchallenged and unchecked?

The Kohl government also is under pressure from high-technology exporters who, always eager to find new markets, are not exactly elated by American efforts to restrict their trading opportunities on security grounds. But their interest in making profits is outweighed by the need to keep an agent of mass destruction out of the hands of a lunatic like Libya's Moammar Gadhafi.

Under his control, a gas plant would be especially dangerous and destabilizing in a region that already is volatile. Israel's reaction illustrates this point. Noting that Libya is one of their country's most dangerous enemies, Israeli leaders have vowed that "whoever would dare to use this kind of weapon against Israeli military units or Israeli civilian targets will be clobbered 100 times if not more." It is not unthinkable that Israel, which can afford to take no big chances, might even conclude that a pre-emptive strike against the horrifying threat of poison gas would be justified.

Libya's plans to build its factory of death must be thwarted. Let the technology exporters find other markets and other uses for their expertise and their products.

BOSTON GLOBE

6 January 1989

Pg. 10

## The chemical-warfare threat

The furor over a chemical-weapons plant in Libya and the downing of two Libyan MIGs should not obscure the urgent need for international cooperation against the manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. The threat of chemical warfare is grave and immediate, and there can be no realistic chance of prevention without international provisions for verification and enforcement.

An appreciation of this reality is evident in the proposals Secretary of State George Shultz will make this weekend at a Paris conference convened to reinforce the 1925 Geneva Protocol that outlawed the use of chemical weapons.

Shultz is expected to ask that the United Nations secretary general be empowered to investigate charges that chemical weapons have been used, and that UN trade sanctions be employed against violators of a new treaty banning the production, accumulation and transfer of chemical armaments. A practical aim of the Paris conference is to provide political impetus to the 40-nation Geneva negotiations on

chemical warfare that have dawdled on for too long without producing such a treaty.

Shultz' mission signifies a belated recognition that certain problems cannot be solved by a unilateral use of American force. Many nations, including the United States, already possess a chemical-warfare capability, and many others contribute to the proliferation of chemical weapons. There are grounds for doubting that an international ban against these weapons can be enforced, but it is certain that the United States, acting alone, cannot prohibit the acquisition or use of poison gas.

One hundred and forty-one nations will be represented at the Paris conference. The task of diplomatic persuasion will require tact and patience, qualities that the Reagan administration has displayed infrequently during the past eight years.

Nonetheless, it is never too late to learn from experience, and the wisdom of this multilateral approach may be the best legacy this administration could leave to its successor.



Representatives of 150 nations signed a declaration condemning the use of chemical weapons and reaffirming the Geneva Protocol. The United States and the Soviet Union, in addition, indicated a strong desire to have all such weapons eliminated.

The Soviets opened the conference with a pledge to destroy their stockpiles.

been productive. U.S. officials said the treaty exceeded their expectations. Arab nations didn't hold out for language that continued their argument with Israel. U.S. and Soviet delegates cooperated. This round of successful diplomacy was a commendable step away from a savage and vicious practice.

## Penalize Chemical Arms Users, Makers

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is pushing a set of bipartisan bills to punish foreign governments that use chemical or biological weaponry as well as the private companies that assist in the production of such weapons of mass destruction. It's about time.

The two bills are sponsored by committee chairman Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island, and the ranking minority member, Sen. Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina. The first bill requires U.S. diplomatic and economic sanctions against governments that violate the 1925 treaty that prohibits using chemical weapons against other nations or their own people.

A second bill would deny American markets for three years to any firm or its subsidiary that supplies the technology, equipment or chemicals to these nations. These companies could also lose their patent rights in the United States.

The proliferation of chemical weapons

— the poor nation's atomic bomb — is a growing danger, with as many as 20 countries believed capable of producing such arms. The deadly use of gas by the Iraqis, in the gulf war and against Kurdish civilians, has undermined the traditional abhorrence of such weapons. Coupled with the proliferation of ballistic missiles, gas attacks against cities — particularly in another Mideast war — could become more likely.

As needed as these sanctions are, problems with verification exist. Unlike nuclear weapon technology, most plants that can make chemical arms and toxic chemicals are dual-use facilities, usable for both peaceful and warlike purposes.

The so-called Australian group of Western nations that exchanges information on this problem is poorly organized and lacks enforcement powers. Establishing an effective international oversight group for controlling chemical arms should be the first order of business.

ST. LOUIS POST-  
DISPATCH

29 Jan 1989 Pg. 2B

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## Pact on Chemical Weapons Reflects Well on Diplomats

The use of poison gas in the World War I trenches produced hideous results. Soldiers by the thousands died or were permanently disabled as clouds of mustard gas or chlorine blistered their skin and ate away their lungs. The resulting horror and revulsion were reflected in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, an international agreement banning the use of chemical weapons.

The agreement was largely respected during World War II, in part because Hitler and other Axis leaders knew that the Allies had stockpiles of chemical weapons and could retaliate if necessary. After the war, the Soviet Union and the United States both built inventories of chemical weapons, although the United States halted production from 1969 to 1987 at a time when the Soviets were modernizing and expanding their arsenal.

Events this week in Paris strengthened the international commitment to keep chemical weapons out of combat. Representatives of 150 nations signed a declaration condemning the use of chemical weapons and reaffirming the Geneva Protocol. The United States and the Soviet Union, in addition, indicated a strong desire to have all such weapons eliminated.

The Soviets opened the conference with a pledge to destroy their stockpiles.

President-elect George Bush has called for the total destruction of chemical weapons worldwide.

Some of the worst problems with chemical weapons have arisen in the Middle East, where Iraq used poison gas against Iranian troops. It is widely believed that Syria, Egypt and Israel, along with Iraq and Iran, have chemical weapons and that Libya is completing a manufacturing facility for the weapons. Some of Israel's enemies said they consider chemical weapons necessary to deter Israel from using nuclear weapons.

It is encouraging that a majority of the world's nations have affirmed a commitment not to use chemical weapons, to convene another conference to ban the production and development of such weapons and to give the secretary-general of the United Nations a role in investigating violations of the treaty.

International conferences of this sort are not always productive. This one has been productive. U.S. officials said the treaty exceeded their expectations. Arab nations didn't hold out for language that continued their argument with Israel. U.S. and Soviet delegates cooperated. This round of successful diplomacy was a commendable step away from a savage and vicious practice.

## Penalize Chemical Arms Users

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ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH

29 Jan 1989

Pg. 2B



## Tighten the ban on chemical weapons

HARTFORD COURANT

7 January 1989

Pg. B8

The manufacture and stockpile of chemical weapons may be immoral, but no international law prohibits such activity. Governments may produce and store these arms, so long as they do not use them.

An attempt to close that senseless loophole in the 1925 Geneva Protocol will be made at a conference in Paris beginning today. Delegates from 140 nations will participate in the effort to toughen the Geneva agreement on the use of chemical weapons.

Evidence indicates that such weapons have been used in recent years by Iraq and Iran against each other, by the Soviets against Afghan guerrillas and by the combatants in Cambodia. Syria, Israel and Egypt also reportedly make the killer gases. The United States and the Soviet Union continue to manufacture and stockpile these weapons.

The thought that a mercurial leader — Libya's Moammar Gadhafi, for instance — could start supplying combatants or terrorists with chemical weapons is discomforting, to put it mildly.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz is

expected to propose at the Paris conference increasing the powers of the United Nations to investigate charges that chemical weapons have been used anywhere in the world.

At a time when these arms are considered by some to be just another weapon in the arsenal, it's clear that the Geneva agreement needs strengthening. The agreement prohibits the use but not the manufacture or possession of chemical weapons, and has no enforcement provisions.

One proposal that the delegates in Paris are expected to consider is the imposition of a worldwide ban on making, storing and shipping chemical weapons. It would give the U.N. secretary-general the power to investigate any alleged uses of these weapons. It may call for sanctions against any country violating its provisions.

George Bush has said that one of his highest priorities as president will be dealing with "this terrible scourge." What a strike for global sanity it would if a total ban on chemical weapons became one the first pieces of completed business of the Bush administration.

## Kadafi's Bloody-mindedness

Question: Why would Libya's Muammar Kadafi send two Soviet-built jet fighters far out in the Mediterranean to harass U.S. aircraft operating from a mighty carrier task force?

Answer: Because he was more than willing to sacrifice a couple of planes (and pilots) if the resulting incident would deflect world opinion from the chemical weapons plant the United States believes he is building south of Tripoli.

Libya's dictator is quite capable of hatching so wild a scheme. With the United States pushing hard for an international treaty banning the production and possession of chemical weapons, Colonel Kadafi had good reason to feel cornered. President Reagan had explicitly not ruled out a U.S. bombing attack to destroy the CW (chemical warfare) facility. And U.S. diplomats were preparing to prove at a Paris conference this weekend that the Libyan plant was the prime example of a spreading scourge that must be eliminated.

So yesterday morning, two Libyan MiG-23 jets started tailing a pair of American F-14 fighters on a routine mission near the carrier John F. Kennedy. The F-14s swooped down from 15,000 feet to 4,000 feet to take evasive action, according to Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci. When there were indications the Libyan planes were turning on their radar and preparing to fire, the American pilots shot them down with air-to-air missiles.

Although the United States is not above provocation in dealing with the Kadafi regime, this time Libya appeared to be the aggressor. For one thing, the incident took place a full 600 miles from the site of the alleged CW plant. For another, F-14s would not be the aircraft of choice if a bombing run were contemplated. It was instructive that the Reagan administration was quick to declare the incident "closed" as Libyan officials tried to drum up sympathy, not least from Arab governments that detest Colonel Kadafi.

The United States can best thwart Libya by making it clear that victory in an aerial dogfight is not what the current crisis is all about. It is about the spread of chemical weapons to more than a score of countries and their use by both sides in the Iraq-Iran war. It is about the evidence U.S. authorities supposedly have amassed that the Libyan plant, when fully operating, would have ample capacity to export CW supplies to other countries. And it is about the common interest of the large powers, especially the superpowers, to stop this menace by agreeing at last on a treaty that would outlaw chemical weapons as effectively as biological weapons were outlawed in 1975.

No ban can be airtight: verification problems are staggering. But international condemnation of CW would be far better than indifference toward Colonel Kadafi's latest bloody-mindedness.

BALTIMORE SUN

5 Jan 89

Pg. 10



# Text of State Dept. Report on Abu Nidal Group

Special to The New York Times  
WASHINGTON, Dec. 31 — Following is the text of a report on the Abu Nidal group issued today by the State Department:

## Introduction

The Abu Nidal group is among the most dangerous of the Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. It is probably the best organized and most effective of the radical Palestinian terrorist groups, carefully planning its operations and keeping its information tightly compartmented.

The group has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to operate in any country it chooses. It has staged attacks in over 20 countries on three continents and operates throughout the Middle East.

Abu Nidal has conducted over 60 terrorist attacks during the last eight years — at least 30 of them since the beginning of 1984. Two-thirds of the group's nearly 20 attacks this year have taken place in Western Europe, as innocent bystanders increasingly have become casualties of the group's assaults:

¶The simultaneous attacks on airline offices in Rome and Vienna on Dec. 27, which have the hallmarks of Abu Nidal, left more than a dozen dead, including 5 Americans.

¶The Egyptair hijacking in late November ultimately cost the lives of 59 passengers.

¶The group bombed the British Air office in Rome in September injuring 15 persons, many of them passers-by.

¶Abu Nidal members threw grenades at Rome's Cafe de Paris in September, injuring 38 tourists — among them Americans, Germans, Britons, Italians, Argentines and Brazilians.

¶The group bombed two hotels in Athens, one in September that injured 19, mostly British tourists, and one in August that injured 13 Britons.

¶In Spain, Abu Nidal attacks in July at the British Air office and the nearby Alia ticket office killed one and wounded 24 customers and employees.

¶Also in July, the group was probably responsible for the bombing of two restaurants in Kuwait, killing 8 and injuring almost 90.

¶In April, an Abu Nidal terrorist fired a rocket at a Jordanian airliner as it was taking off from Athens air-

port. The rocket hit the plane but did not explode. Hundreds of casualties might have resulted had the operation been successful.

The official name of the Abu Nidal organization is "Fatah — Revolutionary Council," which it usually employs when attacking Israeli targets. But it has employed a number of cover names for its operations. Originally, the group operated under the name Black June; more recently, the group has used the name Arab Revolutionary Brigades when it staged attacks against Persian Gulf targets. It also acts as Black September when it attacks Jordanian and Palestinian targets and employs the name Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems (ROSM) as its signature for attacks against British targets. It added Egyptian nomenclatures when it hijacked the Egyptair plane in November.

## Background

The group is headed by Sabry al-Banna (who uses the nom de guerre Abu Nidal), grew out of elements that broke away a decade ago from P.L.O. chairman Arafat's Fatah organization. The group is committed to the use of violence to destroy diplomatic efforts designed to reconcile Israel and the Arab states, especially those mounted earlier this year by King Hussein and Arafat's P.L.O. The Abu Nidal group also calls for the destruction of ruling "reactionary" regimes such as Jordan, Egypt and the Persian Gulf states and is critical of what it sees as Arafat's and the P.L.O.'s moderation and lack of revolutionary base and zeal. Consequently, the group contends that both inter-Arab and intra-Palestinian terrorism are needed to force the all-embracing Arab revolution, which in turn would lead to the liberation of Palestine.

The group was formed in 1974 after Arafat instituted a ban on P.L.O. involvement with international terrorism outside Israel and the occupied territories. Abu Nidal's radical views found favor at the time with the Iraqi regime, which helped him create the organization that Abu Nidal called "Fatah — the Revolutionary Council" to promote his claim that his organization, rather than the one led by Arafat, was the legitimate Fatah. He has similarly duplicated other Fatah organizational titles to suggest a parallel structure with the original.

Beginning in the early 1980's, Baghdad suppressed activities of the Abu Nidal group out of Iraq. Elements of the group then moved to Damascus. Since early 1984, Libya began to pro-

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## Insight

16 December 1985 Pg. 37

### Nidal's Threats

Following the Egyptair hijacking in Malta, Palestinian terrorist chief Sabry al-Banna, alias Abu Nidal, leader of a splinter faction called the Fatah Revolutionary Council, has maintained that his men involved in the hijacking never intended to negotiate for the release of the hostages but to blow up the plane; and if the hostages were killed in the explosion, that was of no concern except in helping publicize his group's agenda. Clearly pleased with his media celebrity status as "terrorist of the week," Nidal said that his enemies are not only "Zionists" but anyone who supports the United States, Britain, Israel, Egypt and any other Arab state willing to negotiate peace with Israel.

More specifically, Nidal said that President Reagan, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Jordan's King Hussein are on his hit list. So is Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain. Nidal boasted that he "cooperates closely" with the Provisional Irish Republican Army and has trained IRA assassins at his camps in Libya and the Syrian-occupied Bekaa valley in Lebanon. Linking himself to the October 1984 hotel explosion in Brighton, England,

that killed one member of the British Cabinet and came close to wiping out Thatcher and her entire Cabinet, Nidal said, "She will not escape the next attack."

Western intelligence sources point out that regardless of Nidal's threats, in practice, government heads are difficult targets. Private individuals, however, are easy targets.

The real trend of Nidal's terror campaign, they believe, may have been indicated by the murder early this month of a respected moderate Arab spokesman, lawyer Aziz Shehadeh, in the West Bank town of Ramallah. Nidal issued a statement in Damascus saying the murder was the "execution of the people's fair sentence for all his crimes and double allegiance" to King Hussein and Israel. Shehadeh's "crime" was having advocated "humiliating coexistence," namely the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank as part of a peace agreement with Israel. Operating with the support of Syria and Libya, Nidal's organization is regarded by intelligence analysts as posing a serious threat to moderate Arabs, supporters of Israel, and Western travelers throughout the Mediterranean in the coming months.



NEW YORK TIMES 1 January 1986 Pg. 5

## New Terrorists: 'Kids Who Are Trained to Go Out and Kill'

By JOHN TAGLIABUE  
Special to The New York Times

ROME, Dec. 31 — The attacks mounted by Palestinian terrorists on the Rome and Vienna airports bear a new brand of terrorism that European security officials say poses severe new challenges.

Evidence gathered by the investigators in both cities indicates that the assaults were carried out by young Palestinians who were guided from the Middle East to Western Europe by a network of experienced Arab and, possibly, European supporters, working behind the scene.

Security officials say this pattern runs through a string of recent Arab terrorist attacks in Italy, including the hijacking in October of the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro. They say the pattern distinguishes the attacks from previous actions in Europe attributed to Middle Eastern terrorists that, the officials say, seem to have been masterminded and carried out by the same people.

The distinction is troubling to European security officials, because it suggests that hard-line Palestinian groups, such as the Fatah Revolutionary Council, which is thought to have directed the airport attacks, or the Palestine Liberation Front, considered the authors of the Achille Lauro hijacking, can avail themselves of broad logistical support in a number of cities in Western Europe.

It also confronts European security officials with the intractable task of uprooting an obscure terror network whose members seem to offer assailants crucial support while themselves remaining in the background.

"In the past the people involved worked by themselves," said a Middle Eastern diplomat who follows terrorist activities. "They were of high caliber, and they were usually assured important positions after the action."

"Now there are the professional planners, and the kids who are trained to go out and kill," he went on. "When they go out, the professionals wait by the television."

The pattern, he said, tends to reflect changes in terrorist methods in the Middle East, where conflicting groups have resorted increasingly to using youthful suicide commandos.

The security officials say the emergence of the European network may be a result of the same sense of desperation in some Palestinian circles, such as student groups, that are considered responsible for the changed tactics in the Middle East.

### Terrorists Tend to Be Young

As in the Middle East, the terrorists who are exported to Europe tend to be young. The only survivor of the four Palestinians who hurled grenades and sprayed automatic weapon fire at Rome's airport last week, was born 19 years ago in the Palestinian refugee district of Shatila in Beirut. He told Italian investigators his name was Mohammed Sarham.

Similarly, at least two of the four Palestinian activists jailed in Italy for the Achille Lauro hijacking were teen-agers, and one had to be retried last November when birth records supplied by Lebanon revealed that he was 17 years old — not 19 as he had told his questioners —

and thus too young to be tried as an adult under Italian law.

Hassan Aatab, a baby-faced Palestinian who threw a bomb into the British Airways office on the Via Veneto last September, wounding several people, was 16 years old.

But Mr. Sarham, like other Palestinians seized here in recent months, described a network of older more experienced supporters, some of whom met him and his confederates on arrival in Europe and supplied them with aid and instructions.

In connection with the Achille Lauro hijacking, the investigators in Genoa, where the case is being tried, have uncovered traces of several experienced Palestinian activists who were involved in smuggling the arms and explosives into Italy and instructing the youthful hijackers from behind the scene.

### The European Connection

The apparent presence of Europeans, in addition to Arab nationals, in the network, is also troubling to security officials. Mr. Sarham, when questioned by the Italians, said the weapons used in the airport attack were supplied to him and his accomplices by helpers who the police believe were Europeans.

Ali Minour, a Palestinian who was seized last April when he fired a bazooka at the Jordanian embassy here, said he had received the weapon from a woman he said was either Italian or French. Mr. Aatab, the terrorist in the British Airways bombing, said the explosives he used were given to him by a tall, blond man he knew only as "the Belgian."

The investigators here point out that tenuous links have been uncovered in the past between Arab extremists in Europe and domestic terror organizations, such as Italy's Red Brigades. Italian newspapers speculated in recent days that the Soviet-designed automatic weapons the terrorists used might have come from as yet undiscovered Red Brigades arms caches, or from organized-crime weapons supplies.

But justice officials have denied there is hard evidence of such links, and they describe them as "working hypotheses."

Police investigators also concede that they have few concrete leads to follow in sweeping out the presumed terror nests. The police here have assumed for some time that a "conspiratorial apartment" might exist near the city center for use to store arms or false documents.

But searches in the city, near the main train station, in recent days failed to turn up such an apartment. And officials admit that the assumption that such hideouts exist is based on an analogy with the domestic terror organizations, such as the Red Brigades.

But they say the support might be organized out of cheap hotels that the planners could change readily, or from diplomatic missions of countries such as Iran or Libya that tend to support the aims of extremist groups such as the one that carried out the airport attacks.

The involvement of diplomatic channels cannot be excluded, security officials say, because of past incidents in which suspected terrorist have used diplomatic passports from Arab countries such as Iraq.

### REPORT...Continued

vide increased support to the group, and Abu Nidal himself and many of the groups operations may have moved there within the last 12 months.

The group probably has several hundred members, although an accurate count is difficult. We believe the group has a number of cells throughout Western Europe and the Middle East and makes use of the large number of Palestinian students studying abroad, sometimes involving them in operations after only perfunctory training. These new recruits, for example, were involved in the five grenade attacks staged by the group in 1985.

### Current Operations And Trends

Based on the style of Abu Nidal attacks, it is evident that the group is willing to cause indiscriminate casualties. Apart from assassinations of particular individuals, Abu Nidal operations through November 1985 resulted in nearly 70 deaths and 201 wounded among innocent bystanders — and the number could have been much higher if the Jordanian airliner attack in Athens had been successful. In the previous year, 111 died in the crash of a Gulf Air jet on which an Abu Nidal bomb may have exploded.

The Abu Nidal group has concentrated on attacking Jordanian interests since 1984. These attacks were provoked by the Jordanian agreement to host the P.N.C. meeting in November 1984 and King Hussein's February accord with Arafat to restart the stalled Middle East peace process. Abu Nidal operatives are thought to have assassinated former West Bank mayor and Palestinian moderate Fahad Kawasmeh in December 1984 shortly after his election to the P.L.O. Executive Council. The anti-Jordanian/P.L.O. campaign has not abated. As long as Jordanian and P.L.O. efforts toward Middle East peace negotiations continue, attacks against both Jordanian and Palestinian targets probably will also.

Aside from the attack on Alia offices in Madrid in July and the attempt to down a Jordanian airliner over Athens in April, other incidents involving Jordanian targets in 1985 have included:

¶ The Nov. 24 assassination of a Palestinian in Amman.

¶ The murder of a Jordanian publisher in Athens in September.

¶ A plot to assassinate the Jordanian Ambassador to Greece in August.

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# Lax Security Aided Terrorists At Two Airports, Experts Say

By EVANS JOHNSON  
New York City Tribune Staff

The airport massacres in Rome and Vienna on December 27 might have been prevented or minimized if earlier security warnings and requests had been forcefully acted upon, according to intelligence experts.

Terrorists firing Kalashnikov assault rifles and flipping hand grenades burst into airports in Rome and Vienna at 9 a.m. as throngs of holiday travelers waited to board planes. Including three terrorists, 15 people died during or after the attack on the El Al Israel Airlines counter inside Rome's Leonardo da Vinci Airport. As many as 70 people were wounded.

In Vienna, one terrorist and two travelers died, and 47 more were wounded as the gunmen assaulted an El Al departure lounge at Schwechat Airport.

Terrorists captured alive in both countries carried Moroccan passports, but indicated they were Palestinians loyal to either the main PLO faction, Al Fatah, or the Abu Nidal group, allegedly opposed to Israel.

The toll in the Rome attack was particularly severe because the El Al counter is near those of Trans World Airlines and Pan American World Airways. According to employees of Italy's national carrier, Alitalia, security at da Vinci was very lax.

"The controls are ridiculous," employee Ferdinando Caltri told Italy's *Corriere della Sera* newspaper. "Any terrorist could enter without danger, place a time bomb in the toilets and get away easily."

"On international departures you often get on with just a passport, without showing a ticket," Caltri said.

*Corriere* quoted another, unnamed employee as saying, "It's just too easy for terrorists to come in and out without any danger. They could plant 1,000 bombs."

However, according to at least three security organizations, the airports had ample warning that a terror strike was imminent.

Both the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Interpol said the afternoon of the attacks that they had issued warnings in November, saying European airports might be targets for terrorist attacks during the holiday season.

The Paris-based Interpol (the International Criminal Police Organization) said

airports in Europe were told in November to be on alert but did not mention specific airlines.

In Washington, an FAA spokesman said the agency also warned airlines and airports serving Europe and the Middle East about the possibility of terrorist activity during the holidays.

More importantly, in Rome the director of Italy's military intelligence (SISMI), Adm. Fulvio Martini, told the newspaper *La Repubblica* Sunday that his Secret Service alerted authorities of a possible operation against the airport several days before the attack.

"We did very well what had to be done, that is an intelligence job, of information," Martini said. "We do not have the same ask as the police. It is not up to us to put our hands on the attackers."

Martini asserted that the terrorists had trained in Iran, but had traveled to Italy from Syria, possibly by boat. Other security officials said the terrorists apparently arrived by train via Switzerland.

Italy's Defense Ministry said later that Martini's remarks did "not express the thought of the government." Western diplomats interpreted that as an effort to deflect criticism of Italy's relatively close relations with Syria and Iran.

Martini also predicted further attacks soon, but probably not inside Italy. "I don't think the next blow will be launched against Italy," he said. "I think it will be outside. A few days will pass, but not too many. The wild dogs of Middle East terrorism are not the kind to allow much hope of a truce."

Martini said SISMI had "obtained a list of airports where an attack was being studied." He mentioned the airports at Athens, Madrid and Nicosia, Cyprus, as among those considered by terror groups.

A security specialist with close ties to Israeli intelligence told the *New York City Tribune* that the Italian government had repeatedly turned down requests from Israel to separate EL Al passenger operations from those of other airlines, thereby allowing Israeli guards to maintain heightened security.

Following the 1972 massacre of Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich, West Germany, EL Al had been allowed to construct separate, more secure facilities there.

The government in Jerusalem had asked other European states to permit

## KIDS...Continued

The announcement from Tunis that passports used by the terrorists in the January 17 attacks in Libya, had been confiscated in Libya, has thrown pictures here that Libyan officials, the old details, may have played some role in the airport attacks.

## REPORT...Continued

The murder of a journalist in Ankara on July 26, 1984, was a rocket attack on the U.S. Embassy in Rome in April.

The group has also targeted interests. PLO claimed responsibility for the kidnapping in March of a British journalist in Lebanon, the assassination of British diplomat in India and Greece in 1984. The force of the attacks probably is to force the U.K. to release group members imprisoned for the attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador in London in June 1982.

Even before the recent attacks in Vienna and Rome airports, Al Fatah had begun to concentrate his field operations in Western Europe. Although his targets have been his enemies, e.g. British, Israeli, and Arab, he has become very vocal in his criticism about injuring innocent Western European civilians. The relatively relaxed attitude conducive to his operations there. The pattern of concentrating his efforts in Europe has coincided with the strengthening of his links with Libya. The likelihood of Libyan financing, safehaven and logistical assistance should be very helpful to his future international terrorist operations.

similar arrangements at their airports, he they had refused, the security specialists said. In New York, El Al was allowed to enhance its security at Kennedy Airport in the late 1970s, he said.

Because the El Al counter was isolated in Rome, Israeli security guards could not adequately screen travelers, he said, adding that had El Al been set apart, passengers at the neighboring terminals would possibly not have been shot or injured. As it was, in Israel the guards have been heralded as heroes in the media, since they are believed by Israeli intelligence to have been the ones who finally put down the assault in Rome by shooting the terrorists.

Although the PLO emphatically denied responsibility for the attacks, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres charged Sunday that by permitting the PLO to open quasi-diplomatic offices in their capitals, some European nations had in effect sanctioned Palestinian terrorism.

"I'm not just speaking of terror," Peres

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## Police in Several European Cities Said to Have Foiled Terror Plots

By PAUL LEWIS

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Jan. 2 — The police in several European cities appear to have disrupted a number of Arab-backed terrorist plots for assassinations and bombing attacks during the Christmas and New Year holiday period.

Over the last week, arrests and expulsions of Arabs suspected as terrorists have taken place in Brussels, Madrid, Paris and Athens, according to reports Wednesday and today.

On Wednesday night, authorities in Belgium said that on Monday, the police seized two Arabs and a Belgian citizen after discovering a large cache of arms, grenades and ammunition at a town near Brussels. Last Sunday, the Paris police arrested two Portuguese and an Egyptian and accused them of planning to bomb a synagogue.

In Madrid, the Government said today that it recently expelled three Libyan employees of that country's embassy on suspicion of plotting to kill a visiting Libyan opposition leader. And the Greek Government arrested eight Arabs over the weekend, but now says it plans to release them. It announced last week that it was "cooperating" with the Palestine Liberation Organization, led by Yasir Arafat, in efforts to fight terrorism.

### Report of 4th Arab in Vienna

In Vienna, meanwhile, Austrian investigators said a fourth man, whom they did not identify, gave final instructions to the three Arab gunmen who staged the attack last Friday at Schwechat Airport in Vienna, telling them to seize Israeli hostages, hijack a waiting El Al Israel Airlines plane and "explode it in or over Tel Aviv," according to an Interior Ministry spokesman.

Austrian sources said the report about the fourth man, described as being of Arab appearance, was given by the single terrorist to have survived the Rome airport attack. The report was said to have been relayed to the Austrians by the chief Italian investigator, Domenico Sica, when he visited Vienna last weekend, and it was said to have been confirmed by one of the two terrorists held in Austria.

The report illustrates the way European police forces are tightening cooperation against terrorism in the wake of the attacks last Friday.

In Rome, where an investigation into the attack at Leonardo da Vinci Airport was continuing, 3,000 airport workers held a three-hour strike to demand metal detectors at every entrance and quicker check-in procedures.

An additional victim of the attack in

Rome died today in a hospital, bringing the number of deaths there to 16, including three of the four Arab gunmen. Another three people, including one gunman, died in the Vienna attack. The person who died today was Efrosini Mediani, a 56-year-old Greek woman.

In Belgium, the police said the two seized Arabs, whose names and nationalities were not revealed, arrived by air from Athens Saturday and were followed by antiterrorist officers after an airport computer indicated that one of them had attended a terrorist training camp in Lebanon.

### A Video Connection

The Arabs were trailed to the provincial town of Hasselt, about 40 miles east of Brussels, where they were met by the unidentified owner of a local video shop, who was described only as a Belgian resident previously convicted of arms possession.

On Monday, the police raided the video store and arrested the Arabs and the owner. They reported discovering more than 40 pounds of explosives and an assortment of arms and ammunition.

Officials in Rome say they suspect that some Arab terrorists may be obtaining some of their arms and explosives in Europe from organized crime groups and paying for this help by helping the organized crime groups to obtain drugs from the Middle East. In Europe, drugs are frequently smuggled in consignments of video tapes and distributed through video shops.

### French-Spanish Cooperation

In Madrid, meanwhile, the Spanish Foreign Ministry said today that on Dec. 20, three Libyan employees of the Libyan Embassy who did not have diplomatic status were "invited" to leave the country by Jan. 1. Officials said Spanish intelligence believes the Libyans were plotting to assassinate a Libyan opposition leader who is expected to visit Spain.

The Spanish police were also said to have played a key role in the arrest in Paris last Sunday of three men accused of preparing to blow up the synagogue. The authorities said the men were apparently acting on behalf of an unknown Palestinian Christian terrorist organization variously called St. Peter's Commando and the Commando Llamado of Jesus Christ.

According to the authorities, the French police spotted a man photographing the synagogue and he was followed to Madrid. The Spanish police were said to have then discovered plans to mount the attack, and to have

## SECURITY...Continued

told an audience in Jerusalem, "but about he who gives it shelter, equipment and encouragement, by eye-shutting."

The attack in Vienna was particularly embarrassing to the government, because under former Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, Austria was the first Western state to recognize the PLO diplomatically.

It came as no surprise, then, to Western diplomats, when Interior Minister Karl Blecha Sunday "ruled out" any involvement by Arafat's Fatah group in the Vienna attack. Blecha fingered Abu Nidal as the most probable backer of the raid.

In that, he concurred with Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who told a group of Americans Sunday that "it is our impression" that Abu Nidal was responsible.

If so, Israel's anticipated retaliation becomes quite difficult, according to intelligence sources. Abu Nidal's strongholds are in Syria, Iran and Libya, where he is said to have a close personal relationship with Moammar Qaddafi. Thus far, Israel has retaliated against Palestinian terrorism on at least 32 occasions by bombing suspected terror training grounds in Lebanon, and the PLO headquarters in Tunisia.

Striking at Abu Nidal's bases would probably necessitate attacks on Syrian, Iranian or Libyan soil, and that, according to diplomats and intelligence sources in the Mideast and Washington would almost certainly provoke war.

In Hamburg, West Germany, Sunday the sensationalist newspaper *Bild am Sonntag* said Libyan-backed terrorist squads, "indoctrinated in fanatic hatred," are en route to Europe to stage further attacks.

Qaddafi has promised Abu Nidal \$12 million a year to subsidize the extremist European operations, the newspaper said, adding that the two men met in the Libyan desert to make their financial agreement. Libya has already made a \$4.8-million first payment to the extremist group, said the newspaper, which is considered to have good West German intelligence sources.

alerted the French authorities, who arrested the three men shortly after they arrived in Paris with the ingredients for manufacturing a bomb.

On Wednesday, Greek newspaper disclosed that eight Palestinians had been arrested during a sweep last week of cheap Athens hotels frequented by Arabs. But today, a Government spokesman said the Palestinians had been "simply passing through Greece and there is no evidence they had committed any illegal action." He said they would soon be set free.



NALL STREET JOURNAL  
3 January 1986

Pg. 12

## 'Libya's Band of Thugs'

This is excerpted from comments to a United Nations committee Nov. 25 by the U.S. delegation's Joseph T. Reed, formerly Washington's ambassador to Morocco.

Libya's acts in the international arena have been and are an atrocity. Libya's leader is a dictator—an agent of hateful and evil acts. Libya's strongman is a modern day Barbary pirate.

The history of Libya's involvement in terrorist activities is unbelievably long, yet it continues to grow. Libya provided sanctuary to the perpetrators of the murders at the Olympics in Munich. Earlier this year, Col. Qadhafi called for the cutting off of our president's nose. That's quite a span of time from 1972 to the present in acts and words of hate.

London, April 11, 1980: A free-lance Libyan journalist was assassinated by two gunmen outside the Islamic center mosque. The gunmen were arrested by Scotland Yard. Two additional suspects characterized as Libyans were detained the following day.

Rome, April 19, 1980: A Libyan businessman was assassinated in a cafe. The assailant was apprehended a short distance away—a Libyan. Why had the businessman been killed? The assassin said the victim had been murdered because he was "an enemy of Col. Qadhafi."

London, April 25, 1980: A Libyan lawyer was shot and killed at an Arab legal center. The gunman and another man asked for their victim by name, walked into his office and fired several shots, killing him as other employees watched. The assassins were believed to be members of Libyan death squads that are assassinating opponents of the Libyan strongman.

Rome, May 10, 1980: A Libyan businessman was assassinated. The victim was lured to a hotel for an appointment and, following a few minutes of talk with two men, was shot twice in the head by one of a nearby railroad station. Police arrested a Libyan suspected of being involved in the assassination.

Bonn, May 10, 1980: A Libyan businessman was shot dead in Bonn's city center. The former diplomat had received death threats prior to his assassination by a Libyan who had arrived in West Germany at the end of April.

Athens, May 21, 1980: A young Libyan was found dead in his apartment. Local authorities said the victim was known as an outspoken critic of Col. Qadhafi.

Fort Collins, Colo., Oct. 14, 1980: A Libyan graduate student was shot and killed by an individual who had come to Rome. The victim was known as an opponent of the Libyan regime.

Ogden, Utah, July 17, 1981: A body believed to be that of a Libyan student was found in the trunk of his car. A Libyan national, also a student, suspected of the murder was arrested at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago as he was departing from a flight from Utah. He was carrying a large amount of cash and tickets for travel to where? Tripoli.

Lebanon, December 1982: Libya sent armed contingents to north Lebanon to carry out attacks against the multinational forces in an effort to increase unrest in the area.

Tripoli, February 1983: In a series of resolutions adopted in the Tripoli People's Congress, Libya's charlatan body politic called for spending part of Libya's oil wealth on arms for "all the revolutionary forces in the Arab and Islamic worlds." The resolution called for "suicide squads" to be formed to press attacks inside Arab territory occupied by Israel and against the symbols of treason in the Arab arena who "follow the imperialist camp headed by the United States, the leader of world terrorism."

Switzerland, April 1983: The Swiss government expelled the Libyan charge d'affaires for supplying weapons to two convicted Swiss terrorists.

Germany, April 1983: Libya took eight German technicians hostage in order to blackmail West Germany into releasing Libyans charged with violent crimes.

Jordan, June 1983: The Libyan envoy to Jordan defected. The ambassador revealed Col. Qadhafi's plan to use missiles to destroy the aircraft carrying King Hussein.

Sudan, March 1984: A Libyan bomber invaded Sudanese airspace and attacked a radio-TV station.

Chad, February 1985: The government lodged a complaint in this house of peace, the United Nations, claiming Libya had attempted to assassinate President Hissen Habre in September 1984. Photographs of the attaché-case bomb that was to be used in the attack were provided as evidence.

Chicago, February 1985: At a convention of members of the Nation of Islam headed by Louis Farrakhan, Col. Qadhafi, speaking over closed-circuit television, called for black Americans "to immediately leave the military and fight with his support for an independent black state. We

NEW YORK POST  
2 January 1986

Pg. 2

## Greece: we foiled terror plot

ATHENS, Greece — Eight Palestinians arrested here last week were apparently plotting a terrorist attack in the Greek capital.

Security sources said the Palestinians apparently belonged to "the Secret Army for the Liberation of Palestine," a group close to Abu Nidal, who heads a renegade faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Nidal's group has been blamed by the U.S. and Israel for last Friday's bloody airport attacks in Rome and Vienna.

are ready to give you arms," he proclaimed.

The U.S., May 1985: Our government uncovered a Libyan plot to assassinate anti-Qadhafi Libyans in the U.S. As a result, a Libyan diplomat at the U.N. was declared persona non grata.

Bangladesh, June 1985: A Libyan-trained Bangladeshi national who had received Libyan support in an earlier coup attempt was arrested for plotting to kill President Hossain Mohammad Ershad.

The plotting to assassinate modern Arab leaders has been going on since the '70s. Libya's plans to kill Middle Eastern ambassadors in several Middle Eastern capitals and at least one European capital have been uncovered. What does the world think? Libyan "hit squads" have been sent throughout the world to murder exiled Libyans in an overall effort to intimidate dissidents. Libyan hit squads have reached out and attacked exiled Libyans in Italy, England, West Germany, Lebanon, Greece and the U.S. Where next? The dictator's efforts to use terrorism to eliminate dissidents whom he regards as a danger is a constant. The regime and its representatives are terrorists.

May 1985: Col. Qadhafi threatened a terrorist campaign against "his enemies" by stating: "I am a terrorist. I would, if I could, behead the rulers of other Arab nations that oppose me."

November 1985: A group of armed Libyans were arrested by Egyptian authorities for again attempting the assassination of former Prime Minister Abdel-Hamid Bakoush.

When Libyan officials at the People's Bureau in London opened fire on peaceful demonstrators, killing a British police woman assigned to protect that diplomatic establishment, it graphically pointed out the fact that the present Libyan regime and its diplomatic representatives have rejected all, I repeat all, international treaties and laws. Libya has in effect left the family of nations and has set itself apart from civilized governments. As a result of this position taken by the Libyan strongman, governments throughout the world are taking necessary precautions to protect their citizens and their overall national security against Libya's band of thugs masquerading as diplomats.



NEW YORK TIMES 5 January 1986 Pg. 1

# Trail of Mideast Terror: Exploring Link to Libya

By DAVID K. SHIPLER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 4 — The Administration's concerns over Libya, long focused on that country's attempts to undermine neighboring pro-Western governments, has taken on an added dimension in the last week with charges that Libya supported the Palestinian terrorist group that attacked the Rome and Vienna airports.

If the charges are true — and the evidence is only circumstantial — it would be an ominous development, in the view of Administration officials. They say this is a new combination of three elements: the Abu Nidal group, one of the world's best-trained terrorist organizations, with a supply of young men willing to go on near-suicide missions, and backing from a Government with an aggressive record.

"It is getting more dangerous," said a State Department official who specializes in watching terrorism. More guerrillas seem to be "willing to have their heads blown off," he said.

## 'Dangerous Situation'

"You hook up the resources of a country like Libya with a skilled organization like Abu Nidal, and you have a dangerous situation," he added.

The Abu Nidal group takes its name from the nom de guerre of the man said to be its leader, Sabry al-Banna, a Palestinian who broke from Yasir Arafat's main branch of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the 1970's. Administration officials have contended that Mr. Banna's group now receives support from the Libyan Government of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi.

Officials in the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency said they were being pressed by superiors this week to come up with new suggestions for action against Libya and various terrorist groups. But almost all of these officials expressed doubts that dramatic steps, either military or economic, would be effective.

"We come up with the same list of options all the time," another high-ranking State Department official said. "We're all frustrated, but there are no new ideas."

Some White House and State Department officials said they thought Colonel Qaddafi had already retreated

somewhat in the face of movements by the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and rumors that the Administration was considering an attack in the wake of the assaults on the two airports Dec. 27, in which 19 people died and more than 110 were wounded.

At a news conference Wednesday in Tripoli, without specifically mentioning those attacks, Colonel Qaddafi gave a general defense of the activity of Palestinian guerrillas, saying, "This is the most sacred action in the world."

On Friday, his Foreign Minister, Ali Treiki, sent a letter to Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the United Nations Secretary General, calling the airport attacks "deplorable blood outrages" and declaring that Libya "is not involved either directly or indirectly in those regrettable actions, which it vigorously condemns."

A State Department analyst said: "It's funny about Qaddafi. When he gets into a tough situation he backs down. He tweaks Egypt, and when Egypt masses on the border, he melts away and disappears. He is an absolute past master at brinkmanship. This underscores the futility of trying to temporize with a guy like this."

He said that merely talking tough might have the effect of emboldening the Libyan leader, but added that "real intimidation" rather than verbal assaults might be effective.

The evidence linking Libya to the Abu Nidal group is sketchy. Perhaps the most persuasive piece of information came to light this week when the Tunisian Interior Ministry announced that the Tunisian passports carried by three of the terrorists who attacked the airports had disappeared in Libya. Two of the passports were confiscated by Libyan authorities from Tunisians who were expelled from Libya last summer, and one of them was reported lost by a Tunisian in Libya in 1977.

## Seeking Safe Haven And Money in Libya

In addition, United States and Israeli officials say, Mr. Banna has moved from Syria to Libya in recent months. "The evidence is not overwhelming," said a senior American intelligence official, "but there is no doubt that Abu Nidal is clearly connected with Libya." "There are signs that Abu Nidal's

base of operations is now in Libya," which has been helpful in providing "safe haven, money, logistical support and encouragement," he said. "What is more difficult to prove is the Libyan connection to any particular operation," including the airport attacks, he added.

The Abu Nidal group often uses the more formal name Fatah — Revolutionary Council. Mr. Banna, the leader, is a Palestinian who was born in Jaffa, then part of British-controlled Palestine and now part of Israel. He and his wife are said to have a son named Nidal, which means struggle in Arabic; hence the name Abu Nidal, or Father of Struggle.

Since Mr. Banna broke from the main branch of the P.L.O., he has reportedly served as a kind of subcontractor for Arab governments in operations against each other, first for the Iraqis against the Syrians, then for the Syrians against the Jordanians, and now apparently for the Libyans.

Mr. Banna is an extremely shadowy figure, and reports about his death have gained currency in the Middle East from time to time.

Al-Tayeb Abdel Rahim, who heads the P.L.O. office in Cairo, said in a statement on New Year's Day that the P.L.O. was sure that Mr. Banna was

*This article is based on reporting by Stephen Engelberg, Thomas L. Friedman, Leslie H. Gelb, Bill Keller and David K. Shipler, and was written by Mr. Shipler.*

dead and that the terrorists who carried out the airport attacks were merely using the Abu Nidal name as a cover. He accused Libya and Syria of masterminding the raids with the aim of disrupting the P.L.O.'s relations with its best friends in Western Europe.

Word that Mr. Banna had died of a heart attack spread in November 1984, but a month later Libya's Government-controlled press agency reported that Colonel Qaddafi had received "Abu Nidal, the leader of Fatah — Revolutionary Council," in Tripoli.

Last October, the West German magazine Der Spiegel published what it said was an interview with Abu Nidal, conducted in Libya.

According to reports from the Middle East, Mr. Banna more often than not cooperates with the intelligence services of the governments he happens to be dealing with at any given time. No one has ever reported seeing Mr. Banna receiving money from Libya, but his financial link with Tripoli is accepted almost as fact in Arab and Palestinian quarters.

Mr. Banna is reported to spend most of his time in Libya, with frequent trips to Syria, the Bekaa region of eastern

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



## TRAIL...Continued

Lebanon and Bulgaria, where he is said to have a large following among Palestinian students.

One of the Abu Nidal group's most damaging assaults came in June 1982 against Shlomo Argov, Israel's Ambassador in London, who was shot in the head and disabled. Although Israel's Mossad intelligence agency said the Abu Nidal group, and not the P.L.O., had been responsible, Israel used the event to explain attacks on P.L.O. bases in Lebanon. The attacks provoked P.L.O. shelling of northern Israel and quickly set off a long-planned Israeli invasion, beginning the war that drove the P.L.O. out of southern Lebanon and Beirut.

In that assassination attempt in London, as in other attacks, the Abu Nidal organization demonstrated what Israeli and American officials call a high degree of professionalism and secrecy. The three assailants captured in London, for example, described their preparations as thoroughly compartmentalized. One brought guns, one brought plans and a third activated the team.

## An Intelligence Picture Of Sophisticated Terror

In addition, experts say, Abu Nidal operations have been marked by Mr. Banna's devotion to the politics of revenge — not a violent means to the political end of a Palestinian state, but rather a belief in permanent war in which the means become the end.

Mr. Banna's opposition to any Arab negotiations with Israel and his rivalry with the Arafat faction place him squarely in a camp with Colonel Qaddafi, who has expressed contempt for Mr. Arafat and for Arab leaders who consider talks with "the Zionist entity," as the Libyan leader refers to Israel.

"He's one of the last leaders in the Arab world who is talking about the destruction of the Israeli state," Lisa Anderson, a professor at Harvard who has studied Libya, said of Colonel Qaddafi.

Some specialists on the Middle East believe that terrorism that is blamed on Palestinians generally creates fresh tensions in the Middle East and diminishes the prospects for the kind of peace process that Colonel Qaddafi has opposed. What enhances the danger, one official contended, is that the Libyan leader has shown less restraint than Abu Nidal's former patrons, Syria and Iraq.

## Egypt and France: Plan for Hit Squad

But the obstacles to effective action against Colonel Qaddafi are formidable. In 1981, a senior official said, Presidents Valéry Giscard d'Estaing

of France and Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt drew up a plan to assassinate the Libyan leader with Egyptian hit teams supported by French intelligence. Although France and Egypt asked for American participation, the Reagan Administration declined. The plan was dropped a year later, the official said, although Egypt was reported to have pursued it, using Libyan military officers.

More recently, President Reagan was reported to have authorized the C.I.A. to provide assistance to neighboring countries to help undermine the Qaddafi Government, possibly by provoking a rash step that would strengthen Colonel Qaddafi's opponents in the Libyan military and enable them to take power.

Some specialists who follow Libyan affairs are not sure that eliminating Colonel Qaddafi would improve matters for the United States, however. One analyst noted the existence in Libya of solidly pro-Soviet elements, which could take over.

"They would be less erratic and harassing of Western forces," he said, "but would be, over the longer run, more deleterious to American interests." Libya now buys Soviet weapons with cash and oil, and there are growing commercial and economic ties between the two countries.

Intelligence officials say they have also discerned more radical attitudes among some of Colonel Qaddafi's colleagues in the ruling council who are believed to have pressed for more direct, overt action against American interests than Colonel Qaddafi has been prepared to take.

Although he is believed to have authorized several attacks, including a foiled attempt to bomb the United States Embassy in Cairo in May, most of his operations abroad have been assassinations of expatriate Libyan opposition figures.

## A Future More Extreme Than Qaddafi's Present

One question frequently asked is whether a more radical leadership might take power in a post-Qaddafi era.

"It's fairly murky," Professor Anderson said. "There probably is a wing in the regime that is a little less cautious than Qaddafi. But by and large, he has been in the forefront of radical policies in the Government."

She speculated that more moderate elements, supporting free elections and a Parliament to write a Constitution, might gain power for a short time in a post-Qaddafi period. This moderate school, now represented in a group of exiles known as the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, has sympathizers inside Libya who were apparently responsible for the 1984 attack on Colonel Qaddafi's barracks, she said. But she expressed doubts about the durability of such a Government.

"There would be a lot of liberation fighting," Professor Anderson said. "All the groups waiting for Qaddafi to fall would fight among themselves. I can envision a sort of Syria and Iraq in the 1980's — a series of coups."

What action is available to Washington is a matter of debate. One State Department official said he thought the United States should avoid engaging in "foreign policy by tantrum" to punish Colonel Qaddafi.

"What we want to do is convince him that he can't continue to flout international convention, international law," the official said. "To do that, there isn't any magical formula. We must make the costs higher than any benefit he can get out of it. I'm not talking about Armageddon things. There isn't going to be any total economic embargo of Libya. Just up the price of terrorism to the point where he finally abandons it. He's a very pragmatic guy."

But this must be done with international cooperation, the official said, not by the United States alone. Western European countries that buy oil from Libya are considered unlikely to endorse a boycott. Italy, West Germany, Spain and France are Libya's largest trading partners in Western Europe, according to the International Monetary Fund.

On Friday, Bonn explicitly ruled out trade sanctions against Libya.

## U.S. Sanctions Judged Largely Ineffectual

The economic sanctions initiated by the United States in 1981 have been largely ineffectual, analysts say. Exports of American high technology to Libya were banned, as were imports of Libyan crude oil, on which the United States had spent an average of \$5 billion to \$7 billion a year, a State Department spokesman said. The ban was extended last Nov. 15 to refined petroleum products; in 1985, the United States imported \$9 million in oil products from Libya.

But while some major American oil companies and other businesses withdrew from Libya, smaller firms have maintained an important presence, offering Libya technical expertise that is considered crucial for it to get its oil out of the ground. The State Department said these included the Occidental Petroleum Company, Amerasia Hess, Conoco, Marathon and Chevron. Half of Libya's oil is pumped by companies in which these firms have minority interests and Libya has majority holdings; the other half is pumped by Libyan firms with no American participation.

The State Department says 1,000 to 1,500 Americans live in Libya, despite a general ban on using United States passports for travel there. Most are dependents of Libyans, Americans employed in Libya or dependents of those employees.



# Libya softens its stance on airport attacks

By Tom Masland  
Member, Staff Writer

TRIPOLI, Libya — While continuing to warn that a reprisal raid by the United States was imminent, Libya moved yesterday to distance itself from the airport attacks on Dec. 27.

"We condemn any actions against individuals, including that one in Rome and Vienna," said Dr. Ali Traiki, Libya's equivalent to foreign minister. "Libya has nothing to do with it. We deny it officially."

Traiki said, however, that the attacks, in which 19 people died, were carried out by Palestinians "looking for justice." A note found on one of the attackers called it a response to Israel's Oct. 1 raid on the PLO's headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia, in which more than 60 people died.

In another sign that Libya was moderating its line, expected massed demonstrations yesterday against the Belgian Embassy, which represents American interests, did not materialize.

Diplomats had reported earlier that cars were being moved away from the building in preparation for such a rally. A mob set fire to the U.S. Embassy in 1979, and its staff was recalled.

State media also had announced that suicide squads were being organized in a large downtown square for attacks against American interests. But the area was deserted yesterday, and Americans here reported no incidents.

Downtown Tripoli was quiet. Ships moved through the harbor. Residents went about their ordinary Saturday routine — including lining up for staples made scarce by slumping oil revenues and last year's expulsion of thousands of foreign workers.

The Libyan news agency, JANA, initially hailed the airport attacks as "heroic," and Libyan leader Moammar Khadafy Wednesday called the attacks the result of a holy Palestinian struggle. He said Israel and the United States were the leaders of world terrorism.

Khadafy also warned that attacks by Palestinians would escalate

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
5 January 1986 Pg. 26

From Reuters

PARIS—France will prolong anti-terrorist security reinforcements made after attacks on Rome and Vienna airports, the Interior Ministry said Friday. A spokesman said the original short-term measures will be extended at airports and railway stations and other possible targets.

should Israel retaliate against Palestinian radical Abu Nidal, blamed by Israel and the United States for the airport killings.

- Abu Nidal had been a frequent visitor to Tripoli last fall, although he was reported to have left the country prior to the airport attacks, and Israel and the United States have held Libya responsible.

At the same time that Libya was backing away from its early support of the operation, state-run media continued to report that the United States was preparing for military aggression.

Quoting a Soviet report, it said American forces were being assembled for an invasion to be preceded by air attacks.

The United States was continuing to build up its forces in the Mediterranean by sending aircraft equipped with jamming instruments to Naples, Italy, from a base in Washington state.

The U.S. aircraft carrier Corral Sea left Naples Friday heading a naval task force, a Navy spokesman in Naples said. Asked about reports of a buildup, President Reagan said he was "not aware of anything unusual going on."

Reagan has been pressing American allies to impose trade sanctions against Libya. The United States banned the import of Libyan oil in 1982 and forbade Americans to travel here in 1981, although about 1,500 oil specialists have defied the ban.

Yesterday, Britain rejected the U.S. call for sanctions; West Germany called them "unsuitable," and most other nations said they were studying the situation.

Meanwhile, the Arab League yesterday warned that any attack on Libya could have disastrous consequences. The league was holding an emergency session in Tunis.

On Friday, Iran pledged to come to Libya's defense if it is attacked.

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From the average 1965 to 1966 the average expenditure was 100 American dollars. In consideration of that, the average in 1966 varied to 1,000 dollars, because of some great increases. Finally, the average expenditure varied to 100 to 200 and improvement of that up to 200 and 1,000 does not go up to the mark. But 1,000 does not mean American dollars, because again the expenditure is not that big. Usually expenditure is given that a person can and to some 1,000. Another approach is change 1,000's to 100,000 — million dollars — various but not unrepresentative, according to sources in Washington.

*"I Love Me In London  
Up to Me Only."*

"The whole thing with the strong economic downturn," said Geoffrey J. D. King, a former special assistant on trade to Clinton as President Bush, "made that we're heading up to the crisis in this."

[illegible][illegible]

One possibility, he suggested, would be for the Navy to sail into the Gulf of Sidra, challenging Libya's claim to the gulf as its territorial waters, prompting a Libyan attack and providing an excuse to respond. In an incident similar to the episode in 1981, a Libyan SU-26 jet fired on two Navy F-14 jets over the Gulf of Sidra, and the United States fighters shot down two Libyan planes. The Navy pilots were highly praised by President Reagan.

Mr. Knap said the greatest military mistake was the possible shooting down of American planes and capture of American pilots. But he did not credit the Libyan military with much skill. "Their record is one of incompetence," he said.

The political danger, he said, lay in an operation that had any sign of Israeli involvement.

"While you could make a case from a military standpoint for a joint U.S.-Israeli operation, it would be the most silly thing to do politically," he said.

"Unless you handled it very carefully,

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DALLAS MORNING NEWS  
7 January 1986 Pg. 1

# Reagan tops hit list, terrorist leader says

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Abu Nidal — reputed mastermind of the airport bloodbaths in Rome and Vienna — says that President Reagan is at the top of his assassination list, which also includes British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, King Hussein of Jordan and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

The United States, not Israel, is the greatest enemy of the Palestinian people, and Reagan, accordingly, is at the top of the Patah Revolutionary Council's hit list, said council leader Nidal in an interview at a Libyan hideout.

The 48-year-old faction chief also condemned Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat as a "Zionist puppet."

Nidal, also blamed for the Achille Lauro hijacking, said his movement seeks a total destruction not only of Israel, but of its supporters as well — especially the United States.

"If there is ever any absolute on this Earth," he said, "then it is our hostility toward American imperialism. Indeed, without American help, the Zionist structure (Israel) would no longer be alive."

"The Americans fan the war in the (Persian) gulf and the split among the Arabs. If the Arab struggle ends in victory one day, we shall not allow a single American to set his foot on our territory."

"I can assure you of one thing," he said. "When we have the slightest chance to hurt the Americans, we won't hesitate to do so. There is a war being fought to the bitter end between the Americans and ourselves. The Americans shall remember us in the coming months and years."

"They can select as president whomever they want: a ballet dancer, a cowboy, a comedian. But when American planes drop bombs on our houses, it's terrorism and a crime to which we reply in kind."

Nidal, apparently gleeful over the beefing up of security at the White House against possible truck bombings, said, "Reagan has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to make his White House secure. We are happy to see how scared he is, and it shall stay that way."

Nidal deplored the fact that many Arab leaders were on good terms with the United States. "I ask every king, every emir or sheik in our region to honestly admit whether he dares to even sleep with his wife without American permission."

"Who can really believe that even such a dwarf state as Qatar would have its own army, flag and national anthem if the Americans had not helped them?"

His animosity does not extend to the other superpower, however. "The Soviet Union is a true friend of the Arabs."

Thatcher is a target of his anger because, he asserted, British intelligence services, in cooperation with Israel's intelligence service, the Mossad, have smuggled hundreds of agents into Arab countries with British passports. This accounts for his faction's close cooperation with the Irish Republican Army, he said.

Nidal said he collaborated closely with other European underground organizations, including France's Direct Action, Belgium's Fighting Communist Cells, the Basque separatist ETA and the West German Red Army Faction.

The Revolutionary Council's civilian Jewish targets are fair game, he said, because they were being used by the Mossad. He also charged that British, French and West German embassies served as centers of Mossad activities.

Nidal confirmed that it was his organization that shot Shlomo Argov, the Israeli envoy to Britain, in 1982 in London, claiming the envoy

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## ROLE...Continued

Richard Straus of the Middle East Policy Survey said Tureiki's statement may be an indication that U.S. diplomacy is having some effect.

"Kadafi can't be comfortable being singled out; he does want a certain amount of international respectability," Straus said. "But this has a very limited effect."

Richard C. Shadyac, a Washington lawyer who for years has handled Libya's legal business in the United States, accused the Administration of conducting a "Rambo" foreign policy.

"Our President likes to pick on countries he can beat," Shadyac said of President Reagan.

"There is no question that Moammar Kadafi is a hard-line revolutionary, and there is no question that he backs hard-line Palestinians. He is an obstacle to the Middle East peace settlement that would give Israel what it wants," Shadyac said. "What we ought to do is send a diplomatic team to Libya and sit and discuss the issues with Kadafi. If we can sit down with the madmen of Russia that are raping Afghanistan, why can't we do the same thing with this small country?"

The State Department said the Abu Nidal group, expelled from the mainstream PLO more than a decade ago for refusing to abide by Chairman Yasser Arafat's restrictions on terrorism outside Israel, has only a few hundred active members, although it is "probably the best organized and most effective of the radical Palestinian terrorist groups."

The department accuses the group—which uses as its title the *nom de guerre* of its leader, Sabri Banna—of carrying out at least 30 terrorist attacks in the last 13 months. Although two-thirds of the group's 1985 assaults were carried out in Western Europe, it has conducted operations in 20 countries on three continents.

## Death Threat to Arafat

Since 1984, the State Department says, the group has "concentrated on attacking Jordanian interests" because it considers Jordan too ready to talk peace with Israel. Abu Nidal has vowed to assassinate Arafat and is believed to have been behind several unsuccessful attempts to do just that.

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# Italy ponders question of who in Rome aided terrorists

By Marc Duvoisin  
 Inquirer Staff Writer

ROME — In the aftermath of the Rome airport terrorist attack, suspicion has centered on arms merchants greedy for profit and blind to the consequences, the remnants of the radical Red Brigades, and even the Mafia.

But investigators actually may never learn who provided arms and ammunition to the four Palestinian terrorists who opened fire in Leonardo da Vinci Airport on Dec. 27. They know this much: It was someone in Rome, and that fact is the important thing, authorities say.

Evidence gathered so far indicates the gunmen received not only weapons and ammunition, but also instructions, food and possibly lodging from sympathizers here whose identities and nationalities remain unknown, according to Italian authorities.

Palestinian terrorists "either have their own bases in Rome or some continuing connection with Italian terrorist groups," Stefano Rodota, a member of the Italian Parliament and a law professor at the University of Rome, said in an interview yesterday. "There is a stable organization, a point of reference. This is very important."

"There appears to be serious support [in Rome] in that they get weapons here rather than bringing them in," an official in a Western embassy here said. "One has to think it might be the same [source] for a number of terrorist incidents."

"It seems to me that the Italians have absolutely no idea who the people are who are providing this infrastructural support," he said. Speculation that the Mafia may have supplied arms to the Da Vinci gunmen "reveals the lack of knowledge," he said.

Nineteen people, including four terrorists, were killed and more than 110 were injured in the Rome attack and in an airport assault the same day in Vienna, Austria. Authorities here and in Israel and the United States have attributed the incidents to the Abu Nidal group, a radical Palestinian organization that is blamed for at least 70 acts of terrorism in the past decade.

Evidence that Palestinian terrorists or their sympathizers have established a support system here is disturbing to authorities for several reasons. The behind-the-scenes supporters are extremely difficult to identify and root out. And they apparently are adept at manipulating and motivating the teenagers who increasingly are being called upon to carry out terrorist attacks.

The lone surviving gunman in the Da Vinci assault, Mohammad Sarham, 19, reportedly is cooperating fully with Italian investigators. Domenico Sica, the Roman magistrate who is supervising the probe, has questioned the young Palestinian at length at his bedside in a military hospital.

On Saturday, Sica, along with Sarham's physician and representative of several security agencies, accompanied the Palestinian on an ambulance ride around Rome. Sarham, who was wounded in a gun battle with police at the Rome airport, was asked to point out the places where he met the people who supplied him and the three other gunmen with money and arms.

Investigators have determined that Sarham and the others entered Italy with stolen Moroccan passports in early December and spent the next several weeks in a succession of inexpensive hotels. On or shortly before the day of the raid, supporters based in Rome are believed to have provided them with grenades and Kalashnikov assault rifles.

Authorities believe these supporters may have been Europeans, and possibly Italians. That suspicion is based in part on information obtained from two teenage terrorists captured after separate bomb attacks in Rome last year.

In one of the incidents, 15 people were wounded when a 16-year-old Palestinian threw a bomb into the British Airways office on the Via Veneto in September. The Palestinian said he had received the explosives from a tall, blond man whom he knew only as "the Belgian."

In the other incident, in April, a Palestinian terrorist fired a bazooka at the Jordanian Embassy here. He later told authorities that a woman

who was either Italian or French had given him the weapon.

The disclosure that the Da Vinci gunmen apparently received aid in Rome has provoked speculation in the Italian press that surviving members of the Red Brigades, the paramilitary group that terrorized Italy during the 1970s, had resurfaced. Although the organization was crushed by aggressive prosecution and a wave of anti-terrorist laws, several dozen members are still at large, according to authorities.

Evidence of a Red Brigades connection is scanty, but intriguing. Under questioning by Sica, Sarham reportedly has mentioned the Italian terrorist group, although he also is said to have changed his story several times.

In addition, investigators suspect that the Kalashnikov rifles used by the Da Vinci terrorists may have come from a cache smuggled into Italy in the late 1970s by Palestinian organizations working in cooperation with Mario Moretti, the Red Brigades leader, now in prison.

Rodota, the Italian legislator, said he understood that police experts were conducting ballistics tests on the rifles used in the airport attacks to determine whether any of them also had been used in assaults by the Red Brigades.

However, Rodota, a leader of Italy's Independent Left party, said he believed it was unlikely that the Palestinian terrorists had received organized assistance from Italian citizens. Although Palestinians sought help from Italian terrorists several years ago, he said, they are believed to have established a support system of their own here — in part, to avoid being swept up in Italy's crackdown on domestic terrorists.

The people who helped the Da Vinci gunmen were very likely fellow Arabs or Italians motivated by sympathy for the Palestinian cause rather than by organizational connections, he said. "We discovered at the time of Italian terrorism that it is very easy to build up a network," he said.



# U.S. Rebuts Libya Terrorist Denial

## Says It Has 'Firm Evidence' Kadafi Harbors Camps, Sheltered Abu Nidal

By ELEANOR CLIFT, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Scoffing at assertions by Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi, White House spokesman Larry Speakes said Monday that the Reagan Administration has "firm evidence" that Libya harbors training camps for terrorists and has provided sanctuary for Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal.

Kadafi regularly gives Abu Nidal, who has been blamed for last month's terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports, "a place to stay and money," Speakes said. Also, he added, Abu Nidal is "a frequent visitor" to the terrorist training camps.

In a televised interview Sunday, Kadafi protested that no network

of training camps exists in Libya. And although he has admitted that Abu Nidal has been in Libya, he has denied that the radical Palestinian is involved with any such camps.

### 'Not on Vacation'

But, one White House official asked sarcastically Monday, "what's the guy doing there? He's not going there on vacation."

The Administration had to settle for a war of words over the camps' existence because, Speakes contended, disclosure of evidence about the sites would endanger intelligence sources. But Speakes declared flatly that Kadafi's pro-

testations of innocence are "patently untrue."

The White House spokesman conceded, however, that the Administration had known about the camps for at least a year. When asked why no action was taken earlier, Speakes retorted: "What would you suggest we do?"

Indeed, the exchange pointed up the Administration's seeming inability to formulate an appropriate military response to stem Libya's terrorist activities and to retaliate for the bloody Dec. 27 airport attacks, in which 15 travelers including five Americans, were killed.

The terrorists are believed to be members of Abu Nidal's violent faction, which was expelled from the mainstream Palestine Liberation Organization in 1974.

### A Limited Response

Administration policy has long been that the target of any retaliatory response be limited to terrorist bases and not be carried out in a way that would inflict bloodshed on innocent people. And it is generally agreed that the chances of finding the right conditions for such a strike are fairly remote, despite the Administration's tough rhetoric.

Asked if military action is imminent, Speakes responded, "Those responsible and those actively involved should be kept guessing and not sleep well at night."

Nonetheless, with the military option appearing increasingly unlikely and Israel apparently unwilling to take the lead in punishing the perpetrators, the Administration could do little else but continue to implore its Western allies to join in a limited economic boycott of the Tripoli regime.

In his first news conference of 1986, President Reagan tonight is expected to press his case for diplomatic and economic isolation of Libya. On Monday, he met with his national security advisers to assess whether there is anything more the United States can accomplish unilaterally, short of taking military action.

U.S. trade with Libya has declined dramatically since 1981, when the Administration first imposed economic sanctions. In 1979, before Reagan took office, export trade reached a high of \$860 mil-

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH

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## U.S. Cannot Seal Out Terrorism, Ex-Ambassador To Egypt Says

By Bill Smith

Of the Post-Dispatch Staff

Americans should not minimize recent threats from Libyan leader Col. Moammar Khadafi that Libya could send suicide squads into the streets of the United States, a former U.S. ambassador to Egypt says.

"I would not say that one can be complacent about that," said Alfred L. Atherton, who was head of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo under former President Jimmy Carter and under President Ronald Reagan until 1983. "There is a lot of anger out there."

Terrorism has become so widespread that it is impossible for the United States to keep its borders free of terrorists, he said in an interview Monday.

"You can't seal the U.S. hermetically. One has to realize that at some point they are going to get lucky."

Atherton was in St. Louis for a speech sponsored by the World Affairs Council of St. Louis at the Top of the Sevens in Clayton. He spoke to about 120 people.

In the interview before his talk, Atherton agreed with Reagan's statement earlier Monday that the United States should limit its actions to economic pressure to punish Libya for its support of terrorists.

Military action now would swing world public opinion against this country, he said.

"There isn't any simple answer," Atherton said.

The only way to combat terrorism is to continue to try to arrest and prosecute those directly responsible for terrorist acts and to try to exert economic pressures on those countries that support terrorism, Atherton said.

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# Austria links man to airport terrorists

WASHINGTON TIMES

8 January 1986 Pg. 6

## Libya reported using Switzerland

BONN, West Germany — A West German newspaper said yesterday that Libya appears to be using Switzerland as a base for terrorist operations in other European countries.

Die Welt said Col. Muammar Qaddafi's government was misusing diplomatic courier rights to smuggle weapons and false identity papers into Switzerland. It attributed its report to an unidentified security official in Bern, the Swiss capital.

Italian investigators investigating the Dec. 27 machine gun and grenade attack at the Rome airport announced last week they had learned the gunmen received their final orders and money in Switzerland, probably Geneva, before traveling to Italy by train.

## DENIAL...Continued

lion, but it plummeted to \$200 million by 1984. In addition, the Administration banned the import of Libyan crude oil in 1984.

Although Reagan could announce additional modest sanctions in his news conference, the United States largely has exhausted its economic leverage. Instead, he is expected to mount a further effort to persuade the European Communities to curtail its diplomatic and economic contacts with the Kadafi regime.

Speakes expressed hope that "a growing realization of the threat" posed by Libya makes it "more likely now than ever" that Europe will take action.

### Feeling the Heat

Another White House official, meanwhile, reported that talks with U.S. allies are continuing and that the allies are feeling the heat of public opinion in the aftermath of the attacks.

Leaders of these nations know "something has to be done," this official said. "Their vulnerability is sinking in."

The Common Market historically has been reluctant to take collec-

tive economic action, however. Leading Western nations, including West Germany, Britain, Austria and Italy, Libya's largest trading partner, already have made it known that they do not approve of economic sanctions as a way to discourage terrorism.

Speakes countered virtually every assertion that Kadafi made in his interview, conducted in a barley field outside Tripoli, but he refused to confirm or deny the existence of the so-called suicide squads that the Libyan leader claims to have placed in the United

Reuters

VIENNA, Austria — Austrian police have identified the man who briefed the three Palestinian gunmen involved in last month's terrorist attack at Schwechat Airport here and say he traveled on a Tunisian passport, an Interior Ministry spokesman said yesterday.

"We think his name [is] Dakhili Ali Ben Bechim and that he traveled from Damascus, Syria, on Dec. 22 with a Tunisian passport," the spokesman said. The police also released a photograph of the man.

"He flew from Damascus to Hungary and then took a train from Budapest to Vienna," he said. "He is certainly not Tunisian, but for the time being we don't know his nationality."

Austrian officials have said the three terrorists who took part in the Dec. 27 airport attack carried Tunisian passports. Tunisia has said the three passports were taken from Tunisian citizens working in Libya by the government there.

Police said the man gave the three gunmen their final instructions over breakfast at the Vienna Hilton hotel on the morning of the attack. They have no information on his whereabouts since then.

One of the three gunmen was killed by police, and the other two were wounded. They are in Austrian hospitals. Two travelers were also killed in the attack.

A similar assault the same day at Leonardo da Vinci Airport in Rome resulted in 16 deaths, including three of the four gunmen responsible.

In Rome, Italian radio reported yesterday that police have arrested a young man suspected of complicity in the Rome attack.

The man, who was described as being of Mideast origin, was detained in Vicenza, a city about 215 miles north of Rome. No other details were given.

States.

"We're always vigilant," Speakes said at one point.

Pressed on the existence of the alleged death squads, Speakes refused to be specific, saying only that the Administration takes the threats seriously and remains "on guard" against terrorist incidents.

Rumors of Libyan "hit squads" during Reagan's first term proved to be unfounded, but the Administration cited them as the reason for placing extensive fortifications around the White House and State Department.



WASHINGTON POST 10 January 1986 Pg. D12

JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA

## Terrorist Nerve Center Tempting Target

**W**hite House documents emphasize President Reagan's attitude toward any further tweaking of Uncle Sam's beard by Moslem terrorists: He's sick of being pushed around. Reagan believes that the American people "are tired of suffering insults at the hands of other nations," as one policy paper put it. For this reason, Reagan is convinced that "minimal risks" can be taken to bolster U.S. leadership in the world.

The list of target options that could both assuage the public's outrage and deal the terrorists a damaging blow includes the obvious ones such as Libya, Syria and Iran. But there's an even more tempting target: the ancient city of Baalbek in northeastern Lebanon.

If ever there were a viper's nest ripe for destruction, it is this terrorist plotting-and-training center in the Bekaa Valley, close to the Syrian border. Since 1975, the Bekaa has been the headquarters and nerve center for the greatest concentration of terrorists in the world today.

Protected by Syrian troops, who screen every outsider venturing into the area, the Bekaa Valley is only about an hour's drive from Damascus or Beirut. It is an ideally situated launching pad for terrorist operations anywhere in the world.

Among the groups that use the valley's facilities, which are defended by mobile batteries of Syrian anti-aircraft missiles, are terrorists linked to the notorious Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez (Carlos the Jackal) and radical Palestinians Abu Musa and Abu Nidal.

Of all the terrorist gangs in the Bekaa, the most numerous and blatant are those supported by Iran, loosely lumped under the cover name of Islamic Jihad. The most vicious of these fanatics are the Shiite Hezbollah and the Islamic Amal, both based in Baalbek.

At one time or another, almost every American hostage held in Lebanon, aside from last June's TWA hijacking victims, has been kept at some location in the Bekaa Valley.

According to intelligence sources, two prominent Bekaa Valley terrorists are Sheik Subhi Tufaile, leader of Hezbollah in the Bekaa, and Hussein Rezaie, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in the valley.

The nerve center for most of their depredations is a dilapidated building in downtown Baalbek known as "Hosseinih." A former school, it serves today as the Bekaa Valley headquarters for the Revolutionary Guards.

The Iranian guard units were rushed to the

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LOS ANGELES TIMES 11 Jan 86 Pg. 1

## U.S. Accounts Are Funding Terrorists

### Private Libyan Deposits in American Banks Used, Top-Secret Report Says

By JAMES GERSTENZANG and RONALD J. OSTROW, Times Staff Writers

**WASHINGTON**—Funds from Libyans' private bank accounts in the United States, which were not affected by President Reagan's order freezing the North African nation's official bank deposits here, are being used to pay for international terrorist activities, according to a top-secret U.S. intelligence report.

Reagan Administration officials with access to the document said Friday that an apparent "laundering" operation was discovered more than a week ago—before the freeze was imposed—but that government officials have not moved to cut off the flow.

One Administration official placed the value of the accounts at "millions and millions" of dollars.

"There are accounts on which terrorists are drawing in the United States. It's unbelievable," said one senior Administration official, speaking on the condition that he not be identified. "There is intelligence to the effect that there are bank holdings in this country that are drawn upon for the purpose of supporting terrorism."

#### Stable and Secure

As portrayed by another official, the money was being deposited in U.S. banks, considered among the world's most stable and secure, and then withdrawn for eventual payment through various channels to terrorists overseas.

However, the senior official cautioned that disclosure of details

about the accounts, the flow of money or those with access to the funds could hamper government efforts to monitor use of the money—a process that could possibly provide information about overseas terrorist networks.

An investigative source said that the material, classified top secret, was discussed at an interagency meeting of intelligence experts earlier this week. It was also circulated in the government's National Intelligence Digest.

The Treasury Department, which holds primary responsibility for monitoring currency transfers, is leading the investigation, the sources said. It is understood that the agency is looking at the accounts and transactions under the federal requirement that all transfers of \$10,000 and above be reported to the Treasury in a currency transaction report.

Treasury spokesman Kim Hogard said Treasury Secretary James A. Baker III had decided that "there will be no comment from this department on that subject."

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#### TARGET...

Bekaa in June 1983. Their strength was growing. It was that terrorists put the U.S. Embassy in 1983, as well as kidnappings of An

The old school target for U.S. Khawam is used training school. Sheik Abdullah town; a one-time target of French but has since b

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## TARGET...Continued

Bekaa in June 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon. Their strength quickly reached 350 and kept growing. It was from the Hosseinieh headquarters that terrorists planned the devastating bombings of the U.S. Embassy and Marine compounds in Beirut in 1983, as well as airplane hijackings, murders and kidnappings of Americans.

The old schoolhouse isn't the only identifiable target for U.S. retaliation in Baalbek. The Hotel Khawam is used by the Hezbollah as a military training school. The Hezbollah headquarters in the Sheik Abdullah barracks sits on a hillside above the town; a one-time Lebanese army post, it was the target of French and Israeli reprisal raids in 1983, but has since been rebuilt.

## ACCOUNTS...Continued

But one Treasury official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said that in a public relations sense, "it wouldn't hurt us" to make public the information about the accounts.

Reagan's order, issued Wednesday, froze access to Libyan government accounts held in U.S. banks as the Administration stepped up its efforts to isolate the regime of Col. Moammar Kadafi in retaliation for the Dec. 27 terrorist attacks by radical Palestinians at the Rome and Vienna airports. A total of 19 people—15 of them travelers, including five Americans—died in the attacks.

The order was issued after the Libyan government transferred about \$100 million from an American bank to a foreign bank earlier Wednesday, raising officials' fears that more would be quickly withdrawn.

The Administration has been deeply divided over proposed legislation giving Reagan the authority to monitor, regulate, or even prohibit, loans and other banking transactions to a number of foreign nations.

The legislation has been sponsored by Sens. Jake Garn (R-Utah) and William Proxmire (D-Wis.), the chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Banking Committee. It was supported by the CIA, the Pentagon, the National Security Council staff and the Justice Department, and opposed by the Treasury, State and Commerce departments, according to Wayne Abernathy, a banking committee economist.

As originally written, the proposal would have applied only to financial transactions with Soviet Bloc nations. However, there is

support in the Senate and in the Pentagon for adding to the list the nations considered by the State Department to be supporting terrorism, among them Libya, Syria, South Yemen, Iran and Cuba, Abernathy said.

He said that, short of declaring a national emergency, the President, under the Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, had no other method of monitoring and sequestering funds flowing from U.S. banks to overseas destinations. That act was the law used when

NEW YORK TIMES 12 Jan 86 Pg. 1

# Response to Terrorism: How President Decided

By BERNARD WEINRAUB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 11 — On the morning after the terrorist attacks at airports in Rome and Vienna, an inter-agency working group was hastily convened at the White House to draw up a response. At the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff started shaping contingency plans and military options for a possible reprisal against the terrorists.

In a Los Angeles hotel suite President Reagan gazed at the television pictures of the airport carnage with "revulsion" and "anger," a close aide said. Almost immediately the President, who was in California for the New Year holiday, began receiving option papers on use of military force and considered some type of armed reprisal.

## Hesitant on 'Macho Response'

Yet one week later, while returning home to Washington from a brief official visit to Mexico, Mr. Reagan sat in a front cabin of Air Force One and informed his closest aides that he was reluctant to take what a ranking White House aide termed "the macho response" to Libya.

The depiction of the President and his top advisers tensely weighing policy options in the days after the airport attacks was pieced together from interviews with White House, State Department and Pentagon officials.

In the week after the attacks Mr. Reagan and some of his closest aides concluded that Americans in Libya would be in danger if the United States carried out military reprisals and that the terrorist leader believed responsible for the attacks, Abu Nidal, and his followers were, for the moment, impossible to track down.

Moreover, a bombing raid without killing terrorists, officials argued, would probably have scant support among the European allies and could cause political problems for the Administration among friendly Arab nations in the Middle East.

In an interview with European journalists made public today, Mr. Reagan suggested a theme voiced privately by his advisers in recent days — that with the departure of the remaining Americans from Libya, which he has ordered, the United States would be freer to take strong measures against Libya.

Mr. Reagan has said there is "irrefutable evidence" of Libyan involvement in the airport attacks.

## A Move to 'Untie Our Hands'

Mr. Reagan told the European journalists that by ordering the Americans out, he was able to "untie our hands" with regard to whatever action might be necessary in the future.

On Tuesday night — 11 days after the airport attacks — Mr. Reagan announced in a nationally televised news conference that although Libya "has engaged in armed aggression against the United States," he was forgoing military action against the Libyan Government of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. Instead, Mr. Reagan severed economic ties with Libya and ordered the Americans to depart immediately.

## Fury and Frustration

By all accounts, Mr. Reagan's response to the terrorism on Dec. 27 was marked by personal fury and by frustration about how to react to the kill-

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Libya's official accounts were frozen Wednesday.

"Generally, individuals don't register their nationalities when they open accounts," the Senate staff member said.

The proposed legislation, if expanded to include those nations on the terrorist list, also "would give the President authority" to counter the flow of individuals' funds out of this country. The measure is pending before the Senate Banking Committee, and its future is uncertain.



# RESPONSE...Continued

ings of 19 people, including five Americans. It was also marked by a continuing but hesitant assessment of military options that was relayed to him in Los Angeles and Palm Springs.

"There was the normal desire for a macho response, but it had to be restrained in view of the fact that we had 1,000 to 1,500 Americans over there," a ranking White House official said, referring to the State Department estimate of the number of Americans in Libya. "Many of them would end up dead or injured. At best they would be held hostage."

Mr. Reagan told one aide: "I want to punish the right people. I don't want to lay waste the buildings of an area or a whole city and not know that we have hit the perpetrators."

A senior White House official remarked: "If somebody said there's an apartment house on such-and-such a street that Abu Nidal was in, we'd go after it. The problem is the lack of precision in the target. The problem is you're dealing with people in a fog. You don't see them. They're in shadows. Who is Abu Nidal? If he walked into this room would we recognize him? Where the hell does he hang out? Who are his followers?"

Abu Nidal, whose real name is Sabry al-Banna, heads a group that split in the 1970's from Al Fatah, Yasir Arafat's mainstream group in the Palestine Liberation Organization. The United States says the Abu Nidal group, which is believed to use Libya as a haven, carried out the airport attacks.

## President's Reaction: 'Horror' at TV Scenes

Mr. Reagan's immediate response to the airport attacks was, in the words of one aide, "horror at what he saw" on television in his suite at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles. Yet beyond that, officials indicated, Mr. Reagan almost immediately told his aides that the situation demanded a measured response — one that would not lead to the deaths of Americans in Libya and many Libyan civilians.

"He was tempted by it, but he couldn't be satisfied by certain equations," a senior White House official said, describing the President's attitude toward military retaliation. "He asked: 'What happens to our own people? Are we sure we're going to hit the right people? What are the targets that are worthwhile?'"

Another White House official, who was with the President, said: "There was a sense of outrage. He sees the image of the 11-year-old girl who was killed. It's sickening. He just found it outrageous that a human being would cause that on another person."

Another official who was with Mr.

Reagan said: "His position that first day was, forgetting the hideousness of the attack, that the reaction had to be a measured one. If we knew the people who did it, we would retaliate. The kind of thing he said was, 'We want to retaliate, but we don't want to start World War III.'"

## Shultz and Weinberger Split on Use of Force

On Dec. 28, a day after the attacks, an interagency group to deal with the crisis was convened at the White House under Donald R. Fortier, deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs. Specialists from the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, other agencies and the White House began examining military maps and satellite photos and drawing up military contingency plans.

There was little hint publicly that United States officials were weighing military options. At the time, attention was focused on whether Israel would undertake some military retaliation.

A White House official said Secretary of State George P. Shultz favored American military action against Libya, especially because he felt that evidence directly linked the Abu Nidal terrorist group to the airport attacks. Mr. Shultz's view, according to officials, was that the United States seemed virtually paralyzed after terrorist attacks abroad and that since evidence of Abu Nidal's link to Libya seemed clear, retaliation was in order.

On the other hand, officials said, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger opposed military action for several reasons. There was concern that a military strike would inflame Arab nations and pose problems for American military forces in the region. At the same time, officials said, Mr. Weinberger was concerned about a Congressional or public backlash if the operation failed and Americans or many Libyan civilians were killed or wounded.

Mr. Weinberger was especially worried about the risk of losing American planes in Libya against anti-aircraft emplacements, as happened in Lebanon on Dec. 4, 1983, when two Navy bombers were downed by Soviet-supplied SAM-7 missiles. The Soviet Union recently sent SAM-5 missiles to Libya and may have technicians at the site.

A key White House official said: "This is not the first time I've seen this. The State Department is more militant than Defense. And Defense is more diplomacy-oriented than State."

A senior State Department official observed: "If we are going to redress terrorism it has got to be a routine matter of retaliation soon after the terrorist deed, with the best intelligence we have and with standard operating procedures. We practice for things, we rehearse, we have procedures, we go and do it. We have never established

this routine. When this happens, time and time again this Administration says 'My gosh, what can we do?'"

## Logistical Problems, Civilian and Military

Officials indicated that at the outset of the crisis, some confusion marked planning because Mr. Reagan was in California without his chief advisers and other senior officials were scattered. Moreover, the aircraft carrier Coral Sea, whose warplanes would possibly be deployed in a military strike, was on port call in Naples, with most of its crew ashore.

"It could have left port early without a full complement had there been a need, but on the other hand, had it left with half their people, it would have been noted in the Italian press," said one White House official. "Where would your secret be?"

Over the New Year holiday, Mr. Shultz and Donald T. Regan, the White House chief of staff, arrived, as originally planned, in Palm Springs to join the President and attend several parties at the estate of Walter H. Annenberg, the publisher. The three officials conferred on the estate as the State Department issued, on Dec. 31, a report that directly linked the Abu Nidal group to the airport terrorism and stressed the group's links to Libya.

Mr. Reagan indicated to his advisers that he was leaning against an air strike against Libya, but in the meantime, military contingency plans were still under consideration.

On New Year's Day the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Mr. Weinberger's approval, told the Navy to take precautions in the event of an American military strike. Six EA-6B jamming planes were sent from Whidbey Island, off the coast of the state of Washington, to Sigonella Air Base in Sicily.

At the same time officers aboard the carrier America and the battleship Iowa, both moored in Norfolk, Va., were told to have their crews prepared to return to ship on 72 hours' notice to begin the 10-day trip to the Mediterranean. The crews were never called.

"The military buildup and the military movements occurred largely in the media," said Robert B. Oakley, head of the State Department's counterterrorism office. "Very little actually took place. There was a lot of contingency planning."

## More Aides Head West And the Options Grow

On Jan. 2 Mr. Reagan returned to the Century Plaza in Los Angeles to prepare for a four-hour meeting the next day in the border town of Mexicali with President Miguel de la Madrid of Mexico. At the same time Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, the national security



NEW YORK TIMES 12 January 1986

Pg. 2E

# Qaddafi Is Making the Most of the Spotlight

By JUDITH MILLER

TRIPOLI, Libya -- Like a lightweight using jujitsu principles to outmaneuver a bigger, stronger adversary, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi appeared last week to be making American sanctions and threats of military reprisal work for him. "The challenge was very useful," the Libyan leader said at a news conference.

Arab and Western diplomats here tended to agree with him. Libya initially feared an American military strike when the United States and Israel accused it of involvement in the attacks by Palestinian terrorists at the Rome and Vienna airports Dec. 27. But by week's end, the talk of military reprisal receded, although President Reagan said the United States "should be ready for any contingency." The score sheet seemed, for the moment, favorable to Libya and its unpredictable ruler.

Diplomats and other Libya watchers pointed to benefits Colonel Qaddafi had obtained. The threats strengthened his hand internally by distracting his opponents. They dramatically reduced Libya's isolation in the Arab camp, forcing even longtime foes to rally around a beleaguered "brother." They assuaged strained relations between Tripoli and Moscow. And they created difficulties for the United States in its dealings with European allies.

"Qaddafi has had a victory at a very low cost," a

Western diplomat said. "He has declared war on a superpower, dared to threaten to send suicide squads into the streets of Washington. This has helped him enormously at home and boosted his standing in the Arab world. It has been a beautiful bluff."

"It has been a formidable victory for a man whom Americans have called mad," an Arab diplomat agreed. "He is not mad. Qaddafi knows how to play with the U.S. This incident shows he has followed his vision and dreams in quite a coherent way."

Recent unrest and discontent in Libya, stirred by drastic shortages of food and basic commodities, seemed all but forgotten last week as Libyans, predictably, supported their leader. And although only a few months ago, Libya was barely on speaking terms with most of its neighbors, the other Arabs have rushed to his aid. Egypt, which has frequently accused Libya of sponsoring terrorist operations against it, warned last week that American military action would mean the end of the Jordanian-Egyptian peace initiative nurtured by Washington. Tunisia, which had been infuriated by Libya's expulsion this year of thousands of its workers, agreed to serve as host for a meeting of Arab League foreign ministers later this month to discuss the threat to Libya.

Syria and Iran vowed to help defend Libya if it should be attacked, and usually cautious Persian Gulf countries such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates also offered verbal support. Even Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who has been totally at odds with Mr. Qaddafi, supported Libya despite what Mr. Arafat described as "our differences." Expressions of solidarity also came from the Islamic Conference Organization of 45 countries, which includes United States allies and aid recipients such as Pakistan and Turkey. Last week, in Fez, Morocco, the organization said the "imperialist-Zionist threat" to Libya was a threat to all Moslem countries.

Libya's relations with the Soviet Union have also been boosted by the clash with Washington. Diplomats said Colonel Qaddafi's visit to Moscow in October had not gone well. The Colonel, who has reportedly spent \$5 billion on Russian weapons over the years, was annoyed that Moscow seemed reluctant to provide its most advanced equipment. More than a week passed after the visit, the official said, before the two countries ex-

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## RESPONSE...Continued

adviser, and James A. Baker 3d, the Treasury Secretary, arrived in Los Angeles. Admiral Poindexter had additional military contingency plans.

The options, according to Administration officials, did not include a strike against the SAM-5 surface-to-air missiles being installed in Libya near the Gulf of Sidra. Attacks on these sites were ruled out apparently because they are staffed with Soviet technicians and bear no relation to the terrorists.

The list included strikes on one or more of the five main air bases along the Libyan coast or on some of the 15 terrorist training camps said to be situated in the Libyan desert. Administration officials said that the use of special forces was never seriously considered and that air power was considered the most feasible option against Libya.

Although there had been initial discussion about using B-52 bombers

flying from the United States and refueling in midair for the element of surprise, this was dismissed by military leaders, Administration officials said. The Joint Chiefs considered its main assets to be the Navy FA-18's and A-6 attack planes aboard the Coral Sea, and the Air Force F-111's in Britain.

Officials said that on Jan. 3, as Mr. Reagan flew back from Mexico, he weighed the military options with some of his closest aides, including Mr. Shultz, Mr. Regan, Mr. Baker and Admiral Poindexter. Aides indicated that the President, on the late-afternoon trip back to Washington, made it plain that he favored economic punishment of Libya, rather than military reprisal.

(Later, officials said that they were also considering economic sanctions against Syria for its support of Abu Nidal but that there were no active plans to impose them at present.)

### Before Planners Meet, The Decision Is Clear

A final and formal decision on Libya was set aside until Monday, when the highest-ranking foreign policy and defense advisers in the Administration — the National Security Planning Group — were set to meet in the late morning at the White House.

But by 8 A.M. Monday, as key officials of the White House staff held their first meeting of the year with Mr. Regan, it was evident that the President had already made up his mind: He would sever all economic ties to Libya and demand the withdrawal of the remaining Americans there.

An official at the 8 A.M. staff meeting said: "My sense in listening to what was being said that morning was that the recommendation was going to come down for economic sanctions. By then it did not seem at all that the military option was serious. It wasn't even discussed. We were told that we should be quiet until the President made his announcement Tuesday night."



WASHINGTON POST 12 January 1986

# Interpol Issues Terrorism Warning

## Scandinavian, Dutch Security Forces Deployed at Likely Targets

By Abner Katzman  
Associated Press

AMSTERDAM, Jan. 11—An Interpol warning that the renegade Abu Nidal faction has targeted Jewish and Israeli institutions in Scandinavia and the Netherlands has thrown security forces into high alert, police and government officials said today.

Synagogues, historic sites and Israeli diplomatic and commercial buildings were placed under increased guard, and airports, border crossings and ports were placed under close surveillance after the warning.

The Paris-based international police organization gave word Thursday that two commando groups directed by Abu Nidal were heading for Scandinavia this weekend, according to Sven-Ake Hjalmroth, Sweden's security police chief.

Interpol said "a very reliable source" indicated that the Palestinian faction was ready to strike Jewish or Israeli targets in Sweden, Denmark, Norway or the Netherlands.

"We look very seriously at this threat," said Hjalmroth, adding that the state of alert will continue at least for a few days.

The United States has blamed the Abu Nidal faction, which broke from the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1974, for the Dec. 27 attacks on the El Al Israeli airline check-in counters at the Rome and Vienna airports in which 19 persons died.

The Amsterdam daily De Volkskrant said today that the Interpol alert was based on a tip from an unspecified Western European intelligence service that followed an anti-Israeli terrorist group in Western Europe but lost its trail.

Interpol's warning was issued two weeks before Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres is scheduled

### SPOTLIGHT...Continued

changed "solidarity" messages.

But the massing of Egyptian troops on Libya's border late last year and rising tensions after the hijacking of an Egyptian jet to Malta prompted the Soviet Union to dispatch SAM-5 antiaircraft missiles with Soviet trainers. This brought the number of Russians in Libya to more than 4,000, diplomats estimated. Colonel Qaddafi said in an interview last week that the missiles were now operational; Western officials believe that they will be within a month. Last week, the Soviet Union issued a strong statement of support for Libya.

Finally, Colonel Qaddafi worked last week to exploit differences between the United States and its European allies. Receiving seven ambassadors of West European countries, he thanked them for refusing to support American economic sanctions. American and West European interests in Libya are different, he said, with 40,000 West Europeans and 230 European companies working on \$13 billion of Libyan contracts. In the next five years, he added, Libya plans to spend \$36 billion more. "These figures have significance in economies like ours," a West European diplomat acknowledged. Officially, Europeans explained their position as opposition in principle to sanctions that, they insist, do not work and to lack of proof of Libyan involvement in the two airport massacres.

"It seems ironic, doesn't it?" a diplomat observed. "Qaddafi has been able to shift the political ground totally. No one remembers any longer where this all began," he said. "The 19 dead and 110 wounded at European airports have been all but forgotten in the stampede to defend poor Libya from superpower bullying."

to visit the Netherlands for two days.

The Israeli Embassy in The Hague, already under heavy police protection, said there were no plans to cancel the visit because of the warning.

About 10 sites in Amsterdam were put under increased police protection, according to police spokesman Klaas Wilting, including the Anne Frank House, one of the nation's major tourist attractions.

Stockholm's main synagogue was cordoned off with barricades, and police patrolled the area with dogs.

On Dec. 24, Dutch national police said they had been alerted to possible terrorist action in Western Europe during the Christmas holidays.

Three days later, Palestinian commandos struck Schwechat Airport in Vienna and Leonardo da Vinci Airport in Rome.



JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA

# Qaddafi Buying Austrian Plastic Pistols

**L**ibyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi is in the process of buying more than 100 plastic handguns that would be difficult for airport security forces to detect.

Incredibly, the pistols are made in Austria—where Qaddafi-supported terrorists shot up the Vienna airport during Christmas week. "This is crazy," one top official told us. "To let a madman like Qaddafi have access to such a pistol! Once it is in his hands, he'll give it to terrorists throughout the Middle East."

The handgun in question is the Glock 17, a 9mm pistol invented and manufactured by Gaston Glock in the village of Deutsch-Wagram, just outside Vienna. It is accurate, reliable and made almost entirely of hardened plastic. Only the barrel, slide and one spring are metal. Dismantled, it is frighteningly easy to smuggle past airport security.

In fact, one Pentagon security expert decided to demonstrate just how easy it would be to sneak a Glock 17 aboard an airliner. He stripped the gun down and disguised the metal parts in his carry-on luggage. For example, he wrapped the spring around a pair of eyeglasses.

The Pentagon man tested his system twice at Washington National Airport, and got past the security checks both times. He subsequently alerted airport security personnel, and taught them how to spot the elements of the pistol. Security measures have been tightened.

Intelligence sources tell us Qaddafi has nearly completed a deal to buy more than 100 Glock 17s, possibly as many as 300. They explain that Austrian arms merchants hoping to sell Qaddafi big-ticket items—such as tanks—are using the Glock 17s as "sweeteners" for future transactions.

A marketing official for Glock in Austria assured us that the company has not sold Libya any of the guns, at least not yet. He offered no information on current negotiations.

Austria's past dealings with Qaddafi suggest that even the obvious danger of such a sale would not be enough to bring government intervention. It was the first European country in nine years to entertain Qaddafi on an official state visit, in 1982. He used the platform provided by the Austrians in Vienna to denounce President Reagan.

The Austrians were rewarded for their attitude toward Arab extremists in 1981 when Palestinian terrorists assassinated Heinz Nittel, a prominent Austrian Jew and close friend of then-Chancellor Bruno Kreisky.

When Kreisky complained to Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat, the latter pointed the finger at his rival, Abu Nidal, and even

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

15 January 1986

Pg. 1D

# Trying to track the elusive path of Abu Nidal

For the last 12 years, the suspected mastermind of the airport attacks has been at or near the top of the Israelis' list of terrorists that they would like to eliminate. But he survives.

By Robert J. Rosenthal  
*Inquirer Staff Writer*

JERUSALEM — Wherever he is, Abu Nidal is happy and feeling fulfilled.

This is the assessment of Israeli intelligence and terrorism experts about the mood of the man who has become the most notorious symbol of international terrorism.

Most recently, U.S. and Israeli officials have accused Abu Nidal of masterminding the terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports Dec. 27 that left 19 dead.

For Abu Nidal and his supporters — the men and women who follow him and the Syrian and Libyan governments that condone his terrorist attacks — the events of the last 10 days have fulfilled the goals of the airport attacks, according to Israeli officials.

"The role of the terrorist is to

create all-out conflict," said one Israeli official involved with intelligence-gathering. "They want Israel to be involved in a total war with the Arab world, not to allow any normalcy, to create deterioration in relations through small activities until there is total conflict."

The world expected the Israelis to retaliate for the attacks on the check-in counters of El Al, their national airline, with a swift and heavy military action. But the Israelis, who stressed that their fight against terrorism was a long-term war, said last week that they would retaliate at the time and place and with the weapons of their choosing.

While the Reagan administration, along with the Israelis, has linked Libya to Abu Nidal, the truth is that little is known about the specifics of how his terror network operates. For the last 12 years he has been at or near the top of the Israelis' list of terrorists

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WASHINGTON POST  
17 January 1986 Pg. 15

## U.S. Says Qaddafi's Remarks Prove His Role in Terrorism

By John M. Goshko  
and George C. Wilson  
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Reagan administration said yesterday that Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi's declaration that he will train and equip Arab guerrillas for "suicide missions" is proof of U.S. charges that "he has, in fact, been training terrorists for years."

"Qaddafi is his own smoking gun," Secretary of State George P. Shultz was quoted as saying in reaction to Qaddafi's threats against Israel and the United States during a long, rambling speech in Tripoli Wednesday night. Qaddafi dropped the conciliatory tone he had taken toward the United States in recent days and proclaimed Libya "a base for the liberation of Palestine."

His public vow to train and arm terrorists came as Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead was beginning a trip to Canada and Europe aimed at persuading U.S. allies that Libya was involved in the terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports last month.

However, while U.S. officials cited Qaddafi's remarks as an admission of support for terrorism, their reaction was essentially disdainful, apparently taking their cue from President Reagan's characterization of Qaddafi as "flaky."

Some officials said the administration wants to avoid a heavy-handed propaganda exchange and believes the U.S. case can be made better by the evidence being carried by Whitehead and by Qaddafi's actions and statements.

State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb said Shultz had called Qaddafi "his own smoking gun," and added: "Qaddafi's statements should have been put in the past tense . . . . He has, in fact, been training

terrorists for years. A new element in his speech is that he publicly admitted support for terrorism."

Shultz, interviewed on CBS' "Morning News," said, "What [Qaddafi] should have said is that he will continue to train. Qaddafi's involvement in terrorism is nothing new. It isn't some new thing he's going to start. He's been doing this."

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger said Qaddafi had "confirmed" what "we've been saying all along," that his country "is a base for terrorism. I don't think it escalates the situation."

At his first general news conference in four months, Weinberger declared that the two aircraft carriers and escorting warships deployed by the United States in the Mediterranean are an "appropriate" force and need not be expanded.

Pentagon officials added that the carrier USS Saratoga and its escorts were cruising off Lebanon, while the carrier USS Coral Sea is conducting North Atlantic Treaty Organization maneuvers with Marines on the western coast of Italy. Both carriers have A6E bombers which, with midair refueling, could reach targets in Libya.

Weinberger said the United States has "a good idea" about the location of some terrorist bases in Libya. But, in response to repeated questions about why the United States does not retaliate militarily against Libya, he opposed the idea of "an indiscriminate response."

State Department officials, reacting to reports that Soviet warships have arrived in Tripoli harbor and that the Soviet Union may be accelerating weapons shipments including anti-aircraft missiles to Libya, said the Soviet actions did not appear to exceed normal patterns of Soviet-Libyan cooperation.

### ISRAELI...Continued

Four years later, members of Abu Nidal's organization shot Israel's ambassador to Britain, Shlomo Argov, and the attempted assassination became the immediate pretext for Israel's assaults in Lebanon on bases of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Machanaimi said.

There have been reports about Abu Nidal's death in the last two years, the general said. Actually, "He had serious heart trouble but he underwent surgery a few years ago in East Germany, and now he's fine."

He said Abu Nidal's terrorist organization had about 300 Arab members and that apparently the group also has had European sympathizers who may have been involved in the December airport attacks in Vienna, Austria, and Rome.

Until the early 1980s, the headquarters of Abu Nidal's organization was in Baghdad, Iraq, but when Iraq and the United States began talks about resuming diplomatic relations, the United States insisted that Iraq expel the terrorist.

The Israeli official said there was clear proof that Libya was involved in the European airport attacks, but he noted that the United States was limited in its military options because of the presence of more than 1,000 American citizens in Libya.

"Khadafy is, first of all, a big mouth," said Machanaimi, "but he can be a serious danger. . . . He can attack civilian aircraft in the air, and for fighter planes to attack civilian airliners is like shooting sitting ducks."

Asked how Israel planned to fight Khadafy's role in promoting terrorism, Machanaimi said, "The trick in quiet warfare is to be quiet."

"I would refer you to the biblical verse: 'By careful stratagems, thou shalt make thy war,'" he said with a smile, quoting Proverbs 24: 6.



**Newsweek**

20 January 1986  
Pg. 20

# Could Terrorism Hit Home?

The United States has good defenses

**C**ould Arab terrorists sneak into the United States, shoot up an airport, sabotage a nuclear power plant or bomb a crowded building? So far, none has. Could Muammar Kaddafi make good on his threats to send suicide squads against Americans at home? Even all of his varied attempts to eliminate Libyan opponents in the United States have failed. So could it happen here?

It's possible, say American government and academic experts on terrorism, but the obstacles are considerable. While most of its European allies regularly count the dead from the terrorist plague, the United States has proved remarkably resistant to the disease, particularly its Mideastern strain. Among experts, the more optimistic believe that terrorists—and governments like Libya that back them—are reluctant to try bringing Mediterranean-style terrorism to U.S. shores. "They're scared of us," says Robert Kupperman, a leading terrorism expert at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. "To bring international terrorism here is to really take us on."

There is a risk that past precedent could lead to future overconfidence. President Reagan gave the impression in his press conference last week that international terrorists had already landed on American

shores—and had been repulsed. He said that 126 terrorist attacks had been thwarted. But when administration officials sought to explain the numbers, they held up about as well as Viet Cong body counts. Only 23 of the attacks were to have taken place in the United States, and at most 9 were plotted by foreign terrorists. Only one of the suspected terrorists is an Arab—a Libyan diplomat expelled last June after allegedly plotting against Libyan dissidents—and he alone is responsible for 3 of the 23 cases.

"The rising concern for terrorism [in the United States] outdistances the reality," says FBI Director William Webster. By his count, terrorists in the United States managed to carry out only seven attacks in 1985, compared with 112 in 1977. None of last year's attacks was committed by Arabs. In fact, the FBI has attributed four of those cases to the Jewish Defense League, and two involved attacks against Arabs. So far, says Rand Corp. terrorism expert Brian Jenkins, "there haven't been any Shiites coming up the Potomac to blow up the White House."

If Arab terrorists have made such a point of attacking American innocents abroad, why haven't they taken the next logical step? The answer appears to turn on geog-

raphy, demography and psychology. The United States is farther from the Middle East than Europe, and far harder to enter for Arabs, who in many cases can visit European countries without visas. Europe has large populations of Arab migrant workers and students, so Arab terrorists are not as conspicuous there. In Kaddafi's campaign to kill exiled Libyan dissidents, only 1 of the 30 attacks he sponsored from 1980 through mid-1985 took place in the United States.

Psychology may be an even more important deterrent. "They distinguish between attacking Americans abroad, which they are quite willing to do, and launching an assault on the American public in this country—a change in the rules," argues Jenkins. "They are unwilling to risk the kind of reaction a terrorist action in the United States would provoke." And with some reason. Now that U.S. officials have exhausted the available nonmilitary sanctions against Libya, the administration has in effect drawn a line around the United States and its interests and dared Libyan-backed terrorists to cross it.

**Inept hit man:** Even if Kaddafi were to mount an operation in the United States, perhaps using some of at least 1,200 Libyans studying in America, his chances of success seem small, judging by Libya's stateside bumbling in the past. U.S. intelligence has proved highly successful in the dissident-ridden Libyan community; only one of the Libyans' antidissident plots in the United States played all the way out—and that one, in Ft. Collins, Colo., resulted in the arrest of the hit man, a former Green Beret whose would-be victim survived. "The capacity of someone like Kaddafi to train, organize and control squads to do other than invest money in discotheques is nil," says Edward Luttwak, a senior fellow at the Georgetown center and a Defense Department consultant.

Still, the possibility remains—and U.S. officials are preparing for it. Libya's diplomats at the United Nations in New York are kept on a short leash, and last week U.S. patrols were tightened on the Canadian border after 19 Libyan students arrived in Toronto; Canadian officials had tipped off the United States. "Far from being immune, [the United States] is as vulnerable

## BACKING...Continued

tive steps towards a peace settlement."

The Abu Nidal group, for example, apparently has a skeleton operation that works out of two Damascus offices, according to diplomatic and Palestinian sources. But people who are said to be representatives of the group tell visitors that they have no authority to speak for it.

"Syria is supporting the organization," said a Palestinian source with links to Abu Nidal. "But Syria gives it no privileges it does not give to any other Palestinian group."

At another point, he said, "We do believe that Syria is supporting the Palestinian armed struggle."

Communications of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, the official name of Abu Nidal's faction, and its weekly magazine, The Revolution of Palestine, are distributed quietly, not sold openly on the street.

The cover of the most recent issue depicted President Reagan trying to pull himself up on a chinning bar, against a background showing the wreckage of the United States Marine garrison in Beirut, which was destroyed by a suicide bomber in October 1983.

## KHOMEINI...Continued

Khomeini has allocated millions of dollars to build up a Shiite terrorist organization among the more than 60,000 students from Islamic countries who attend U.S. universities.

Even before the Iranian revolution, Khomeini's recruiters were proselytizing black militants in U.S. prisons, under the guise of teaching them about

Islam. One recruit, David Belfield, was charged with killing anti-Khomeini exile leader Ali Akbar Tabatabai at his home in Bethesda, Md., in 1980.

Within hours of the shooting, Belfield had been spirited to Canada, provided with a fake passport by Iranian diplomats, and flown to Zurich and then Tehran. Today, calling himself Daoud Salhuddin, he is an adviser to Khomeini's terrorist plotters.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



NEWARK STAR-LEDGER  
24 January 1986 Pg. 18

## Iran directing terrorists from Rome center

Iranian diplomatic facilities in Rome are the principal center for planning the Ayatollah Khomeini's terrorist operations throughout Western Europe.

Our intelligence sources now believe that the Iranian colony in Rome assisted in the Christmas time gun and grenade attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports. The head of Italy's military intelligence service reported earlier that the airport terrorists had been trained in Iran.

While Libya has been fingered as the main culprit in the airport attacks, and there is close cooperation among Libya, Iran and Syria in terrorist activities, it is the Iranians who have been responsible for the killing and kidnaping of more Americans than any other terrorist sponsor. The grisly "body count" of Americans killed by Iranian-inspired violence is 50 times that of Libyan-backed assassins.

Rome became the headquarters for Iran's Western European terrorist operations in early 1984, following the French government's expulsion of many Khomeini supporters from Paris. Brussels is the secondary center for the violent exportation of Khomeini's Islamic revolution.

The Iranian terrorist nest in Rome is directed by Ayatollah Khosrow-Shahi, Khomeini's ambassador to the Vatican. The son of a carpenter, Khosrow-Shahi had been imprisoned by the late Shah for subversive activities. After the Shah's ouster, Khosrow-Shahi became Khomeini's chauffeur, body-



**Jack Anderson**

guard and trusted aide. He was second-in-command of the student revolutionaries who seized the American embassy in Tehran and held its personnel hostage for 444 days. He was rewarded in 1981 with the ambassadorial appointment to the Vatican.

At least twice, Italian police have monitored Rome meetings arranged by Khosrow-Shahi of top officials in the Iranian and Syri-

### STUDENTS...Continued

[Meanwhile, in Athens, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead, who is making a tour of U.S. allies to explain U.S. views on terrorism, said yesterday all the states he has visited, including pro-Arab Greece, agreed that Qaddafi backed terrorism. He added, in a Reuters report, that Washington reserved the right to reconsider military action against Libya but "devoutly hoped" it would not be necessary.]

[Mr. Whitehead said that last November's EgyptAir hijacking, two guerrilla attacks on British tourists here, and the latest attacks at Rome and Vienna airports were all carried out by Palestinian Abu Nidal with Libyan support.]

Responding to reporters' questions at the high school, Maj. Awadat said the students in his school were not allowed to take their pistols and Soviet-designed Kalashnikov machine guns home with them at night.

With almost perfect precision, the blue-bereted students dismantled and reassembled their Kalashnikovs in less than 50 seconds. A squad of about 60 students marched up and down in a demonstration of Soviet-style goose-stepping.

One group plotted the firing trajectory for their rocket launchers, known as "Stalin organs." The rocket launchers were unarmed; the target marked on their plotting board was Israel's Star of David.

On command, the students ran to the four truck-borne launchers and went into action, simulating the firing noise by beating on the trucks with their fists.

Maj. Awadat seemed pleased with his students. Their high precision led some of the reporters to question his claim that they received only two hours of military training per week, compared with 36 hours of civilian instruction.

Asked how many military instructors, compared with civilian teachers, were employed at the school, Maj. Awadat said "that is confidential."

Maj. Awadat said the military training at his and all other Libyan schools was exclusively for self-defense.

Asked where he thought the en-

an secret services.

Much of the plotting goes on at the Islamic European Cultural Center at 361-63 Via Nomentana, a large complex purchased at the time of Khosrow-Shahi's arrival. He and his deputy also have an apartment at 56 Colli de la Farnsina, but most of the work is done in the 60-room Islamic Center building.

### TEAMS...Continued

vide an infrastructure for future terrorist activities.

He said federal authorities last summer uncovered direct Cuban involvement in a Puerto Rican terrorist group known as the Macheteros or machete-wielders. As a result, authorities have been on guard against potential Cuban-backed terrorism.

The Macheteros have committed nine terrorist attacks since 1977, including a Jan. 25, 1985, rocket attack against a federal building in Puerto Rico with weapons later traced to Vietnam and Cuba.

"The Castro government is continuing to support insurgencies and terrorist activities throughout the Western hemisphere," Mr. Revell said. "We certainly would have to be naive not to be concerned about the potential for Cuban-instigated activities in the United States."

Currently, 56 Cuban diplomats, plus an unknown number of staff, operate out of Cuba's United Nations mission in New York and its interests section in Washington. Half of the diplomats are suspected operatives of the Cuban DGI intelligence service, according to U.S. officials.

emy was located, he said: "He is in the 'black house.' We have no quarrel with the American people."

The expression "black house" is often used by Col. Qaddafi in sarcastic reference to the U.S. presidential mansion.

In other developments, the Libyan air force stepped up patrols along the coast, using Soviet-built MiG-25 and French-built Mirage F1 fighter planes.

Lights at the Mantiga air base here and along roads leading to Benghazi airport are dimmed at night. Libyan warplanes have been moved to remote airfields around the country to guard against a possible U.S. or Israeli strike, officials said.

Two Soviet vessels, a radar ship and a cargo boat, arrived here yesterday. Diplomats said the cargo ship delivered military supplies and the radar ship would be used in intelligence-gathering operations.

The Italians use long-range cameras to keep watch on the center, but surveillance is made difficult by hidden exits to two nearby streets and at least one underground passage to the Libyan embassy next door.

Trunks suspected of containing arms and explosives have been delivered to the

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NEW YORK

## Europe To Co

BRUSSELS, Common Market arms sales to "clearly implorism."

A declaration did not President Reagan behind the meeting. However, the meeting British Ministry Office, said doubt at all refers to."

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# Europe Agrees to Ban Arms To Countries Backing Terror

By PAUL LEWIS

Special to The New York Times

BRUSSELS, Jan. 28 — The European Common Market agreed today to ban arms sales to countries that were "clearly implicated in supporting terrorism."

A declaration by the 12 member nations did not mention Libya, which President Reagan has accused of being behind the recent airport attacks.

However, one of the participants in the meeting, Linda Chalker, who is British Minister of State at the Foreign Office, said, "There is absolutely no doubt at all that it is Libya the text refers to."

Since major exporters like Britain, France, Italy and West Germany already refuse to sell arms to Libya, officials said the new embargo was unlikely to have much effect. The other members are Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.

## Commercial Advantage at Issue

The Common Market countries also declared that they "will do everything in their power" to insure that their nationals do not "seek commercial advantage" from the withdrawal of American interests in Libya under President Reagan's sanctions. The European Governments lack the legal power to compel companies and citizens not to pick up jobs and contracts.

The declaration today came in response to President Reagan's appeal to Western Europe to support American sanctions against Libya. John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State, in touring European capitals last week, urged the allies not to buy Libyan oil, to stop sales of high-technology goods and to restrict airline links with Libya. But the allies turned their back on any new measures.

Several Common Market countries were reported ready to announce an explicit arms embargo and to call on Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, to respond to the accusations made against him by President Reagan.

But officials said that all mentions of Libya were removed from the final declaration at the insistence of Spain and Greece, two members with close ties to the Arab world, with some support from France and Italy.

Mrs. Chalker, the British delegate, later said Britain was among those willing to see Libya named in the declaration. Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy said his Government was also ready to name the Libyans if they could not rebut the American charges.

## IRAN...Continued

center—immune from search under diplomatic seal. Hundreds of young, bearded Iranians have come and gone over the past five years, including one lot of three dozen flown into Rome ostensibly for medical treatment—although the center has no medical facilities.

One reason the Italians are so concerned about these young Iranians is the secret minutes of a high-level conference held in Tehran on May 26, 1984. Ayatollah Mohammed Khomeini's minister of Islamic guidance, ordered Iranian officials to produce 1,500 to 2,000 men for suicide missions. They were to be under 30, preferably unmarried and "completely committed to martyrdom," according to the minutes.

CIA Director William Casey's comments to a small group of academics last April are worth considering. He said: "Probably more blood has been shed by Iranian-sponsored terrorists during the last few years than by all other terrorists combined. Tehran uses terrorism as a major element of its ongoing campaign to export the Iranian revolution throughout the Moslem world and to reduce Western influence—especially that of the United States—in the Middle East... Libya's (Col. Moammar) Khadafy is not in the Ayatollah Khomeini's league."

\* \* \*

Italy announced an arms embargo against Libya after the attack on Rome airport last month. France stopped sending arms to Libya in 1983 when French forces moved to help Chad repel a Libyan invasion.

Britain halted arms sales after a policewoman was shot from inside the Libyan Embassy in London in April 1984. And West Germany has not been selling arms on the ground that Libya is an area of tension.

The Foreign Ministers also sought to defuse a crisis that has blown up after the Danish Parliament rejected a package of amendments of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the Common Market. The changes are intended to help member countries eliminate remaining obstacles to free trade

## Insight

27 January 1986  
Pg. 36

## PLO Gift Shop

Security officers for the Netherlands' KLM airline have discovered that the Palestine Liberation Organization, headed by Yasser Arafat, has purchased control of the duty-free shop at Tanzania's Dar es Salaam international airport and is negotiating for the purchase of similar shops in Harare, Zimbabwe, and Maputo, Mozambique. According to the PLO representative in Zimbabwe, Ali Halimeh, the organization regards the duty-free shop in Tanzania strictly as an "economic investment." The KLM security staff disclosed its information at a meeting of airport security chiefs in London Dec. 13, two weeks before terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports.

Airline security officers point out that the duty-free shops are "airside" of security checkpoints. By the time a passenger gets to a duty-free shop, he has already been subjected to security examinations, and duty-free purchases are placed in sealed bags that are not searched before passengers board. The duty-free shops routinely are serviced by trucks and vans that are not subjected to security checks. The officers also point out that airline passengers transferring from an arriving flight are rarely subjected to subsequent security scrutiny. A terrorist could obtain weapons or explosives from a duty-free shop and travel to virtually any destination.

by allowing them to take the necessary decisions by majority vote.

The Danish Social Democrats have refused to support the changes on the ground that they could undermine Denmark's high environmental standards and reduce the power of Parliament.

Today the Foreign Ministers agreed to minor changes in wording to assure the Danes that their environmental standards would not be whittled down.

Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen of Denmark said today at a news conference that the Parliament will hold a final vote on Tuesday. If the Common Market plan is defeated, he said, the Government plans a national referendum at the end of February.



# Interpol issues global alert for the arrest of Abu Nidal

By Charles J. Hanley  
Associated Press

PARIS — Interpol has relayed a "wanted notice" worldwide for Palestinian terrorist leader Abu Nidal and turned over his case to a newly formed anti-terrorist unit, the agency's chief said yesterday.

Raymond E. Kendall, secretary-general of the international police agency, said the alert went out Saturday to police forces in 138 countries that belong to Interpol. Both he and Italian authorities, seeking Abu Nidal in connection with the bloody attack Dec. 27 at Rome's airport, say they do not know where the fugitive is.

Libya and Syria, which have been accused of aiding the Palestinian group led by Abu Nidal, were among the member countries receiving the notice.

The agency, whose headquarters are in the Paris suburb of St. Cloud, is essentially a clearinghouse for information on international crime. For years, it dealt warily with terrorist offenses because of their political overtones.

But 15 months ago, Interpol's governing body voted to involve the organization more deeply in combating terrorism, and this month Interpol established the anti-terrorist unit.

The Abu Nidal case is one of the first to be handled by that unit.

"It was decided that we should reinforce our effort in relation to ter-

rorism by having an identifiable anti-terrorist unit, and that unit has been in operation since Jan. 1," Kendall said.

"One problem is that we tend to give terrorism a mystique it ought not have," he said. "To me, Abu Nidal is no more, no less than a criminal, like any other."

Asked whether he expects cooperation from Libya and Syria, Kendall replied: "In general, we have as good cooperation from any member country as from any other. . . . The notice goes to 138 countries, and they act according to their own laws and conscience on the matter."

An Italian prosecutor, Domenico Sica, announced last week that he would issue an international warrant for the arrest of Abu Nidal, the code name — meaning "Father of Struggle" — for a maverick Palestinian guerrilla chief whose real name is Sabry Banna.

Arab terrorists linked to Abu Nidal staged almost simultaneous grenade-and-rifle attacks Dec. 27 on travelers waiting in the Rome and Vienna airport terminals. Sixteen people were killed in Rome, including three terrorists, and four were killed in the Austrian capital, including one terrorist. About 120 other people were wounded.

The international alert, relayed through Interpol's telecommunications network, says Abu Nidal — who is not believed to have been present at the attacks — is "charged with

complicity in and being the instigator and organizer of the terrorist attack Dec. 27 at Rome airport."

If he is located, it says, authorities in Rome should be notified immediately, and extradition to Italy would be requested through diplomatic channels.

The initial notice gives only Abu Nidal's year of birth and birthplace — 1939 in Jaffa, in what was then British-controlled Palestine and is now Israel.

Interpol later is to issue a more formal written notice, including any additional information available on Abu Nidal, such as fingerprints or photographs.

Kendall, 52, a veteran British police official who was named Interpol police chief last year, would not discuss the new unit's operations or staffing, except to say, "It's being given all it needs — computers and everything else."

Interpol's computerized information banks provided one of the early breaks in the airport massacres investigation.

Two Tunisian passports used by terrorists in the Vienna attack were found to be on a list of lost passports maintained by Interpol.

Tunisian officials later said that the passports had been confiscated by Libyan authorities from Tunisian workers expelled from Libya.

Kendall said Interpol had not yet received confirmation of that from its Tunisian police contacts.



BALTIMORE SUN 1 January 1986 Pg. 21

## U.S. is offering rewards for capture of terrorists

By Gilbert A. Lewthwaite  
Washington Bureau of The Sun

WASHINGTON — Wanted: Mohammad Abbas, Palestinian, alleged terrorist — Reward: \$250,000. Wanted: Hasam Izz-al-din, Mohammed Hamadei and Ali Atwa, Lebanese, members of the Hezbollah, Party of God; alleged hijackers, murderers — Reward: \$250,000. Wanted: The killers of two Americans slain on a Kuwaiti airliner in Iraq in December 1984 — Reward: \$250,000. Wanted: The killers of six Americans gunned down in a San Salvador cafe — Reward: \$100,000.

For the past five months, the State Department has been putting high prices on the heads of terrorists, known or unknown, in the hope of bringing them to justice. To date \$850,000 is on offer involving four terrorist incidents. No money has yet been paid out.

The money comes from a \$5 million fund established in 1984 by Congress, at the Reagan administra-

tion's request, as part of the stepped-up effort to counter terrorism.

The legislation was prompted by the 1983 bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, in which 63 people died, and the truck-bombing later that year of the U.S. Marine barracks at Beirut airport, which killed 241 U.S. servicemen.

"The origin was basically that this is a tool that often has been effective in domestic criminal cases, so let's try this option in international cases. It is not necessarily always going to work," said a State Department official closely involved with the program.

It is, say experts inside and outside the administration, too early to pass judgment on the program, designed to put human greed into play against ideological violence and to give bounty-hunters fresh incentive to bring in wanted fugitives.

"Clearly terrorism does not have simplistic solutions, and this, in it-

self, is not going to eliminate terrorism. What it does is have a psychological impact, and it might have a practical impact in specific cases," said Yonah Alexander, fellow in terrorism studies at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Mr. Alexander, who has interviewed both religiously motivated and politically motivated terrorists, said that a reward was unlikely to persuade the true fanatic to betray his cause. But within terrorist movements there are also "mercenaries" who might be attracted by the money, he said.

"I would not be surprised if you would have various elements who would make it a business to go into it [bounty-hunting], including some criminal elements. There is a connection between terrorism and ordinary criminality, whether it's narcotics or whatever. In general, I think whether it is going to be effective depends on a variety of responses."

The law provides for rewards of up to \$500,000 for information that leads to the arrest, apprehension and punishment of terrorists who attack U.S. citizens or property. So far the highest price tag announced has been \$250,000.

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BALTIMORE SUN 8 January 1986 Pg. 4

## Secret government report urges cooling of military threats by U.S.

Knight-Ridder News Service

WASHINGTON — A special commission on terrorism headed by Vice President George Bush has recommended in a secret report that President Reagan stop making warlike threats of retaliation unless he intends to take military action, according to sources who have seen the report.

The report suggests that U.S. threats have been counterproductive and generally not helpful in the fight against terrorism.

As summarized by one source, the report recommends, "Don't speak with bellicosity unless you intend to carry through."

The report was sent to the president Dec. 20, it was learned, a week before terrorist attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna, Austria, that led to renewed threats of U.S. military reprisals.

The report of the commission, formally known as the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting

Terrorism, was the result of a six-month study ordered by President Reagan after the June 14 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in Athens, Greece.

The executive director was retired Adm. James L. Holloway III, former chief of naval operations. Commission members included representatives of 12 federal agencies.

The study is believed by its authors to be the most comprehensive examination of terrorism — and what might be done about it — to be undertaken by the U.S. government.

It has been classified as secret. A declassified version is expected to be made public by the White House next month.

The sources said that a consensus was reached among commission members that the United States should not adopt Israel's practice of attacking Palestinian targets in reprisal, regardless of whether actual perpetrators of a terrorist attack could be identified.

The commission concluded, ac-

cording to one source, "that we cannot do what Israel does because it would not fit politically and morally with our system."

White House spokesman Larry M. Speakes said last week that U.S. military action was an "option" in response to the Vienna and Rome attacks and that "if we can find who they are, or any nation can find who they are and they attack 'em and wipe 'em out, that's fine with us."

In 1981, President Reagan promised "swift and effective retribution" against terrorists but for the most part has been unable to fulfill that pledge, largely because U.S. officials have been unable to identify and locate terrorists after incidents have occurred.

The one successful military action of the administration following a terrorist incident occurred in October when U.S. warplanes forced an Egyptian airliner carrying the suspected Palestinian hijackers of the Achille Lauro cruise ship to land in Sicily.



# Iraq refuses to extradite Abbas to U.S.

By Bill Kritzberg  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Iraq has refused to extradite Mohammed "Abu" Abbas, the suspected mastermind of last October's Achille Lauro hijacking, U.S. officials disclosed yesterday.

A State Department spokesman said that "to the best of our knowledge" no formal request for extradition was submitted to Iraq, but other administration sources said such a request had been made.

The Reagan administration apparently decided not to publicize the rejection to maintain the momentum of its bid to improve relations with Iraq.

Administration sources confirmed that the diplomatic effort to bring the Palestinian leader to trial had been made after The Washington Times learned of it in a conversation with Israeli Ambassador to the United States Meir Rosenne.

Mr. Abbas was in Iraq and the United States was aware it, Mr. Rosenne said.

In an interview, Mr. Rosenne said that "they [the United States] asked for the extradition of Abu Abbas. . . . They asked Italy, Yugoslavia and Iraq, but it was denied."

Relations between the United States and Iraq have been improving this past year. Speaking of the possibility of an extradition request, a State Department spokesman said recently that a failure of Iraq to agree would have grave implications for U.S.-Iraqi relations.

In an interview last month with The Washington Times, Iraqi Ambassador to the United States Nizar Hamdoon said Iraq would not agree to the extradition of Mr. Abbas if requested, but he said that, as far as he knew, Mr. Abbas was not in Iraq.

Late yesterday, Mr. Hamdoon could not be reached immediately for comment.

Speaking of world terrorism, the Israeli envoy said, "There are two kinds of nations in the world, those that help terrorists and those that are victims." Libya, Syria and Iraq fall into the first category, he said, and Israel and the United States, among other countries, fall into the second.

Mr. Rosenne said, "Those who gave a standing ovation to [Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser] Arafat and did what they did when Israel acted against terror" bore responsibility for the current worldwide wave of terror.

Quoting Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who last Sunday said, "It is the policy of the Israeli government that no terrorist enjoy immunity," Mr.

## REWARD...Continued

That is the value put on the arrest of Mr. Abbas, a Palestinian who purportedly masterminded the hijacking of the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro. He was released by Italy, which subsequently said it regretted the action and issued a warrant for his arrest.

He is now believed to be in Iraq. The State Department has put the Iraqis on notice that it will seek his extradition if his presence there can be established. Iraq has indicated it would not comply with such a request.

The normally taciturn Secretary of State George P. Shultz, furious over Mr. Abbas' ability to get away, thumped the table during a stopover in Yugoslavia last month as he told the Yugoslavs, who allowed Mr. Abbas to pass through their country despite a U.S. request for his arrest, "There must be no place to hide for people who do that sort of thing."

Another \$250,000 reward has been posted for the hijackers of the June 1985 TWA Flight 847, in which U.S. Navy diver Robert Dean Stethem, of Waldorf, Md., was killed. Arrest warrants have been issued for three men on charges of air piracy, which carries a prison sentence in the United States of 20 years to life, and murder aboard a U.S. aircraft, which carries the death penalty. The three reportedly live in Beirut, where the plane was taken and held for 17 days.

A third \$250,000 is on the heads of the unknown hijackers of a Kuwaiti airliner, on which two Americans died. Iran claimed to have detained the hijackers after storming the plane in December 1984, but there has been no indication of their fate and there is considerable skepticism inside the administration that they were ever arrested.

The killers of four U.S. Marines and two U.S. businessmen in El Salvador in June carry a price tag of \$100,000. A group calling itself the Party of Central American Workers, a splinter group in the leftist insurgency alliance in El Salvador, has claimed responsibility.

Three people have been arrested in the case, but it is not known whether the offer of a reward was a factor in their detention. The law excludes government officials, such as police officers, from claiming the reward and provides for the protection of the informant's identity.

The \$100,000 was decided for the El Salvador case because there was a government involved that was committed to countering terrorism. In the Middle East cases, involving Lebanon, Iran and possibly Iraq, it was felt higher rewards were necessary to overcome lack of government involvement in the issue.

"There's nothing hard and fast. But you don't want to get too far out of line. Also there is the theory that if you offer \$100,000 or \$250,000, you still have the option of increasing it later," said one administration official.

Rosenne said that no nation harboring terrorists would be exempt from Israeli retaliation.

In a televised interview over the weekend, Mr. Peres indicated that Israeli action would be confined to terrorist bases, as was the case in Israel's raid against PLO headquarters in Tunis.

But the Israeli envoy stated that Mr. Peres was referring to the specific case of the PLO headquarters raid in Tunis.

Mr. Rosenne said that the PLO was as responsible as smaller "dissident" Palestinian groups for the current wave of terrorism and the difficulty the United States and Israel have had in responding to these incidents.

The United States, he said, was doing all it could in the war against terrorism. "What is not publicized are preventive acts that have taken place," he added. The absence of publicity, he said, was "for obvious reasons."

"Many terrorist attacks have been prevented," he emphasized.

"One thing that is forgotten is the economic consequences of terrorism," he said. Referring to the reluctance of America's Western European allies to take action against Libya for its support for terrorism, Mr. Rosenne said, "Business is business, but a state is not a commercial enterprise."



# List of Thwarted Terrorist Missions Included 23 in U.S., Officials Say

By Mary Thornton  
and John M. Goshko  
*Washington Post Staff Writers*

Federal officials said yesterday that of the 126 terrorist missions against the United States that President Reagan says were detected and thwarted last year, 23 occurred in the United States, including a suspected assassination plot against Libyan dissidents in this country.

Assistant FBI Director William M. Baker said his agency, which handled the domestic incidents, could not release details of all 23 cases since many are still under investigation.

But he said that one case investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation led to the State Department's expulsion last June of a Libyan diplomat, Farhat Tibar, an administrative assistant at the Libyan mission to the United Nations.

Other federal sources said Tibar, 32, was thought to have been involved in a Libyan-directed plot against Libyan dissidents in the United States. The sources said the Tibar case was related to a grand jury investigation last May in Alexandria in which 15 to 18 Libyans in Virginia, North Carolina, Michigan and Colorado were subpoenaed in connection with a suspected plot to assassinate at least three Libyan dissidents.

In addition, the FBI included on its list of foiled terrorist incidents

for 1984 the case of two Libyan "students" convicted of purchasing silencer-equipped weapons from an undercover FBI agent. The "students" had asked the agent to supply "hit men" to "eliminate defectors."

Baker said the agency also foiled a plot last year by seven Sikh extremists to assassinate Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and another Indian official during a visit to the United States last summer.

Figures provided by FBI Director William H. Webster indicate that from January through November 1985 there were 695 terrorist incidents worldwide, with about 200 directed against the United States. Nearly 2,000 people were killed as a result, including 17 Americans. An additional 122 Americans were injured. Webster has said that in recent years the United States has become the target of about 40 percent of world terrorism.

A State Department official, who asked not to be identified, refused to discuss specific foreign cases among the 126 cited by Reagan at his news conference Tuesday night, but said they involved "situations that we thought were real enough and far enough along to count. We did not include in this number any situations where we suspected a terrorist incident was planned but where the available evidence and intelligence was not strong enough to make a clear-cut case."

Both FBI officials and Robert B. Oakley, director of the State Department's office of counter-terrorism, warned that the numbers given publicly are conservative. In a September speech, Oakley said: "There are unconfirmed reports of additional incidents which may have been planned against the United States, but they [foreign officials] are uncertain of their validity . . .

Obviously, we cannot divulge too much about our successes and about where and why the terrorists failed."

Despite a general reluctance to discuss specific cases, officials have identified several of the foreign incidents:

- House Majority Leader James C. Wright Jr. (D-Tex.) said a guard dog at an airport in Zurich, Switzerland, uncovered a plot "aimed at the destruction of the American Embassy in Rome . . . and the death of the U.S. ambassador."

- Oakley said in the September speech that thwarted attacks included an attempt to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia; unsuccessful attempts to bomb the U.S. Embassy residence in Beirut and several attempts to kidnap U.S. officials in Lebanon and Europe.

- A week ago, Belgian police announced the arrest of two Arabs suspected of planning an attack on the Brussels airport similar to the Dec. 27 attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports by Palestinian terrorists.

Federal sources said the FBI maintains an interest in about half the 6,500 Libyan nationals living in the United States—those who are thought to be supporters of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi.

The sources said the FBI is especially interested in Libyans with temporary U.S. visas—an estimated 3,200 to 3,300 people, according to Duke Austin of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. They include tourists, business travelers and 1,200 to 1,300 students, Austin said, adding that the State Department recently ordered that Libyan students be barred from studies in nuclear physics and aviation-related fields.

## PROFESSOR...Continued

"In many nations today," Silkett said, excluding the United States, "there's not going to be much accomplished through democratic means."

While combating terrorism is expensive, Silkett said, ways to fight back include more international cooperation, better training of counter-terrorist forces and vast resources for intelligence gathering.



WASHINGTON TIMES  
13 January 1986

Pg. 2

# Better intelligence curbing terrorism, U.S. officials say

By Bill Gertz  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The United States has improved its ability to curb international terrorism as the result of better intelligence collection, Reagan administration officials said yesterday.

"We've vastly increased our intelligence and have been able to thwart... over 120 other kinds of terrorist acts that could have taken many, many more lives," Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said on ABC's "This Week with David Brinkley."

Attorney General Edwin Meese III and Secretary of State George Shultz also said intelligence gathering has improved.

"We've done a lot," Mr. Meese said on NBC's "Meet the Press." "We've improved our intelligence. We've improved our operational readiness to combat terrorism both at home and abroad, [and] we have worked very hard to make sure that we're keeping as good a track of the terrorists as we can."

Mr. Meese called for enacting tougher anti-terrorism legislation, including laws that would impose the death penalty in terrorist cases and laws that would make deaths resulting from hostage-taking capital offenses.

Mr. Shultz said on CBS' "Face the Nation," "We need to do more, but at the same time we shouldn't get that helpless feeling that we don't know anything that's going on and we can't do anything about it. We can, and we have, and we need to do a lot more."

In his nationally televised news conference last week, President Reagan said 126 terrorist incidents were prevented in the past 14 months, 23 of them in the United States.

Improving intelligence against terrorists is the most effective action that can be taken by the United States in response to the spread of international terrorism, Mr. Weinberger said.

He defended President Reagan's imposition of economic sanctions against Libya last week for that country's apparent involvement in terrorist attacks last month in Rome and Vienna.

"We think what is right is to impose sanctions as a step toward convincing Libya that this kind of behavior doesn't pay," Mr. Weinberger said in response to questions about the tacit support sanctions have received from U.S. European allies.

The United States has the means and capabilities to use military force to retaliate against Libyan support for terrorist acts, but it favors legal means, such as sanctions, to pressure the radical Arab state, the defense secretary said.

Economic sanctions will damage Libya's economy, he stated, "despite the bluff and bluster coming out of Tripoli." The sanctions may prompt "some realization in Libya that they can't serve as host for this sort of terror-

## COUNTER-TERRORISM... Continued

irritant. People think about it, then forget it."

Specialists in terrorism noted improvements in security at airports, government buildings and military bases around the world. But what is needed, Alexander said, are joint U.S. military anti-terrorism efforts, a combined NATO commando force and closer ties among intelligence agencies.

Some members of Congress are thinking along similar lines. For example, a House Armed Forces subcommittee is preparing legislation to unify the Army Green Berets and Delta Force, Navy Seals and other special forces under a single civilian command.

Robert H. Kupperman, a terrorism specialist at Georgetown University, said that "we have to get over our shyness about covert actions [abroad]. This business [of terrorism] is far more geared to covert operations than it is to purely military assault."

"What we need to do is to make operational commanders such as [Palestinian guerrilla leaders] Abu Nidal and Mohammed Abbas, whoever, feel unsafe anywhere," he said. "And in some cases, as repugnant as it may sound, we may have to assassinate some people."

## Legal changes

At the same time, Kupperman warned that "any attempt at a uniform policy is a great mistake. These are tactical problems and ought not be glorified to appear as though we're fighting a major war."

Alexander urged legal changes that would make it easier for terrorists caught in one country to be sent to another for prosecution.

ist activity," Mr. Weinberger said.

"We have the strong desire to take legal measures and not to reply to terrorist acts with terrorist acts," he said.

He referred to many of the Americans residing in Libya as "virtually Libyans," but warned them that the North African country is "a very dangerous place to be."

Regarding the Gramm-Rudman deficit-

He called it "ridiculous for the United States to say it is against terrorism and then refuse to extradite some terrorists." He referred to U.S. court rulings against turning over Irish Republican Army fugitives, including one accused of murdering a British soldier, on the ground that their offenses were "political."

On similar grounds, France refused to extradite to the United States an Armenian suspected of planting a bomb in the Los Angeles airport.

Spokesmen for the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Police Foundation said they knew of no studies showing whether local police were sufficiently prepared for terrorist attacks.

But experts agreed on the need for more training and coordination on the local level.

## The likely targets

"If you look at the most likely targets in America, they are New York, Los Angeles and Washington," Kupperman said. "The police are very well-trained there. The same is true in Chicago. Philadelphia, I think, has its problems."

"The MOVE incident suggested that strongly," he added, referring to the city's May 13 confrontation with the group.

Elsewhere, he said, the degree of training and experience varies widely.

Congress, apparently convinced that the FBI's 500 counter-terrorism agents are doing an excellent job of spying on violence-prone organizations, added \$8.5 million to the agency's \$40 million anti-terrorism budget late last year.

The FBI is using the extra money to expand its local-federal task forces in Boston, Chicago, New York and Washington and to set up new units in Los Angeles, San Francisco and Newark, an aide to the Senate Intelligence Committee said.

The FBI also plans to strengthen its 50-member hostage-rescue team, add sophisticated tracking equipment to its arsenal and expand the National Terrorism Research and Analysis Center, which analyzes terrorists and their affiliations, methods and movements.

reduction law, Mr. Weinberger criticized Congress for failing to support President Reagan's budget programs during the past five years.

"If the Congress would enact these budgets instead of saying they're dead on arrival before they arrive, then, I think, we would have an opportunity to do what we need to do," Mr. Weinberger said.



COLORADO SPRINGS GAZETTE-TELEGRAPH  
10 January 1986 Pg. 1

## Meese says terror at home possible

By Susan Leonard  
Gazette Telegraph

International terrorists haven't attacked within America's borders because the U.S. government has superior intelligence-gathering capabilities to prevent it, U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese III said in Colorado Springs Thursday.

Meese also credited the lack of attacks to "the fact that the American population generally doesn't have a subculture to provide support for terrorists. But whenever we talk about not having attacks here, we have to knock on wood. I'd be the last one to say that the possibility isn't there."

Meese made his remarks in a brief news conference during the USO's 45th anniversary celebration at the Fort Carson Officer's Club. His wife, Ursula, is a member of the USO's world board of directors. The Meeses were guests at the Pikes Peak Region USO celebration.

Meese declined to say how the U.S. would respond if Libyan leader Moammar Khadafy carried out recent threats to terrorize Americans in their own streets if the U.S. takes military action against the North African country.

President Reagan has said military action is one possible response to terrorist attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna Dec. 27 in which 19 people were killed, including five Americans. The U.S. government has said Khadafy supported the terrorist attacks.

"That (possible responses) is one of the things we don't talk in much detail about. We've tried over the past several years to be better prepared both in our operational response and intelligence capabilities," he said.

Meese also declined to say whether the government keeps

Arabs living in the U.S. under surveillance. "Who may be watched or not watched I can't say."

Meese smiled when asked for the Justice Department's official response to Sen. Howard Metzenbaum's suggestion Wednesday that the U.S. government "eliminate" Khadafy. Meese shrugged off the suggestion saying, "For a long time I haven't paid much attention to Mr. Metzenbaum." The Ohio Democrat reportedly made the comment during an interview in Cleveland.

Meese said the administration was disappointed that no European nations joined the U.S. this week in imposing economic sanctions against Libya. Reagan cut off all but humanitarian aid to Libya, severed business ties with the North African nation and froze Libyan assets in the U.S. over what Meese called Libya's "obvious involvement" in the airport terrorist attacks.

"We've gotten support from Western Europe in security and intelligence, but economic and military steps, no," Meese said. "We hope many more (nations) will see the necessity of the civilized world isolating countries that support terrorism." The U.S. can't stop terrorism alone, he said. "It's got to be a unified and joint effort."

Reagan also ordered all Americans living in Libya — about 1,500 — to leave the country. Meese said they "were recalled for their own protection" and said possible sanctions against any American who remained in Libya would be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Asked if there was a risk that Americans in Libya might be held hostage, Meese said he "wouldn't want to contemplate what might happen."

Meese said Americans traveling by air in this country and abroad "can feel comfortable in the sense that precautions are being taken at airports and with aircraft. But, unfortunately, there is more terrorism now than ever before."

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER  
12 January 1986 Pg. 1

## Officials see ways U.S. can improve counter-terrorism

By Aaron Epstein  
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Experts agree that the United States is better prepared than ever to combat terrorism within its borders, but they say that much more needs to be done to improve training of local police, strengthen laws and enhance coordination among anti-terrorist units here and abroad.

As worldwide terrorism mounts and Libyan leader Moammar Khadafy threatens to meet U.S. retaliation with violence "on the streets of America," a beefed-up FBI managed to chalk up its best anti-terrorism year.

Terrorist plots within the United States failed more often than they succeeded, according to government records.

The number of incidents of domestic terrorism, which used to amount to about 100 a year, dropped to 13 in 1984 and only seven last year, the FBI said.

At the same time, Director William Webster reported that the FBI foiled 23 planned acts of domestic terrorism in 1985. They included a Tripoli-directed assassination plot against Libyan dissidents, a Sikh scheme to assassinate Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi during a visit to the United States, various criminal acts by The Order, a neo-Nazi group and plots by other radical organizations, federal officials said.

In addition, about 100 terrorist missions directed at Americans overseas were said to have been averted last year, including multiple attempts to bomb U.S. embassies and kidnap or kill U.S. officials.

"The good news is that we did score some victories against terrorists and the FBI did a great job last year," said Yonah Alexander, director of the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism at the State University of New York at Oneonta.

"But the intensity of terrorism is growing... and I am not convinced that, at this point, the United States is adequately prepared. Terrorism is not yet a high priority... We tend to regard terrorism as a nuisance, and

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

WASHINGTON  
13 January

## Better terrorism

By Bill Gertz  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The United States to curb international terrorism of better intelligence administration officials.

"We've vastly improved and have been able to kinds of terrorist acts many, many more like Caspar Weinberger said with David Brinkley."

Attorney General Secretary of State G. intelligence gathering.

"We've done a lot," Mr. "Meet the Press." "We intelligence. We've improved readiness to combat terrorism and abroad, [and] we have to make sure that we're track of the terrorists."

Mr. Meese called for terrorism legislation, would impose the death cases and laws that would ing from hostage-taking.

Mr. Shultz said on CBS "We need to do more, but shouldn't get that help don't know anything that can't do anything about have, and we need to do a

In his nationally televised last week, President Reagan incidents were prevented months, 23 of them in the

Improving intelligence is the most effective action the United States in response international terrorism, Mr.

He defended President tion of economic sanctions week for that country's app in terrorist attacks last month Vienna.

"We think what is right tions as a step toward conviction of this kind of behavior doesn't this kind of behavior doesn't berger said in response to q tacit support sanctions ha U.S. European allies.

The United States has th abilities to use military against Libyan support for it favors legal means, such pressure the radical Arab secretary said.

Economic sanctions will economy, he stated, "despite bluster coming out of Tripoli may prompt 'some realization they can't serve as host for



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Mr. Sofaer  
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PAGE

States is hurting this coun-  
try's efforts to fight terrorism else-  
where, the State Department's legal  
adviser, Abraham Sofaer, said yes-  
terday.

"I don't believe that extradition is  
a minor part in the war against ter-  
rorism," Mr. Sofaer told a breakfast  
meeting of the American Bar Asso-  
ciation standing committee on law  
and national security. "It is a crucial  
aspect."

The proposed amendment to the  
extradition treaty between the  
United States and Great Britain  
would overturn several federal dis-  
trict court rulings that have blocked  
extradition of members of the IRA  
wanted by the British for alleged ter-  
rorist acts.

The courts have ruled that, as  
members of an organized force en-  
gaged in "quasi-military" conduct,  
the IRA suspects are entitled to  
claim an exception for political off-  
enses.

The treaty amendment has been  
stalled because of opposition by key  
senators with heavily Irish con-  
stituencies.

Mr. Sofaer said the IRA court  
cases often are cited by countries  
that refuse to extradite terrorists  
wanted by the United States for acts  
committed against U.S. citizens  
abroad.

French officials, he said, have  
asked, "What are you doing about  
those IRA people?"

"I think it's a good question," Mr.  
Sofaer said. "I just cannot stand on  
my feet and tell people in Europe and  
other countries to give us terrorists  
and have these [court] precedents  
staring us in the face."

Mr. Sofaer criticized the logic of  
the court decisions, saying the  
courts have ignored the overall re-  
cord of the IRA in committing acts  
of terror and have focused only nar-  
rowly on the specific crime with  
which individual suspects have been  
charged.

"The notion that it's OK because  
you killed a cop or a lieutenant in the  
army, as if these people were some  
kind of fair game in a democracy in  
order to change a policy, is just to-  
tally unacceptable," he said.

the cases  
to the United States  
a safe haven for terrorists  
of many kinds."

Meanwhile, two experts on terror-  
ist activities yesterday called for the  
United States to develop a coherent  
anti-terrorism policy.

"It is time for the U.S. to make up  
its mind on a way to deal with terror-  
ism, which is an urgent threat to na-  
tional security," said Ray Cline, an  
analyst at the Georgetown Center for  
Strategic and International Studies.

Mr. Cline and associate Yonah  
Alexander outlined several steps  
they said the Reagan administration  
could take in responding to the  
threat of state-sponsored terrorism,  
especially in the Middle East. They  
also presented a map showing 11 lo-  
cations in Libya where they claimed  
Col. Muammar Qaddafi has allowed  
terrorist training camps to flourish.

While Mr. Cline termed U.S. mili-  
tary action a response "of the last  
resort," he said the bases in Libya  
should be so attacked "if there was  
a clear trail of evidence, even cir-  
cumstantial" that terrorists were be-  
ing trained there and if all other  
means to eradicate them had been  
exhausted.

Ten of the 11 bases are located  
along the northern Mediterranean  
border of Libya. Mr. Alexander said  
all of the bases had been identified  
through open sources.

At a news conference announcing  
the publication of their new book,  
"Terrorism as State-sponsored, Co-  
vert Warfare," the researchers said  
the administration appears to be  
making a concerted effort to arrive  
at a coherent anti-terrorism policy.

But no federal agencies "have yet  
clearly established logical, sophisti-  
cated principles for recognizing and  
dealing with terrorism as an en-  
demic threat rather than isolated  
episodes of violence," they wrote.

Recommended government steps  
include attaching a high priority to  
the policy of counter-terrorism, cre-  
ating an effective command and con-  
trol organizational structure within  
the government, encouraging allies  
to exert economic and diplomatic  
pressures and raising the public  
consciousness to support govern-  
ment actions against terrorism.

The Reagan administration is in  
the process of preparing a compre-  
hensive anti-terrorism policy.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



# 'FIFTH AV. ARAB SENT \$3M RANSOM TO TERRORISTS'

By PAUL THARP

A FIFTH Avenue antiques collector was being held last night in the kidnaping of an Arab billionaire whose \$3 million ransom was earmarked for terrorists, authorities said.

The bizarre plot was acted out in New York, Europe and the Mideast.

Authorities said they nabbed the middleman, wealthy collector Mustafa Zein, 43.

The ransom money, however, was not recovered.

FBI agents stormed into Zein's 10th-floor cooperative apartment at 372 Fifth Av. over the weekend and held him for deportation hearings to be held this week.

Zein, a native of Beirut, Lebanon, has lived alone in the coop for four years but traveled frequently, neighbors said.

Scotland Yard tipped the FBI to Zein's alleged involvement in the

kidnaping of Arab billionaire Mohammed Sadiq Tajir, 44, the brother of the United Arab Emirates' ambassador in London.

Zein arranged and collected the \$3 million ransom, which apparently was smuggled to Iraqi terrorists fighting Iran, according to Scotland Yard sources.

The abducted billionaire, however, was not freed as agreed. He escaped from a London house, dragging the bed to which he was chained.

Tajir was kidnaped in London at gunpoint on Jan. 6 and held blindfolded in a small room of a south London house until his dramatic escape last Friday.

He was found running down a street, still blindfolded and dragging the bed behind him, police said.

Four Arab-speaking suspects were still being sought in London.

## PLO...Continued

hire, dealing with explosives without a license, exportation without a license and conspiracy, Kaufman said. He was lodged last night in the Metropolitan Correction Center in New York.

The case was the third brought by Customs officials involving the smuggling of high-tech equipment from the United States under an investigation known as Operation Exodus, Kaufman said.

On Dec. 2, authorities arrested three men of Turkish origin at Port Newark and charged them with con-

## JERSEY...Continued

smuggle out of the country \$10 million worth of spare parts for American-made fighter jets used by Iran.

A week later, U.S. Customs agents arrested three men at Newark International Airport and charged them with trying to buy missiles, anti-aircraft guns and other weapons to arm a 100-member guerrilla group in the African nation of Ghana.

Officials said they do not believe these seizures are an indication of increased smuggling activity, but rather are the result of increased law enforcement efforts. For instance, Greelish said the U.S. Attorney's Office has begun to work more closely with U.S. Customs agents during their investigations.

Four years ago, the federal government began Operation Exodus, a program to curb illegal shipments of high technology equipment.

According to Stiffel, this effort was strengthened about eight months ago with a 30 percent increase in the number of agents conducting investigations before and after seizures of equipment.

Nationwide, the federal government this year has confiscated about \$75 million worth of military equipment being illegally transported. Nearly half of this total was seized in the New York metropolitan area, with much of this in New Jersey, according to Michael Kaufman, a spokesman for the Customs Service.

In New Jersey this year, there have been nine such seizures that have resulted in criminal charges, according to officials.

Guarding against illegal shipments is a constant job for the hundreds of Customs inspectors who work in the New York area.

Before shippers can transport selected military items out of the country, they must get special licenses from either the State Department or the Department of Commerce. The government may permit the export of some of

spiring to ship sophisticated military defense radar equipment to Iran.

A week later, undercover agents arrested three Ghanaians at Newark International Airport and charged them with conspiring to buy missiles, anti-aircraft guns and other weapons to arm a 100-member guerrilla group in the African nation.

these items to friendly countries but prohibit them to others, such as Iran.

In New Jersey alone, Customs agents are responsible for checking hundreds of tons of cargo that pass yearly through Port Newark and Port Elizabeth, as well as nearby Newark International Airport. These facilities are operated by the bi-state agency, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

The New Jersey port area is by far the busiest in the metropolitan area and one of the busiest container ports in the nation. Last year, these facilities handled about 70 percent of the cargo shipped through the New York area. Ports in the entire area handled general cargo last year valued at about \$41 billion, according to the Port Authority.

While Newark International handles a small fraction of international air cargo that is transported at John F. Kennedy International Airport, the New Jersey facility is growing rapidly. Last year it handled 10,000 tons of international air cargo, nearly double the year before, and expects to see further increases.

Customs agents could not possibly check every shipment. Instead, they use "scientific profiles" and check selected containers based on their investigations.

"We don't just blitz the area. We pick and choose our targets," said Stiffel.

In a number of instances shipments are detained because of administrative errors or clerical mistakes. In some cases, shippers whose crates or containers are detained claim they did not know they needed special licenses.

"Everybody has a story when you get them," said Stiffel, 44, whose 15 year career with the Customs Service began as a skymarshall.

About 20 percent of those shipments detained are then confiscated by the government and criminal charges are filed, he said. In a number of other instances, civil penalties may be sought.

The government will seek criminal penalties only if they can prove that the exporter intentionally tried to break the law, Stiffel added.

Most of those who try to smuggle military equipment out of the country arrange for a delivery to a destination permitted by the U.S. government and then divert the shipment after it leaves the U.S., according to Stiffel.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



# PLC ARMS TEL dson businessman charged with smuggling bombs

By AL FRANK

year-old Jersey City busi-  
was arrested yesterday by  
authorities who said they were  
charge him with plotting to ex-  
pounds of explosives to Israel  
of the Palestine Liberation

Ibrahim El-Gawli was ar-  
S. Customs agents around 4  
travel agency he operates  
Boulevard, said spokesman  
man.

n said the arrest was  
nths after agents received  
Gawli and two others were  
urchase the explosives and  
o the West Bank of Israel  
asting caps and remote  
nating devices.

at the couple's Sip Ave-  
queline El-Gawli said she  
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Newark today. El-  
ged with murder for

D NEXT PAGE

NEWARK STAR-LEDGER  
22 December 1985

Pg. 49

## Jersey rated a hotspot for illegal arms exports

By DAVID SCHWAB

Three or four times each week,  
agents of the U.S. Customs Service de-  
tain military equipment being improper-  
ly shipped overseas through the bus-  
tling seaport in Newark and Elizabeth  
and the nearby international airport.

Most of these seizures of spare  
helicopter parts, ammunition and the  
like do not result in criminal prosecu-  
tions like the one last week in which a  
Jersey City travel agent was arrested  
for trying to export "high tech" explo-  
sives to Middle East terrorists.

In many of these cases, legitimate  
firms have failed to meet the rigid gov-  
ernment licensing requirements for  
shipments of sophisticated military  
hardware. When these shortcomings  
are corrected, their shipments are per-  
mitted to leave, according to the gov-  
ernment.

But the recurring seizures that  
have resulted in the confiscation by the  
government of millions of dollars worth  
of equipment this year is an indication  
to enforcement authorities that New  
Jersey, with its international transpor-  
tation network, has become one of the  
busiest areas in the nation for illegal  
shipments.

"New Jersey is one of the busiest  
areas for the export of all legal ship-  
ments, so it is going to follow that it is  
going to have a large volume of illegal  
exports as well," said U.S. Attorney  
Thomas W. Greelish.

In addition, these seizures are a  
measure of the huge market for these  
potentially destructive shipments in  
certain portions of the world.

"There are countries starving for  
the type of technology we have," said  
Arthur Stiffel, the agent in charge of  
the U.S. Customs office in Newark.

The arrest last week by Customs  
officials was the third of its kind in  
New Jersey in less than a month, each  
the result of weeks of undercover in-  
vestigations and purchases.

Just two weeks before, three inter-  
national businessmen were arrested by  
U.S. Customs agents at Port Newark.  
They were charged with trying to

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

NEW YORK POST  
11 Oct 85  
Pg. 13

## Terror tide of illegal aliens

WASHINGTON

Some "very serious  
international terror-  
ists" were among the  
more than a million  
illegal aliens from 70  
countries caught en-  
tering the U.S. last  
year.

Immigration and  
Naturalization Ser-  
vice Commissioner  
Alan Nelson told a  
news conference yes-  
terday that the Bor-  
der Patrol appre-  
hended more than  
1.26 million illegal  
aliens in the fiscal  
year ending Sept. 30  
— an 11 percent in-  
crease.

With the flood swollen  
by illegal aliens from  
countries other than  
Mexico, Nelson said,  
the INS is involved  
with the FBI and  
other agencies "in  
the apprehension . . .  
of very serious inter-  
national terrorists."

The problem is com-  
pounded, said an-  
other official, by the  
growing number of  
illegals carrying  
weapons, raising the  
incidence of armed  
clashes with the Bor-  
der Patrol.

# RAIN TER

By PAUL TH  
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


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Checkpoint p. 50*

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# CURRENT NEWS SPECIAL EDITION



20 Feb 86

**TERRORISM**

No. 1405

THIS PUBLICATION IS PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE (SAF/AA) AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL NEWS ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO SUBSTITUTE FOR NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS AND BROADCASTS AS A MEANS OF KEEPING INFORMED ABOUT THE NATURE, MEANING AND IMPACT OF NEWS DEVELOPMENTS. USE OF THESE ARTICLES DOES NOT REFLECT OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT. FURTHER REPRODUCTION FOR PRIVATE USE OR GAIN IS SUBJECT TO THE ORIGINAL COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS.

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Technology  
Fence -  
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*FG 1A1100-*



PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 9 January 1986 Pg. 17

# To terrorism's roots . . .

By William O. Beeman

Terrorist activity is increasing at 12 to 15 percent a year, concludes a new report from the Rand Corp., and soon may become a normal feature of life on Earth if measures are not taken to curtail it.

Even more disturbing is the fact that governments have no effective way to deal with terrorists. Despite threats to "retaliate" from Washington and other world capitals, terrorism continues unabated. The Rand report itself was noticeably lacking in suggestions of what to do.

If the world really wants to reduce terrorism, the worst thing we can do is persist in seeing it as a phenomenon of isolated, conspiratorial groups supported by certain governments. An alternative view comes from anthropological research on disaffected communities. While it offers no quick fix solutions, it suggests a more effective, long-term approach.

As a working definition, terrorism may be described as: intentionally illegal acts of violence carried out against defenseless targets in order to achieve political goals perceived as unaddressable in any other fashion.

The most important insight about terrorism is that it is community-based — an outgrowth of the social dynamics of particular communities where individuals feel themselves to be beleaguered and ignored both at home and by the international community. When they feel themselves under siege, community members begin to tolerate more extreme behavior in the name of community causes. The surest sign of imminent terrorist activity is unwillingness of community leaders to condemn their extreme elements for fear of losing overall public support.

Such communities can be described as terrorist-generating communities. The Sikh community in India, Catholics in Northern Ireland, Shiite Muslims in Lebanon, and Palestinians throughout the Middle East are good examples. These communities feel, rightly or wrongly, that they have exhausted every channel in getting their needs heard and addressed. They feel that no one cares about them and thus that violent force will give a sense of movement to their cause, galvanizing internal support and attracting international

USA TODAY 8 January 1986 Pg. 8

PATRICK J. LEAHY

Guest columnist

## Good rule: Talk softly and carry a big stick

NEWPORT, Vt. — Libya's Khadafy gains top "honors" as one of the leading supporters of international terrorism.

He touts his "victories" over unarmed civilians on commercial aircraft, on ships, or in airports. His top priorities are to destroy Israel and to drive the USA out of the Middle East. There can be no doubt about his financial support to terrorist groups all over the world, or that he makes Libyan soil available to train these murderers.

We do not need pronouncements by the State Department spokesmen about his guilt. The USA needs an effective, consistent, and coherent counterterrorism policy.

There are four main ingredients for such a policy:

■ There must be good intelligence, which permits deterrent or retaliatory action. U.S. intelligence, still far behind what is needed, is beginning to catch up.

attention to them.

Because community members see their causes as righteous, indeed even sacred, the terrorist acts in their name are often perceived as virtuous.

The Palestinians are the most prominent among terrorist-prone communities, and PLO leader Arafat has long waffled in denouncing terrorist acts. Similarly, Tamil leaders in Sri Lanka have refused to condemn the terrorist Tamil Tigers; Northern Ireland's Catholic leaders have often toned down their condemnations of IRA terrorism — in last year's elections, Sinn Fein, the legal arm of the IRA, gained more

Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., is vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

■ There must be carefully constructed military options tailored to specific situations. The indiscriminate use of force is not acceptable, and the surgical precision that the legitimate use of force requires still does not seem to be possible. Nevertheless, we are making significant progress here as well.

■ We must have a strategy for combating the terrorists. What are our aims and what mix of diplomacy, political action, military force, and economic sanctions is best suited to attain them? I see little evidence the USA has any such strategy clearly in view to guide its responses.

■ Perhaps most important of all, there must be the will to act firmly, and this must be founded on a solid consensus

among the president, Congress, and the people. When the USA moves against the terrorists, we do not need hesitations, second-guessing, and partisan divisions. The key to such a consensus is agreement between Congress and the president about the elements of a counterterrorism policy and a clear explanation of that agreed policy to the people. To date, this has not happened.

Terrorism is going to be a menace to U.S. interests for many years to come. It is time the administration adopted the policy of another popular Republican president by "talking softly and carrying a big stick." Six years after the president declared war on terrorism, there is no excuse for not having a strong counterterrorism policy we can all support.

votes than ever before; the large Croatian community in Europe, North and South America has made only perfunctory denunciations of Croatian terrorism.

Terrorist-generating communities are not a new phenomenon, nor are they restricted to the developing world — the "Sons of Liberty" from the American Revolution has been used as a case study of a terrorist organization by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Because terrorist acts are based in the community, attacking individual terrorists is a futile control device.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



## U.S. stance reflects debate on response to terrorism

By Mark Thompson  
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Congress had a simple question for Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger buried among hundreds of written inquiries addressed to him at the conclusion of a hearing last year: "Where do we stand in our war against terrorism?"

It was the only question that remained unanswered when the hearing transcript was published several weeks later. "The department was unable to respond to this question in time to be printed in this hearing volume," a committee clerk reported.

The Pentagon has faced a similar problem responding to terrorism in Europe and the Middle East, hamstrung by the administration's ambivalence toward retaliation.

The Pentagon drew up a roster of targets after the Dec. 27 terrorist attacks that killed 19 travelers, including five Americans, at the Rome and Vienna airports. Officials took steps that presaged a military strike against camps in Libya believed to harbor and train terrorists. The Pentagon put its forces in Europe and the United States on alert, dispatched warplanes to Sicily and deployed the carrier Coral Sea into the Mediterranean.

Although the Pentagon quickly set its sights, President Reagan indicated 11 days after the airport attacks that he would not pull the trigger.

Yet he kept alive the possibility of future military reaction if economic sanctions against Libya failed to stop terrorism.

### REAGAN...Continued

If the Europeans would decide to stop doing business with Qaddafi, he might become a true pariah and less hospitable to suicidal fanatics.

But the ultimate solution was defined by the "flaky barbarian," who rarely says anything worth listening to. Holding court on a tractor and wearing a cloth envelope on his head, he said, "There are Palestinians everywhere. You must solve the Palestinian problem if you want peace and to bring an end to these actions."

He had spoken the hard truth that the new pragmatist in the White House is not willing to face over Israeli objections. The answer to terrorism is not military or economic; it is political.

"I promise you that further steps will be taken," Reagan said in his Tuesday night news conference.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz sounded a similar warning yesterday, telling a news conference that military action "may be necessary on occasion" to counteract terrorism.

Such warnings, however, have an increasingly hollow ring to observers outside the government who perceive a conflict over the use of force at the core of the administration.

While Shultz consistently has advocated the use of force against terrorists and those who harbor them, Weinberger has been far less eager to commit the military, except on the rare occasions when the terrorists can be crippled without inflicting casualties on innocent people nearby.

In the case of Libya, Defense officials say any attack would be risky and could have dire results for U.S. policy in the Middle East.

"If we attacked, we'd have 100 million Arabs furious with us," an Air Force official said. "We'd probably lose some aircraft, and we'd be in real trouble if the Libyans got hold of any of our pilots."

Officials reviewing potential military options in recent weeks said attacks could be launched by the 45 F-18s aboard the USS Coral Sea, part of the Navy's Sixth Fleet that maintains a permanent U.S. presence in the Mediterranean, or from England, where more than 150 Air Force F-111 fighter-bombers are based.

In any such action, some of the planes, equipped with radar-killing missiles, would try to knock out the Libyan radar stations that guide Soviet-made SA-5 anti-aircraft missiles.

U.S. attack planes, guarded by higher-flying fighter escorts, would follow. They would attack camps that have been identified with "very high confidence" as terrorist training bases by U.S. reconnaissance satellites, according to a U.S. official.

"We know where the training camps are," he said. "The intelligence is solid, and it has been for some time."

Libya's 8,500-man air force would mount what most intelligence sources believe would be a haphazard defense with its fleet of more than 500 warplanes, including French- and Soviet-built interceptors.

But a successful U.S. strike against terrorist camps could herald a whole new series of headaches, according to several experts.

"The administration realizes that terrorism doesn't occur in a vacuum, and neither does a military response to terrorism," said Bruce Hoffman, who studies terrorism and the Middle East with the Rand Corp. in Santa Monica, Calif.

"A military response initially may be psychologically fulfilling, but it also may be counterproductive because it could help Khadafy achieve his goal of sabotaging a negotiated settlement in the Middle East," he said.

"There's a strong likelihood that Libya would respond violently," said Eugene Mastrangelo, a senior analyst with Risks International Inc., a private terrorist-assessment group just outside Washington. But he dismissed Khadafy's threats to strike in the United States.

"Their ability to execute is better in the southern Mediterranean area, where they've got the legal and illegal infrastructure to support such activities," he said.

Alexander M. Haig Jr., former secretary of state in the Reagan administration, agreed with other U.S. experts that any retaliation must be quick to be effective. Hints of possible U.S. responses do damage in the long run, he said.

"We spoke threateningly and loudly about all of the options under consideration through faceless White House and government officials," Haig said of the response to the latest attacks. "This gave the Libyans the time and the ability to garner support."

A period of "ominous silence" would be better, especially if it were followed by strong U.S. measures, he said.

"If the inaction is not preceded by a lot of bombast, then the consequences of that inaction are far less damaging," Haig said. Reagan's latest moves will persuade more of the 1,500 American citizens still in Libya to leave and "put the Libyans on notice that their next direct involvement [in terrorism] could indeed result in a military reprisal," he said.

The administration's reluctance to use military force eventually will

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



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The administration's reluctance to use military force eventually will

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# Devil Theory

## How the Europeans View Libya

By William Pfaff

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are calling for economic  
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people in Washington  
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ture of moral outrage  
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policy is before that  
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The moral argument, in Europe, runs into an ancient policy assumption that foreign relations are not an area of state activity in which moral outrage or uplift is appropriately — or usefully — applied. This has always been a point upon which Americans and Europeans disagree. It is held in Europe that power and interests are what count in international relations, and that feelings get in the way of effective policy.

Another reason West Europeans are reluctant to follow the U.S. in this is that they suspect this will prove one more American media-hyped frenzy which in a few more days or months will be shoved aside in favor of some new sensation or popular outrage. Americans have enthusiasms. These frequently are short-lived. Colonel Kadhafi is this week's sensation. The current condemnation of Libya for supporting Abu Nidal's group of Palestinian terrorists could, on the evidence thus far produced, just as plausibly be directed against Syria. Why not? The Soviet Union has clearly played a cynical role in arming terrorists. Why confine the outrage to Libya?

Europeans, finally, refuse to see Libya as a major force in world affairs. They note that it is a nation totally dependent upon foreign oil purchases, with less than 8 percent of its land arable, most of that pasture, without other known resources, possessing a population of some 3.5 million people and armed forces with a total complement smaller than the U.S. Marine Corps — forces, moreover, heavily dependent upon mercenaries for air crew and technical staff. The colonel's amiably expressed threats to set the Mediterranean aflame should anyone dare attack him, to strike Europe's ports when American vessels are present, or attack European cities, are fantasy or delusion.

Of the West Europeans, Italy is the country most involved with Lib-

ya. This is not because the Libyan government has invested in Fiat and sells oil to Italians, but because there has been a common history of war and oppression which deeply marked both countries. Italy waged a war of colonial conquest in Libya which began in 1910 and was not ended until the 1930s. Then came the desert battles between Italians and Germans and the British, in the Second World War, fought mostly in Libya, from which Italy had launched its invasion of Egypt.

After the war, Libya became a major Western base in the Mediterranean — something which is often forgotten. When Colonel Kadhafi took power in 1969 he was widely thought a client of the CIA. It even is possible that he was one. He was ferociously anti-communist during the early years of his rule. The U.S. ambassador of the time said that he contributed "important assets in the struggle against Soviet influence and communism in the Arab world." He loaned U.S.-built aircraft to Pakistan during the 1971 India-Pakistan war — when the U.S. "tilted" to Pakistan's side — and he worked with Egypt's President Anwar Sadat against a left-wing threat in the Sudan in 1972. His career thus provides additional reason for skepticism about villains and histories in international relations.

The West Europeans are not fools. Commercial relations with 3.5 million Libyans are trivial to a European Community of nearly 350 million people, making up the biggest trading force in the world. Europeans have been the principal victims of terrorism outside the Middle East. More of them have died than have Americans. They would be delighted to put an end to terrorism. The problem is that they cannot for a minute believe that punishing Colonel Kadhafi is going to do it. They think this is the kind of noisy activity people engage in when they cannot think of anything serious to do.



BALTIMORE SUN 19 January 1986 Pg. 4G

# Trying to fight terrorism through the U.N.

By Louis Halasz

**W**hile the Soviet Union is tempting the U.S. allies in Europe with visions of nuclear peace, it continues to increase the flow of arms to Col. Muammar el Kadhafi, godfather of terrorism.

This cannot but make the job of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations even more difficult as it joins the rest of the American diplomatic establishment in the effort to create international cooperation against the current main source of terror, Libya.

The vehicles available for that purpose to the American diplomats stationed at the New York headquarters of the world organization are two resolutions passed without any formal objection, the first by the General Assembly last Dec. 9 and the second by the Security Council Dec. 18.

The Assembly resolution declared that "all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism" were "criminal" and thus must be condemned. The Security Council demanded "the immediate safe release of all hostages and abducted persons wherever and by whomever they are being held."

Asked how they propose to put teeth into these resolutions, senior diplomats in New York assert that the first step, argued in various European capitals by Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead, is "a very deliberate consciousness-raising effort." They add that they are engaged "in a very serious enterprise and not in any gimmickry," and that they are considering all openings to find "practical, manageable and pos-

sible proposals" to put forth.

Countering skepticism on this score, they assert that there are "little signals" their antennae have already picked up.

Indeed, after the initial non-cooperative response by America's closest and most important European allies, things seem to have been slowly changing for the better. Pope John Paul II's eloquent expression of "the absolute and unanimous reprehension" of terrorism in a speech at the Vatican Jan. 11 and his call on the United Nations not to tolerate member states which "compromise with terrorism" are seen by U.S. diplomats as strong medicine.

In a sense, the pope's comments are a response to the complaint of U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar in his year-end press conference that what member states "give us as a kind of expression of gratitude . . . is sometimes nothing; as a rule, nothing."

The secretary general's vexation was connected with his feeling that resolutions are often passed only as a show. He called on member states to "stop this very nice and comfortable policy of producing good speeches while if they once leave the Assembly hall they forget about the United Nations."

As a matter of fact, the anti-terrorist resolutions passed by the Assembly and the Security Council were so controversial that they had to be adopted virtually without any oratory so as to create the facade of unanimity.

The Assembly's resolution had been fought out first in the Legal Committee in four disputatious meetings, in the course of which Cuba and some like-minded states pushed a draft which, for all practical purposes, would have held the United States and Israel responsible for terrorism.

When the draft later adopted by the Assembly finally came to a vote in the committee, Cuba voted against it, and the African state of Burkina Faso joined Israel in abstaining — for opposite reasons. In the Assembly, Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu took exception to the clause in the draft that called for the "progressive elimination of the causes of international terrorism" by pointing out that "freedom fighters do not butcher babies, rocket school buses or execute defenseless tourists." That, in turn, inspired the representatives of those states that support terrorist groups — Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq and South Yemen — to use the occa-

sion for anti-Israeli speeches.

If the Assembly was careful to approve the resolution by consensus, avoiding a formal vote in order to create the impression of unanimity, the Security Council was even more cautious: Its meeting in which the unanimous vote of 15 took place lasted all of three minutes so as to avoid controversy. But, significantly, the draft demanding the release of hostages was not sponsored unanimously: the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, China, India, Madagascar, Burkina Faso and, for reasons that are not clear, Thailand refrained from putting their names on the list.

In short, the United Nations displayed its habitual shying away from anything that may be considered decisive. The unwillingness of practically all states to go on record with support to the U.S. initiative bodes ill for the efforts now underway to give some practical effect to the resolutions.

U.S. Ambassador Vernon A. Walters put his best face on the matter in his post-Assembly press conference in which he singled out the passage of anti-terrorist resolutions as the foremost "positive achievements" of the last session. In another press meeting he claimed that the Security Council resolution "gives us a powerful instrument to use in bilateral talks with nations."

That may or may not be so, but Soviet behavior in connection with the current conflict between the United States and Colonel Kadhafi's Libya is a bothersome omen. Ambassador Walters had high praise for his Soviet colleague, Ambassador Oleg Troyanovsky, because of his cooperation in the Security Council considerations, and Mr. Walters said he was "very happy with the attitude of the Soviet Union on this issue." But when asked whether he is still happy with Moscow in the light of the most recent developments, his spokesman declined even putting the question to him: after all, Ambassador Walters' partner in the United Nations is Oleg Troyanovsky and not Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

President Reagan laid it on the line in an address before the American Bar Association last July in Washington. "The question of the Soviet Union's close relationship with almost all of the terrorist states and the implications of these Soviet ties on bilateral relations with the United States and other democratic nations must be recognized," the president said.

Mr. Halasz is a veteran United Nations correspondent.

## COMBATTING...Continued

is a multilateral undertaking between the countries targeted that none will negotiate separately, but that each outrage will be viewed as an attack upon all, to be dealt with jointly.

This protects governments against internal pressures and against national egotism. It would constitute at least a promising beginning in a conflict that is likely to be with us for many years.

Uri Ra'anani, co-author of "Hydra of Carnage," a book on terrorism, is director of the international security studies program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.



URI RA'ANAN

# Combating terrorism

To grapple effectively with the challenge of terrorism, one has to understand its international dimensions.

Isolated terrorist groups, although capable of inflicting damage, lack the means to pose a major threat to modern, sophisticated societies. Sporadic shooting sprees, in which bystanders die, are always possible, of course.

Serious disruption of the normal functions of an advanced society, however, requires precise intelligence information to pinpoint vulnerable spots in power stations or airports, or provide accurate lists of the personnel employed in "high value" targets (those that, if damaged or destroyed, would have the greatest impact upon urban life). These personnel can be intimidated, blackmailed, bribed, or cajoled to cooperate with terrorists.

The Red Army Faction in West Germany has used this kind of operation against NATO installations.

## The ultimate objective

Intelligence for these operations is difficult to obtain without help from the security services of a colluding state, and this is true also of logistical support, appropriate training facilities, and the acquisition of the most effective modern weapons that can be handled with ease by tiny groups, or even individuals.

Thus, support and coordination of terrorist operations requires state support if the ultimate objective is to be met — the disruption and destabilization of the targeted societies.

Here, modern technology has to be put into the equation. The jet age has brought together terrorist elements from countries and regions as far apart as Japan, Germany, Italy, the Middle East, Central and South America to be trained at a single facility. They are then sent to operate in areas many thousands of miles away.

As a result, such groups be-

come interchangeable, providing an element of surprise that adds considerably to the effectiveness of their assaults. Japanese Red Army terrorists wrought havoc with the Lod Airport massacre in Israel, since security authorities on the alert for attacks by Middle Eastern elements could not anticipate trouble from an Asian group.

The jet age also makes it possible for terrorists to find haven in a distant supportive country after hitting their target. Modern technology, moreover, has added the Precision Guided Munition to the available arsenal, although, fortunately, it has not been employed very frequently so far.

This weapon gives an advantage to small groups over the formidable defenses of the advanced state. A large "high value" target, once sighted — by optical, television, infra-ray, or other devices — is likely to be hit. A few individuals who operate the PGM can disperse easily and conceal themselves.

## Drugs and arms

The international dimension of terrorism has been enhanced also by its growing linkage with international drug traffickers. This provides ready channels across frontiers for the movement not only of drugs, but also of attack groups and their arms, and turns both types of operation into self-financing enterprises.

To some extent, both share a goal, or at least an effect — the destabilization of the societies that are targeted. Here, again, states have become involved heavily both as bases and as sponsors of such traffic, providing the raw materials required, as well as a safe haven.

This is the broader context within which the question of defensive measures must be approached. Apart from passive defense — tighter security measures at airports and protection of leading personalities — there has been much soul-searching concerning a

more active method. Unfortunately, there has been confusion between actions of three different types — rescue, retribution and preemption.

None of these are easy for a free and open society. Rescue poses risks of casualties, both for the rescuers and those who are to be rescued. It is almost impossible to achieve the necessary element of surprise, although this proved feasible at Entebbe.

Retribution suffers from some of the same disadvantages since, almost by definition, public opinion in open societies would expect such a strike to occur shortly after an outrage and somewhere nearby.

Preemption has the virtue of allowing the antiterrorists to seize the initiative. However, it requires long and patient infiltration of terrorist groups, so that the public may be left frequently with the impression that "nothing is being done." The fact that terrorist groups have a haven in a colluding state makes such preemptive measures much more difficult.

None of these countermeasures, however, are impossible; the point is merely that the attendant risks and disadvantages have to be kept in mind.

## Lack of solidarity

What is practical are international actions. The single most damaging factor in the war against terrorism has been the lack of international solidarity among the countries targeted.

The world has witnessed, more than once, not merely the absence of essential security measures at vulnerable international points of access, but even, more regrettably, the wish of individual governments to negotiate with hijackers for the safety and release of their citizens, letting terrorists go free in the midst of a hijacking, with apparent indifference to the fate of other nationals involved.

It is understandable that governments of open societies are particularly sensitive to the pressures from the families of the victims. However, each act of this nature constitutes a setback in the attempt to eliminate terrorism.

What is needed most urgently

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



THE AMERICAN  
**LEGION**  
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# TERROR IN THE SKY

**The terrorist assault on TWA Flight 847 sent shock waves through the friendly skies and alerted the world that airport security is a global responsibility.**

**By Jerome Greer Chandler**

**W**E WOVE the fine fabric of airport security in another era, one in which loners and losers threatened airplanes. When such misfits slipped through the mesh, the result was more often than not annoyance, inconvenience, perhaps a quick trip to Havana.

On June 14, 1985, Americans discovered that another kind of hijacker exists, a predatory species driven to a feeding frenzy by the promise of American blood.

When it was assaulted, TWA Flight 847—Athens to Rome—was packed with Americans. Arabs, Israelis and Europeans have known the true nature of the beast for years, but it took the voice of pilot John Testrake to transmit the terror into the livingroom: "He has pulled a hand grenade pin and is ready to blow up the airplane if he has to," radioed Testrake to the control tower. "We must, I repeat, we must land at Beirut. We must land at Beirut. No alternative."

Before the drama ended, an American sailor was murdered and thrown onto the simmering tarmac of what passes for an international airport. While cameras focused on Beirut, terrorists struck again: A bomb ripped through Frankfurt International, killing three people, two of them children.

*Jerome Greer Chandler is a contributing editor of International Passenger Association, which is concerned with commercial aviation safety.*

Another explosive device detonated at Tokyo's Narita International where two baggage handlers died. As the acrid dust cleared, half a world away bodies and bits of airplane bobbed in the North Atlantic. At approximately 8:15 on a Sunday morning—about the time they were eating breakfast—329 human beings were executed. In all likelihood Air India Flight 182 had been sabotaged.

June 1985—one of the blackest months in the history of commercial aviation—made manifest an apparent axiom of air safety: Passengers have to face mortal danger before major security measures are enacted.

For years, the security sieve at Athens—where the TWA hijackers boarded—had been the worst kept secret in the industry. After a visit there last November, staffers of the House Foreign Affairs Committee suggested that the Greeks participate in the State Department's anti-terrorist training program. The offer was refused. In succeeding months, the Federal Aviation Administration and the Montreal-based International Air Transport Association reviewed Greek procedures, trying in vain to get high officials to face up to their airport's security shortcomings.

Even after the TWA hijacking, the Greeks insisted that all was well. The country's director of civil aviation told an *Aviation Week and Space Technology* writer, "There is no need for improvement at the airport now."

**I**T TOOK "passenger power" to prompt the Greeks to clean up their act. After the U.S. government issued a travel advisory warning U.S. citizens of above-average potential for terrorist activity at Athens, cancellations began to deluge travel agents.

Greek officials estimated there were

10,000 cancellations. Others said the number was higher. "Significantly, what really frightens them is that people are canceling conventions two years hence," said one observer.

Just how safe are international airports in general?

Air transport is interdependent. What happens in Milan can affect passengers in Minneapolis. Because of the strength of the dollar, more Americans are traveling abroad than ever before and from an increasing number of domestic airports. It used to be that if you wanted to fly overseas, you had to depart from New York, Los Angeles or a handful of other gateways. Now, passengers can fly non-stop to Europe from Orlando, Fla., Atlanta, Dallas, St. Louis, and Minneapolis, among others. Easy access cuts both ways. While increasing passenger convenience, it also yields new opportunities for terrorists.

Testifying on proposed anti-hijacking legislation, Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg of New Jersey said, "The world has changed. Terrorism is in full force and not isolated to any part of the world."

**S**INCE 1973, FAA statistics indicate that more than 100 attempted hijackings and similar crimes have been foiled by airport security. Some 30,000 weapons have been confiscated from people passing through security checkpoints. On the surface, the numbers are impressive and seemingly indicative of an effective system.

*A closer look reveals something else.*

Dan Smith is manager of consumer and industry affairs for the International Airline Passenger's Association (IAPA). He said the current airport security system in this country was never designed to stop the new crop of terrorists. CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



# Terrorism and the Mass Media

By Dr. Rudolf Levy

In a democratic society, free and uncensored media are indispensable communication links between the government and those it governs. This is one of the basic rights in a democracy and is guaranteed by the United States Constitution. As such, the media serve the economic and sociopolitical interests of society by collecting, recording, and disseminating information.

Because of rapid advancements in electronic communications, information can be collected at the site of an incident and transmitted worldwide directly into viewers' homes. This increased access to and reliance upon the media make their psychological impact dramatic and persuasive.

Unfortunately, this same technol-

ogy provides terrorist groups one critical asset—immediate access to millions of people through the mass media, which willingly or unwillingly serve their propaganda and psychological warfare needs. Terrorism is propaganda by deed—armed propaganda. Terrorism feeds on publicity; only in this way can terrorists advertise their ideologies, causes, and deeds to the world. In many ways, the modern terrorist is the creation of the media. Espousing various ideologies and claiming some sort of liberation of the masses, terrorists have become increasingly adept at using the media in an effort to influence people and governments.

## Media Functions

Although it appears that only terrorists can take advantage of the media, in a democratic society each individual and, indeed, the government have equal access. There are five basic functions of the media in a free society:

- **Informational:** to maintain the flow of news and current events.
- **Judgmental:** to provide a basis for judgment and interpretation.
- **Educational:** to transmit knowledge and to define and clarify.
- **Interactional:** to provide an open forum for the free exchange of ideas and opinions.

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## KUPPERMAN...Continued

we back off. Those are tactical decisions and political decisions. The worst thing the president can do, in my mind, is to place himself in the position of setting himself up for a fall—and that is what happens when we say that we will always retaliate. We will not always retaliate."

When retaliation is mentioned, the role of the press becomes an immediate concern. In a recent debate with some of the better known U.S. correspondents, including Tom Brokaw of NBC News and Peter Jennings of ABC News, Kupperman detailed three "no-no's" in the media business when terrorism is concerned. "First, they [the press] ought to report the news, but they ought not be talking about the motion and the location of assault forces in very delicate and diplomatic operations. Second, they ought not shove cameras in the faces of the bereaved. But I think there is

something even more important. If you have ever been in a crisis center, people are extraordinarily active, then it goes dull for awhile. There are lulls because you are going to wait to see something happen. Everything doesn't happen spontaneously. What happens during these lulls is the government watches television. And it learns through fifty specials in a row that it is impotent. And the public feels this way. And government emerges as impotent... One of the good things, if you can say anything good about the Italian cruise liner [Achille Lauro incident], was that nobody could get pictures. Television was out of business."

This last statement is somewhat reminiscent of a line of his quoted by *TV Guide* earlier this year: "If the press could just cool it a bit, you know, terrorism would be the sound of one hand clapping."

In concluding, Kupperman stresses that we cannot win all the time. If

asked if he has any advice for the president, Kupperman says, "I would advise him to ask America not to be infantile. Freedom does not involve comic strip characters. We won't win them all. We may end up killing Americans in the form of assault if we make a mistake. We may have it [terrorism] come here, although the Bureau [FBI] is very good at tracking it. Whatever, we are a great nation and I don't think we have to forego any of our civil liberties. Nor do we have to deliberately get smacked in the mouth each time it happens."

Robert Kupperman is a realist. He tends to call the shots as he sees them. In assessing the aftermath of the Achille Lauro hijacking, he notes with a certain degree of contentment, "Look, terrorism is a highly theatrical endeavor. And what was needed occurred. It was a kind of counterterrorism drama. And I think that was terrific." Ed.

## MEDIA...Continued

• **Recreational:** to provide entertainment and learning situations and send out social messages.

## Terrorist Media Strategy

It is evident that terrorists have expended considerable effort to manipulate the media in all its basic functions. Carlos Marighella, a Brazilian philosopher and leader of a terrorist organization, his death in 1969, described a manipulation strategy and a psychological warfare strategy which attempts to place the terrorist in the position of a defender to defend itself. According to Marighella's *Manual of the Guerrilla*, terrorist media strategy is divided into

- **Phase I, primary:** tactics include attacks on targets on a small scale, the name of the group before the public.
- **Phase II, secondary:** objective is to have the organization disseminate the organization's claims in an appeal to public support while the government is achieving final objectives.
- **Phase III, final:** a public support while the government is achieving final objectives.

## Contagion Hypothesis

The three main media in its treatment of terrorism are the news, the terrorist incidents, the terrorism, and the terrorist personality. That this type of coverage has adverse effects, such as

- Encouraging the formation of groups. Tactical and successful exploitation of the momentum of the press, thus, to an increase in the number of groups.
- Keeping the group's name before the "masses" on which terrorists supposedly draw.
- Leading other groups or individuals to imitate daring acts of terrorism.
- Tempting the



- **Recreational:** to provide amusement and learning situations and to send out social messages.

### Terrorist Media Strategy

It is evident that terrorists have expended considerable effort to manipulate the media in all five of its basic functions. Carlos Marighella, Brazilian philosopher, author, and leader of a terrorist organization until his death in 1969, described media manipulation strategy as an aggressive psychological warfare technique which attempts to place the government in the position of always having to defend itself. According to Marighella's **Manual of the Urban Guerilla**, terrorist media manipulation strategy is divided into three phases:

- **Phase I, primary:** tactical objectives include attacks against suitable targets on a small scale which bring the name of the group and its causes before the public.
- **Phase II, secondary:** the strategic objective is to have the media advertise the organization's ideological claims in an appeal for broad support.
- **Phase III, final:** a call for complete public support while actually fighting the government in an attempt to achieve final objectives.

### Contagion Hypothesis

The three main criticisms of the media in its treatment of terrorists and terrorism are its emphasis on terrorist incidents, the fictionalization of terrorism, and the glamorization of terrorist personalities. Experts believe that this type of coverage often has adverse effects, such as:

- Encouraging the formation of new groups. Tactical successes and successful exploitation of the media lead to terrorists taking advantage of the momentum of previous actions and, thus, to an increase in terrorist acts.
- Keeping the terrorist organization's name before the public and the "masses" on whose behalf the terrorists supposedly act.
- Leading other less successful groups or individuals to commit more daring acts of terrorist violence.
- Tempting terrorists, who have

received favorable media coverage in the past, to attempt to seize control of the media.

### Media-Enhanced Impact of Terrorism

Terrorist violence becomes the theater of the obscene, a drama amplified by mass media and relentlessly projected onto the world's consciousness. In fact, a circus atmosphere is often created as reporters scramble to be on the scene and to witness every gruesome detail of the violence as it unfolds. The coverage of the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 by a militant Shiite group in June is one recent example.

As with all crimes, excessive publicity creates copycat situations where individuals imitate the criminal acts they see reported on television. This was evident during the Cyanide Tylenol case in Chicago. Within a few weeks there was a flood of complaints about poison food and candy or contaminated eye drops and other products throughout the United States. Excessive or slanted reporting of terrorist incidents, especially where the terrorists are portrayed as being strong and the authorities weak, can create hysteria and a climate of intimidation. In fear of their lives, people may act on their own, outside of the law, or they may demand that drastic measures be taken by the government. Usually, such action is counterproductive and, in fact, plays right into the hands of the terrorists. Whenever terrorism counteraction measures are taken, some freedoms must be suspended. A classic example of media-created mass hysteria and panic is the 1938 Orson Welles' radio broadcast, "War of the Worlds." The mere fact that the so-called invasion was presented on nationwide radio gave it a certain credibility. In addition, people were already in a state of anxiety because of the trouble brewing in Europe. Taking these two circumstances into account, it is easy to see how the "invasion" was accepted as fact.

Also, as television dwells on the sensational, retelling and portraying all the bloody details over and over again, people become immunized against the reality of the suffering; such reporting dulls their sense of propriety and morality. Societies that are exposed to large doses of terror

and killing become desensitized to it and come to regard acts of terrorism, including killing, as normal, everyday occurrences.

On-the-spot coverage of hostage situations can actually endanger the lives of hostages and law enforcement personnel, as well as interfere with hostage recovery operations. On the other hand, the media can sometimes assist in the hostage negotiation process. Hostage takers usually trust the media and, sometimes, will settle for the publicity rather than actually commit the violence that always earns it.

The media is able to confer status on people merely by mentioning their names; consequently, folk heroes and legends have been created. Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, "Carlos" Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez, Fusako Shigenobu, Dr. George Habash, and others were portrayed as selfless fighters for human rights and liberators of the masses, or as modern "Robin Hoods," while, often, they were instruments of subversive powers, and nothing less than cold-blooded murderers.

By using techniques such as repeated reporting, making assumptions, and fictionalizing about the terrorists, the media can literally create something that did not initially exist. The media become an unwilling partner of the terrorists as their broadcasts and press coverage create fear and panic in people—since this is precisely what the terrorists seek. However, looking at the other side of the coin, the media could be used to expose terrorists for what they really are and, thereby, calm the population.

Again, modern technology aids the terrorists, who carry transistor radios and portable television sets, then listen to and view law enforcement activities in process. Examples abound of terrorist exploitation of media broadcasts and communications which caused loss of lives. In Vietnam, unscrupulous reporters "uncovered" continuing or planned operations and reported our troop movements to their headquarters via telephone or single-sideband radios which were easily intercepted by the enemy.

The Khaalis Hanafi Muslim Group takeover of several buildings in Washington, D.C., in 1977 almost ended in

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## MEDIA...Continued

tragedy when local TV reporters filmed the lifting of a basket of food to an upper floor of a building where 11 people were hiding from the terrorists. Although initially unaware of their presence, terrorists were promptly informed by sympathizers who saw the news report on local television. Fortunately, police rescued the people before the Hanafi terrorists had a chance to act.

The presence of media cameras, lights, and sound equipment draws crowds—some of whom may be on the side of the perpetrators, others against them. Situations such as this could lead to serious disturbances, riots, and street fighting and can interfere with law enforcement operations. Also, placing law enforcement personnel on the spot by hounding them for interviews further interferes with operations and distracts, intimidates, and impedes the decisionmaking process.

The media have created spectacles out of small incidents that might have been resolved much faster. Terrorists want to prolong siege/hostage situations, because as long as the media cooperates, they are receiving publicity and are accomplishing at least part of their mission. The 1977 siege of the Dominican Republic's embassy in Bogota, Columbia, lasted more than 60 days, but could have been resolved much sooner.

Perhaps the best illustration of saturation media coverage that aided the terrorists is the Iranian hostage situation which lasted from November 4, 1979, to January 20, 1981, a total of 444 days. It was a crisis that shook the diplomatic and political world. Daily, television viewers worldwide saw that terrorists had power over the most powerful and democratic nation in the world. Counting down the days, TV announcers would narrate the embassy takeover and show pictures of one of the hostages with his head bandaged being pushed around by a mob and a U.S. flag burning while being stomped on the ground. Probably the best example of terrorist control over media programming is the Iranian student-filmed interview with Cpl. Gallegos, one of the U.S. hostages. The unedited interview aired for 30 minutes on one of our major

networks. Speaking under a portrait of Ayatollah Khomeini, Gallegos affirmed the humane treatment the hostages were receiving and the absence of abuse. However, prior to the interview, one of his captors, Mary, delivered a lengthy unedited anti-American tirade. Here, the terrorists were given a worldwide hearing of their poisonous propaganda, designed to cause controversy and dissension among U.S. citizens and members of the government. And they succeeded to a certain extent.

However, not all media coverage during the Iranian hostage situation was negative. Following the seizure of our embassy and the subsequent expulsion of U.S. citizens from Iran, the media were the only effective intelligence and communications links to that country. And after the expulsion of the U.S. media from Iran in January 1980, the British Broadcasting Corporation and German wire services served as our only link there.

## Terrorist Use of Media Information

Information gleaned from television or newspapers can be very useful to terrorist operations. Profiles of hostages, their families, and friends are excellent tools and can be used to pressure hostages and increase terrorist blackmail capabilities. Such was the case when Brig. Gen. James Dozier was kidnapped in Italy. The Red Brigades were provided Dozier's biographical data as well as information on his family and friends by the press, radio, and television. This was the most valuable intelligence the terrorists were to secure. Since reporters have little or no access to the terrorists, they must concentrate on the law enforcement side; consequently, decisions, tactics, and movements are "given" to the terrorists by the media.

As stated previously, media coverage can endanger the lives of hostages. The 1977 terrorist hijacking of German Lufthansa Flight 181 is one of many examples of terrorist use of media reports. First, a foreign radio station reporter overheard a radio transmission of a German Boeing 727 carrying a GSG-9 rescue team to Crete, and promptly announced it on the news. The Germans quickly explained that the aircraft was carrying the requested terrorist captives to them. Second, reporters probably

contributed to the death of the German airline captain when one of them announced that the captain was providing information about the terrorists to the authorities. Upon hearing this, the terrorist leader, Zuhair Akash, a.k.a. Captain Mahmoud, murdered the German pilot in front of the passengers.

The presence of media in siege/hostage situations can also cause problems. During negotiations, journalists may be saying one thing while the negotiator is saying something else, thus destroying the negotiator's credibility. Milking the media for what it is worth also delays resolution of these incidents.

The situation is further complicated when, exposed to world scrutiny provided by the media, the terrorists are anxious not to lose face, may initiate even more drastic actions or kill hostages or innocent bystanders. The presence of an audience may also goad terrorists into doing what they think is "expected" of them. Reporters who deal directly with the terrorists or insert themselves between law enforcement personnel and the terrorists isolate the negotiators and law enforcement personnel. This occurred in 1971 during the Attica Correctional Facility riots and, in fact, contributed to the siege/hostage situation.

Media presence can also alter the psychological environment in which the terrorists operate either by giving them a feeling of security, by upsetting them with inflammatory statements, or by divulging names and activities the terrorists wish to keep secret. Direct communication between reporters and the terrorists can further endanger lives. During the Hanafi incident, mentioned earlier, a local TV reporter had a telephone interview with Khaalis, the terrorist leader, pressing him for a deadline. However, during negotiations, the absence of a deadline is more advantageous to negotiators. In another instance, a thoughtless and ignorant reporter linked Khaalis to another organization which he hated; this created a vicious outburst and one of the hostages was threatened with death. The 1977 Hanafi situation turned out to be a dangerous media circus that could have cost many lives.

Constant media scrutiny of law enforcement  
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## MEDIA...Co

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## Terrorist Explo

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**MEDIA...Continued**

forcement, intelligence, and other counterterrorism personnel interferes with their operations since, for obvious reasons, they need to keep their identities secret. This type of interference also delays important decisions. The presence of media on the scene gives away an important bargaining tool in hostage situations and sieges.

**Terrorist Exploitation of the Media**

One of the most exploitable aspects of the media is the competitiveness of reporters. There is almost a rabid quest to be the first to bring the terrorist theater drama to the people. As a result, the situation is not examined carefully enough, so subsequent coverage may only succeed in glorifying the terrorists. Their actions are portrayed as being just and the government's actions as unjust or repressive, and the message that comes across is that the terrorist's only immediate solution is violence.

With the media's help, terrorists have an easy time presenting the government as weak and ineffective. At this point, the terrorists hold all the cards; to them, the end justifies the means. They are willing to risk lives, even their own, to achieve their objectives. Law enforcement people, on the other hand, operate under a practical handicap of minimizing the harm to persons and property.

Manipulation of the media, by having them repeat broadcasts each time the terrorists do something, makes it appear that the media are working for the terrorists. Media events, such as the Iranian hostage situation, the death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs in Afghanistan in 1979, and the bombings of U.S. embassies and the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut, have had a psychological impact on the U.S. population and have resulted in the radicalization of some elements and the polarization and division of other elements within the U.S. government. Cries for "liberation of the downtrodden" or "help the underdog" appeal to certain segments of American society and cause some people to excuse the violence or killing of innocent people, because the terrorist's cause sounds "just."

**Mass Media Benefits**

The media's role in terrorist inci-

dents can be just as beneficial as it can be detrimental. It is the job of the media to inform the population about terrorist activities and to alert people to emergencies. Law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community benefit from the extensive data base and up-to-date information generated by the media. In the past, the media have actually provided alternatives to terrorist acts. The media have also been able to expose foreign influence or support of terrorist activities and have been instrumental in the apprehension of terrorists and foreign agents. Knowing that the media may expose them does provide some curbs on terrorist activities. Files, tapes, films, photographs, and articles about terrorists and their activities constitute an excellent data base. In short, the media **can do** for the authorities what they **do** for the terrorists.

**Role of Media in****Terrorism Counteraction**

The media are in a position to help as well as hurt terrorism counteraction operations. To accomplish the positive result, it is necessary for the authorities to develop rapport with reporters and other members of the media. They must be kept informed of the real situation in regular or impromptu briefings. The briefings should be conducted by professionals from public affairs offices (PAO) or by intelligence personnel. All PAO personnel should be familiar with terrorism and terrorism counteraction. Media representatives should be briefed, if they are not familiar with the terrorist threat.

A media center, provided with communications, radio, and television, should be set up away from the incident scene to protect members of the media. This press center should be operated by a PAO team and should include a legal officer, a chaplain, and, wherever possible, intelligence personnel, especially in cases where hostages are held. Media representatives should be escorted by PAO or law enforcement personnel when they leave the press center. An access and pass list for reporters should be established in a prolonged situation. A separate area should also be established for families of hostages and other victims of the terrorist strike. Generally, families of hostages should

be kept away from the media. Special requests by the media for interviews with these people should be considered carefully, and interviews should not be allowed to interfere with counterterrorism operations, to endanger the lives of hostages, or to jeopardize negotiations. A public affairs annex should be included in every counterterrorism/hostage recovery plan.

The majority of media representatives are responsible professionals who take their jobs seriously and are willing to do the right thing. To prevent them from reporting or to deny them information would constitute a violation of First Amendment rights. A thorough explanation of the case, an appeal for cooperation, and courteous treatment of media representatives would benefit our intelligence operations, public relations, and the overall terrorism counteraction effort. \*

*Rudolf Levy, a native of Czechoslovakia, was a member of anti-Nazi underground organizations during World War II and later was a member of an anti-Communist organization. He was arrested by the Czechoslovak Secret Police and later escaped to West Germany after serving six months of a 15-year sentence. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1951 and was commissioned in 1961 with dual branch status in Infantry and Military Intelligence. While in the Army, Levy served in Europe, Japan, Alaska, Korea, Vietnam, and in various assignments in the continental United States. Levy is a professional linguist in Slavic languages and has conducted research and studies on international terrorism and political violence and Communist tactics and strategy for the past 30 years. He also teaches at colleges and universities and departments of public safety. Levy was educated at the Technological Institute in Prague, Heidelberg University, Geneva International University, University of Texas, and American Western University, studying Political Science, International Relations, and Political Violence. Levy was formerly employed as a researcher, course developer, and instructor on international terrorism and counterterrorism operations with the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca. He also serves as guest lecturer at other military schools and installations.*



## The most crucial and essential aspect of the US border problem has become national defense.

**W**hile America's military planners are engrossed in the development of futuristic and sophisticated "star wars" defense systems, the land borders of the United States remain among the most poorly guarded and ill-regulated of any modern nation's. No other nation, for example, allows the legal emigration of tens of thousands of illegal aliens who regularly cross its boundaries in both directions. The continuous, massive influx of undocumented persons into the US from Central and South America is providing almost unrestricted opportunity for the entry of drug smugglers, fugitives, and individuals or groups bent upon acts of political sabotage or terror.

While the rapid growth in drug trafficking from Mexico and Latin American nations has been well documented by the US media in recent years, relatively little attention has been directed—by the media or politicians—toward the threat of terrorism originating in these regions. This neglect of the real possibility that substantial numbers of well-armed terrorists could readily infiltrate across the Mexican-US border may, in part, be attributed to the tendency of America's defense establishment to define "national defense" too narrowly and too traditionally. Historically and traditionally, US national defense policies have been oriented toward countering threats stemming from armed forces of hostile governments. Quite obviously, our "Good Neighbor to the South" fails to fulfill the image of a hostile and aggressive military power. But while the Mexican government poses

no immediate problem for the US in the traditional military sense, recent events have shown that Mexican territories could be covertly employed as entry and staging areas by third-party groups or organizations with terrorist aims. This possibility must seem far from remote in the wake of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi's recent threats to bring terrorism to the streets of America.

Given the existing circumstance of a virtually open Mexico-US border, and given the growing phenomenon of worldwide terrorist attacks against US citizens and interests, it seems apparent that no national policy that is designed to prevent or deter terrorism in the United States can be

The master social problem of America's permeable borders should not be regarded simplistically as an "immigration problem," nor a "welfare/crime problem," nor even an "employment problem," although it certainly includes elements from each of these areas. In today's climate of international terrorism, the most crucial and essential aspect of the US border problem has become national defense; accordingly, it is the Nation's defense establishment which should play a leading role in addressing and responding to the situation.

The clandestine entry of terrorists from south of the border has already become more than a hypothetical possibility. Duke

# America's Insecure Borders in an Age of International Terrorism

by Thomas W. Foster

called complete unless it also squarely addresses the persistent and increasingly urgent problems associated with America's land borders. The Immigration and Naturalization Service reported that 1.3-million illegals were apprehended in the US in Fiscal Year 1985, 98% of them on the US' southern border. So while the US-Mexican border offers the most visible and immediate threat to national security, the long Canadian-US border has not been free from the problems of illegal entry either. It is becoming increasingly imperative that America's political and defense planners undertake a systematic and timely review of the vulnerabilities of the entire border areas of the United States.

Austin, a spokesman for the US Border Patrol, recently told me that, over the past year, a "small number" of individuals with known ties to terrorist organizations have, in fact, illegally crossed into this country from Mexico. Austin said, "Our intelligence has been instrumental in reporting terrorists," and added, "these people were associated with the IRA, the PLO, and Sikh radical organizations." Austin pointed out that Mexico provides an attractive and convenient entry point for political terrorists for several reasons, including: 1) the relative ease with which foreigners can obtain Mexican visitor visas, 2) Mexico's contiguous borders with

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### POLICY...Continued

ments in Italy, make economic retaliation more difficult than its proponents foresee, the doubters say. "They could cease to supply Qaddafi with oil-drilling equipment, and the Japanese would zip in and do it. They could cut off his agricultural imports from the United States, and the farmers would go crazy."

But there is a general, if testy, consensus that Reagan is trying to send a get-tough

message when he switches signals on retaliation from red light to green. "That's exactly what it means," one observer says. "It means there was confusion, but it also means the president started out thinking one way, and by the time somebody got to him he was thinking another way."

"I don't think it reflects any hardening of policy because I don't think we have the wherewithal to harden the policy," says another. "I think he is making the right rhetorical noises, and he'll do nothing. I think

the policy has crystallized, and every time they say there is no place for terrorists to hide, they just think that people will believe that and that's enough."

A more hopeful view expressed by one source is that Reagan's signals, through Speakes, indicate "a toughening and unification of administration rhetoric. What I read it as is that the Shultz line is now the line, in a way that it hasn't been before."

— Don McLeod



## BORDERS...Continued

politically unstable Latin American nations, and 3) the border's length and geography in relation to the availability of personnel for patrol duties. Austin described the present condition of the border as "porous" and expressed concern that the terrorist threat would probably worsen in the future. "We are making 3,000-4,000 apprehensions of illegals per night," he commented, and explained that under such circumstances, it "would certainly be possible for small groups [of terrorists] to come in."

While official statistics overwhelmingly support the conclusion that border violations have sharply increased in recent years, it is not only the number, but also the flagrancy, of the violations that have grown. One of the most blatant recent examples is based upon allegations that, in August 1985, Mexican law enforcement officers armed with machine guns and .45 caliber pistols accompanied drug traffickers across the border into Starr County, Texas. According to a *New York Times* report of September

ber 25, 1985, these allegations were contained in a letter written in September to President

Reagan and 13 Members of Congress from the Fraternal Order of Border Agents, an organization of current and retired officers of the United States Customs Service and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Also, under the title "The Worst Radiation Accident in the History of North America," *Science* reported that a radiation accident occurred in early 1984 in which "the public had been exposed to gamma radiation 100 times more intense than at Three Mile Island five years earlier." According to the article, junkyard workers in the city of Juarez had accidentally mixed 6,010 radioactive pellets containing cobalt 60 with steel scrap. The scrap was transferred to two Mexican steel foundries where the radioactive pellets were melted down and combined with the steel to form reinforcing rods for concrete as well as pedestals for restaurant tables. Some of the rods and the table supports were subsequently transported to the US in trucks, which reportedly passed undetected through the border checkpoint at El Paso. According to a National Public Radio report, this happened because there were then no radiation detectors employed at the El Paso checkpoint by the US Border Patrol. The first discovery of the radioactive material in the US took place after one of the trucks took a wrong turn and tripped a radiation detector in a laboratory building at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. The subsequent detection of

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a truck carrying some of the irradiated table supports occurred in Illinois, where state highway patrol cruisers are equipped with radiation detectors (in most states, police lack such detectors).

Efforts were still under way in the US in late summer 1984 to complete the recovery of radioactive materials from the public. At that time, contaminated table supports had been recovered from 27 states. Officials believed that most of the reinforcing rods had been found but not all of the table supports, which had been more widely distributed. As a consequence of the accident, *Science* stated that "200 people received unsafe doses of radiation (some getting lethal doses) while 20 houses and 4,000 tons of steel were contaminated."

Although little publicized by the mass media, the Juarez incident demonstrated that not only dangerous persons, but also highly lethal substances, including materials capable of injuring hundreds or even thousands of Americans, have recently entered this country without being detected by immigration authorities. Furthermore, these already injurious materials could easily have been converted into even more effective instruments of destruction. What happened by accident during this incident could happen again in the future through design unless US state and federal authorities implement much more effective preventive and reactive measures.

On May 5, 1984, *The New York Times* reported that American officials had announced that Geiger counters were being installed at every official border crossing point between the US and Mexico. This announcement raises—or should raise—the question of just why such a basic and inexpensive precautionary measure was not taken earlier; it also raises serious doubt concerning the extent and adequacy of existing measures of nuclear detection which have been implemented by federal authorities. However, the Juarez incident further demonstrated that the individual states are equally unprepared for such contingencies; most lack nuclear detection equipment, as well as systematic programs of transport vehicle inspection and law enforcement. The central point here is that besides having international borders that are extremely vulnerable to the passage of dangerous materials, the US also lacks any "defense in

depth" within the states to guard against such dangerous incursions.

It requires little imagination to envision how easily radioactive materials, such as cobalt 60, could be acquired by determined terrorists and converted to their own ends. Terrorists would not need large amounts of such materials, nor highly sophisticated nuclear triggering devices, to cause havoc and panic throughout this Nation. They might, for example, achieve the same ends by merely "seeding" relatively small packets of radioactive substances in certain key locations around the country. They could also easily combine radioactive materials with conventional explosives to produce bombs and other explosive devices that would undoubtedly prove highly effective in inducing public fear and hysteria.

**S**ecuring the US-Mexico border will require much more than the installation of Geiger counters at official checkpoints (which can readily be circumvented) or federal legislation outlawing the employment of illegal aliens. First and foremost, improved physical security measures must be instituted. A promising beginning was made in this direction during the Carter Administration when construction was started on a high-technology fence. Unfortunately, the fence was never completed and several portions that were built have since fallen into a state of disrepair. Consideration should now be given to repairing and extending this fence in areas where practical. It is extremely difficult and costly to provide the manpower to adequately patrol a 1,936-mile-long border. A solution to this problem, for which prior political precedent exists, would be to rotate regular units of the US armed forces, i.e., Army or Marine units, to supplement the routine patrols of the US Border Patrol. The temporary assignment of regular Army or Marine units to the US Border Patrol would provide valuable, realistic training and experience for armed forces personnel, some of whom might later be involved in counterterrorist or counterinsurgency operations. Of course, preparatory training in the Spanish language and in civil/legal techniques of detection, apprehension, the permissible use of force, and so forth, would necessarily precede the assignment of military personnel to temporary border patrol duties. However, regular personnel of the US Coast Guard have long fulfilled similar functions on the Nation's sea lanes, establishing a viable precedent for the action. The questions of when and how to arm and uniform regular military units attached to the Border Patrol would, of course, be sensitive matters requiring careful deliberation and close, continuous supervision at the highest command levels.

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By Lieutenant Commander Douglas S. Derrer, Medical Service Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve

# Countering Terrorism

## Part I

By Lieutenant Commander Douglas S. Derrer, Medical Service Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve

The heat of the night was almost palpable. Shimmering waves of overheated air rose in the dark, enveloping the great silver 747 making it seem like a mirage as it sat on the tarmac, mute and unmoving. It had been there for three days, as if standing guard like a modern Valkyrie over the body lying dead on the ground near its nose. Negotiations and communications with the terrorists inside the plane were deteriorating. Another American death was threatened within the hour if demands were not met. The situation, in the words of a seasoned negotiator, "was becoming grave, indeed." The White House wanted a resolution, and soon. The United States had taken too much of this kind of bullying and brutal extortion.

Barely visible patches of the shimmering night air seemed to coalesce and float almost effortlessly over the ground toward the plane. The patches of air took shape and like the Ninjas of centuries ago, became silent stalkers and like the Ninjas of centuries ago, became silent stalkers moving rapidly toward their prey from all directions. Some worked high-speed drills under the plane while others set ladders against the wings and doors. Carefully designed explosive charges were detonated, rendering the plane.

Thunder-flash stun grenades were thrown into the plane, followed by what seemed like a legion of charging Darth Vaders, all in black, screaming, "Everybody down! Get down! Get down!" Finely tuned machine pistols and hand guns spat shot-range bullets that entered, but did not pass through the body. Precision work; two shots to the head of each terrorist giving any resistance. Ten seconds after the Darth Vaders had entered the 747, the terrorists were dead, the hostages were freed, and the siege was over. The United States had struck back at terrorism with a heavy hand, giving a blow to the terrorists they would not soon forget.

This kind of spectacular and dramatic operation by a counterterrorist strike force is enormously appealing to Western governments which too often feel powerless against the ravages of terrorism. The Israeli paratroopers at Entebbe, the German GSG-9 at Mogadishu, the Royal Dutch Marines at Bovensmilde, and other successes by such strike teams have become legends that have resulted in a compelling attractiveness for the counterterrorism "hardware" option. Such tactical successes have been

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## BORDERS...Continued

Another solution to protecting the vast border expanse would be the increased employment of existing technologies. A more widespread deployment of various types of detection instruments, for example, would seem to be absolutely mandatory, including both personnel and radiation detectors. Again, regular units of the armed forces could be called upon to supplement many of the equipment needs of the Border Patrol, at least on a temporary basis. In this regard, infantry units are routinely equipped with night-spotting scopes, all-terrain

vehicles, communications gear, and other equipment that would complement and enhance the work of the US Border Patrol. Certainly, federal legislative efforts should be directed toward upgrading the number, training, and effectiveness of US Border Patrol personnel. The pending Simpson-Rodino Bill would provide some \$180-million toward these goals and would be a step in the right direction, but that legislation stalled in the House during the last session of Congress. But even with increased personnel, Border Patrol officials admit they cannot hope to actually

seal the border, at least not without incurring huge, and, by implication, unrealistic, personnel expenditures. The only realistic solution, then, would seem to lie in the foregoing proposal for the employment of military units for patrol duties. Congress should, accordingly, act *before* the incidence of terrorist acts reaches crisis proportions in the United States. Last, legislation is needed to improve the abilities of the states to develop their own coordinated and rational responses for dealing with the movement of illegal aliens and hazardous materials through their territories. ■ ★ ■



## TERRORISM, PART I...Continued

few and far between, because countering terrorism presents a variety of problems for security planners and strategists. Part 1 examines some of these problems; part 2 recommends some methods of countering the threat with a number of counterterrorism "software" options.

**Tactical Options:** We are suffering from tactical "tunnel vision." In May 1980, Iraqi terrorists held members of the Iranian Embassy hostage at Princess Gate, London. After a week of negotiations the situation had not been resolved, and the terrorists had begun killing their prisoners. Tactical action had to be taken. The entire world watched on TV the stunning success of the British Special Air Service (SAS) assault on the embassy. They rescued all the hostages and killed all the terrorists except one who escaped through the back door.

The high visibility, drama, and quick resolution of counterterrorism strike forces have led government and military security planners and strategists to rely too heavily on hardware. Consequently, most approaches to combating terrorism have emphasized mobile strike teams, commando tactics, automatic weapons, novel photographic and electronic equipment, specially designed tools, aircraft and helicopters, and other sophisticated gear. While sometimes necessary, such approaches are of limited effectiveness and are very expensive. Even the phrase "combating terrorism" suggests a wartime atmosphere and warlike preparation. The resulting tactical tunnel vision of planners has not permitted them to consider other options that are less spectacular, less explosive, and potentially more effective.

Effective policy and planning to counter terrorism call for a fresh examination of the kinds of problems it presents. Terrorism is a tactical, political, ideological, and psychological phenomenon. To deal with it properly, all these aspects must be clearly understood.

Tactical approaches include special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams, and retaliatory and preemptive strikes. Each has value, but each has difficulties as well. Army Brigadier General James Dozier's rescue in January 1982 by the Italian Carabinieri, after 42 days as a hostage of the Red Brigades, followed a most impressive counterterrorism manhunt and final assault. Similarly, last October's interdiction by U. S. Navy jets of an Egyptian airliner and the capture of the Palestinian terrorists who hijacked the *Achille Lauro* were tactical and law enforcement successes that gave the American fight against terrorism a much-needed morale boost. But essential as such teams or military interventions are, there are relatively few counterterrorism situations in which they can be used, as the events that engulfed TWA Flight-847 made abundantly clear.

Furthermore, the majority of hostage situations are resolved by negotiations, not by SWAT strikes. Unfortunately, such strikes—usually launched after negotiations fail or the terrorists begin killing hostages—get an inordinate amount of attention from the press and become lodged more firmly in the public's minds than the quieter, less flashy processes of negotiation.

Finally, some half to two-thirds of terrorist attacks around the world consist of bombs that detonate long after

the terrorists have left the scene and against which neither a strike force nor a negotiating team is effective.

Retaliatory strikes against bombers, assassins, or hostage-takers require identification of the culprits—a luxury seldom afforded us by terrorists who prefer to attack and die with their own bombs or to fade away without facing their adversaries. Retaliation is acceptable to the American public if two conditions are met: first, there should be solid assurance that the right people are being counterattacked, and, second, the retaliation should take place within a reasonable time after the terrorist attack. This "window of support," as it has been called, seems to vary with the perceived outrageousness of the attack. The window was quite large after U. S. Marines were killed in Beirut, but now that window is closed, except possibly for anyone close to the Marine victims who may still harbor wishes for revenge. Retaliation needs both accuracy and timing to be effective, which was clearly the case with the Navy's capture of Palestinian terrorists who hijacked the *Achille Lauro* and murdered Leon Klinghoffer. But, as the Israelis have repeatedly found, retaliation may produce counterretaliation. "We may not like what we get back," Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger noted.

Preemptive strikes would be especially difficult for the American public to accept. They make the United States look too much like the very terrorists we condemn. Such strikes rely heavily on intelligence-gathering and infiltration of terrorist groups. Because terrorists typically are organized into small, closeknit units such an effort is extremely difficult. And no matter how extensive the intelligence-gathering, the public would always be asking whether we were correct in our preemptive action.

We appear to be engaged in a battle in which it is nearly impossible for us to go on the offensive. Must we accept the frustrations of the defensive position in countering terrorism? Only if we continue to limit ourselves to narrow "hardware" definitions in combating terrorism. To counter terrorism effectively, it is imperative to understand how terrorists think, plan, and operate—"Know thy enemy."

**Terrorist Strategy:** Political and psychological warfare are the essence of terrorist strategy. In the 19th century, this concept was called "propaganda of the deed" by Johann Most, a German theorist of terrorism and inventor of the letter bomb. In spite of the lives lost and the damage done to property by terrorist attacks, terrorism is minimally tactical. Terrorism is dependent upon the news media to amplify its political and psychological "firepower," to provide publicity, carry its message, garner support, and to influence public opinion.

Terrorism serves as a political platform. Terrorist attacks and the resulting media response are a primary form of political action by some groups. They aim to affect policies or power. Not only do they use their terrorist activities to express their political views, but they attempt to change governments and policy. Their acts are broadcast to the entire world. In the stable democracies of most Western governments, terrorists attempt to generate publicity for their causes and to effect policy change through

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TERRORISM, PART I...Continued

their actions. In other areas of the world, where governments are less stable, terrorism is an effort to cause civil war, alter the balance of power, and to change governments. That terrorists are able to have a significant political and psychological impact on policy can be seen by the U. S. withdrawal from Beirut following the bombing of the embassy and Marine Corps barracks. Terrorists toppled the Somozan Government in Nicaragua by bringing about a "war of national liberation," as the Sandinista propagandists call it, and a similar effort is currently being made in El Salvador by the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front revolutionaries.

**Planning and Policy Problems:** We have to remember geopolitical and ideological differences. Discussions of terrorism usually treat all terrorist groups the same. But important differences exist among terrorist groups along geopolitical and ideological lines. At least three distinct groups of terrorists exist—European, Middle Eastern, and Latin American. Understanding the differences among these groups can have important implications for policy, planning, and counterterrorism strategy.

European terrorists are usually from the middle class and are the best educated and trained. They plan their operations carefully and execute them with precision. There is strong evidence that many European groups, such as the German Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades, Direct Action of France, and others have engaged in coordinated actions, with NATO as their primary target. While notably Marxist-Leninist in orientation, there are indications that the current generation of European terrorists are less ideological and more militaristic than their predecessors of the 1970s. However, in an apparent effort to gain wider popular support from organizations like the European peace movement, these terrorists usually target installations, facilities, and physical representations of NATO rather than individuals and personnel.

In contrast, Middle Eastern terrorists have a different perspective on human life—their own and that of their victims. Many of their operations are antipersonnel and use human suicide bombers to achieve their results. Their ideological foundation is frequently Islamic fundamentalism, which teaches that the United States is the incarnation of the devil, that the American military is the tool of the devil, that a strike against any aspect of this foe has the full approval and support of Allah, and that for the faithful ("fida'i") to lose life in this cause gives one a special place in heaven. These terrorists are usually not as well-trained and educated as their European counterparts, but they often try to make up for these shortcomings with the zealotry of religious fanatics, totally convinced of the righteousness of their holy war ("jihad").

A case in point is the hijacking of TWA Flight-847. It was a terrifying ordeal for the hostages because of the fanaticism and brutality of the terrorists. But from an operational standpoint, the terrorists almost appeared to be making it up as they went along, flying senselessly back and forth between Beirut and Algiers, having left one of their colleagues behind because of poor planning. Brilliant operational tacticians? No. Dedicated, demented, and

dangerous? Yes.

Similarly, operational and ideological confusion seems to have existed with the *Achille Lauro* hijacking. The terrorists were getting media attention, although their cause was unclear, and Yassir Arafat was on his way to mediate and possibly to emerge as the "hero" of the incident. Then came the senseless and unprovoked murder of a helpless old man so that the terrorists, Yassir Arafat, and the Palestine Liberation Organization lost all credibility in the wave of public dismay and outrage that followed.

To understand this enemy, it is important to realize that these ideological attitudes and religious beliefs have existed at least since the 11th century when the tyrannical Hassan ibn-al-Sabbah controlled most of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and parts of Turkey using dedicated, suicidal assassins to battle his enemies in a similar jihad.

In Latin America, terrorism has historically been the main route to insurgency. These terrorists are usually attacking what they view as an oppressive government, and they often have a constituency among the people. Successful attacks against their government have several important effects from the revolutionary standpoint. Terrorist assaults tend to make the government become more repressive with stricter laws, harsher punishments, and fewer civil liberties; such repression makes the people more restive, ready for revolt, and supportive of the radical groups who claim to want to liberate them; and they help to draw various radical elements together to present a united front. Whenever the United States gets involved in Latin American terrorism, we are frequently stepping into someone else's civil war. Even though we may be there in only an advisory or training capacity, we are identified with the government in power, and the revolutionaries will target us for terrorist attacks. Latin American terrorists have seldom attacked us before we have butted into their revolutions. Inasmuch as the United States emerged from a revolution against an oppressive government, one would think we could understand Latin revolutionaries better.

From the standpoint of warfare planning, what is the nature of terrorism? In this arena, a great deal of confusion exists. Terrorism has been called an "undeclared war." Looking at the broad scope of terrorism, there appears to be no battle front, and no territory to be won or lost. There is no alternation of offense and defense based on superior weapons, troops, planning, or military strategy. Because terrorists have the advantage of always attacking by surprise, they maintain the offensive. That leaves the rest of the world in the unenviable position of being perpetually on the defensive, or worse, helplessly mourning their losses in impotent fury over the terrorists' most recent strike.

Much debate has taken place among strategists over whether terrorism is unconventional warfare or not. Certainly, any single assault has all the earmarks of unconventional warfare. But when these attacks are regarded collectively, a different perspective emerges. Terrorism is occurring very frequently on a global scale. There is clear coordination among disparate groups. Terrorists are attempting to change governments and acquire territory. Perhaps concepts of conventional warfare are more suit-

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## TERRORISM, PART I...Continued

able. At the forefront of counterterrorism for many years, the Israelis regard terrorism as conventional warfare and develop their plans and strategies accordingly.

Much intelligence about terrorist operations and security precautions is, appropriately, classified. Too often, however, information has been classified that was readily available from open sources. The clandestine nature of terrorism gives rise to reflexive, complementary secrecy among those attempting to counter terrorism. This is what Australian terrorism expert Grant Wardlaw describes as "... a siege mentality and the often self-perpetuating obsession with secrecy which characterises [sic] most law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies." This excessive concern with secrecy produces several problems that are counterproductive in the efforts required to combat terrorism, including the exclusion effect and poor personnel preparedness.

Information about the terrorist threat for a particular area or military base is too often kept at high levels of command or only given to security forces. Control of this vital information has effectively excluded all others, such as those personnel working on base, so that they may be unaware of the possible danger to themselves and their installation. Security forces are limited and cannot be expected to cope effectively with all possibilities of a terrorist attack. Properly informed personnel could act as extensions of the eyes and ears of the security forces, alerting them to suspicious persons, events, or vulnerabilities that could prevent a bombing or other terrorist attack. To exclude personnel who could support and assist base security is making poor use of resources.

In addition, by excluding these personnel from information about the threat of terrorism in their area, they are poorly prepared to respond appropriately to minimize injury or loss of life should a bomb threat or assault take place. A too-narrow definition of who has a "need to know" can limit security's effectiveness and cost unnecessary loss of life. In a high-threat area, ensuring that practical information on terrorism is widely disseminated can increase the awareness of all personnel and possibly prevent or at least reduce the risk of a terrorist attack. Excessive concern with secrecy can make us more vulnerable to such an attack. This exclusion effect may result in our playing into the hands of terrorists who can use our limited security forces and unprepared personnel against us.

There is a lack of centralized policy, planning, intelligence, and training. Every government agency that has any interest in countering terrorism has its own policies, procedures, intelligence-gathering, and education and training programs to deal with terrorism. It is well known that the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, the different military branches within the Department of Defense, and the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) have concerns about terrorism. While the individuals who do this kind of work will communicate with each other on an informal basis, there is little consistency in policy and approaches to dealing with the problem. Different agencies have different needs, of course, but that does not justify such variety and inconsistency at the planning and policy level that has spawned the proliferation of "terror-

ism specialists," training programs, recommended procedures, data-gathering, and intelligence collection. Policy, guidelines, information exchange, consistent and open communication, and good working relationships need to be established to reduce duplication of effort and to make the greatest use of skilled resources in this troublesome area. Perhaps an interagency think tank should be established. For example, a more uniform approach could eliminate the confusion and consternation that existed among the military and civilian Iranian hostages because neither knew how the other had been trained or briefed. After one has become a hostage is not a convenient time to find out. Such a situation is rife with possibilities for the terrorists to manipulate and exploit the hostages for propaganda purposes and to embarrass the United States.

*Psychological Problems Caused by Terrorism:* Terrorism causes a number of significant psychological factors and problems that must be realized and dealt with in developing any effective countermeasures to terrorism. In looking at these factors, the effect of terrorism as potent psychological warfare can be most keenly felt. While one sees evidence of increased security at many military installations, the adverse psychological effects of terrorism in both high- and low-threat environments can unintentionally undercut even the best security precautions. In addition, there are important psychological factors in hostage rescue operations that can affect the mission's outcome. These factors must be considered in implementing an effective system of countering terrorism.

A sequence of debilitating psychological events takes place when personnel are exposed to a high threat of terrorist attack. These events comprise the anxiety-fatalism cycle that can be seriously detrimental both to morale and combat readiness. Initially, a person is anxious and worried in this environment, and becomes hypervigilant and constantly "on alert" for possible danger. Startle reactions increase so that one tends to overreact to noises or sudden actions. Physiologically and psychologically, the person is at a high level of arousal. But this level cannot be maintained indefinitely. One eventually tires, feels depressed and discouraged, but has difficulty sleeping. Depression can lead to despair and a sense of helplessness. Fatalism occurs when, out of despair, apathy, and helplessness, the person believes he will probably be killed and there is little he can do to protect himself. This results in poor morale, reduced alertness, forgetfulness, mistakes, accident proneness, impaired judgment and decision-making ability, and, ultimately, poor combat readiness.

A high-threat environment and the inability to counter-attack were just the conditions that our Marines were exposed to during their peacekeeping mission in Beirut. Morale, alertness, and, ultimately, combat readiness decline when troops trained for combat cannot fight back when exposed to constant danger. Fatalism was evident to observers on the scene who reported that some Marines did not wear their helmets or flak jackets in spite of the fact that repeated sniping was a constant threat. In addition, as the Long Commission report details, alertness to and preparedness for the eventual bombing attack was less

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TERRORISM, PART I...Continued

than adequate. Numerous prior warnings about an impending attack were not given credence, responded to, nor disseminated to alert the command. The psychological effects of the anxiety-fatalism cycle impaired the effective use of intelligence, interfered with decision-making, reduced preparedness, and increased the Marines' vulnerability—with devastating results.

Similar detrimental effects were observed on a collective scale during the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979-81 when the morale of many Americans, including that of the persons responsible for the attempted rescue, was adversely affected. Because of their psychological importance to the rescue team, some of the principles essential to an effective mission include: a clear mandate for positive action from the highest levels of government and the military; sole reliance on the authority of the on-scene commander once the mission begins; and the realistic acceptance of possible loss of life, both civilian and military. Colonel Charlie Beckwith, U. S. Army (Retired), commanded the Delta Force unit that attempted to rescue the hostages. In his book *Delta Force* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1983), he points out that none of these key ingredients was unequivocally present in the Iranian hostage rescue mission. Consider this contrast.

Israel had been confronted with a similar problem in June 1976 when members of the Red Army Faction (RAF) and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) had hijacked an Air France Airbus to Entebbe, Uganda. These German and Palestinian terrorists separated the Jews from the other passengers and threatened them with death. For many Israelis, this was too much like the Holocaust. Pressure for an immediate rescue was enormous. Another similarity to our Iranian crisis was the fact that these hostages were being held not only by terrorists but also in a country hostile to Israel. Idi Amin's Uganda was cooperating with and providing support to the terrorists; Libya and Somalia were believed to be involved as well. A rescue mission would be an invasion. Nonetheless, the Israeli paratroopers who comprised the counterterrorism strike force were given a clear mandate and full support to proceed. With bravery, skill, and daring, this commando raid succeeded brilliantly and was the first major defeat of international terrorism. The two RAF and five PFLP terrorists were killed. Only four hostages were casualties out of the more than 300 passengers on the plane.

In Iran, the United States wanted a clean strike and an effective rescue. What psychological factors made the difference between the Israeli success in Uganda and our debacle in Iran?

First, insufficient materiel support made the mission's success questionable from the outset; too many groups involved added to the confusion of what needed to be a very tight operation. There were not enough backup helicopters and other equipment; many of the personnel involved, other than Delta, were not used to the rigors, demands, and "style" of this kind of operation. The group dynamics of the team concept were largely ignored. While Delta was specially selected and trained together constantly, other important supporting groups were not and did not.

Second, once the mission was launched, the U. S. team was not given a clear mandate to proceed at all costs. Too many contingencies were required by the mission planners to allow for an abort if almost anything went awry. Such an approach undermines the mind-set of the strike force which depends on a psychology of total commitment once the mission is under way. The motto of the British SAS is "Who Dares, Wins." Too many "back out" options required by the higher echelons eroded the Delta Force operators' belief in their own mission.

Third, it must be accepted by planners and strategists that the outcome of a rescue mission is black or white: you either win big or you lose big as illustrated by the Egyptian Commandos' 24 November rescue of the hostages on board the hijacked Egypt Air jetliner on Malta. It is an all-or-nothing operation. Once having decided to effect a rescue, all possible support must be given to that mission. Again, from the President down there was uncertainty, temporizing, and equivocation about mission support. The chain of command stretched virtually from the Iranian desert, across the Atlantic, to the White House. This implied a lack of trust in the mission and an unwillingness to rely on the independent authority of the on-scene commander. The mission was weakened from within before it even began by the psychological cost of this indecisiveness and lack of support.

Finally, it was difficult to accept that there could be loss of life during this rescue effort. But death is an unfortunate fact of life in war. The unwillingness to treat international terrorism and counterterrorism as warfare that, unfortunately, involves non-military personnel is psychologically detrimental to effective planning and positive action. This dilemma is the lesser of two evils: the cost of hostage lives in a rescue versus the value of a strike against known terrorists. This issue can only be resolved in each case.

The only truly acceptable hostage casualty rate is zero. But if a rescue is decided upon, it must be recognized that some hostages will probably die in the attempt. A recent study of 66 hostage-taking incidents showed that when hostages died, 80% of those deaths (12 out of 15) occurred during a rescue operation. One could conclude that rescue is not healthy for hostages. This conclusion seems to have been reached by the hostages of TWA Flight-847 who repeatedly pleaded *not* to be rescued. Of course, those pleas came after they were in the hands of the Amal militia, after the killing had stopped, and after their situation seemed to have improved drastically. But not to accept the grim fact of hostage deaths during a rescue operation will result in a mixed message to the strike team that is sure to subvert their maximum effort and effectiveness—"go get those bad guys, but don't hurt anybody!"

The public's resistance to security in low-threat environments results from a combination of ignorance and denial. These factors are fostered by the exclusion effect and excessive secrecy. Without clear evidence that it needs to be concerned, the public tends to ignore the problem. Or it makes it somebody else's problem, such as police or security. Because of inadequate preparation and understanding, most people would not know how to react to a crisis, such as a bomb threat, if it should happen. Since Marilyn Buck's recent arrest and the discovery of a

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## TERRORISM, PART I...Continued

Baltimore "safehouse" of photographs and plans to bomb a building at the Naval Academy, I have informally asked some of my friends who work at the Naval Academy whether they are concerned about security with nearly two million visitors a year. Few are. Most of them reminded me of the inconvenience of coming to work and parking when security was very tight during the 1984 Summer Olympics while the Naval Academy hosted some foreign soccer teams. I think they are complacent. They think I am a worrywart. We are all vulnerable.

Security forces, too, have psychological resistances to increased security. Resistance can result from the exclusion effect among enforcers who keep information at the top; or from the belief that a crisis will be handled by special operators like SWAT, FBI, or NIS. Sometimes, they believe that these experts will tell the security officer what to do and how to do it when the time comes. A crisis is a poor time to conduct training.

Alertness of security forces is difficult to maintain for an event that is sporadic and unpredictable, does not occur very often, and about which one may be mostly ignorant. Finally, there is inconvenience. Too often, I have seen tight security lifted during the morning rush hour to get onto base. But just drive in about 0930 when there is little traffic, and you will get a thorough going over. Terrorists know these little quirks about us—and use them.

The United States is a popular target. Americans are easy victims. After two decades of active European, Middle Eastern, and Latin American terrorism, we still are not prepared to handle the terrorism problem. From the standpoint of history and preparedness, the United States seems to be about where Europe was in the 1970s. American citizens, the U. S. military, and American institutions such as bases, embassies, and businesses are being targeted and attacked with increasing frequency by international as well as domestic terrorist groups. Too often, they find us vulnerable and poorly prepared as most European countries were ten years ago. We were late in developing counterterrorism commando forces, and they have had few successes. While policies and response plans for negotiation and/or rescue exist, they appear to be inadequately developed, uncoordinated, and cannot be executed in a prudent and timely manner on short notice.

Our contingency planning which must respond immediately to a terrorist act seems to be largely ineffective. It was so in the Iranian hostage situation, and the TWA Flight-847 crisis showed that it had improved little. In

spite of stated policies that the United States will make no concessions to nor negotiate with terrorists, there is enormous public pressure to do so when civilians become hostages as TWA Flight-847 demonstrated. Also, our media have not learned how thoroughly they are being manipulated by terrorism and, consequently, show little responsible self-control during an incident. The American public is poorly educated about terrorism and is an easy target for terrorists' publicity and emotional appeals. As a result, the public has a powerful response to terrorist acts: there is a great outcry, concern for the victims, expressions of frustration, and demands for retaliation. The terrorists definitely get our attention, which is, of course, exactly what they want.

Sympathy toward the terrorists and their cause is a common psychological reaction among hostages. This powerful effect, known as the Stockholm syndrome, was evident among many of the hostages from TWA Flight-847. A similar psychological reaction took place among the public, who in a sense were also held hostage by the graphic media coverage of this incident. It is too easy to remember the good treatment, the open-air luncheons near the sea, and to forget the actual terror and death that the hostages experienced. It was only afterward that the anger and fear of some hostages toward their captors became apparent. The psychological phenomenon known as cognitive distance predicts that people tend to think more kindly of those who have first threatened them and later are nice. The public mind was being masterfully manipulated by the terrorists' use of the press.

While the practice of terrorism dates back centuries, its current resurgence, its technology, and its potential for extreme violence—the realm of pure terror—are new. To counter terrorism effectively, we must initiate approaches that are also new. In Part 2, which will be published in the February issue, some of the problems raised in this analysis will be reexamined from different perspectives to develop recommendations for positive, definitive actions against terrorism.

Commander Derrer received a BA in psychology from the University of Colorado, and an MS in physiological psychology and a PhD in social psychology from Yale University. He completed a post-doctoral internship in clinical psychology at the Yale University School of Medicine, and is a licensed Psychologist in California. His jobs have included clinical psychologist for Survival Evasion, Resistance, Escape School, Naval Air Station North Island, and consultant to the FBI Academy on field training exercises in terrorism and hostage stress reactions. He is currently Chief Psychologist in the Department of Psychiatry, Naval Hospital, Camp Pendleton. Commander Derrer's May 1985 article, "Terrorism," served as a catalyst for the Institute's seminar, "Terrorism and the Military Professional," in which he also participated.







## PROCEEDINGS

February 1986 Pg. 73

By Lieutenant Commander Douglas S. Derrer, Medical Service Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve

# Countering Terrorism

## Part 2

Terrorism is declared warfare. It has been declared for many years. Look at almost any terrorist communiqué. Consider "The Revolutionary Catechism" written by the Russian nihilist Mikhail Bakunin in the late 19th century; or for the 20th century view, try Brazilian terrorist Carlos Marighella's "Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla." These and other chilling and revealing writings make it abundantly clear that from the terrorist perspective the war is unceasing.

Terrorists' short-term objectives are to wrest political concessions from governments through publicity and through the psychological impact of assaults and taking hostages. Eventually, they hope to topple democratic governments and to replace them either with anarchy or with governments deemed suitable by the terrorists, which usually means putting themselves in power.

Terrorism victimizes civilians as well as military personnel. For years—from the Rules of Engagement and Laws of Land Warfare to the Geneva Conventions—international efforts have been made to establish vital differences between the citizen and the soldier. One of the soldier's primary responsibilities is to protect the citizen in time of war. In "humanitarian" wars, churches and hospitals are not bombed, and civilians are protected. One frightening aspect of terrorism is that these rules no longer apply, and terrorists are specifically targeting civilians to attain the maximum psychological and political impact. Recent examples range from the murder of two Americans and the torture of two others on a Kuwaiti airline, to Leon Klinghoffer's murder on board the hijacked *Achille Lauro*.

\*In Part 1, which was published in the January issue, Commander Derrer discussed the policymaking, strategic, and tactical problems posed by international terrorism. He also provided an analysis of the psychological effects of terrorism—both on target groups and on individuals.

Terrorism should be regarded as conventional warfare, although terrorists do not play by conventional rules. This usually leaves the United States unprepared when their assaults occur. Such unpreparedness is partly a product of our perspective. International laws and historical precedents guide the conduct of warfare, trying to make it a "manly contest," a "fair fight," or a "just war." Terrorists ignore all that, and, worse yet, flaunt it. Something about this strikes one as unfair, frustrating, and infuriating. "Stand up and fight, you cowards!" some want to scream, and others have.

These are not new problems for us. We have been on both sides of guerrilla warfare. We were the victims of it from the beginning in Vietnam. The enemy fought, ambushed, and sabotaged by night, and disappeared into the villages by day. Guerrillas were frequently hard to discern from civilians. Although this continued to be a problem for us, accepting that this type of guerrilla warfare was "conventional" in this setting, and doing battle accordingly, made life a little easier. But long before Vietnam, Americans changed the tactics of warfare during the Revolutionary War, by wearing buckskin for concealment and shooting from behind trees for cover, while the British wore bright red coats and formed their troops into hollow squares in the open. Back then, we were called "unfair" and "cowardly." But the American tactics prevailed. Not only did we win our independence, but we changed the way wars were fought.

Terrorism and guerrilla warfare are doing the same thing now. What was once regarded as unconventional and exceptional is now commonplace. We must change our perspective with the times. The Israelis have regarded terrorism as declared, conventional warfare for years.

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## TERRORISM, PART II...Continued

Therefore, they have a psychological and strategic advantage because they can plan and make decisions based on this perspective. They have a clear, well-coordinated policy and a defined response to terrorist incidents. The Israelis are seldom surprised or unprepared when incidents occur. Such a perspective would have practical advantages for us as well. As examples, it would help us decide whether families should go overseas to certain areas, or how much detailed briefing a service member needs before deployment.

Publicity and counter-propaganda, if used effectively, could turn the terrorists' main weapon against them. Continuing publicity about terrorism could alert citizens to the problem, increase their awareness, and show them, pragmatically and specifically, what they can do to prevent terrorism. Publicizing citizens' efforts to combat terrorism could also be effective.

The effects of counter-propaganda, persuasion, and threat can be a powerful force in preventing terrorism. Shortly before the 1984 Olympic games in Los Angeles, the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team displayed some of their spectacular, and mostly secret, tactical capabilities on the network evening news, as if to say, "If you try anything, we're more than ready." Show of force? Deterrence? Saber rattling? Propaganda? Whatever you would care to call it, it seems to have worked. And it showed that the media can be a potent force in countering terrorism.

Although the press has been criticized for being manipulated by terrorists and for serving a supporting function in their propaganda campaign, we must also bear in mind that the press is not subject to the same restraints as the diplomats, negotiators, and intelligence gatherers. At times, the press has been able to obtain valuable, visible information about who has been captured, where they are being held, how they are being treated, and who is in control during the hostages' captivity. The press has gathered intelligence useful to strategists. The press has also been able to bring some comfort to families wondering about the fate, health, and welfare of family members being held hostage. We should all work toward a more balanced perspective of the press and toward a more cooperative working relationship with them. Admittedly, the press can serve the interests of the terrorists, but it can also be a powerful ally in the efforts to control, prevent, and defuse terrorism.

The press has a responsibility to provide an alternative to the picture of terrorism that the terrorists want us to see. Terrorists often portray themselves as "freedom fighters" engaged in a "just cause" against an "evil oppressor." Yet, from a law enforcement view, most terrorists are criminals engaging in illegal acts for their own reward, self-aggrandizement, or other narrow goals.

Even the language of terrorism, which we use unwittingly, tends to affect our thinking about terrorists. When a terrorist kills someone, he calls it an assassination or execution. That terminology is nonsense or Orwellian Newspeak. Only states have the legal power to execute people. Terrorists commit murder. Other terms, too, need to be translated from the distorted terrorist lexicon. "Lib-

erate" is "theft" or, in the case of a country, to "take over by force of arms." "Freedom fighter" or "political prisoner" are euphemisms for "terrorists"; usually, the latter are behind bars. "Political pressure" is nothing more than "extortion" and "blackmail." This translation exercise shows us why the FBI regards terrorists as criminals and seeks to prosecute them under federal racketeering statutes. Counter-propaganda, through appropriate publicity by the press, could be a powerful tool in providing an alternative picture of terrorists and their methods.

**Crucial Factors in Preventing and Countering Terrorism:** Psychological approaches are needed to understand and to counter the special problems presented by terrorism. Human beings—not military hardware or commando strike teams—most often have to deal with or attempt to counter terrorists. Those persons include the alert citizens who are willing to help, the hostages who are trying to survive their ordeal, or those who are responsible for negotiating with the terrorists.

In spite of increased publicity and public interest during the hijacking of TWA Flight-847, we still find ourselves dealing with a variety of lingering psychological issues in order to develop an effective counterterrorism strategy. When an incident is over, public attention wanes quickly. Psychological denial reasserts itself; most people would rather not think about the problem, and they try to reassure themselves that such an incident will never happen to them. There is widespread non-involvement and lack of responsibility. The responsibility for dealing with terrorism is usually shifted to others, who are regarded as specialists. These specialists, in turn, are often secretive with their newly gained information and knowledge, so that the rest of the people are uninformed and unprepared when the next incident occurs.

Training and awareness programs are necessary at all levels of military commands (and for civilians as well) to ensure that everyone understands that terrorism will not just go away. It is crucial to motivate people to maintain alertness to the problem. Knowledge and preparation are the best defenses—and the best survival tactics, if needed—in the effort to prevent and defuse terrorism. They are cost-effective and inexpensive skills that all hands can possess.

**Awareness:** Aside from the media stories about each terrorist incident, there should be wide dissemination of practical information to all citizens, military and civilian. Some information should, appropriately, be classified, but the "exclusion" effect must not continue. All citizens are potential victims of foreign or domestic terrorists; therefore, they all have a need to know as much as possible, to help them deal with the problem. Citizen awareness and concern can be extremely useful in preventing terrorism.

**Acceptance:** Terrorism is here to stay. It can impact on the individual; it does not always happen to the other person. All of us have the responsibility to help counter this threat; it is not just the specialists' job. Such acceptance reduces denial and increases one's willingness to take responsibility to fight this scourge.

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## TERRORISM, PART II...Continued

Knowledge gives power over helplessness. Knowing the dangers of terrorism and what to do to avoid them can be vital. The protective strategies of "be alert, be unpredictable, and keep a low profile" can save lives. And they should have. In 1985, there were a number of assaults that should not have killed or injured Americans, including the following:

► February 1985: The National Front placed a time bomb in an Athens bar that was popular with American service members. Fifty-seven soldiers and their dependents were injured, and 13 were airlifted to Wiesbaden, Germany, for special burn treatment.

► April 1985: Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the bomb detonated in a Madrid bar frequented by American and Spanish personnel from Torrejon Air Force Base. Eighteen Spaniards were killed, and 15 Americans were injured.

► June 1985: A machine gun assault by the Faribundo Martí National Liberation Front in a San Salvador bar that was popular with American servicemen killed four Marines and two American businessmen; in all, 13 were killed and more than 15 were injured.

Did you notice the phrase "popular with Americans"? If we know the bars where our fellow Americans hang out overseas, it is certain the terrorists do, too. They will know where to find us when they want us. And they did. Avoiding such clustering is a basic principle of personal protection and preventing terrorist assault.

Most of these attacks would not have happened if these Americans had known and followed some simple rules. Had they never been briefed on the principles of personal protection? Did they ignore them? Were they unaware of the danger? How many more Americans will have to be assaulted, hijacked, tortured, or killed before most citizens and certainly all military personnel are completely aware of the dangers of terrorism and thoroughly schooled in how to prevent, avoid, or cope with terrorists?

Crisis has a specific psychology, structure, and procedure. People can learn what to do about a bomb threat, an attack, or a hostage taking. A massive, full-scale education and training campaign for all military personnel, their dependents, and deployed civilians could be the least expensive and most effective weapon in the arsenal for countering terrorism. Research has shown that personnel with such training cope more effectively and are less stressed by crises than those without. The knowledge and methods are available. But they will be useless unless taught to the widest possible audience.

Public support is created by awareness, acceptance, and knowledge. In U. S. neighborhoods across the country an approach called Crime Stoppers has had dramatic success in reducing crime. With proper training, citizens have become alert to suspicious behavior, to surveillance, to "approaches," and through improved understanding of and relations with police have mounted a major effort that works against crime. Such an approach could readily be transplanted to military bases at home and abroad so that all personnel could become the eyes and ears of security in combating both crime and terrorism.

The keys are proper training, creating a climate of con-

cern, and fostering a sense of personal responsibility about the welfare of others. Overcoming the "bystander syndrome" can be difficult. That concept derived from a 1960s psychological investigation of the reasons why 32 neighbors stood by their windows in Queens, New York, while an assailant outside took half an hour to murder Kitty Genovese. No one called the police or went to her aid in any way. Clearly, there was diffusion of responsibility: "It's not my job"; "Someone else has called the police"; "I don't want to get involved."

If Crime Stopper programs can be effective against criminals by helping citizens to become aware, knowledgeable, and willing to get involved, the same approach can be applied to preventing and disrupting terrorists. The following two examples illustrate the effective impact of alert and responsible citizens in countering terrorism.

On 4 April 1980, a woman in Evanston, Illinois, became suspicious of some people in jogging suits crossing her yard and loading what appeared to be bags of sports equipment into a van. She was suspicious because it was late at night, the joggers were fat, and they smoked cigarettes. She alerted police, who investigated and subsequently arrested the joggers. The so-called joggers were fat because they were wearing combat fatigues under their jogging suits. The "sports equipment" being loaded into the van was actually a supply of weapons, ammunition, and explosives. These "joggers" were members of the notorious Puerto Rican terrorist group, the Armed Forces for National Liberation (FALN), that was about to make an extensive series of assaults and bombings in various U. S. cities. Among those arrested were Manuel Torres and his wife, two of the group's ringleaders. The alert lady in Evanston should be decorated! With a simple act of awareness and concern, she was responsible for preventing single-handedly what could have been much loss of life and destruction of property, and for causing a major disruption in the activities of a dangerous and deadly terrorist group.

Similarly, in Nyack, New York, in October 1981, a Brinks robbery took place that resulted in the deaths of several policemen and Brinks guards and the theft of \$1.6 million. Here again, alert citizens felt a sense of responsibility and were willing to get involved. They provided the police with eyewitness accounts and information that led to the capture of most of those terrorists and the recovery of the money. An FBI investigation proceeding on leads from concerned citizens showed that this was a combined operation involving several notorious domestic terrorist groups, including the Weather Underground, the Black Liberation Army, and the United Freedom Front. Furthermore, the FBI was able to link together a number of robberies that had been perpetrated by this network of terrorist groups. The combination of the arrests and the recognition of joint efforts of terrorists working in concert dealt a telling blow to domestic terrorism.

Even a small amount of citizen support and involvement can have a major impact. Non-involvement is tantamount to passive support of terrorism. People can be powerful if they accept that the responsibility for security and protection belongs to us all, and is not someone else's job. This

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# New terrorist tactics leave airports helpless

by Tana de Zulueta, Rome, Roy Isacowitz, Tel Aviv, and Richard Bassett, Vienna

DESPITE explicit warnings that a terrorist attack on civilian airports in Europe would take place this Christmas, there was little the security forces of either Austria or Italy could have done to stop the attacks on Friday morning which killed 15 and injured more than 120.

Admiral Fulvio Martini, the head of Italy's military secret services, gave a warning in mid-December of an imminent attack on a European target. "I am extremely worried. There are a number of indications that an attack in Italy will take place this month," Martini said. The Italian police reported that "after Malta (the hijacking in which 59 passengers died), Italy will be next".

Dutch security services issued a warning in late December that there would be an attack on "a civilian airport in Europe over Christmas". Israeli intelligence informed European and American intelligence agencies at the beginning of December that there was an imminent danger of Palestinian attacks on European and American civilian targets.

Interpol gave warning that civilian airports in western Europe might be a holiday terrorist target. The United States Federal Aviation Ad-

ministration said that it had told airports and airlines to be prepared for the possibility of increased terrorist attacks.

The Italian authorities took the warnings seriously and increased police checks on railways, ports and the country's main airports. But the attack on Friday at 9am took them by surprise. Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, the minister of the interior, said on Friday that the technique of that attack was "completely new".

He said: "The police did not expect an attack on an airport to be staged from the city, from Italian soil. We expected it to come from an incoming plane."

Intelligence and police officials held an emergency meeting at Rome airport yesterday in an attempt to work out what they should have done to foil the terrorists. Their depressing conclusion was that their security had been just about as good as it could be.

In Vienna, however, security at the airport may have been slightly less vigilant. A spokesman for the opposition People's Party yesterday called for a

thorough review of policing at the airport.

There have been criticisms that the elite Austrian anti-terrorist unit, Cobra, panicked when the terrorists opened fire and that El Al security personnel were the first to react. But Lieutenant Colonel Alfud Ruft, an airport security expert, denied allegations that his men panicked during the attack.

Two of the injured terrorists, one in Vienna and one in Rome, were under interrogation yesterday and officials hoped they would cast light on who organised the attack and why.

The terrorist in Rome has been identified as Mohammed Sarham, who was born in the Palestinian refugee camp of Chatila in the southern outskirts of Beirut. A message signed by the "Martyrs of Palestine", which is believed to be a front organisation, was found on him.

The three who carried out the the Vienna attack have been identified as Ben Abdullah Saadqoue, 26, who was shot dead, Ben Ahmed Chaoval, 25,

who was wounded in the stomach and is in a serious condition, and Abdel Aziz Merzoughi, 25, who was shot in the chest. Believed to be Lebanese, he is under heavy guard in a Vienna hospital.

A number of organisations, some of them mythical, have claimed responsibility for the attack but it is still unclear who is carried it out. Israeli government officials have put the blame firmly on the Palestine Liberation Organisation headed by Yasser Arafat.

However even their own intelligence agencies disagree. Top of their list of suspects is the Abu Nidal group, which is also believed to be responsible for the plane hijacking in Malta last month. Nidal's organisation is backed by both Syria and Libya.

The Israeli deputy prime minister, David Levy, called for vengeance and said: "These beasts know no borders and we will hit them wherever they are". However, military sources in Tel Aviv do not expect Israel to retaliate militarily, and not with the massive force with which it devastated the PLO headquarters in Tunis in October. The problem is, the officials said, that the terrorists do not have a home address.

## STATE POLICE DESCRIBE CHECKS ON FOREIGNERS

AU311343 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 31 Dec 86 p 12

[Special Report]

[Text] Vienna -- It was most likely only their original Tunisian passports, presumably issued in false names, that saved the three terrorists who carried out the bloody attack at Vienna's Schwechat Airport on last Friday from early discovery. This is because a special detachment of Vienna's state police visits Vienna's hotels day and night in search of suspicious foreigners as well as Austrians. "Every day a few people are caught," the state police say.

Some two dozen officers daily inspect at random all hotels and boarding houses. More precisely, they check the registration books which all newly arrived guests must enter

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



OFFICIAL ON TERRORISTS USING BERLIN CHECKPOINT

DW141117 Bonn DIE WELT in German 14 Jan 86 p 1

[Report by "W.K.": "Berlin Checkpoint: 'A Loophole for Terrorists'"]

[Text] Bonn -- Federal General Prosecutor Kurt Rebmann has called the Berlin checkpoint of Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse a loophole for terrorists. At that "checkpoint" "infiltration can easily be accomplished, especially if terrorists state they are merely people seeking asylum," Rebmann said in an interview with the magazine WELTBILD. Entrance to West Berlin via the "GDR" Schoenefeld Airport and Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse is "comfortable and practically without risk," said the federal general prosecutor. Answering a question about controls or restrictions on the part of the "GDR," Rebmann said: "I cannot say anything about it because of the talk of detailed information. However, the GDR is certainly interested in impairing the stability of our state in this way."

ETA TERRORISTS CLAIM CREDIT FOR RECENT ATTACKS

PA251309 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1229 GMT 25 Dec 85

[Text] Today the terrorist Basque organization ETA made phone calls to various news organs of the Basque region to claim credit for the 23 December attack in Pamplona on retired Civil Guard General Juan Atares Pena. In a communique, ETA also claims credit for three attacks carried out between 26 November and 13 December against Civil Guard units. ETA has claimed that the 26 November assault on a Civil Guard convoy in Altube was carried out with grenades, grenade launchers, and included a machinegun attack on motorized units.

ETA also claimed credit for the machinegunning and killing in Mondragon (Guipuzcoa) of a civil guard, about whom it gave no further details, and for the attack with grenade-launchers and a booby-traps on a Civil Guard barracks in Izarra (Alave).

CUNNING...Continued

the telephone, in his car or in his helicopter via police radio, on his way to work via a special signalling device, and on holidays via a Eurosignal receiver or short-wave radio.

"You're constantly on edge", Becker explained, "hoping that nothing has happened. Although it may sound paradoxical, the signalling devices calm me down in the knowledge that everything's OK as long as they don't bleep."

Starting on 2 January Becker will again turn to more "regular" police activities.

The change at the top of this department, however, overshadows a problem

which Becker was unable to solve during his period in office.

Abu Nidal, the rival of the head of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, would appear to be increasingly pursuing his own political course. The renewed links between the RAF and left-wing extremist Palestinian commandos (as in the seventies) suggest that the Federal Republic of Germany may yet again have selected as an arena of terrorist activity.

Abu Nidal, who, according to the latest reports, is disabled and often conducts terrorists operations sat in a wheelchair, and the RAF have one main common enemy: the United States and its military installations, including those on German territory.

*Werner Kahl*

(Die Welt, Bonn, 30 December 1985)







## ABU NIDAL...Continued

bloody suppression of the Palestinian fedayeen in September 1970, a deep hatred for the Hashemites. It was during these years as well that he also began to develop links with other radical Palestinian groups committed to the use of international terror. He may also have maintained ties with Fatah's own terrorist arm, Black September. By 1971 he had been appointed PLO representative in Baghdad. It is here that he became intrigued with the radical approach of the Iraqi Ba'th and more disillusioned with what he perceived to be establishment PLO policies.

By 1973 the stage was set for a formal break with Arafat and Fatah. Several events seemed to converge to push him away from Fatah. At a time when Fatah was beginning to limit its involvement in international terrorism, Abu Nidal was just getting started — carrying out attacks against the Saudi embassy in Paris and an attempted hijacking at the Rome airport. He had been greatly influenced by the earlier activities of Black September, and became convinced that transnational terrorism had to play a central role in Palestinian strategy.

At about the same time, the October 1973 war and the possibilities of movement on the diplomatic front had prompted Arafat to begin cultivating a more respectable international image and to adopt a more flexible political program. Abu Nidal vehemently opposed any tempering of the PLO's commitment to the armed struggle and felt excluded from the diplomatic and political world in which the PLO began to operate. He was not alone in his opposition. This tactical shift in Fatah's policies created a real dilemma for those in the movement committed to the PLO's maximalist goals. In 1974, George Habbash's PFLP temporarily left the PLO's executive committee to protest what it saw as Arafat's accommodationist policies.

Unlike Habbash, however, Abu Nidal did not return. That year the break with Arafat became final amidst accusations that Abu Nidal was implicated in a plot to eliminate Fatah's top leadership, although Abu Nidal claims that the rift was triggered by Fatah's campaign to kill its own people. Abu Nidal was tried and sentenced to death in absentia. The break with Arafat was now complete and a vendetta sworn against Fatah that would become a

key component of Abu Nidal's *raison d'être*.

For the next nine years, Abu Nidal would operate out of three Middle Eastern capitals — Baghdad, Damascus, and Tripoli, not coincidentally regimes that were in the forefront of opposition to any Arab-Israeli accommodation. For the Iraqis, with whom he cooperated closely until they broke with him and expelled him in the early 1980s, he offered a useful tool in their campaign against their arch-rival Syria. In fact, after the Syrian move into Lebanon in June 1976, Abu Nidal adopted the name Black June as a cover for his anti-Syrian activities — undertaking attacks against a range of Syrian and Palestinian targets.

For the Syrians, with whom he still maintains ties, Abu Nidal became an asset in Assad's efforts to pressure Jordan and the PLO. As Arafat's dialogue with Jordan's King Hussein intensified, so did Abu Nidal's anti-PLO and Jordanian activities. In 1983, Abu Nidal's organization was thought to have been involved in the assassination of Issam Sartawi, the PLO's leading advocate of accommodation with Israel; he is also thought to have been involved in the murder of Fahd Qawasmeh, a moderate West Bank mayor deported by the Israelis. This attack, occurring in broad daylight in a residential area of Amman, was doubtless intended as a not-so-subtle message to King Hussein that there would be a price to pay for ignoring Damascus' interests on Arab-Israeli issues. Throughout 1985, Abu Nidal continued to attack Jordanian diplomats and airline facilities.

Finally, for Libya, with whom he has been strengthening ties since mid-1984, Abu Nidal became another hit man for Khadafy's terror squads. His choice of an Egyptian airliner in the recent Malta hijacking and recent operations in Europe coincide with Libya's support for international terrorism. Indeed a look at Abu Nidal's recent operations — culminating in the December 1985 attacks in Rome and Vienna suggest that he has — while not severing his Syrian connection — brought his tactics into closer alignment with Libyan interests. In a September 1985 interview in Kuwait he claimed to fully support Egypt's Revolutionaries, a group that has claimed responsibility for killing Israeli diplomats in Cairo. Such operations coincide with Libya's goal of embarrassing Mubarak and creating tension between Israel and Egypt.

But what of Abu Nidal's goals and objectives? What does he hope to

achieve and what do his patrons hope to gain?

In following Abu Nidal's trail over the past decade, one fact is unmistakable. The violence and terror he advocates is not directed at any achievable political goal. While Abu Nidal pursues tactical ends — publicity, intimidation — he does not seek to see or a state in his lifetime or even in that of his children. For him the struggle against Zionism and all of its supporters is timeless and all of its without regard for accommodation, compromise, or negotiation. "The Arab homeland is for me more than a crime," Abu Nidal asserted last fall. "For me it would be a crime if we permitted the Zionists to leave our homeland alive." It is here, in a world of grievances that can never be addressed, of injustices that can never be righted and of unending vengeance that Abu Nidal operates — impervious and opposed to all forms of accommodation or moderation.

Within this view of revolution and terrorism, however, Abu Nidal has pursued two basic objectives. First, he has sought to challenge Fatah, and Arafat in particular, by maintaining that he is the legitimate heir to Fatah's original policies. Much of the ideological rationalization for his policies rests on his accusations that Arafat is deviating from the principles of the total destruction of the "Zionist entity" and the pursuit of true Arab unity.

It would be misleading, however, to suggest that Abu Nidal's only enemy is Arafat and the Israelis. Coincident with his total opposition to the Arab establishment is his virulent hostility to "bourgeois and pro-imperialist" Arab regimes whom he views as corrupt and venal. Although Jordan is a particular object of his hatred, Hussein is not alone. "My enemies are the slovenly and chaotic states of our Arab society, as well as the suppression and seduction of our young generation," Abu Nidal recently declared. Like other Arab revolutionaries of the 1950s and 1960s, Abu Nidal places a high premium on the importance of overthrowing these regimes as a prerequisite to Arab unity and thus the liberation of Palestine.

Abu Nidal, however, does not exist in a vacuum and it is crucial to understand the intra-Arab and international environment in which he operates. In a sense it is this Arab and international support that elevates

## ABU NIDAL...

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ABU NIDAL...Continued

him from the garden-variety terrorist to the transnational terrorist league in which he plays. The Arab states that have backed Abu Nidal-Iraq at one time, Syria and now Libya — and the East Europe bloc nations did not create him; he is not simply a kind of Palestinian or "have Kalashnikov, will travel." Nonetheless, the support these states provide is vital to the effectiveness of his operations. While there is clearly a transnational terrorist network from which a man like Abu Nidal could benefit, his ability to operate and survive for over a decade and a half is directly linked to the assistance he derives from external sources.

The Libyan connection is only the latest of Abu Nidal's tactical alliances, and it's no coincidence that the states that have most actively supported Abu Nidal over the past 10 years are those that have historically been most opposed to reconciliation with Israel. They have also at one time or another been involved in major confrontations with those moderate states — Egypt and Jordan — that have been pushing for peace with Israel. It is also these states that have been most adept at using terror not only in the Arab arena but abroad as well in the service of their own goals. Although Abu Nidal's Arab support is thus relatively tightly circumscribed, there was always a market for his services. When Arab states' interests and behavior shift, as in the case of Iraq in the early 1980s or in the case of Syria, 1984-1985, Abu Nidal moves on to another patron. Thus, it is possible for Abu Nidal operatives to train in the Bekaa Valley and yet be given false passports, money, and weapons by Libya.

The lessons drawn from studying Abu Nidal and his world are not heartening ones. Indeed the consistency and effectiveness of his operations lead to the conclusion that his brand of terrorism is likely to remain a permanent feature of the Middle East's political landscape. Even more sobering is the recognition that Abu Nidal's terror has become very much a permanent fixture of shifting rivalries between Arab regimes. He remains effective because he is willing and able to provide services for a variety of patrons.

Nonetheless, in the end there are limits to what Abu Nidal can hope to achieve. He represents no constituency with any real power; he can never achieve anything positive for Palestinians. He can only destroy and intimidate until he himself is de-

LOS ANGELES TIMES

7 January 1986 Pg. 10

## Abu Nidal's Kin Live Quietly on West Bank

By DAN FISHER, Times Staff Writer

NABLUS, Israeli-Occupied West Bank—Youssef Banna doesn't go around boasting about his infamous relative, Abu Nidal. But he doesn't try to hide the relationship, either.

"With the Israelis, whoever walks a straight line has no problems," the 53-year-old merchant told two visitors to his small fabric shop here Monday. "All I do is go from the house to the shop, the shop to the house."

Youssef Banna is a cousin of Sabri Banna, who, under the *nom de guerre* Abu Nidal, has captured the limelight as one of the world's most notorious terrorists.

Abu Nidal's renegade Palestinian group is blamed by the United States and Israel for the murderous Dec. 27 airport attacks in Rome and Vienna and for the Nov. 23 hijacking to Malta of an EgyptAir jetliner en route from Athens to Cairo. Fifteen travelers died in the grenade and automatic weapons assaults on the Rome and Vienna airport counters of El Al Israel Airlines, and 60 people died in the course of the Malta hijacking.

### Quiet, Prosperous Lives

While Abu Nidal, whose whereabouts are not known, hatches plots against Israel and anyone who befriends this country, shopkeeper Youssef Banna and about 60 of the terrorist's other relatives live quiet and, in at least some cases, prosperous lives here on the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

Abu Nidal's brother, Mohammed Khalil Banna, is a large fruit and fish wholesaler in Nablus who does considerable business with the Israelis and reputedly speaks perfect Hebrew.

Youssef Banna's son, Mirwan, is serving a 30-year jail term in Britain for his role in the attempted assassination in 1982 of Israel's then-ambassador to London, Shlomo Argov. Abu Nidal claimed

stroyed. More like him may follow, but their legacy will not be any more enduring.

responsibility for that attack, which Israel cited as the last straw that led to its invasion a few days later of Lebanon to crush what it called a Palestinian "state within a state" in the southern part of that country.

However, most of the terrorist's relatives here, like most other West Bank Palestinians, say they have little sympathy for Abu Nidal's politics.

"Everybody is entitled to his own views," said Youssef Banna in an interview. However, he added: "I don't think (Abu Nidal's) way is fruitful. There is no better way than peace."

"He's not very loved here on the West Bank because he's acting against the Arabs and against Arafat," said the shopkeeper's 19-year-old son, Majid.

Until recently, Abu Nidal's followers have been more notorious for their attacks against Arab leaders whom they consider too moderate than for their actions against Israel. An early ally of Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat, Abu Nidal broke openly with the Palestinian mainstream in 1974 and was sentenced to death in absentia by the PLO.

### Many Negative Opinions

Daoud Koutab, managing editor of the English-language edition of the pro-PLO East Jerusalem newspaper Al Fajr, commented, "The top and the best PLO men have been gunned down by Abu Nidal and his supporters."

"So most people here have a very strong (negative) opinion about him and his actions," Koutab added, "although obviously there is a very tiny minority which, in a way, feels relieved when they hear of any action that is a way of venting their frustrations over the situation that they live in."

The Bannas are among the Palestinian families that have lost the most to the Jewish state.

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to think that between the 1948 and the Libyans, they had it all sewn up."

As a result, "the French would look at a guy, a known terrorist, as he went through their airports and not lift a finger," the official said.

and in exchange terrorists would come and go from country 'X' freely," Robert B. Oakley, director of the State Department's counterterrorism office, told National Public Radio.

### KIN...Continued

They had lived in and around Jaffa, on the Mediterranean coast, for 400 years before the 1948 Arab-Israeli war after the U.N. partition of Palestine. The family prospered in the textile and fruit-exporting businesses.

They left Jaffa "of our own will" as the 1948 fighting raged, Youssef Banna recalled. "We thought we were leaving only for a week. So we took only blankets and mattresses and a few basic things."

He was 16 at the time, the shopkeeper said. The future Abu Nidal (the name means "father of the struggle" in Arabic) was 11.

The Bannas scattered throughout the Middle East. There were about 500 in the clan in 1948, Youssef Banna said. His branch and that of Abu Nidal were among those who came to Nablus. "It's the best town," the shopkeeper said. "It's the biggest, and we knew the merchants here."

Youssef Banna said he has not seen his notorious cousin for 25 years or more. But he recalls no early signs that the youth would become a hunted terrorist. "No, no,

no," he replied when asked if Abu Nidal had been an angry young man. "He was a very ordinary man—very calm."

Abu Nidal went to Saudi Arabia to work in the late 1950s and began his political activity there.

### **News From the Radio**

Youssef Banna said the family has no knowledge of Abu Nidal's whereabouts or his state of health. "We know about him only from the radio," he said.

It is known that Abu Nidal gave an interview to the West German magazine *Der Spiegel* in Libya last fall, and Israeli and U.S. officials believe that he is still there, drawing his primary logistical support from the Tripoli regime. Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi said Sunday that Abu Nidal is not currently in Libya but that he visits there frequently.

For himself, Youssef Banna concedes that he still dreams about returning to Jaffa. "Everybody wants to go back to his homeland," he said. "But in general, I am satisfied here."

His main wish, he said, is that his 23-year-old son Mirwan be released from prison. "I could die any day, and I want him with me," the merchant said.



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# Athens Airport Spins a High-Tech Security Web

By RALPH BLUMENTHAL  
Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, April 12 — From the cafe deck of Hellenikon Airport, Greece's top security official was pointing out some of the Government's latest anti-terrorism measures when a visitor noticed that the roof, a public area, freely overlooked a restricted zone. Could not some weapon or other contraband be dropped to a confederate below? the guest asked.

The official, Kostas D. Tsimas, considered the question for a moment, then with a snap of his fingers summoned a cluster of hovering assistants. "Put in a glass or a grate here," he ordered. "Anything could be dropped down to someone below."

Responding to acute concern over airport security and smarting from a large decline in the number of American tourists, Greece is zealously seeking to satisfy foreign critics while protesting that it is unjustly being held a scapegoat.

With some qualifications, it has succeeded. Western diplomats and airline officials agree that many security gaps have been plugged since the hijacking last year of a Trans World Airlines plane out of Athens and other terrorist attacks focused attention on the Athens airport.

## 'The Human Factor' in Security

On the other hand, the officials note that 90 percent of proper security is not technology but what they call "the

human factor" — the alertness and motivation of the staff — and that lapses still occur. Armored police cars, for example, guard the airport entrance and tarmac, but the militiamen inside are sometimes lounging half-asleep.

Officials who led a tour of the airport security system described some of the new security measures:

¶A recent increase in the total security force from 1,000 to 1,500, including members of an elite commando unit called T.A.E.

¶A better perimeter fence, new X-ray equipment and metal detectors, closed-circuit cameras and improved training and scheduling for operators.

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## TIME

14 April 1986

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# High-Technology Threats

Noel Koch, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, recently left his Pentagon office toting an overnight bag and rode to Washington's National Airport. Koch breezed through three airport metal detectors and into the departure lounge. That was as far as he planned to go. Inside his carry-on bag, Koch had concealed a 9-mm handgun that weighs only 23 oz. and is made partly of superhardened plastic. When disassembled, the Austrian-made weapon, known as the Glock 17, does not look like a firearm. Only its barrel, slide and springs, which are metal, show up on airport scanners. The polymer handgrip, trigger guard and ammunition clip that complete its profile as a gun do not set off the security devices.

High-technology weapons have created a terrifying dilemma for airport officials in their war against terrorists. Already, new guns made entirely of plastic are being developed. Easily concealable handguns like the Glock, along with hard-to-detect components for putty-like explosives that are also readily available, give air pirates an edge that officials are finding increasingly difficult to counter. The Federal Aviation Administration, which oversees domestic airport security, insists that the Glock 17, which is legally sold in the U.S., can be detected on existing airport X-ray machines. The gun's manufacturer attributes Koch's success in "smuggling" it to human error, not a system deficiency.

Firearms are only one of the tools of terrorism that have become more sophisticated. Security devices at airports are intended to spot weapons that could be used by hijackers. But Brian Jenkins, a terrorism expert with the Rand Corp., a think tank in Santa Monica, Calif., warns that the machines cannot identify bombs like the one planted aboard the TWA plane last week. Says he: "Explosives are made out of organic material. They won't set off a metal detector, nor do they have any distinguishing silhouette. It's a blob and can be of

any shape." A bomb detonator can be as slim as a pencil, and a timer no more conspicuous than a travel alarm. Plastic explosives can be concocted from a wide variety of chemical formulas and take many forms, ranging from string on a package to sheets of paper. For all the refinements in new bombs, he believes, there is still a tried-and-true defense. Says Jenkins: "The best explosive-detection system has four legs and a cold nose."

Israel's state airline, El Al, which sets the world standard for security, relies mainly on people, rather than machines, to spot danger. El Al's thoroughness sometimes infuriates passengers, who must endure a check-in ritual that includes hand searches of carry-on luggage, minute scrutiny of passports and rigorous quizzing of passengers about the contents of their luggage. Result: El Al can boast that none of its planes has been hijacked since 1968.

But such counterterror tactics conflict sharply with what one Italian airport official calls the "commercial philosophy" of Western airlines. Says an Interior Ministry official in Rome: "A commercial airport is asked to give tourists a pleasant, welcoming image. Is this consonant with stripping passengers, body checks and shaking out their clothes?" Such inconveniences on the ground may be the price that travelers pay for peace of mind in the air.


Some countries have responded to the recent spate of terrorist hijackings by deploying heavily armed guards and armored vehicles at airports. Although

reluctant to discuss what other safety measures have been taken to meet new threats, airline officials insist that both detection technology and security personnel are under constant review. Explains Pan Am Spokesman James Arey: "The terrorists out there use every nugget of information to help develop their master plan." Some insiders, however, are skeptical. An Alitalia pilot believes that terrorist attacks galvanize airport security police into only temporary vigilance. "That lasts about a week," he complains. Too often, the normal lax checking procedures creep back in soon afterward.



Bomb detector at work in Rome airport





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FGIAI/DD -



## JEFFERSON AND THE BARBARIANS / JOEL S. SORKIN

'THE PIRATICAL ENSIGNS  
OF MAHOMET'

**I**F HISTORY is any guide, the Reagan Administration's effort to mobilize support in Europe for a war on terror is doomed to failure. Thomas Jefferson and John Adams had the same idea, but it did not work.

The first time Islamic fundamentalists hijacked an American-flag ship was in October 1784, when Morocco captured a Philadelphia merchant brig named *Betsey* and her 11 crewmen. Coming five months after Congress signed the final draft of the peace treaty that ended the Revolution, the attack on the *Betsey* was the first war-like act against the new nation.

To manage the crisis Congress delegated its three senior diplomats, who were stationed in Paris at the time: Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams. Since Dr. Franklin was old, soon to sail for home and retirement, the burden fell on Adams and Jefferson.

Both men agreed that the hijacking was barbaric. They also agreed that without the collusion of the corrupt European monarchies, the so-called "Barbary Pirates" could not exist. It was no secret that the Old World powers, in order to protect their own commercial fleets from attack, paid

tribute to the Mussulmen who claimed sovereignty over the Mediterranean; that they gave "presents"—enormous quantities of money, and the armaments with which the Barbary brigands carried out their savage attacks. The deys, beys, and bashaws of North Africa had to get their weapons somewhere; what they could not hijack they extorted.

John Adams despised what he called "this Africa system." Above all, this staunch New England abolitionist and grandson of Puritans loathed the pirate powers because they were the bases for slave-raiding caravans into the African interior. In high dudgeon, Adams wrote, "Never, never will the slave trade be abolished while Christian princes abase themselves before the piratical ensigns of Mahomet."

Still, as a practical man, a lawyer and friend to Boston's merchants, he pressed the business line in his arguments with Jefferson. He counseled appeasement—specifically, meeting the Moroccan emperor's demand for ransom and tribute. Realistically, America had no money to go to war against him. There was no navy; all armed vessels had been sold off or scrapped when peace came. There was, finally, no sentiment for war. The country was floundering in war debt already, and tribute was cheaper.

Jefferson disagreed. After the *Betsey's* capture, he warned Congress against meeting Morocco's demands, for "an insult unpunished is the parent of others"—a general aphorism he deduced from a prolonged study of Barbary piracy. Jefferson had foreseen trouble in Barbary: He had read histories of the problem, and consulted with other ambassadors in Paris on their countries' approach to the brigandage. It was his conclusion, a month before he read in a newspaper of the loss of an American vessel, that the only solution for America in the event of hostilities was a navy. He calculated six frigates were needed.

But Adams's counsel prevailed. To free the 11 hostages, Congress promised the emperor "presents." Captain Erwin and his ten crewmen were freed after nine months.

*Barbary Gratitude*

**T**WO WEEKS later, Jefferson's aphorism came to horrid life when cruisers from Algiers captured two American ships, taking 21 hostages. Jefferson wrote to Nathanael Greene that the outrage "left the faculties of my mind absolutely suspended between indignation and impotence."

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

*Mr. Sorkin is completing a book and a screenplay on the Barbary Wars.*

STRIKE FORCE...Continued

security interests. Western nations must integrate their efforts and resources to better deal with the diverse terrorist groups that appropriate the world's stage to act out grievances and dramatize causes. The collective use of military force against terrorism, or states that

support such violence, is an issue that can no longer be ignored or dealt with privately. Sooner or later, it will be necessary for the free world, as a collective, united body, to confront terrorists militarily. To do this effectively requires the creation of a multinational counterterrorism strike force.



Again he argued for force. Pointing to European history, he demonstrated that while tribute was cheaper than war in the short term, it was not in the long, for once begun, "extortion" would continue at an ever escalating rate. Above all, he rejected negotiations with the kidnappers because "it is humiliating to treat with these enemies of the human race."

In 1790, as the first Secretary of State, Jefferson reported to Congress on the situation in the Mediterranean, the plight of the hostages now five years in Algiers, and his considered opinion that the United States needed a navy. In 1792, with President Washington's approval, he wrote to John Paul Jones, still in Europe, to see about hiring a fleet of armed vessels to sail against Algiers. Jones died in Paris two weeks before the letter arrived. A year later, Jefferson had to close out his tenure in office with a report to Congress on a catastrophe: Algiers had struck again, capturing 11 U.S. vessels, with 119 carried into slavery.

In the next session of Congress, debate was intense. The country had been without a navy since independence. Southern interests argued that piracy was a concern of the insurance companies, not the Federal Government. The North threatened secession: Without a navy to guard its ships, it was ruined. James Monroe, Jefferson's protégé, argued on the floor of the

House in Philadelphia that "American vessels were being kicked and cuffed about the ocean by ships flying the Crescent of the Prophet."

Finally, six ships were commissioned (Jefferson's strategic number of a decade before), but before they could be completed and launched against Algiers, the appeasers succeeded in negotiating ransom and tribute with the dey. On July 13, 1796, 85 emaciated Americans staggered out of Algiers's dungeons, survivors of an original 131, many of whom had died of plague, starvation, and beatings.

### *The Shores of Tripoli*

**S**OON AFTER their liberation the American Government signed similar treaties of tribute with Tunis and Tripoli. For Algiers, the U.S. Government built, gratis, a fully outfitted frigate, which was shipped to Algiers in the same months Americans were bragging that they would pay "millions for defense but not one cent for tribute" (to France).

Jefferson took office as President in March 1801. Two months later in Tripoli the United States Consulate was sacked by a mob. The reigning bashaw, disgruntled by the size of American tribute and delay in its arrival, declared war. Consul James Cathcart, his wife, and their two small children had to flee for their

lives to the Danish Embassy, where they hid for ten days until they could be smuggled from the city.

Now Jefferson had his chance to practice what he had preached for 15 years. The war lasted the four years of his first term. It began badly. A navy ship, *Philadelphia*, was captured; 307 were taken hostage into Tripoli. The hostages were released and the war ended only when William Eaton of Connecticut—the navy agent to the Barbary States—led a detachment of 11 United States Marines and a thousand mercenary cutthroats (whom Eaton paid with his own money) over six hundred miles of desert to capture the Libyan port of Darna. Eaton's threat to march on "to the shores of Tripoli" itself so terrified the bashaw that he sued for peace and freed the captives. The United States never had trouble with Tripoli again, at least until recently.

Today, a Euro-cynicism of the kind Jefferson encountered still persists, as does self-abasement before the "piratical ensigns of Mahomet." In 1980 the European Community, in its Venice Declaration, legitimized the Palestine Liberation Organization, the premier hijacking agency of the 1970s. Is there any reason to think that six years later Europe has changed?

Thomas Jefferson understood the necessity of going it alone. Under his leadership, the United States did. □



## FOREIGN MEDIA

### ARAB TERRORISTS ADHERE TO DISCIPLINE, SECURITY

Milan EUROPEO in Italian 18 Jan 86 pp 12-13

[Article by Luigi Irdi: "Fire, or You'll Never Get to Heaven!"]

[Text] Qadhdhafi, Syria, the battles between Palestinian guerrilla groups are not enough to explain the attacks on the West. There is also a new messiah involved: the 12th Imam.

You want evidence that we are dealing here with trained professionals and certainly not with random attacks by leaderless guerrilla fighters? Here is some. First, the discipline. The four Palestinian terrorists responsible for the Fiumicino massacre on 27 December had come to Rome from Switzerland at least a month before the attack, unaware of their mission, waiting for orders from home. They had been moving around the city from pensions to trattorias to red-light moviehouses, their pockets filled with dollars, but without ever attracting attention, never unduly noisy, never drunk, never out of line.

Second: their carefully controlled behavior, like real secret agents. They continually swapped passports with one another, the better to cover each one's movements. And on 27 December, the morning of the killings, before heading for Fiumicino airport they performed a meticulous cleanup operation. They eliminated any scrap of handwriting, every telephone number or address jotted down. They destroyed some of their clothing, and removed all labels, acronyms, and brands from their new ones.

Obedience and security. Two days before the slayings they had received their instructions and retrieved their weapons--four Kalashnikov machineguns and 15 hand grenades. Weapons and orders were delivered to the commando right in the middle of Rome, on Via dei Fori Imperiali at the intersection with Via Cavour. With their machineguns and their grenades, the two terrorists dutifully appeared for their appointment with their handler in a Roman hotel, to plan their final moves.

Perhaps it was because the magistrate who interrogated them, Deputy Prosecutor Domenico Sica, with that beard of his, those black eyes, and that olive complexion looked more like an Arab than did his senior. In any case, Mohamed Sharam, the only terrorist to survive the battle of the airport, decided to talk. With his deposition, the magistrate covered as many as 60 pages of transcript. A lot of blue smoke, a little bragging. Amid a spate of inconsequential chatter, Sharam would drop a kernel or two of detail, some small scrap that would round out the overall analysis of Middle East terrorism.

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## ARAB TERRORISTS...Continued

The first question Sica wanted answers to was, of course: Who had ordered the commando to Rome? And who had trained these men? The technique used at Fiumicino airport indicates support from an excellent infrastructure; that is beyond any doubt. But if, as the secret services think, the backstage impresario were a foreign government (Libya, maybe?), Sharam would certainly not be the one to say so. These young feddayin are told only what they absolutely have to know to accomplish their mission: nothing more.

The real name of the group this commando belonged to is still uncertain -- a puzzle the investigators are still trying to piece together. The analysts' first thoughts about Middle East terrorism flew directly to Abu Nidal, the venomous Palestinian who heads Al Fatah's Revolutionary Council and is the sworn enemy of Yasir Arafat. After operating for a while in Iraq, he moved into Syria's Western Intelligence Service, transferred to its headquarters in Tripoli, Libya, in August 1985; currently, he lives there, plotting his activities under the paternal eye of Col Muammar Qadhafi.

On closer examination of Mohamed Sharam's testimony, though, some doubts have begun to surface. Sharam, under questioning, made two statements that grabbed the attention of the Middle East experts. The first: "I belong to the Arab Combat Cells -- in fact, to the October 1 Martyrs' group." The second: "I have seen combat in Lebanon. I am covered with scars. I have fought against the Palestinian guerrillas loyal to that traitor to the Palestinian cause, 'Arafat.'"

How's that again? On 1 October 1985, the Israeli Air Force bombed PLO GHQ in Tunisia, hoping to kill Yasir Arafat into the bargain. If Mohamed Sharam is indeed Abu Nidal's man, something is sorely amiss. Abu Nidal would have rejoiced at Arafat's death, and most certainly would never have named one of his commandos after the 1 October Martyrs.

As for Mohamed's second statement ("I fought in Lebanon against 'Arafat," the experts recall that in 1983, during the internecine war among the Palestinian guerrilla factions, one group stood out for its rabid hatred of Arafat and those loyal to him: the Fatah Rebels, some 2,500 fedayin headed by a "High Command" under Abu Musa. With a military base in the Bekaa Valley and GHQ in Damascus, the Fatah rebels maintain a unit for activities in the West, known as the "Western Sector," and run by Khaled Al Amia. People attached to the Western Sector are routinely sent to get their training in the camps that fell into Syrian hands during the Lebanese conflict: Hamorriye, Doma, Beit Na'im. It is possible, therefore, that Mohamed Sharam himself could have received his training there.

And if that is so, he struck a blow at Abu Nidal, or else Fiumicino delighted Abu Musa's group, which thus far has stayed on the fringes of terrorism, but which, according to close observers, is

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ARAB TERRORISTS...Continued

growing ever more dangerous? One glimpses the shadow of Qadhafi's Libya -- is could it be that of Syria? These are very intricate questions, byzantine in the extremely complicated geography of Middle Eastern terrorism, issues that drive a far broader phenomenon, fully expatiated in recent weeks to the government by Italy's secret services, SISDE and SISMI.

Briefly, their analysis, repeated just a few days ago to Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, is this: After the Iman Ruhollah Khomeyni came to power in Iran, and after the Lebanon conflict, the influence of the populations professing the Shia religion has grown out of all proportion. According to their faith, the Shi'ites are awaiting the coming of the new messiah, the 12th Imam. And they believe that they must prepare for his coming through holy war. They are further convinced that, if there is such a thing as a guaranteed passport to Paradise, it is suicide in battle. There are some Shi'ites for instance, like the guerrillas who, at the wheel of cars packed with nitroglycerine, hurl themselves at Western embassies. The extremely young soldiers in Khomeyni's army who run eagerly to death in battle with their (plastic) keys to paradise hanging around their necks, are Shi'ites, too.

The suicide style is arousing emulation among guerrillas of various religious origins (most of them Palestinians and Sunni Moslems. And Mohamed Sharam has said that he, too, is a Sunni. It is very easy for the most violent military atrocities, the toughest wings of the Palestinian guerrillas, to use this reputation to gain leadership in combat that steadily overshadows any notion of a politico-diplomatic solution.

The new wave of fanaticism (example: one of the terrorists who struck at the Vienna airport, on learning that the attack had produced only one victim, reacted with the words: "It is shameful. I should have preferred to die too") draws its strength from two factors: first, the arrival of a whole generation of Palestinians who have grown up in the refugee camps; second, the readiness of some countries, Libya, Iran, and, in its own way, Syria, to support, finance, and maintain the Islamic army of suicides. For international power ends and strategies or for goals wholly domestic in nature, which already have increasingly less to do with the unresolved question of the Palestinian homeland.





# CURRENT NEWS

## SPECIAL EDITION



5 January 1989 **TERRORISM** No. 1768

THIS PUBLICATION IS PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE (SAF/AA) AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL NEWS ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO SUBSTITUTE FOR NEWSPAPERS, PERIODICALS AND BROADCASTS AS A MEANS OF KEEPING INFORMED ABOUT THE NATURE, MEANING AND IMPACT OF NEWS DEVELOPMENTS. USE OF THESE ARTICLES DOES NOT REFLECT OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT. FURTHER REPRODUCTION FOR PRIVATE USE OR GAIN IS SUBJECT TO THE ORIGINAL COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS.

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ties of the United States shall not impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district (in New York) of: ... [5] other persons invited to the headquarters district by the United Nations ... on official business." Under Section 13, "When visas are required for persons referred to in [Section 11], they shall be granted without charge and as promptly as possible."

As if to drive the point home, Section 6 of Annex 2 to the agreement preserves "the right of the United States to safeguard its own security and completely to control the entrance of aliens into any territory of the United States other than the headquarters district and its immediate vicinity."

The Congress of the US by Joint Resolution on Aug. 4, 1947, adopted this agreement and its annexes into the domestic law of the US.

It is commonplace among lawyers that any simple declaratory sentence in any contract can be construed to be ambiguous. But ambiguities are not resolved by the interpretation of one party. They are resolved by further agreement of both, by a tribunal with the appropriate authority, or by the constituencies to which the contract is addressed. In this case, the ambiguities, if any worthy of attention can be supposed, have been resolved against the US by all its allies except Israel; the vote in the General Assembly was 154 to 2.

In these circumstances, there is more than a substantial question as to whether the secretary of state had the authority to withhold a visa from any party invited by the UN. It seems likely that, if Mr. Arafat were to sue in an American court to require Mr. Shultz to issue the visa which, under American and international law, he seems obliged to issue, he would win.

But he will not sue. Why should he? The effect of the American action has not been to pit the US against the

**The effect of the American action has not been to pit the US against the 'terrorist' Arafat, but against the UN.**

"terrorist" Arafat, but against the UN. Politically, the situation has been turned wholly in favor of the Palestinian radical right and against US influence in the Middle East.

Most distressing is that Shultz could have attacked "terrorism" with far more effect if he had known something of the law.

To Arafat's right in the Palestine Liberation Organization's ruling body are several militia leaders, including Abul Abbas, believed to have ordered the Achille Lauro hijacking, and possibly even directly to have ordered the killing of Leon Klinghoffer. Mr. Abbas and his friends lost considerable ground in the declaration of Nov. 14. The US could have compounded his problems by requesting Algeria to seize him as a criminal.

Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, to which Algeria, the US, Italy, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and just about everybody else is a party, ordering the commission of a "grave breach" is itself a "grave breach." It requires all parties to search out persons accused and try them or extradite them to another party concerned. There is no serious doubt that killing even a surrendered enemy soldier is a "grave breach," and certainly killing a crippled civilian is one. Indeed, even hostage-taking is a "grave breach."

Israel may have its own reasons for considering Abbas to be a common criminal and not a soldier committing "grave breaches." But it is very hard to understand how Italy or Algeria, which regard Arafat's organization as a belligerent against Israel, could deny their legal obligations. The US could easily have demanded that Italy explain why it was not requesting Abbas's extradition from Algeria; he was already convicted in absentia of the Klinghoffer murder. The US could also have demanded that Algeria explain its failure to try or extradite him to Italy or to the United States.

The US does not have a bilateral extradition treaty with Algeria to provide for cooperation in normal criminal matters or to abide by the extradition term of the 1949 Geneva Convention. But that failure does not eliminate the obligation; nor does it relieve Algeria of its obligation to Italy. The International Committee of the Red Cross oversees the conduct of the 1949 conventions and would surely have been interested in the correspondence.

The unfortunate conclusion being drawn by international lawyers worldwide is that the United States is not serious, and that Shultz is either hypocritical, incompetent, or more interested in fighting the UN than in doing something about terrorism or bringing peace to the Middle East.

*Alfred P. Rubin is a professor of international law at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.*

Nightline

WJLA TV

November 3, 1968

11:30 PM

ABC Network

Washington, DC

Exclusive Report: The Hostages in Lebanon

TED KOPPEL: U. S. hostages in Lebanon. Has a chance to make progress toward freeing them been lost.

CONTINUED

TERRY ANDERSON: I've been very close to being released several times over the past two years. But each time it seems

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HOSTAGES...CONTINUED

that U. S. government uses its influence to stop any agreement from being made. And I don't understand this.

KOPPEL: Good evening. I'm Ted Koppel, and this is nightline.

KOPPEL: While the presidential campaign has been capturing the headlines, there's evidence that delicate maneuvers have been underway related to the U.S. hostages.

Tonight, an exclusive report examines what's been happening behind the scenes.

\* \* \*

KOPPEL: These may be unrelated items, but they have a common theme.

A month ago, October 1st, a communique was released in Beirut announcing that a hostage was about to be freed. "This decision is difficult for us," read the communique, "but we will prove our good intentions and our earnestness in this matter."

Two days later Mithelleshwar Singh, an Indian citizen who is a permanent resident of the United States, was set free after twenty months as a hostage.

The next day former Iranian President Bani-Sadr claimed that members of the Bush and Dukakis campaigns had been holding secret talks in Iran to bring about the release of American hostages.

Today, a newspaper in Teheran, normally a very anti-American newspaper, called for the resumption of relations between Iran and the United States.

Our national security correspondent, John McWethy, and a team of ABC News investigators have for weeks been looking into the story of efforts, some official, others far more ambiguous, to bring about the release of U.S. hostages. Here is McWethy's report.

JOHN McWETHY: In the videotape released early this week from the kidnappers of Lebanon, hostage Terry Anderson charged

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CONTINUED

the Reagan Administration had stood in the way of his release.

ANDERSON: I've been very close to being released several times over the last two years. But each time it seems that the U. S. government uses its influence to stop any agreement from being made. And I don't understand this.

McWETHY: President Reagan charged that Anderson was being forced to read that message, that it was designed to influence the U.S. election.

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN: ....that there's never been any interference, and -- nor have we ever been negotiating any more than we would with any other kind of kidnapper on a ransom type of basis.

McWETHY: There is some evidence, however, that in the Reagan Administration's desire not to let the hostages become a major election issue, that opportunities to advance the process may have been lost.

There is growing evidence that some Iranian officials are now looking for ways to put the hostage issue behind them, so the government there can forge new ties with the West, including the United States, ties it badly needs after the devastating eight year war with Iraq.

Mohammed Larijani is one of Iran's Deputy Foreign Ministers.

MOHAMMED LARIJANI: Any country who is ready to deal with Iran based on mutual respect, mutual interests and non-interference, then Iran is ready to deal with them.

McWETHY: One signal from Iran came with the October release of hostage Mithelshwar Singh, a resident alien of the U.S. who is a citizen of India. Iranian officials say they regarded the Singh release as the beginning of a process that could have resulted in more hostages going free.

ABC News has learned that the Singh release came as the result of a confidential exchange between the United States and

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HOSTAGES...CONTINUED

Iran, an exchange that used the Foreign Minister of West Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, as the middle man.

Through this channel Secretary Schultz told Iran that the hostages must be freed if there was to be real progress in improving relations with the U.S. That message was passed to Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani. He took it back to Iran and substantial pressure was exerted on the Hezbollah, the radical group in Lebanon believed to be holding the hostages. Hezbollah eventually agreed to let one hostage go.

Larijani told Genscher that a hostage would be coming out; Genscher passed word to the U.S., and American officials waited, hoping that a number of Americans might go free.

Secretary Shultz, days before the Singh release, hinted that something was in the wind.

SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ; ...That there has been movement in the situation in a direction that we find good.

McWETHY: When Singh was released there was disappointment in the Reagan Administration that none of the nine American citizens who are hostages came with him. Through another channel, the Japanese government, Shultz sent back word that the U.S. was grateful for whatever influence Iran may have exerted in the Singh case, but that the U.S. still wanted all the hostages to be freed. There would be no deals, no negotiations.

Iranian officials say this response was an insult, that Iran was not trying to make a deal, only to start a process.

LARIJANI: I think this is kind of insulting to us, it is a kind of blackmail, blackmailing Iran.

McWETHY: American officials, of course, say it is Iran that is doing the blackmailing. Still, from the Iranian perspective a gesture was made that they say could have led to more hostages being released. The U.S. response, in their view, resulted in the door slamming shut.

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HOSTAGES...CONTINUED



While officials in the State Department defend the U.S. response to the Singh release as proper and in line with past American positions, nearly all admit that the American presidential campaign may have been a factor in not responding more creatively. Said one official, no one wants to take risks during this period where the U.S. could be accused of entering into negotiations with Iran.

For the Iranians this episode was bewildering. Adding to their confusion was another set of signals they were receiving through channels that the U.S. government knew nothing about. In fact, State Department officials tell ABC News that Iran complained in an official message in October that it had been approached by so many people claiming to represent either the U.S. government or the Bush or Dukakis campaigns that Iran did not know who it should take seriously. ABC News asked Hussein Sheikholislam, who a decade ago led the takeover of the American Embassy in Teheran about the contact. He is now a Deputy Foreign Minister.

HUSSEIN SHEIKHOLISLAM: There are contacts unofficially from both parties.

McWETHY: Democrats and Republicans?

SHEIKHOLISLAM: From both parties. Or, I should say, from anybody who seeks power in the United States.

LARIJANI: It is hard to evaluate the authenticity and the importance of those contacts.

McWETHY: Iranian officials say they were approached by people claiming to represent the Dukakis campaign, people looking for dirt on the Vice President's role in the Iran-Contra affair. They also claim someone saying he represented the Bush campaign approached Iran wanting to talk about the hostages. Iran refused to provide names or details.

Both of the campaigns deny in the strongest terms that

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they have authorized any such contacts.

Even so, Secretary Shultz was so frustrated by all the unauthorized contacts that he knew about that he went public in early October.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As far as I'm concerned I wish they would all just butt out and let us handle this thing as we think is right.

McWETHY: ABC News has obtained details of one such contact, an unauthorized hostage discussion that set off alarm bells at the State Department. The setting, Damascus, Syria. The timing, mid-August.

It involves Paul Jureidini, an established expert on the Middle East who works for a small consulting firm in Annandale, Virginia. He and his partner, Ronald McLaurin, on what they say was a private business trip, travelled to Lebanon and Syria. ABC News has been told that Iran was well aware of their visit.

Both men have done extensive consulting work for the Pentagon and for thirteen years have held top secret security clearances.

Jureidini, as late as July, was part of a prestigious group of experts serving as unpaid volunteers on the Bush campaign's Advisory Committee on the Middle East. Its job helped formulate language for the Republican platform.

In Syria, on August 16th, Jureidini met with Adnan Hamdani, a high ranking Syrian intelligence official, who, among other things, deals extensively with Iran.

According to a Syrian source, during their meeting they discussed options for freeing the nine American hostages being held in Lebanon and what the impact might be on the U. S. presidential campaign if any of those hostages should be released before the election.

So concerned was the State Department when officials

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learned of their visit two weeks later, that Secretary Shultz sent a cable to the President of Syria, Hafez el-Assad, saying the two Americans did not in any way represent the views of the U.S. government. Word was also passed to Jureidini and McLaurin to stop further such contacts.

PAUL JUREIDINI (ABBOTT ASSOCIATES): I think we made it very clear in our discussions in Lebanon, anyplace we go that we do not represent the U.S. government.

McWETHY: Not related to the U.S. government, not related to any....

RON McLAURIN: Not related to any government whatsoever.

McWETHY: ...any campaign, not related to...

McLAURIN: Not related to a campaign, a government, or any public institution of any sort in any country.

McWETHY: Mark Goodin is a spokesman for the Bush campaign.

MARK GOODIN: I'm not saying he doesn't have contacts with the campaign. I mean, what kind of contact. Does he have an ongoing relationship with the campaign? No. I think the real issue is was he acting at the behest of the Vice President. The answer to all of those questions is no, emphatically so.

McWETHY: But the Syrians, with whom Jureidini met, believed otherwise. So did the Iranians who were monitoring his visit. They believed because of Jureidini's background with the campaign and the U.S. government that he did have active ties, even though Jureidini himself says he repeatedly told them he did not.

The question of whether those two made these contacts on the hostage issue did so with authority of either the campaigns or the government may never be answered definitively. But it's fair to ask would they confirm it if they had. The answer is, probably not.

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So what we are left with is the insistence of both Syrian and Iranian officials who believed in a number of cases they were talking to people who had those ties. Caught in the middle of all this, of course, are the American hostages who everyone says they simple want to help.

John McWethy, for Nightline, in Washington.

KOPPEL: When we come back, we'll be joined by correspondent John McWethy, by a key figure in his report, consultant Paul Jureidini, and by Middle East expert Marvin Zonis.

KOPPEL: Professor Marvin Zonis of the University of Chicago was a frequent guest on Nightline during the Iran hostage crisis. A student of Iranian politics for the past 30 years, Mr. Zonis has written extensively on Iran and on Islamic fundamentalism. He joins us now from our Boston Bureau.

Paul Jureidini, whom you've just seen in John McWethy's report, is an expert on the Middle East and on terrorism. He is with us in our Washington Bureau, as is ABC News' national security correspondent John McWethy.

Mr. Jureidini, I just want to make sure we got your background correct. You're an expert on the Middle East....

JUREIDINI:: That's right.

KOPPEL: You're an expert on terrorism.

JUREIDINI: Right.

KOPPEL: And you did work in one capacity or another in helping the Bush people draft, what?, part of their plank on the Middle East.

JUREIDINI: That's right, until the 21st of July.

KOPPEL: Now I assume you were just trying to be, what?, helpful. You were doing this just as a good citizen in raising the issue of the hostages when you were in the Middle East.

JUREIDINI: Look, let me explain the situation. First, my host in Syria knew quite well that I'd never represented the

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HOSTAGES  
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U. S. government. Let me give you a little situation that evolved after my first visit to Damascus in October of 1987.

KOPPEL: I'll tell you what. You know, we do have limited time, and I wonder if you could just help me by responding a little more directly to my question.

When you raised the issue of the hostages, you were just doing it as a private citizen?

JUREIDINI: Absolutely.

KOPPEL: And how did you raise it, in what capacity?

JUREIDINI: It was only in the context of long-range improvements in U. S.-Syrian relations.

KOPPEL: And you were suggesting what, that only after the hostages were released could relations be improved?

JUREIDINI: Well, I mean that was just one issue. But I've also held the position that is quite known that I don't think Syria in the Khomeini era can effect the unconditional release of our hostages. Iran is key to it, and only Iran is. And specifically, Ayatollah Khomeini.

KOPPEL: Now you are aware of the fact, if only through John McWethy's report, that the Iranians clearly knew what you were doing and what you were talking about with the Syrians.

JUREIDINI: Well, I find that very sort of interesting, because I only met with one person. The report that John discussed with me had me meeting with the President of Syria, with another Syrian official, with an Iranian official, even had me going to Balbek (?), of all places.

KOPPEL: Well, John's a very careful reporter. I've known him for years. And as you just saw, and let's deal with what he reported, not with what your private conversations may have been, he reported only that you met with a Mr. Hamdani....

JUREIDINI: That's right.

KOPPEL: That's correct, right?

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JUREIDINI: Yes, well, but at least you're not denying the accuracy of Jack's report. My question is: you know that these folks know a lot about you. They must have known that you operated in one capacity or another as an adviser to the Bush campaign. Would it not have been reasonable for them to assume that no matter what your protestations about just being a private citizen, that nevertheless, if they have something interesting to say, you would carry it back?

JUREIDINI: Actually no, because in an earlier discussion with them in March, the issue of the turnover, the release of our downed pilot, the naval pilot, back in 1984, was a case I made to them, that you cannot play with American politics, that the best thing to do is to release a person unconditionally, and that, in a sense, releasing them, the pilot to the Reverend Jesse Jackson backfired. So that the discussion really had to do with long-term American-Syrian relations and the role I see for Syria after, or in the post-Khomeini era, but not during Khomeini's lifetime.

KOPPEL: You have learned also subsequently from John, and I say "learned" because you've also claimed you didn't know about it at the time, that a senior Iranian official just happened to be on the plane with you flying from Damascus back to Frankfurt.

JUREIDINI: Well, if he was there, I really didn't know it. I was sitting in economy; the plane was full. There was no reason for me to know who he was since I never met him.

KOPPEL: But again back to my initial question, they know your background. They know who you are; they know what your contacts are. It's really not -- I mean I'm preaching to someone who knows a great deal more about the Middle East than I do. It's not possible for you to present yourself just as a private

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HOSTAGES...

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citizen, is it?

JUREIDINI: Well, no, it is, because, again, when the....

KOPPEL: You work as a consultant for the Pentagon; you have been an adviser to the Bush campaign; and yet when you're over there, you're just a private citizen.

JUREIDINI: No. But again, let me -- again, this is a story that is very important, because after my October, '87 trip, two members of our embassy met with Mr. Hamdani and told him I did not represent the U. S. government. And his response, I'm told, was "I know this; this is what Mr. Jureidini said, and I couldn't meet with him if he was official. Furthermore, I'm not trying to communicate with the U. S. government."

So my host in Syria knew exactly where I came from.

KOPPEL: Okay. We're going to take a break, and we're going to continue with all of our guests when we come back in a moment.

KOPPEL: Continuing our discussion with Marvin Zonis, Paul Jureidini and ABC's John McWethy.

Mr. Jureidini, just a quick follow-up question or two. You still have a security clearance?

JUREIDINI: Yes.

KOPPEL: And when you come back from a foreign trip like this, isn't it a function of being able to maintain that security clearance that you have to file something called a contact report?

JUREIDINI: Yes, absolutely.

KOPPEL: So you filed a contact report with U. S. officials when you came back telling about your meeting with Mr. Hamdani?

JUREIDINI: Yes. No, not about my meeting, but that I went to Syria, that I talked with Syrian officials. The purpose

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HOSTAGES...CONTINUED

of that report, really, is, you know, since Syria is one of the countries on the list, is basically to report any attempt by these officials either to recruit you or elicit classified information.

KOPPEL: So there has to be some kind of an exposition of what it is you talked about, right?

JUREIDINI: Not on that report, no.

KOPPEL: Others?

JUREIDINI: No, no report. I do not work for the U. S. government. Therefore, you know, I don't have to discuss my trip with anybody, if I choose not to.

KOPPEL: Marvin Zonis, what effect do you think contacts such as this are going to have on the Iranians and the Syrians? Do they -- do they so confuse the issue that they make the release of hostages, for example, or the reestablishment of relations more difficult, or do contacts like this sometimes work in the Byzantine manner of the Middle East?

PROFESSOR MARVIN ZONIS: They certainly can work when the Iranians are prepared to see the hostages released. But I think what happens when so many people try to bust into these negotiating situations is that the Iranians try to use them all and to hand out as many different kinds of messages as possible in the hopes that one of them will strike home and they'll gain some benefit in the course of releasing the hostages.

KOPPEL: What do you make of -- and I listed a few incidents of the last few weeks, beginning with the release of Mr. Singh, and then Bani-Sadr's comments about the contacts from the Bush and Dukakis campaigns, and then today's account from Teheran suggesting that, you know, resumption of relations might be possible. What do you make of all of that?

PROFESSOR ZONIS: Well, there's tremendous turmoil within Iranian politics. Ayatollah Khomeini has announced that

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HOSTAGES...  
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neither the Soviet Union nor the United States should be allowed to participate in the reconstruction of Iran. On the other hand, the Speaker of the Parliament recently said that since it's been ten years since the Shah was overthrown, the clerics are sufficiently well established that they could even deal with the United States.

So there's very great confusion at the highest levels of Iranian politics. And I think what's going on in the midsts of the Khomeini succession struggle is that everyone is trying to get themselves positioned to take over when he dies, and a big part of that will be who controls the hostages, how are they released, and did the United States gain any benefit, or did Iran gain greater benefit, at least in the eyes of the Iranians.

KOPPEL: Now if you had to bet on it right now based on your knowledge of the way the Iranians work, it doesn't look, does it, as though any hostages are going to be released before the election this time?

PROFESSOR ZONIS: The hostages, in my opinion, certainly won't be released before the election, nor do I think they'll be released during the remainder of the presidency of Ronald Reagan, because the last thing the Iranians want to do is give this man a success. This is the man, remember, who sent American Marines to Beirut; this is the man who sent the U. S. Navy to the Persian Gulf. The Iranians don't want to see him ending his eight year presidency with a triumph over Iran.

KOPPEL: All right, we're going to wrap things up with the three of you. Jack, I'll be coming back to you in just a moment. We'll continue our discussion when we return.

KOPPEL: Continuing our discussion now with John McWethy.

John, I know you pulled together an enormous amount of information from a great many sources whom you cannot identify

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HOSTAGES...CONTINUED

publicly. Why is it that the Iranians and the Syrians seem to be so convinced that they were contacted by a representative not just of one campaign, I hesitate to add, but by both campaigns?

McWETHY: Well, they have had a whole lot of contacts. Some of them are more convincing than others, Ted. You're dealing in sort of a netherworld here. But the Iranians, in particular, have been convinced that they have been in touch with a number of the campaigns. And interestingly, they would not provide us with any of the details. They say, in their own peculiar way, that they did not want to interfere in the American elections.

KOPPEL: Which leads you to conclude what, that they don't have the names, they're just making mischief, or that the contacts were legitimate enough that they don't want to screw things up?

McWETHY: Well, I think there is some evidence that there has been contacts. But how legitimate the contacts were is what the real question is.

KOPPEL: Mr. Jureidini, let me return to you now in your function as Middle East expert. What is your guess as to when or even whether the hostages will be released?

JUREIDINI: I really don't think the hostages will be released unconditionally during Khomeini's lifetime. As long as he demands atonement, restitution and amends, there's no way we can meet his terms.

Now by releasing Singh, he has provided his successors with flexibility, with a precedent. The problem that his successor is going to find is that he doesn't have the influence that Khomeini now has on the kidnapers in Lebanon. And he's always going to be haunted by the fear that once released, even if he had that influence, we would sort of take our marbles home, our hostages, and slam the door, and Iran would be left high and

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dry.

So I really don't think that direct government-to-government, U. S.-to-Iran is going to lead us any place.

My interest in Syria was specifically because Syria, with three other countries, acting in their own interests after Khomeini dies, will be in a position maybe to secure the release of our hostages.

KUPPEL: Mr. Jureidini, on that note I'm afraid I have to thank all three of you. We are out of time. Thank you all very much. That's our report for tonight. I'm Ted Koppel in Washington. For all of us here at ABC News, good night.

NEW YORK TIMES

4 December 1988

Pg. 31

# My Husband — Their Hostage

By Robin L. Higgins

**A**long with other Americans, I am relieved by the end of the carnage in the Persian Gulf. I am proud of the role played by our elected representatives, and our men and women in uniform, in bringing about an end to the fighting and Teheran's acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598.

There is, however, one outstanding matter where relief still seems an eternity away, where pride is hardly in order and where I have to wonder if everything possible is being done.

I'm referring to our hostages in Lebanon.

All of them concern me deeply. But you'll understand if I feel a special pain, rage and bewilderment for the plight of my husband, Lieut. Col. William R. Higgins, who was serving with the United Nations peacekeeping forces there. Next Saturday, the United Nations will accept the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of the efforts of these forces.

My husband's kidnapping was a direct assault on that force and its mission. Americans have not been the only targets: United Nations personnel who are Finns, Norwegians, Australians and Canadians have also been attacked, maimed and killed. It

is no secret that those who hold my husband and other hostages continue to receive large payments from Iran.

It is to the credit of the United Nations Secretary General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, that he has not conditioned his around-the-clock efforts to win a lasting peace on Iran's border on the safe return of his imprisoned officer in Lebanon. My husband is, after all, one man; upward of a million men, women and children had been killed in the Iran-Iraq conflict.

But the Secretary General has also asked the Iranian foreign minister for assistance in my husband's release. I have no reason to believe that such assistance has been forthcoming.

Iran has now recognized Security Council Resolution 598 but evidently feels it can safely overlook Resolution 618, which exhorts all member states to use their influence "in any way possible" to secure the immediate release of Lieutenant Colonel Higgins.

Do the Iranians feel no sense of indebtedness to the Secretary General? No sense of honor with respect to my husband? Apparently not.

The United Nations now expects enthusiastic support for the deployment of yet another peacekeeping force. I understand why the Administration decided to support this effort. But I'm not sure I can support that decision under the circumstances.

I suggest we consider the following: First, since Congress is directly accountable to the American people in the disbursement of public funds, including the funding for United Nations peacekeeping operations, my husband's release should be taken into account.

Second, my husband is still assigned to the United Nations. That organization must spare no effort in securing his release.

Iran needs the United Nations now. It needs the Secretary General. It needs the West. All are willing to help. But if the Iranian leaders wish to be seen as serious people and worthy interlocutors, they should order the prompt release of all the hostages. Iran should see to it that my husband is returned directly to the United Nations command in Lebanon.

I am vitally interested in the release of all hostages — not only Americans but others as well. This is not a plea for saving one and ignoring the rest. The return of any one of these brave men falsely and criminally imprisoned is right and just.

But it is high time to start somewhere, and my husband's United Nations status provides leverage of a unique kind. Please use it. □

Robin L. Higgins lives in Woodbridge, Va.



7 December 1988

Pg. 1

WALL STREET JOURNAL

# Tale of Suspense

## International Sleuths Track Terror Attacks To Libya's Abu Nidal

### Investigation Focuses on Man Of Numerous Identities—Samir Mohammed Kadar

#### Did He Die in Athens Blast?


By JOHN WALCOTT

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

ATHENS—At 2:30 in the afternoon last July 11, in a remote corner of the Athens waterfront, a metallic green Nissan exploded with the force of a thousand pounds of TNT and blasted open a door into the international terrorist underworld.

At least two terrorists were killed when their ammunition blew. Police found the remnants of three pairs of shoes but the finger tips of just two men. (One had a manicure; the other, dirt under his nails.) No one is certain who the men were, what they had planned to do with their grenades, automatic weapons and 50 pounds of plastic explosives, or what set off the explosion that killed them.

But the blast has given investigators an inside look at what the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency calls "the most dangerous terrorist organization in existence," the Abu Nidal Organization. Intelligence officials say Abu Nidal is the *nom de guerre* of Sabri Khalil al-Banna, the murderous Palestinian who founded the terrorist band in 1974. The group, backed by Libya, specializes in violent attacks on Jews and moderate Arabs, and against nations, like Greece, that hold agents of Abu Nidal in prison. In the Nissan's wreckage, police uncovered the trail of one of Abu Nidal's bloodiest operatives, a man who had organized terrorist attacks while living inconspicuously in Sweden and traveling with the help of fake passports to Greece, Libya and even Bolivia.



Samir Kadar

Four hours after the car exploded, a gunman opened fire on a Greek ferry called the City of Poros, killing nine people and wounding 90. Finally, the gunman accidentally killed himself with one of his hand grenades.

His automatic weapon, however, survived the blast and gave police one of their first clues to who was behind the killing. The Italian-made Beretta, they learned, was one of 7,000 such guns ordered on July 8, 1976, by the government of Libya. That pointed to Abu Nidal, as did the wanton slaughter of the attack and the use of hand grenades, both of which are trademarks of the Nidal gang.

#### Two Theories

The ferry was scheduled to dock just one kilometer from where the Nissan had been parked, and police officials quickly linked the car and the ferry attack. Investigators have two theories: Either the terrorists planned to attack the ferry and then blow up the car at the pier when police, rescue workers and the curious congregated to meet it, or the terrorists intended to hijack the ferry and demand the release of two Abu Nidal operatives imprisoned in Greece. (Reuter reported late last night that one of the operatives was released.)

The demolished Nissan was traced to Speedo Rent A Car here in Athens, where it had been rented July 4 to a man with a Lebanese passport and an international driver's license issued in Lebanon. Both documents turned out to be counterfeit. Fingerprints in the wreckage didn't match any on file with Interpol, the international police agency.

Still, the dead Nissan told tales. A Browning automatic pistol in the debris could be traced. It was one of 10,000 delivered to Libya on Jan. 24, 1980, by Belgium's Fabrique Nationale. And Greek police pieced together the shreds of a passport photograph they found at the scene of the explosion. Such basic police work—reconstructing a picture and sending it off to Interpol—turned out to be the key to tracing the Athens terrorists.

Two days after the Nissan exploded, interRent, another Athens car-rental company, reported that one of its vehicles was missing: a blue Opel Ascona that was supposed to have been returned to the Athens airport on the day the ferry was attacked. An employee of interRent says the car had been turned over to a man using the name Hezab Jaballah. He had booked it through the Electra Hotel in Athens, producing a Libyan passport as identification.

#### The Getaway Car?

For his part, Col. Moammar Gadhafi, Libya's leader, twice has denied any involvement in the attack on the ferry, and Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council has said that, as for Hezab Jaballah, he died three years ago.

Discovering the missing Opel near the port of Piraeus, police broke into it and found three suitcases full of clothes and a passport belonging to one Merih Mehidin. The blue Opel looked to police like an unused getaway car. They dusted it for fingerprints.

Acting on a hunch, police showed the photograph they had pieced together from the Nissan wreckage to the clerk who had rented out the Opel. He said the man in the picture was Mr. Jaballah. With copies of the photo in hand, authorities scoured Athens and found that in addition to staying at the Electra Hotel, Mr. Jaballah had a room at the Galaxy Hotel, a mildewed seafront establishment, and he maintained an apartment at 6 Gregoris Lambrakis St., in a section of Athens that bears a passing resemblance to Beirut and has a large Arab population. A Palestinian terrorist could be inconspicuous there.

Mr. Jaballah's accommodations in Athens were a treasure-trove of clues. He had left so much behind, in fact, that it seemed obvious he either had been killed or had fled in a hurry, without his belongings and without trying to cover his tracks. Police found passports and currency from Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Tunisia, Cyprus, Finland and Bolivia. They found wire that could be used to construct a bomb. And they found a set of keys and airline tickets belonging to one Adnan Sojod, whom several passengers on the City of Poros later identified from photographs as the terrorist who shot up the ferry.

In addition, they found used Scandinavian Airlines tickets for a June 1 trip from Stockholm to Copenhagen in the name of Rouphael Michael Nabih and a connecting flight the same day from Copenhagen to Athens by Mr. Jaballah. The passports were clear evidence that Mr. Nabih and Mr. Jaballah were one and the same. A Lebanese passport for Mr. Nabih, born in Lebanon in 1948, pictured the same man as Mr. Jaballah's Libyan passport did. A Yugoslav passport said he was born in 1951; a Jordanian one had him born in 1950. A Syrian passport and driver's license also gave the year of his birth as 1948.

#### Jaballah's True Identity

As Greek detectives pieced together their case, intelligence and police officials in other countries were looking at the picture of Mr. Jaballah and fingerprints collected from the Opel by Athens police. In Cyprus, police finally came up with the true identity of Mr. Jaballah. He is (or was) Samir Mohammed Kadar, a henchman of Abu Nidal's.

Cypriot authorities reported that in 1978 Mr. Kadar had murdered an Egyptian

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ABU NIDAL

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## ABU NIDAL... CONTINUED

newspaper editor in Nicosia, then hijacked a Cyprus Airways jet in a futile effort to escape. The Cypriots had convicted him of murder but, apparently so as not to court the wrath of Abu Nidal, had commuted his death sentence and expelled him to Syria in 1982.

In 1983, Mr. Kadar showed up in Rome, as an official representative of a Libyan government commercial agency. But Mr. Kadar's real business there was terror, or so Italian and American officials assert. Between 1983 and 1985, Italian officials say, he helped organize a rocket-propelled grenade attack on the U.S. Embassy, a grenade and machine-gun attack on a synagogue that killed a child, and the attempted assassination of Jordan's ambassador to Italy.

Two days after Christmas 1985, Italian authorities believe, Mr. Kadar staged his cruelest act, the massacre at the El Al Israel ticket counter at Rome's Leonardo da Vinci Airport. Twelve people were killed, including an 11-year-old American girl, who died in her father's arms.

In 1986, shortly after the Rome airport massacre, Mr. Kadar moved to Sweden with Arja Saloranta, a Finnish woman he had met at the Cafe de Paris, across from the U.S. Embassy on Rome's Via Veneto. (Italian police believe he also had been involved in a September 1985 grenade attack by Abu Nidal operatives on the Cafe de Paris, in which 38 people were wounded.)

## Using Her Name

On Oct. 10, 1986, Kadar and Ms. Saloranta were married, and this man of many guises took his wife's surname as his own. He continued, however, to use the Lebanese passport, the one that identified him as a Mr. Nabih. He started a business he named al-Alamia, ostensibly to import and export shoes, clothes, cars, furniture and electronics. By-and-by, the Salorantas had a son, Omar, who was baptized last May. And it began to look as if Mr. Saloranta were on his way to becoming a Swedish burgher.

But despite the wife and child and the patina of respectability, his true calling continued to be terrorism. Salman al-Turki, an Abu Nidal operative who was convicted of conspiracy for his role in organizing the Sept. 5, 1986, hijacking of Pan Am flight 73 in Karachi, told Pakistani authorities that he reported to Mr. Kadar.

One month after the Pan Am hijacking (in which 22 people died), Mr. Kadar went to Bolivia. Mr. Kadar's passports indicate that he also traveled to Libya, Abu Nidal's home base, several times. A Sudanese visa bears evidence that he visited Khartoum in 1986 and 1987 on Libyan "official business."

Mr. Kadar's wife, who lived with him in a three-room apartment in a Stockholm

suburb, has told police she thought he was a businessman whose work kept him on the road. The couple's neighbors say that, when he was around, he socialized mostly with his wife's friends and attracted little attention to himself. Swedish authorities say they had no idea that one of the world's most notorious terrorists was living near Stockholm.

## A Perk for Finns

Under Swedish law, explains Erik Lempert, a labor-department official, Mr. Kadar as an alien was entitled to live in Sweden because his wife was a citizen of Finland. Sweden admits some refugees without documents, and the country is home to an estimated 10,000 political refugees. "Having an influx as we do, there will always be problems," says Mr. Lempert, who notes that Sweden does sometimes expel suspected terrorists.

It was Mr. Kadar's Finnish father-in-law who identified him from a picture circulated by Greek police that was published in two Helsinki newspapers. The elder Mr. Saloranta told Finnish police that the terrorist was married to his daughter Arja. Finnish authorities promptly alerted their opposite numbers in Sweden.

When Swedish police visited Mr. Kadar's apartment, they found a roll of undeveloped film. On it were photographs of groves of trees. The police somehow found the spot where one picture was taken and at the site dug up four AK-47 assault rifles; two automatic pistols of the sort issued to the Swedish army but equipped with silencers; and a supply of the East bloc hand grenades often used by Abu Nidal's terrorists.

The Swedes found that Mr. Kadar's supposed import-export concern was a phony. It had done no business and hadn't used its telephone. Still, he had appeared to be a man of means. He drove a late-model Volvo 244 and a 1983 Mercedes-Benz 230, and police reportedly found a substantial amount of money in his bank accounts. Authorities assume he drew his support from the Abu Nidal organization.

## Can It Happen Here?

U.S. officials are distressed by evidence that Abu Nidal's operations are expanding in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in South America. An operative was arrested in Caracas, Venezuela, last year and may be extradited to Israel on murder charges. On July 16, Peruvian police, acting on a tip, arrested three supposed Abu Nidal associates in Lima. U.S. officials believe that one of them, who used the pseudonym Hussein Bouzidi, was based in Algiers and worked with Mr. Kadar to plan the 1985 Rome airport attack.

"Abu Nidal has a very sophisticated intelligence and terrorist organization that has been trained by the East Europeans and assisted by Libya, among others," says Oliver "Buck" Revell, the executive assistant director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. "We believe Abu Nidal also has an infrastructure in the U.S." He thinks Abu Nidal terrorists are lurking in cities such as Los Angeles with large Palestinian refugee and student populations, but he cites no evidence of that. "They don't strike radical poses that make them stand out," Mr. Revell says.

U.S. officials cheer on the sort of methodical, albeit unglamorous, international police effort that traced Mr. Kadar's travels and found his hideout in Sweden. "It's tough, grinding police work, and where it works well is where there's good international cooperation," says L. Paul Bremer, the State Department's top counterterrorism official.

But even the best of police work can leave many questions unanswered. So it has in the case of Mr. Kadar. Police still aren't sure, for instance, whether he blew himself up in that rented Nissan in Athens last July, or whether he wriggled back into the terrorist underground, shedding passports, driver's licenses, even a wife and baby, as a snake sheds its skin.

LONG ISLAND NEWSDAY

12 December 1988 Pg. 7

# Soviet Hijackers Surrender

*4 men, 1 woman jailed  
after forcing Aeroflot  
craft to Israel airport*

By Timothy M. Phelps

Newsday Middle East Bureau

Lod, Israel — Five Soviet "bandits" carrying bags of money were taken into custody at Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv last night, a day after they exchanged a hijacked bus of children for a plane out of the Soviet Union, Israeli military officials said.

After the plane landed, it was directed to a far corner of the airport and surrounded by the Israeli army, police and ambulances. The Soviets surrendered and left the plane after receiving proof that they were in Israel. The Israeli army, which initially had assumed

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## HIJACKERS...CONTINUED

the hijackers were Soviet Jews making a desperate escape from Soviet repression, described the four men and one woman they found as bandits, peacefully relieved them of four pistols and a hunting rifle, and led them off to jail. The five were an Armenian couple, two Russians and an Ossetian, a member of a small minority from the Transcaucasus region.

Soviet officials said they had hijacked a school bus with 30 children and teachers on board Thursday in the city of Ordzhonikidze in the southern Soviet Union and demanded "a large sum of money" and a plane to fly them to Israel, South Africa or Pakistan.

The Soviets allowed them to drive with the bus 110 miles to the town of Mineralnye Vody and exchange the hostages for an Ilyushin-76 cargo plane with an eight-member crew. When they arrived in Israel, they were carrying \$2-million worth of Soviet rubles and U.S. dollars in large sacks, according to Army Chief of Staff Dan Shomron.

Israeli officials made contradictory statements about whether the money was the product of a robbery or whether it was provided by the Soviet government in response to the demands of the armed group.

Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin expressed surprise that the Soviets, who in the past have been particularly rough with hijackers, had let the five go. "How could a superpower like the Soviet Union permit five common criminals armed with four pistols and one hunting rifle — when the children had already been released — leave Russia?" he asked at an airport news conference. "We see that there was no notion of opposing them," he said.

Rabin's statement was immediately regretted by Foreign Ministry officials happy about recently improved relations with the Soviets. They said the two countries had worked well together to solve yesterday's crisis peacefully.

Soviet officials in Moscow said that though the schoolchildren had been released, the plane's crew had been handcuffed. "In order to achieve the release of the children [to which the attackers had not agreed for a long time]," The Soviet news agency Tass reported, "authorities took a decision to give the terrorists a plane. The teacher and the bus driver were also set free." Tass said the hostages were in "satisfactory condition." The Soviet Union would sentence the five hijackers to "many years in jail," the normal penalty for hijacking, Albert Vlasov, chief of the Novosti news agency, said at a Moscow news conference. Many would-be

hijackers in the past have been slain on the ground instead of being permitted to take off.

Israeli officials said the plane and crew would be returned, but they made no immediate commitment to honor the Soviet request for the return of the five hijackers. The two countries do not have formal diplomatic relations and have not signed an extradition treaty. But both

have endorsed the international convention against air piracy, which calls for the return of hijackers.

Ben Gurion Airport, the main civilian airport in Israel, which is used also as a military facility, was put under Army command yesterday afternoon while soldiers, police, reporters and about 50 ambulances awaited the plane as it flew over Turkey to Cyprus and on to Israel.

The Israelis had gotten the first word of the unscheduled flight yesterday morning in a brief telex in crude English from the Soviet Ministry of Civil Aviation requesting permission for a plane with kidnapped children on board to land in Israel.

Army General Amram Mitzna said the five hijackers were handed over to the police "like anyone who tries to enter the country illegally."

"I'm very satisfied with the way this affair ended, especially when you consider how it could have ended," he said.

Jeff Sommer in Moscow contributed to this report.



Newsday / Steve Madden





# CURRENT NEWS

## SPECIAL EDITION



14 FEB 1989 TERRORISM NO. 1777

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Newark Star Ledger

28 December 1988 p. 7

## Spy satellite reportedly spots Waite in Beirut

LONDON (AP)—A U.S. spy satellite spotted Terry Waite, the missing Anglican Church envoy, being moved to a medieval prison in Lebanon over Christmas, and American hostage Terry Anderson may be there too, a newspaper said yesterday.

The Sunday Express quoted U.S. National Security Agency officials as saying the movement was spotted by the agency's Lacrosse satellite. The satellite is permanently positioned over Lebanon, where 20 foreigners, including eight Americans, are missing after being kidnaped.

In addition, there is the case of Waite, who disappeared Jan. 20 after going to Lebanon on a mission to negotiate the release of hostages.

Waite was seen being taken to Basta Prison in west Beirut, along with some foreign hostages, according to the newspaper report. It didn't give the names of the hostages being moved or say how many there were.

But reporter Gordon Thomas, who wrote the story, said in a London Broadcasting Co. radio interview that Anderson, an Associated Press correspondent, was moved at the same time.

Officials in Washington would say nothing about the reports.

"We don't comment on intelligence matters," said White House spokesman Ben Jarratt.

The Sunday Express said the Lacrosse's recorders and cameras can listen in on walkie-talkie radios and pick out individual faces, even through thick clouds and darkness.

The story did not say from where the captives might have been transferred, only that they were "moved across the city" to the prison.

"The spy satellite's ability to identify features as specific as building materials has also helped the CIA in its analyses of the Christmas video appeal from hostage Terry Anderson," the report added.

"Enlargement of the radar images supplied revealed the video's background to be strikingly similar to the stonework of Basta Prison."

The Islamic Jihad, the pro-Iranian group holding Anderson, released a videotape of him on Christmas Eve. Anderson was kidnaped March 16, 1985, and is the longest-held hostage.

The story said specialists in the Central Intelligence Agency's political psychology division were reviewing the Anderson video frame by frame.

The Sunday Express also said the U.S. satellite gathered "information picked up on the streets of Beirut" and found evidence of a split among leaders of Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian Shiite Moslem umbrella organization believed to be holding most of the captives.

It said Hezbollah's holy leader, Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, was at odds with Hussein Musawi, the leader of the Islamic Amal.

"Fadlallah now wants to trade the remaining hostages for huge ransoms, including a reported 20 million pounds (\$36 million) for Terry Waite. The even more extreme Musawi argues that the captives are 'insurance' against any moves Israel might make against Hezbollah groups and Palestinians in south Lebanon if the unrest in the Gaza Strip escalates," the report said.

At least 21 Arabs have been killed by Israeli troops in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip in rioting that broke out Dec. 8.

### Iran...CONTINUED

lead to dependency and corruption, forces the Islamic revolution sought to eradicate.

The release of Western detainees is regarded as a triumph for the moderates and a good-will gesture intended to encourage increased Western contacts. "This move with Britain is significant," said Shahrar Chubin, an Iranian specialist at the Geneva Institute for International Affairs. "This is another step toward the normalization of relations with outside powers."

#### British Embassy Reopened

Britain reopened its embassy in Tehran on Dec. 4, having shut it down eight years ago. Within days, Gordon Pirie, Britain's senior diplomat in Teheran, held talks with Iranian officials about Mr. Nicola and Mr. Cooper, a businessman and journalist. In these sessions, Mr. Pirie also sought Iranian help in the release of British hostages held in Lebanon.

Mr. Nicola was arrested on Sept. 15, 1986, along the Iranian-Pakistani border, and was charged with illegal entry into Iran and possession of two weapons and several cartridges, the Iranian press agency said. He was sentenced to three and a half years in prison and

was released early for "good behavior," an Iranian statement said.

Mr. Nicola arrived at Heathrow Airport today on a scheduled Iranair passenger jet and was met by his father, a cousin and officials of the British Government. British officials said they had no information on how Mr. Nicola got to Iran in 1986 or what he was doing there.

The release was hailed by the British Foreign Office as "an important step forward" in British-Iranian relations. "The Iranians up until now have been in breach of the Vienna convention in refusing to give adequate consular access to detained Britons," the British statement said.



Newark Star Ledger

26 December 1988

P. 1

# Terrorist threat keeps Jersey lawmen vigilant

By ROBERT RUDOLPH

The suspected bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 has roused new concerns over the "vulnerability" of the United States to attacks by international terrorist organizations, and sources confirm that some of these organizations

## Syria...CONTINUED

plane's passengers and crew members. The FBI and overseas agencies are also "tracking down together collectively every lead on every group

that can possibly be involved," Mr. Revell said.

He termed a "hoax" the Dec. 5 telephone warning to the U.S. Embassy in Finland that a woman, unwittingly working for Arab terrorists, would plant a bomb on a Pan Am flight from Frankfurt, West Germany, to New York. "It was not connected at all" with the crash, he said.

The crashed Pan Am Flight 103 originated in Frankfurt.

If the aircraft disaster is ultimately linked to terrorists, Mr. Revell said, the most likely culprits would be the Syrian-sponsored Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command or the May 15 organization, a Libyan-backed radical Palestinian faction that opposes any accommodation with Israel or the United States.

The FBI official said he drew his conclusions from the fact only these terrorist groups were known to possess a sophisticated plastic bomb that explodes when an aircraft reaches a certain cruising altitude.

In October West German police reported finding such a bomb during a raid on a Popular Front hide-out. It looked like an ordinary transistor radio but was packed with Syntex, a potent plastic explosive that cannot be detected by ordinary X-ray machines at airports.

Mr. Koch, the former Pentagon official, said his conviction that Syria was behind the disaster was brought about by "circumstantial evidence and precedent."

He cited, among other airline incidents, two attempts in 1986 to smuggle bombs aboard Israeli El Al airliners departing from airports serving London and Madrid, Spain.

Both of these cases "were connected to incidents that irritated Hafez el Assad in major ways," the

maintain a "presence" within the Garden State.

State Police Superintendent Col. Clinton Pagano said investigations have shown that the level of international terrorist activity in New Jersey is "significant" and maintained that without continued vigilance by police agencies, violence could erupt.

"We live in such a protected environment," Pagano said, "that people don't believe it could happen here... But once it got started, it would be damn hard to shut it off."

former Pentagon official said.

In October 1986 a jury in Britain convicted a Jordanian-born Palestinian, Nezar Hindawi, of trying to use his Irish girlfriend to smuggle a bomb aboard an El Al jet. Routine Israeli security measures, the strictest of any airline, prevented the attempt.

Citing "conclusive evidence" of links between Hindawi and the Syrian government, Britain broke relations with Damascus. Syria denied the charges and cut ties to Britain.

If terrorism is determined to be the cause, Sen. William S. Cohen, R-Maine, said yesterday that the United States should retaliate militarily.

"There have been insufficient expressions of rage" by world governments in prior sabotage cases, the vice chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence said.

In a related development yesterday, Mr. Revell of the FBI denied reports that the CIA's station chief in Beirut, Lebanon, was aboard the Pan Am jet.

"We cannot comment on intelligence community personnel, but I am authorized to say that the station chief in Beirut was not on that aircraft," he said in an interview with CBS Radio.

Two government officials had told the Associated Press on Saturday that the CIA's chief in Beirut was among those killed in the crash. Contacted again yesterday, one of the officials reiterated that the station chief had been a passenger.

In a post-program interview, Mr. Revell was asked whether any U.S. government employee from Beirut had been aboard the ill-fated flight.

"Yes," he replied, "the regional security officer from the State Department was on the aircraft, unfortunately."

The government has been very concerned for some time about the dangers of terrorist attacks within the United States," Samuel Alito Jr., the U.S. Attorney for New Jersey, declared.

At the same time, Alito stressed that "New Jersey is one of the most cosmopolitan areas in the country" and confirmed that "there are people here who are affiliated with many different terrorist organizations."

Officials stressed that although the continental United States has been spared the widespread violence that has plagued many European nations, the danger of attack from international terror organizations remains a constant fear, and federal and state authorities have made anti-terrorist operations a "top priority."

Authorities pointed to the recent arrest and prosecution of Japanese Red Army terrorist Yu Kikumura, who was captured with a carload of anti-personnel bombs on the New Jersey Turnpike, and officials warned that the case proved "they can get in here."

"With the kind of open society we have," Alito said, "it is difficult to keep out people who are intent on getting in."

Pagano said the arrest of Kikumura "saved countless lives" and said without such efforts "things would be a lot different; we would be a lot more vulnerable."

"It's a lot better," Pagano said, "to suppress this activity than to try to investigate it after an incident has occurred."

To date, he said, "we've been able to stay just a little bit ahead of them."

"It's modern warfare," Pagano asserted. "And every member of this division knows there's a war on."

Although authorities said Kikumura—whose organization advocates simultaneous worldwide revolution—was acting as a "lone wolf" in the United States, sources reported that other organizations have support networks inside this country.

Bernard J. Murphy, assistant special agent in charge of the FBI for New Jersey, confirmed that a number of such organizations maintain a "presence" in the Garden State, but stressed that they have confined their activities to "raising money or other types of support."

Murphy noted that although State Department figures on international terrorist incidents have climbed worldwide, the number directed against U.S. interests abroad have substantially declined in recent years. Murphy attributed the dropoff to the success of anti-

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



Philadelphia Inquirer

26 December 1988 p. 3

# Captors say French girls to be freed

## Release attributed to Gadhafi appeal

By Rima Salameh  
Associated Press

BEIRUT — Two French girls, taken captive more than a year ago, along with their mother and five Belgians, will be released as a Christmas present to the world's children, a spokesman for the radical Palestinian group holding them said yesterday.

Walid Khaled, of the Revolutionary Council of Fatah, the group led by terrorist Abu Nidal, did not set a date for the release of the Valente girls, Marie-Laure, 7, and Virginie, 6.

The group said they would be freed in response to an appeal from Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, who is regarded in the West as a backer of the Nidal organization.

A Palestinian source, who requested anonymity, said the two young captives would be freed as part of an effort to counter "a campaign by the Reagan administration against the reported fabrication of chemical weapons in Libya."

President Reagan last week said he would not rule out a military strike against a Libyan plant that the United States has charged produces chemical weapons.

Khaled showed reporters videotapes of the girls' mother, Jacqueline Valente, and the five Belgians, all of whom apparently will remain in captivity, along with a daughter born to Valente after the abduction.

On tape, the captives offered Christmas greetings to relatives and said they were well cared for. Valente and one of the Belgians, Fernand Houtekins, who referred to her as "my wife," reported that she was pregnant.

The Revolutionary Council declared on Nov. 8, 1987, that it had seized the group aboard a French yacht off the Gaza strip and accused them of spying for Israel. However, Israeli news reports said the yacht was hijacked off Libya, the group's main base.

All reportedly hold joint French-Israeli or Belgian-Israeli citizenship.

"We will release the two girls as a Christmas gift for the children of the world and their family," Khaled told reporters at his office in West Beirut's Mar Elias Palestinian refugee camp. "They will be released outside Lebanon. That's why the operation is taking time," he added.

The other Belgians held are Fernand Houtekins' brother and sister-in-law, Emmanuel

and Godelieve Houtekins, and their two children, Laurent, 17, and Valerie, 16. On videotape, the six said they were filmed Dec. 20. "I'm pregnant and in good health," Valente said.

Khaled said last Christmas that Valente had given birth to a baby girl "from an illegal relationship with Fernand Houtekins."

Emmanuel Houtekins said "our accommodation is good and we have heating. We have no problems."

Valerie Houtekins said she hoped to "receive letters from relatives and friends soon." Her brother, Laurent, revealed that "we are all at the same big apartment."

The videotapes were released after Khaled met for an hour with Valente's former husband, Pascal Betille; her mother, Brigitte Valente, and her brother-in-law Andre Metral

### Jersey...CONTINUED

terrorist operations by the FBI and other federal intelligence-gathering organizations.

"We're doing a pretty good job," Murphy said, "but we'd better not let our guard down."

Evidence developed in the Kikumura case showed that the terrorist, who was previously arrested at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam carrying a cache of explosives, was able to sneak into the United States with the aid of a professionally forged passport that he used to obtain a visa from the U.S. Embassy in Paris.

Once in the United States, investigations showed, he traveled freely on a trail from New York to Virginia to Pennsylvania and Detroit, testing his explosives in remote areas before returning to New Jersey, where he was apprehended by an alert state trooper.

Such freedom of movement, law enforcement officials said, highlights the dangers presented by terrorists.

Power plants supplying electricity to major portions of the country, communications cables carrying sophisticated data transmissions, public buildings and even reservoirs, authorities said, present obvious potential targets to terrorists within the United States.

"To say that we're not vulnerable is dangerous," Murphy asserted. "We are."

The FBI in New Jersey maintains a terrorism task force to keep track of such activity within the state, and authorities noted that a symposium on terrorism is being planned in conjunction with the State Police.

"We need to keep the degree of alertness at a high level," Murphy said.

Government sources stressed that while there is no reason to "press the

panic button" in New Jersey, a constant effort is needed to "keep our vulnerability to a minimum."

"New Jersey is a very mobile state, the center of the Northeast Corridor, and there are large numbers of businesses and technical sites" that could be potential targets for terrorists, officials said.

"We are not being besieged within our borders," one ranking federal investigator declared, but added, "There are signs of terrorism."

Although officials refused to identify the specific groups active in New Jersey, sources said there are some half-dozen open investigations into terrorist-related operations.

"There is a very large international community in this state," an official told The Star-Ledger, "and there are persons here who are affiliated with groups that cause terrorist concerns."

Among the support activities being provided by such individuals, authorities said, are serving as the "eyes and ears" for the parent organization, helping to obtain weapons, offering "safe houses" for persons wishing to hide from authorities and producing alibis and "cover stories" for persons more actively involved in the operations.

"These groups have support and direction and some degree of control from foreign governments" which support the terrorists, sources said.

John Lacey, the assistant U.S. Attorney who helped supervise the Kikumura case, said FBI intelligence-gathering on terrorism in other areas of the world is intended in large measure to prevent terrorist acts from occurring in this country.

"The most important step to take in combatting terrorism in this country," Lacey declared, "is to protect the borders."

"We don't want to be a country where you need papers to cross into the next state," Lacey said. "Freedom brings a risk."



Washington Post

24 December 1988

P. 1

# Tip Increasingly Seen as Coincidence

## After Investigation, Finns 'Certain' of No Tie-In to Downed Flight

By Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. antiterrorism authorities increasingly believe that the Dec. 5 telephone tip of a planned bombing

of a Pan American airliner from Frankfurt was a hoax with no connection to the crash of Flight 103 Wednesday in Scotland, a Reagan administration official said yesterday.

U.S. sources said Finnish police authorities have reported following an extensive investigation that they are "certain" that a Finnish resident of Middle Eastern origin, who was named in the Dec. 5 telephone call to the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki, had no involvement in the Pan Am crash.

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Tip...CONTINUED

Finnish police interviewed at the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki Dec. 5 and have originated the Israeli Embassy's report of a terrorist attack from January 1988. The police also interviewed a man who claimed to have knowledge of the telephone calls to the airlines.

The caller, a man of Middle Eastern origin residing in Finland, said he had no contact with the Finns, Finnish police in Helsinki, or these men had no contact with the security authorities.

Despite the fact that in some aspects the circumstances of the U.S. official report is consistent with the tip, which to security authorities is a coincidence.

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Wilson noted that aliens still can be deported for a number of reasons, ranging from insanity to alcoholism to polygamy, and that Congress still can pass laws deporting aliens for speech not protected by the Constitution, such as "fighting words, speech directed to and likely to produce imminent lawless action, and obscenity."

Presidential

Washington Post

23 December 1988

p. 8

# Free Speech for Aliens Reaffirmed

## Anti-Terrorism Limits Would Be Unconstitutional

By Jay Mathews  
Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, Dec. 22—Striking part of an aggressive U.S. government campaign against al-Qaeda terrorists, a federal judge today declared unconstitutional both a law limiting free speech by members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and parts of the 1966 McCarran-Walter Act allowing deportation of those who advocate world communism.

against Immigration and Naturalization Service efforts to deport politically active aliens, District Court Judge Stephen Wilson said his decision "reaffirms the underlying values of the First Amendment," which include the right to free expression of ideas that only through the free market can our nation prosper.

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McCarthy-era McCarran-Walter Act allowing removal of aliens who advocate—or belong to groups that advocate—world communism, totalitarian dictatorship or the unlawful destruction of property.

Wilson said these provisions unconstitutionally violate free speech rights guaranteed to both aliens and U.S. citizens. He also ruled that Congress unconstitutionally erred last year in barring PLO members from newly legislated First Amendment protections.

"Only PLO members who also advocate the prohibited McCarran-Walter ideas can be deported," Wilson noted. "PLO members who stay silent or introverted or advocate Chicago School economics or affiliate with the John Birch Society may stay within the country's borders. . . . Thus, we conclude that the PLO exception is not rationally related to a legitimate government end," he said in an outline of his decision released today.

"It's a wonderful, wonderful decision," said Paul Hoffman, American Civil Liberties Union legal director for Southern California and one of the principal attorneys in the case. "He has made it clear that everybody in the country has First Amendment rights."

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Air India...CONTINUED  
the ground at Tenerife, in the Canary Islands, in March of 1977. The toll of 583 dead was the worst in aviation history. Pilot error was blamed.

In August of 1985, a faulty repair on a pressure bulkhead in the rear of a Japan Air Line 747 gave way and part of the tail ripped off. The ensuing crash into a mountain killed all but four of the 524 people on board and constituted the worst disaster involving a single aircraft.

The gravest concerns to date about the structural integrity of Boeing 747s surfaced two years ago after both Pam Am and British Airways discovered cracks in stringers, metal beams that make up the aircraft's rib cage, on early models of the same type as the Boeing 747-100 that crashed in Scotland.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration ordered emergency inspections of all heavily used and older 747s and several others were found to have similar cracks in the humpback section. Engineers suspected the cracks resulted from metal fatigue caused by the flexing of repeated changes in air pressure.

Although the Boeing 747 that crashed in Scotland had been in service for nearly 19 years, Pam Am officials called it nearly new following a major refit last year. That refit was, in part, a result of FAA directives requiring remedial work on early-model 747s.

The aircraft had logged 70,000 hours in the air and, more important, about 33,000 cycles. Each takeoff and landing constitutes a cycle, which is considered a more significant measure of aircraft wear.



Washington Post 24 December 1988 p. 1

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CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

Washington Post 23 December 1988 p. 8

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Held Unconstitutional*

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Ruling against Immigration and Naturalization Service efforts to deport eight politically active aliens, U.S. District Court Judge Stephen V. Wilson said his decision "reaffirms the underlying values of the First Amendment," which include "the premise that only through the free flow of ideas can our nation grow and prosper."

The seven Palestinians, including two with permanent resident status, and one Kenyan were arrested two years ago and scheduled for deportation under provisions of the

McCarthy-era McCarran-Walter Act allowing removal of aliens who advocate—or belong to groups that advocate—world communism, totalitarian dictatorship or the unlawful destruction of property.

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Air India...CONTINUED  
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Tip...CONTINUED

Finnish police interviewed a man believed to have originated the Israeli Embassy terrorist attack from January through March. The police also interviewed an American resident of the man's telephone calls to airlines.

The caller a man of Middle Eastern origin residing in Finland. Finns, Finnish Embassy in Helsinki, these men have a reputation for being security and terrorism of the Finnish.

Despite the security aspects of some circumstances of the U.S. official said the report is considered and that it appears a tip, which touches security alert, was coincidence."

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L. Paul Bremer, counterterrorism department, said it may be "weekend" it is possible to be opened, quite appropriate.

"We could get some convincing ground" amid the bomb fragment investigation is painstaking reconstruction.

President Reagan's administration officials



Washington Post

24 December 1988 p. 11

## Airlines Have Few Means To Find Plastic Explosives

By Philip J. Hiltz  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Airlines have no reliable method of detecting plastic explosives in luggage, but the Federal Aviation Administration has done tests proving that a new device could do the job, experts said yesterday.

The plastic explosives that have been used by terrorists to blow up

airplanes in recent years, and are being examined as a possible cause of the explosion aboard Pan American Flight 103 that crashed in Scotland Wednesday, are light, powerful and almost impossible to detect without a hand search of all luggage. Cleverly hidden plastic bombs can

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Finnish police reported they have interviewed at length the man believed to have called the U.S. Embassy Dec. 5 and who is believed to have originated telephone tips to the Israeli Embassy about potential terrorist attacks on three occasions from January through July this year. The police also said they have re-interviewed and searched the residence of the man named in all four telephone calls as plotting to attack airliners.

The caller and the accused are men of Middle East origin who are residing in Finland after marrying Finns, Finnish authorities told Reuters in Helsinki. "It could be that these men have some personal dispute," said Seppo Tiitinen, chief of the security and antiterrorism section of the Finnish police.

Despite the striking similarity of some aspects of the telephone tip to circumstances of the crash, a senior U.S. official said the Finnish police report is considered highly credible and that it appears likely the Dec. 5 tip, which touched off an extensive security alert, was "a ghoulis incidence."

It is still uncertain whether Pan Am Flight 103 was the victim of a terrorist attack or structural failure, according to U.S. antiterrorism experts. The faint noise heard on the cockpit recording from the doomed flight, which was recovered and played by British authorities yesterday, is consistent with either a bomb or a structural failure, the U.S. experts said.

L. Paul Bremer, ambassador for counterterrorism at the State Department, said in an interview that it may be "weeks or months" before it is possible to determine what happened, quite apart from who is responsible.

"We could get lucky and find some convincing evidence on the ground" amid the wreckage, such as bomb fragments or telltale chemicals, Bremer said. Otherwise, the investigation is likely to be a slow, painstaking reconstruction job.

President Reagan and administration officials, meanwhile, de-

fended the government's decision not to make public the Dec. 5 tip or other warnings of possible terrorist threats.

To warn publicly of such threats on the basis of anonymous telephone calls, Reagan said, would lead to the world's air traffic being closed down.

Reagan, leaving the White House for a two-week California vacation, mourned the victims of the Pan Am crash and asked Americans to "say a special prayer" this Christmas for families and friends of those who died.

In an interview with wire service reporters, Federal Aviation Administrator T. Allan McArtor defended the handling of flight security and said that "both Pan American and the FAA believed the heightened level of surveillance [following the Dec. 5 tip] was sufficient to counter this specific threat that had been called in."

McArtor revealed that the FAA had issued a new "security alert bulletin" Thursday to U.S. airlines and major airports worldwide in the wake of Wednesday's air disaster. Such alerts are generally kept confidential.

McArtor said that up to Thursday, 23 security alerts were issued by the FAA this year. Other sources said the FAA has received reports on more than 900 threats against U.S. air carriers or U.S. airports during the year. The State

Department said U.S. embassies abroad have received 87 telephone threats since Sept. 1.

U.S. sources said the Dec. 5 telephone call to the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki was from a man with a strong Middle Eastern accent who said in English that a "Yassan Garadat" living in Finland would be supplied with a bomb by a man named "Abdullah" living in Frankfurt.

"Garadat" would in turn provide the bomb to an unidentified Finnish woman in Helsinki, who would unwittingly take the device to Frankfurt and within the following two weeks onto a U.S.-bound Pan Am plane, the caller said. According to the caller, the men he named were connected with Abu Nidal, a break-away Palestinian terrorist who is opposed to the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The report of the telephone call was received at the State Department Dec. 7 and passed along the same day to the Finnish police, the FAA for transmission to air carriers and to U.S. embassies in Europe and parts of the Middle East through the State Department's "TERREP" (or terrorist reporting) confidential channel.

As far as is known, only one U.S. embassy, the one in Moscow, chose to make easily available a version of the warning by posting it on a bulletin board near the embassy cafeteria.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



Toronto Globe &amp; Mail

23 December 1988 p. 9

# Parallels emerging between Lockerbie and Air India crash

BY PAUL KORING  
The Globe and Mail

OTTAWA

Ominous parallels are emerging between Wednesday's fiery mid-air breakup over Scotland of a Pan Am Boeing 747 and the catastrophic explosion aboard an Air-India Boeing 747 off the Irish coast in June of 1985.

The bombing of Air-India's flight 182, from Toronto and Montreal to New Delhi and Bombay via London, was the worst-ever terrorist attack on a civilian airliner. All 329 people on board, most of them Canadians of East Indian origin, were killed in the crash.

In both cases, jumbo jets suddenly vanished, without warning or distress signal, on otherwise routine flights. Both were at cruising altitude, considered the safest part of flight. The wreckage of both was widely scattered, indicating the planes broke up before impact.

"It (the Pan-Am crash) had to be a bomb or a massive structural failure," said a Canadian investigator who was part of the team probing the Air-India disaster and who spoke on condition he not be named.

"It brings to mind Air-India," he said, adding the caution that he was dealing only with preliminary information. "When most things — even structural failure — go wrong on an aircraft at high altitude, there is usually time to radio."

Although there might be causes other than a bomb, "the probability points to some sort of an in-flight explosion," he said.

The most troubling aspect of the two disasters is that both flights were vulnerable to the transfer of unaccompanied baggage.

In Canada, at the time of the Air-India disaster, regulations permitted baggage to be transferred to other flights even if the accompanying passenger failed to board.

Pan Am's flight 103 originated in

Frankfurt. The Frankfurt-London leg, however, was flown aboard a smaller Pan Am Boeing 727. Continuing passengers and baggage transferred to Pan Am's New York-bound Boeing 747 at London's Heathrow airport.

Pan Am spokesman Elizabeth Manners refused yesterday to say whether bags belonging to continuing passengers who failed to board aircraft for the next leg of the trip were removed from the plane.

Any loophole that allows an unaccompanied bag to end up on an airliner is a dream come true for aviation terrorists.

Miss Manners also refused to say how many of the Frankfurt passengers held tickets to New York or whether any of them did not board the doomed transatlantic flight.

Security is in the hands of Pan Am for connecting passengers while the British Airports Authority screens passengers and luggage boarding at Heathrow.

Although investigators are loath to theorize in the immediate aftermath of a crash, speculation in the Pan Am disaster, like that of the Air-India flight, quickly focused on the possibility of a bomb. Even if there had not been the inevitable anonymous phone calls claiming responsibility that follow most major aviation disasters, the sudden loss of a modern airliner in mid-flight suggested a terrorist attack.

"Sabotage is the most likely scenario," said David Kyd, a spokesman for the Montreal-based International Air Transport Association, which represents 175 member-airlines. Mr. Kyd, who also noted the striking parallels with the Air-India crash, added that "aircraft don't suddenly disappear when they are cruising at 30,000 feet."

If the Pan Am crash turns out to be unrelated to terrorism, it could have far-reaching effects on international air transport.

## Liability issues...CONTINUED

line defendants try to settle cases quickly to diminish negative publicity.

Such liability questions are still significant, however, because they form the shadow of possible litigation under which Pan Am would negotiate settlements. Pan Am declines to comment on its insurance coverage. According to Lloyd's of London, the lead insurance broker for the airline's coverage is Frank B. Hall & Co., Briarcliff Manor, N.Y. Most of Pan Am's risk is covered by U.S. insurers, led by New York-based American International Group Inc., Lloyd's said.

For some recent aircraft losses, total claims have cost insurers as much as \$200 million. If an accident is tied to terrorism, insurers sometimes face a major claim on political war-risk insurance.

For the Pan Am flight from Frankfurt, claims related to fatalities could be limited by international agreements known collectively as the Warsaw Convention. The convention caps aviation disaster claims at \$75,000 per death on international flights.

However, that limit doesn't necessarily apply if a victim's family can prove that the defendant's conduct was "wanton or willful," Mr. Wolk says. The prospect of having to litigate the nature of its conduct might encourage Pan Am and its insurer to settle cases for more than \$75,000 each, the lawyer says.

—Craig Forman contributed to this article

The Boeing 747, first introduced in 1969, ushered in a new era of air travel. With its huge capacity, great range, and distinctive humped roof over an upper deck, the jumbo jet became the workhorse of intercontinental routes.

Two decades later, it is still the largest civilian airliner, and the latest model, the 747-400 with non-stop, London-to-Singapore range, will enter service early in the new year. Of the 715 Boeing 747s that have rolled off the Seattle manufacturer's assembly line, fewer than 10 have suffered serious crashes. The aircraft has a better-than-average crash rate, in part because it generally is not used for high-frequency, short-haul trips where most accidents occur.

Its massive passenger capacity, however, has also resulted in Boeing 747s being involved in the world's worst and most spectacular disasters.

Two 747s, one belonging to Pan Am and the other to KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, collided in fog on

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



New York Times

# PAN AM WAS TOLD OF TERROR THREAT

## U.S. Embassy in Finland Was Tipped Off 2 Weeks Ago

By JOHN H. CUSHMAN Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 22 — Acting on a threatening but unsubstantiated tip to its embassy in Finland, the Government notified airlines, airports and embassies in Europe two weeks ago of a possible bomb attack against a Pan Am flight from Frankfurt, the Federal Aviation Administration said today. The public was not informed of the threat.

Today, when the warning became known after the crash of Pan American World Airways Flight 103 on Wednesday, Government and airline officials said the public was not told of any possible danger for several reasons, including concern that such publicity would only spawn a number of crank threats that could paralyze the air industry.

### Threat Received Dec. 5

The bomb threat, received on Dec. 5, did not identify a specific Pan Am flight that might be attacked. In the aftermath of the crash in Scotland of the Pan Am Boeing 747 jet, which had taken off from Heathrow Airport outside London on a flight that had originated on a smaller Boeing 727 carrying passengers from Frankfurt, the warning became a source of dispute. Reporters questioned why the threat was deemed important enough for the Government to alert airports, airlines and embassies, but not to tell civilian travelers.

The State Department said it notified European embassies of the threat to the Pan Am flight, but the department said the notices were meant for security and administrative officers at the embassies, not as general warnings to all American diplomats. One embassy, in Moscow, cautioned its employees about the bomb threat. But the State Department said other embassies did not take similar steps.

Asked whether the State Department has a policy of providing travel information to its employees that is not

available to the general public, Phyllis E. Oakley, the deputy to the State Department spokesman, declined to answer directly. She defended the actions of the Moscow embassy, but added that the steps taken there were unusual. "What is appropriate in one embassy is not necessarily appropriate for what happens in various other embassies, and we certainly are not going to give a

## Finns are monitoring the person who made the threat.

read-out in this situation of what every embassy might do," she said.

Finnish authorities expressed doubts about any connection between the threat received in Helsinki and the crash. But the episode raised questions about the adequacy of existing procedures for informing the public about the danger of terrorist attacks.

### Abu Nidal Group Mentioned

The threat, in an anonymous telephone call to the United States Embassy in Helsinki, warned that operatives of the Abu Nidal terrorist organization would smuggle a bomb aboard a Pan Am flight from Germany to the United States in December.

The Finnish authorities, without naming the suspect, said today that since January the Finnish police have been monitoring the activities of the person who made the telephone threat. The same caller, speaking in a strong Arab accent, has repeatedly made similar threats to the American and Israeli embassies in Helsinki, the Foreign Ministry said. The Finnish statement said that the suspect has not left Finland since his most recent call and that he remains under investigation.

Despite the Finnish doubts about the tip's authenticity, the telephone threat to the Helsinki Embassy on Dec. 5 was taken seriously enough in Washington that the aviation agency advised airports and airlines on Dec. 7 to step up security, agency officials said. The warning stated that there was no way to assess the reliability of the bomb threat.

At least one embassy, in Moscow, posted a notice on Dec. 13 based on the aviation agency's bulletin, advising diplomatic travelers to decide for themselves about "altering personal travel plans or changing to another American carrier."

### Government Defends Its Actions

Today, Government and airline officials defended the handling of the warning, saying that even though the

Helsinki threat could not be fully assessed, it served as a basis for tightening security at European airports. Both Pan Am and the Federal Aviation Administration refused to say what security measures were adopted this month after the bomb threat against the airline.

Ray Salazar, the director of aviation security at the Federal Aviation Administration, said that security bulletins like the one issued on Dec. 7 would become ineffective if they were widely publicized.

"If these became public knowledge, then people could circumvent the security measures," he said. "We have a process that works."

Jeffrey F. Kriendler, vice president for communications at Pan Am, said that when the bulletin was received by the airline "immediate action was taken, and the steps that were implemented at that time are still in place."

They cited three reasons not to warn the public of threats. First, they say such notice would undermine security by disclosing to terrorist groups how much the authorities know. Second, they say public notice might spark "copy cat" threats, magnifying the problem. Third, the airlines would suffer cancellations by passengers even when the threats were not valid.

### 23 Bulletins This Year

Mr. Kriendler of Pan Am said the airline supports the policy of keeping security risks secret, but only because this is the best way to enhance security — not out of commercial interest.

According to Mr. Salazar, the aviation agency has issued 23 security bulletins so far this year, including one that was sent out today urging heightened vigilance in the wake of the Pan Am crash.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the F.A.A. and the National Transportation Safety Board all sent teams to Scotland today to investigate the incident. The F.B.I. team was ordered to look into the possibility that terrorists had brought the plane down. The F.B.I. director, William S. Sessions, stressed that there is no solid evidence so far that that was the case.

If terrorism is judged to be the cause of the crash, the F.B.I. could pursue suspects abroad on the order of the Attorney General under a 1986 Federal anti-terrorism law.

American intelligence officials today began to review electronic intercepts and other data, and to check passenger manifests of the doomed flight and

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Los Angeles Times  
23 December  
p. 18

By CHARL

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Los Angeles Times  
23 December 1988  
p. 18

## Palestinian Terrorists Are Sabotage Suspects

U.S. Experts Point to Abu Nidal or Abu Moussa as Possible Chief Plotters

By CHARLES P. WALLACE and DOUGLAS JEHL, Times Staff Writers

NICOSIA, Cyprus—Terrorism experts seeking the author of the suspected sabotage of a Pan American World Airways jumbo jet en route from London to New York have few clues, but they are focusing their initial suspicion on several key Palestinian terrorists.

"There is a lot of investigating going on but . . . we don't know for sure what the cause is," State Department spokeswoman Phyllis Oakley said in Washington. "We can't make definitive evaluations in any sense about what the crash was, who did it, what happened."

Within hours of the crash, both Iranian Prime Minister Hussein Moussavi and Mahmoud Abbas, a member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, issued vehement denials of involvement in the crash.

In London, a caller identifying himself as a spokesman for a group called the "Guardians of the Islamic Revolution," an organization believed to have ties to Lebanon and Iran, claimed Thursday that his group brought down the Pan Am jet. He said the plane was bombed in retaliation for the U.S. Navy missile attack that downed a civilian Iranian jetliner over the Persian Gulf on July 3. The Pentagon said the airliner was mistaken for an approaching warplane.

Earlier this month, a man speaking in what was described as a Middle East accent called the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki and said a bomb would be placed aboard a Pan Am plane by the terrorist group headed by Abu Nidal, whose real name is Sabri Banna.

Most terrorism experts said Abu Nidal's organization, called Fatah Revolutionary Council, is more likely to have caused such an act than the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, although they conceded

that a third group could also have been responsible.

Terrell Arnold, a U.S. terrorism expert, said the threat to the embassy in Helsinki was less consistent with Abu Nidal's mode of operation than with that of Abu Moussa, another renegade Palestinian terrorist. "But it is also an

easy thing to copy," Arnold said.

A U.S. terrorism expert who asked not to be identified said the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution had attacked Iranian dissidents in Western Europe. "But their previous attacks have been pretty amateurish," he said, "and that gives some doubt to the credibility of their claim."

Also, he noted, "they didn't claim it until this morning, and the time lag, I would suggest, doesn't improve their credibility."

Oakley also noted that the telephone call in the name of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution "was made several hours after the public announcement of the crash, [so] there is simply no way that we can verify this claim."

Neil Livingstone, another U.S. terrorism authority, also was skeptical of claims of responsibility.

"The media were all but inviting someone to take responsibility for this," he said. "If I had been a sleaze bag from some Iranian student organization, I might have claimed responsibility too."

He suggested that Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War), a terrorist group that claims to hold some of the American hostages in Lebanon, might have claimed responsibility

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

be given to the public in such cases? If diplomatic personnel were informed of the warning, why not military personnel or members of the public? How could a bomb possibly have been put aboard a flight, following a warning? Should the Government change either its policies on notifications or its security measures?

"Whether there should be public press releases, bulletins, or something, is probably a good question, but I don't know," said Marlin Fitzwater, the White House spokesman, when asked about the dissemination of warnings.

American officials flatly refused to speculate publicly on which terrorist groups would be prime suspects in an aircraft bombing of the scope of the Pan Am disaster.

### A List of Suspects

But privately, officials and private terrorism experts said many groups possessed both the resources and motives to perform such a deed. Among them are several groups with long public records of terrorist acts.

The Abu Nidal organization, a group loosely allied with the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, has been tied to attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna during the December holiday season in 1985. The State Department has accused Libya of sponsoring the bloody 1986 hijacking of a Pan Am jetliner in Karachi, Pakistan.

American counterterrorism officials have said recently that Colonel Qaddafi appears to be stepping up his nation's role in promoting terrorism after a lengthy hiatus.

In addition, factions in the Iranian Government have repeatedly pledged to seek revenge for the United States Navy's downing of an Iran Air passenger jet last summer in which 290 civilians died. But the Iranian Government today strongly denied any role in the Pan Am crash.

Pan Am told of threat . . . other connecting aircraft, in an arduous search for clues to the explosion.

But while circumstances of the crash "are pointing in the direction" of a terrorist act, one intelligence official said, no conclusive evidence has turned up.

"There are a lot of indications that say 'explosion,' that official said. "But an explosion doesn't have to be a bomb."

United States intelligence and law enforcement officials also played down claims by a number of anonymous callers that Middle East terrorist groups had planted a bomb on the flight, saying such claims are expected after a major aircraft disaster.

The security bulletin was sent not only to Pan Am and the airports it serves, including those in Frankfurt and London, but to other American air carriers and other European airports.

The bulletin was also sent to embassies throughout Europe, primarily to help them coordinate security measures that might be adopted by governments in the region, Mr. Salazar said.

### Some Troubling Questions

The bulletin, like all similar notices, stated specifically that "the information is solely for the use of U.S. carriers and airport security personnel, and may not be further disseminated without the specific approval" of the aviation agency.

But the Government and the airline faced some troubling questions:

What notice of security risks should



Washington Post 22 December 1988 p. 1

## At Least 258 Killed In Jet Crash in Scotland

By A. D. Horne  
Washington Post Foreign Service

A jumbo jet bound from London to New York crashed into a Scottish village last night, apparently killing all 258 persons aboard.

The Pan American Boeing 747 slammed into a gasoline station and several houses in the town of Lockerbie three miles north of the English border, igniting a fireball that rose up to 300 feet into the sky. There was no immediate indication of what caused the accident, which took place in clear weather less than an hour's flight time from London.

"There were no mayday signals," a Pan Am vice president, Jeff Kriender, told reporters in New York last night. The plane had left London's Heathrow Airport at 6:25 p.m. local time (1:25 p.m. EST), and the last contact from the crew was at 7:15 p.m., when the plane was cruising at 31,000 feet, Kriender said.

As rescue teams reached the crash scene, about 275 miles north-

west of London, there were increasing indications of an explosion aboard the plane. The jet's cabin door was found about 10 miles from the rest of the cockpit, while an engine was found on a highway outside the village. At least one witness said the plane may have been on fire before it hit the ground.

The plane, Pan Am Flight 103, "disappeared from radar contact at 7:15 p.m.," British Department of Transport spokesman Mike Vertigans said in a telephone interview. Britain's Civil Aviation Authority said Scottish air controllers had talked to the crew minutes before the crash and received no indication of any problem.

British aviation officials denied reports that the 747 may have hit another plane. One British news service report said the jet may have broken into two before hitting the ground. Brian Reed, a spokesman for Britain's Scottish Office in Edinburgh, said his office had received reports of wreckage landing in Langholm, 10 miles east of Lockerbie.

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### Greece...CONTINUED

behind an attack on a Greek cruise ship last summer that left nine people dead and 98 injured, accommodations to terrorism continue. Greek authorities are stalling on a U.S. extradition request for another Palestinian, Mohammed Rashid, who is wanted in the 1982 bombing of a Pan American jetliner.

At a time when the Palestine Liberation Organization has, rhetorically at least, publicly renounced terrorism, Athens' attitude is even more bizarre. It suggests renewed willingness to countenance rejectionist terrorists passing through Greece if they pursue their murderous business elsewhere.

For terrorists, Athens once had the most porous airport of Western Europe. International pressure forced it to tighten up. The same kind of pressure should be brought to bear now. If Greece is a place where terrorists can come and go with impunity, prospective tourists should know that — and stay away.

sions said his agency has joined the crash investigation.

The FBI has "probably the most sophisticated laboratory in the world," says Sgt. Howard Rechtschaffen of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's bomb squad. "They'll find out."

Investigators will examine the crash site for evidence of bomb parts, including tell-tale electrical wires, the remains of timing devices and detonation switches, says Rechtschaffen.

Test results could be "almost immediate... sometimes months if you're not lucky."

If the plastic explosive Semtex is linked to the crash, suspicion could spread to Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi.

Claims of responsibility for the crash have come from a little-known, pro-Iranian group, rumored to be linked to Abu Nidal's radical Palestinian faction — both believed to receive support from Gadhafi.

The U.S. State Department says the Irish Republican Army has received supplies of the yellowish, claylike, Czech-made explosive from Gadhafi.

Former CIA Director Stansfield Turner advises caution, even if the crash was caused by a bomb: "We've got to learn to be patient in a situation like this, as gruesome as it is."

USA Today 23 December 1988 p. 4

## If it was a bomb, 'fingerprints' exist

By Sam Meddis  
USA TODAY

If a bomb destroyed Pan Am Flight 103, rest assured that crash investigators will find out, experts say.

It's also likely that sophisticated tests will be able to tell exactly what type of explosive was used, says David Fine of Thermedics, a Boston firm working on U.S. government contracts to develop devices

that can sniff bombs at airports and embassies.

Molecular evidence of an explosive would remain like a fingerprint on the plane's debris: "Invariably, in any explosion there's some unconsumed explosive," says Fine.

FBI Director William Ses-

*David Fine of Thermedics*



## Pan Am crash...CONTINUED

"All we know is that all those in the aircraft are dead," said David Brooks, air vice marshal for the Royal Air Force in Scotland.

A police official in the nearby town of Dumfries reported that at least 15 villagers had been killed. Local hospitals said 12 badly burned villagers had been rushed in for treatment.

Pan Am's Kriendler said the airline would not release a passenger list until the next of kin were notified. Flight 103 originated in Frankfurt as a Boeing 727 and changed to the 747 at Heathrow, where additional passengers, many carrying Christmas packages, boarded. A total of 243 passengers and a crew of 15 were aboard the 747, which had been scheduled to land at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport at 9:19 p.m.

Pan Am has particularly stringent security procedures at Heathrow, involving a three-stage check of passengers' baggage beginning before check-in and concluding with a search of hand luggage at the Pan Am departure lounge, according to a recent and regular traveler on the airline.

The first passenger identified was the United Nations commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson of Sweden. A U.N. spokesman said Carlsson was on his way back from a seminar in Brussels to attend a ceremony for the three-nation agreement on Namibia that is to be signed at the United Nations today.

Six members of the U.S. State Department's Diplomatic Security Service, who were returning from Beirut, were also aboard the plane, according to a state department spokesman.

An official at New York's Syracuse University said that 38 of its students were aboard the plane. University spokeswoman Kerry Burns said the students were sophomores, juniors and seniors studying abroad.

The Associated Press said its director of international communications, John Mulroy, was a passenger along with his son and daughter-in-law.

Pan Am spokesman Kriendler said the airline had received "no threats, no indication that anything

was wrong." He said "there were no indications prior to the flight that there were any problems on board the aircraft," and "no signs that inclement weather was a factor."

Kriendler said the airline was sending an investigating team to the scene last night. A team of 10 British air safety experts was being assembled to go to Lockerbie this morning, and the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board said it would send an investigator to assist in the probe.

Royal Air Force helicopters from England and Scotland were rushed to the crash scene. U.S. Ambassador Charles Price was reported flying from London by military aircraft to join Douglas Jones, the U.S. consul general in Edinburgh, at the

scene.

Witnesses in Lockerbie viewed by British radio and television reporters last night, the shock of the crash.

"There was a terrible and the whole sky lit up and it was actually raining fire," said a man, who was a few yards from the scene, told the Broadcasting Corp. television. "I could see several houses and roofs were totally off, and I could see what was left of the houses."

Graham Byerley, who works at a hotel a half mile from the crash

## Pan Am crash...

told the BBC: "We were rumbling over the roof and then we heard a tremor on the ground, a quake. Then we saw this enormous ball about 200 or 300 feet. There was debris everywhere."


"We tried to get it but it was completely broken," Glasgow told the BBC. "There was no chance of anyone getting it."

A BBC reporter at the crash site said he saw a large square. He described it as deep and 10 feet deep and 10 feet deep. He said he saw pieces of visible metal more than 3 feet long. Pan Am's Kriendler had been in service since 1970, but had been and rebuilt last year. Reserve Air Fleet government program airlines receive an exchange for metal available to the emergency. "Although early model 747, brand new plane overhaul, Kriendler Kriendler added had received a letter from San Francisco last week. The airline was to identify what the aircraft was doing with this trouble. Follow our normal

The Associated Press following:

The last major 747 occurred Aug. 1988. A Japan Airlines 747 crashed on a mountain on a day killing 520 people. The Am accident occurred in New Orleans, crashed on takeoff. The Japan Air worst single-plane in history. Boeing faulty repairs causes of the crash contributed to a crash

## THE CRASH OF FLIGHT 103





## Pan Am crash...CONTINUED

told the BBC: "We initially heard a rumbling over the hotel. We thought the roof was falling in. And then we heard a tremendous shudder on the ground, as if in an earthquake. Then we saw sparks, then this enormous ball of flames going about 200 or 300 feet into the air. There was debris flying everywhere."

"We tried to get near the plane, but it was completely on fire," John Glasgow told Independent Radio News. "There were no bodies about. I don't think there would be any chance of anyone getting out of it."

A BBC reporter who reached the crash site said he saw wreckage strewn over an area eight miles square. He described a crater 20 feet deep and 100 feet long, with few pieces of visible wreckage larger than 3 feet long.

Pan Am's Kriendler said the 747 had been in service since February 1970, but had been disassembled and rebuilt last year under the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program, a U.S. government program under which airlines receive aircraft overhauls in exchange for making the planes available to the government in an emergency. "Although it was an early model 747, it was practically a brand new plane" because of the overhaul, Kriendler said.

Kriendler added that the plane had received a base check in San Francisco last week. Asked whether the airline would recall its 747 fleet, Kriendler replied, "Until we identify what the problems associated with this tragedy are, we will follow our normal routines."

*The Associated Press reported the following:*

The last major crash of a Boeing 747 occurred Aug. 12, 1985, when a Japan Airlines flight crashed into a mountain on a domestic flight, killing 520 people. The last fatal Pan Am accident occurred July 9, 1982, in New Orleans, when a Boeing 727 crashed on takeoff, killing 153.

The Japan Airlines crash was the worst single-plane aircraft accident in history. Boeing later admitted its faulty repairs were one of the causes of the crash, which was attributed to a crack in the rear cabin

wall, that caused a sudden loss of pressure. The force of the air tore the plane's tail apart.

The Federal Aviation Administration in 1986 ordered a modification of all Boeing 747s as a result of that crash.

David Jimenez of Boeing Commercial Airplanes in Seattle said the jet that crashed today was a 747-100. He said it was the 15th 747 ever built and that it was delivered to Pan Am in February 1970.

The 747 had approximately 33,000 cycles (one cycle is a takeoff and landing). Even though the jet was relatively old in terms of 747s, that is not considered a high number of cycles, he said. A high number is 50,000-plus.

*Warren Getler of the International Herald Tribune in London, special correspondent Marianne Yen and staff writer Howard Kurtz in New York contributed to this report.*

## PREVIOUS AVIATION DISASTERS

- **March 27, 1977:** 582 killed in a collision of two Boeing 747s operated by Pan American and KLM at the airport on Tenerife in Spain's Canary Islands.
- **Aug. 12, 1985:** 520 killed when a Japan Air Lines Boeing 747 crashes into a mountain on a domestic flight.
- **March 3, 1974:** 346 killed when a Turkish DC10 crashes 26 miles northeast of Paris.
- **June 23, 1985:** 329 killed when an Air India Boeing 747 crashes off the coast of Ireland.
- **Aug. 19, 1980:** 301 killed in a fiery emergency landing of a Saudi Arabian L1011 at the airport in the Saudi capital, Riyadh.
- **July 3, 1988:** 290 killed when an Iran Air A300 Airbus is shot down over the Persian Gulf by the USS Vincennes after being mistaken for an attacking plane.
- **May 25, 1979:** 275 killed when an American Airlines DC10 crashes on takeoff from Chicago.
- **Sept. 1, 1983:** 269 killed when a Korean Air 747 is shot down by a Soviet fighter after flying through Soviet airspace near Sakhalin Island.
- **Nov. 28, 1979:** 257 killed when an Air New Zealand DC10 taking tourists to the South Pole strikes a mountain in Antarctica.
- **Dec. 12, 1985:** 256 killed when a chartered Arrow Air DC8 carrying members of the 101st Airborne Division crashes on takeoff from Gander, Newfoundland.

SOURCE: Associated Press



## In World War on Terrorism, Greece Surre

Atlanta Journal 20 December 1988 p. 12

**Durwood McAlister****World Seems to Have Lost Definition of Terrorism**

Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat says his organization has renounced terrorism and will "do all our best" to stop it; but in the same breath he accuses Israel of practicing "state terrorism" because it met violence with violence and killed five Palestinians.

Another PLO leader says renouncing terrorism does not mean that violent resistance by Palestinians against Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip will be curtailed.



Only a few days ago the government of Greece freed a Palestinian wanted in Italy as a suspect in a 1982 synagogue bombing that resulted in the death of a 2-year-old boy and the wounding of 34 other worshippers. The Greek government decided it was not an act of "terrorism." Instead, it excused the killer's wanton slaughter because, they said, it came "within the domain of the struggle to regain the independence of his homeland."

Last Friday, the Irish Republican Army, which has been killing British soldiers from ambush in its campaign to drive the British Army out of Northern Ireland, announced a one-week deadline for the wives and children of British soldiers to leave Ulster.

The IRA made it clear that it now regards the families of British servicemen as legitimate targets for its guns and bombs.

Three years ago, at the time of the Achille Lauro hijacking, there was some hope that the civilized nations of the world had become fed up with terrorism in all its forms and was prepared to do something about it.

The United States and most of its allies seemed agreed that they would make no deals with terrorists and that they would join forces to see that those who committed acts of terrorism would be tracked down and punished.

That resolve has been frittered away as each country — including the United States — succumbed to the temptation to find an easy way out when the lives of its own citizens were involved.

Once again, the Greek government turned up the white flag in the international terrorism. It turned loose a member of the infamous Abu Nidal gang wanted for murder in a 1982 grenade attack on a Rome synagogue.

In refusing to extradite the Palestinian suspect, Osama Abdel Zomar, it demonstrated a complete disregard for elementary justice and a credible absence of logical faculties.

Zomar had been held in a Greek prison on charge of possessing illegal weapons. He was refused of handing him over to Italy when the bombing ended, Athens canceled an extradition request and allowed him to go to his home of his choice — none other than the base of Abu Nidal thugs.

The Greek justice minister's explanation was that the Rome synagogue attack, in which a 2-year-old boy and 37 people were injured, was "in the domain of the struggle to regain independence" and is therefore not a crime. By this logic, it's all right for Palestinians to kill anyone anywhere in the world.

Soft-headedness on the subject of terrorism is an unfortunate Greek habit. The Greek Communist Abu Nidal group was allowed to keep its logistics office in Athens until allied forces closed it last year. Although the same organization

But perhaps the most damaging development in those years has been the loss of an acceptable, universal definition of "terrorism."

Three years ago there was no question among civilized people that Yasser Arafat was a terrorist and a leader of terrorists. Yet we have just seen the General Assembly of the United Nations take the extraordinary step of moving its session from New York to Geneva for the sole purpose of giving him a world stage on which to play his semantic games.

Not a single government spoke up to condemn the action of the Greek government in describing a senseless bombing of a synagogue and the killing of a child as a legitimate means of fighting a "struggle" for independence of the terrorist's homeland.

And the IRA's decision to target women and children, simply because they are families of British soldiers, has been received with apathy and unconcern.

We are playing a dangerous game in refusing to recognize terrorism for what it is. Today Israelis and the families of British soldiers are the targets. We should have learned by now that terrorism, unchecked, will make us tomorrow's victims.



Security Intelligence and



# COUNTER - TERRORISM

12 DECEMBER 1988

Pg. 2

## Arrow Air: Ice or Sabotage?

When 248 soldiers of the US Army's 101st Airborne Division died in December 1985 along with eight members of a DC-8 crew at Gander, Newfoundland, the cause appeared rather straightforward: ice on the wings. That has explained many an accident under similar circumstances. Now it does not seem nearly so certain in the case of the DC-8 chartered from Arrow Air, even though technically a majority of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB) says it was ice. Many others say it was an explosion. The aircraft departed Cairo, Egypt, for Cologne, West Germany, refueled at Gander and was to fly to Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

A strong dissent has been filed by four members of the nine-member CASB, whose chairman broke a tie vote between the other eight members to create a majority. However, a former member had resigned in protest over the conduct of the investigation and he would have voted against the ice theory if he had remained a board member. Resignation of BGen Roger LaCroix, RCAF (Ret), allowed him to speak out freely in public. Capt. Ross Stevenson, a retired Air Canada pilot with long years of experience, sharply differs with the official report, as do three colleagues and LaCroix, believing an onboard explosion brought the aircraft down. One possibility is sabotage, another is that a soldier put unauthorized ordnance aboard the aircraft in baggage.

The four dissenters still on the CASB are all well-qualified in air transport operations, one being a research pilot on icing at Canada's National Research Council. Another is an aeronautical engineer and airline pilot with 707 and 747 experience. Said Stevenson: "There are too many reliable witnesses in Gander who either worked the flight or measured the weather or observed the weather at the time the aircraft came in and landed and during the time it was on the ground. Plus, there were four flights that came through there at the time and said they needed no de-icing at Gander. Ted West, crew chief on the ground at Gander, has worked there 30 years and said he felt the nose of the airplane and there was no ice on it. We believe those witnesses. There were many key witnesses that we as board members knew nothing about. I hope a full public inquiry hears them."

Irrefutable evidence is hard to find because of the fire following the crash, said Stevenson, but two witnesses were almost hit by the aircraft as it flew over their truck just off the end of the runway. They both said the airplane was on fire on the right side. One said it was at the juncture of the wing and the fuselage. That's where the Number 2 cargo compartment is located." Security procedures for the aircraft in Cairo seem to have been no different than if they had been on a routine exercise in Nevada. A commercial charter was thus handled in Cairo for 248 US troops by Arab nationals and three years later we still don't know who they are. The troops were ordered to appear at the airport in civilian clothes in order not to create anti-American demonstrations by the increasingly fundamentalist Egyptians.

To this day nobody knows the identities of the men in Cairo who serviced the aircraft there and loaded the bags, one Canadian observer told CT. BGen LaCroix does not even believe the investigation was pursued in that direction. Often, information LaCroix requested took eight months to reach him. He later discovered that investigators were told not to speak to him and that US Army documents he had requested were never shown to him after their receipt by the CASB. There are indications of a coverup to fend off the possibility that terrorist sabotage would be found to be the cause of the crash.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

### Beduin terror...CONTINUED

three to the Islamic Jihad, and one to Abu Nidal's group.

Along with details of the cells, the ministry released the text of a letter from Defence Minister Rabin to the

head of the Shin Bet in which he praised the "unknown soliders" of the General Security Services for the "daring, determination, valour, sophistication and resourcefulness" they employ "to capture murderers and terrorists."



Los Angeles Times

26 NOVEMBER 1988

Pg. 1

# On the Trail of a Deadly Terrorist

WASHINGTON—His name is almost unpronounceable, and his face is hardly familiar. But if the FBI maintained a "Ten Most Wanted Terrorists" list, Imad Mughniyah's name would be at the top.

"Mughniyah is the single most dangerous terrorist at large today," says Oliver B. Revell, the FBI's executive assistant director for investigations. "Since 1983, he has been the most virulent and most dangerous terrorist acting against U.S. interests in the Middle East."

So far, according to U.S., Israeli and European officials, Mughniyah has been tied to the abductions of six American, one British and five French hostages, as well as to three hijackings and two mass bombings that killed more than 250 Americans—"at least!" stresses a U.S. counterterrorism specialist.

## 'His Special Touch'

"There's a lot more in which his special touch has been felt," the specialist adds. Israeli sources believe he also has gained control over two Israeli soldiers captured in Lebanon.

Mughniyah's shadowy life illustrates why the U.S. war against terrorism has seen so much frustration and failure. This man, who has apparently masterminded more deadly attacks than the legendary Carlos and who has had more recent impact than the Palestinian renegade Abu Nidal, may prove to be one of the incoming George Bush Administration's toughest adversaries as it grapples over the nine Americans still held hostage in Lebanon.

Mughniyah's is a life shaped by the violence of the Arab-Israeli struggle, the passion of Islamic fundamentalism and almost unfathomable loyalties to family and clan that play such a critical but shadowy role in the Arab Middle East.

## Two Greatest Defeats

Reagan Administration officials acknowledge that the leader of a tiny cell of Lebanese Shia Muslim

By ROBIN WRIGHT,  
Times Staff Writer

extremists who call themselves Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War) was a key figure in their two greatest foreign policy defeats: the 1983 suicide bombing of the Marine compound in Beirut that led the United States to abandon its Lebanon initiative and the hostage seizures that ultimately resulted in the Iran-Contra affair.

For all the attention he has received from U.S. and other authorities, Mughniyah—pronounced Moog-NEE-yah—remains one of the world's most enigmatic figures.

He was originally trained and supported by Iran, but he has increasingly taken his own lead to fulfill a personal agenda.

"Whatever his connections, past or present, it appears he no longer takes orders from anyone, even former mentors in Lebanon and Iran," says an American counterterrorism official.

Of the nine American hostages still held in Lebanon, two are under his direct control and at least three others are said by U.S. sources to be "within his easy reach."

Groups with four different names hold the Americans, although they are all believed to fall generally under the umbrella of Hezbollah, or Party of God. "The other groups tend to follow Mughniyah's lead," says a Justice Department source.

After the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, it took U.S. intelligence agents two years just to trace his name. And pictures thought to be of Mughniyah, whom former hostages describe as bearded and handsome, are still frequently misidentified.

In one near-comic incident, U.S. and French officials thought that they had traced him to France, where he reportedly once had a mistress. When authorities burst through the hotel door, however, they found an elderly Lebanese couple in bed.

Information about him remains wildly erratic. Intelligence sources from five different countries place his age anywhere from 25 to 40. Some say that he has five children, others say he has none. According to one erroneous tip, he had once attended USC.

But all sources agree on his motive: the release of the 17 prisoners held in Kuwait for a series of 1983 bombings, including the U.S. and French embassies there. Among the 17 is his brother-in-law and cousin, Mustafa Badreddin.

U.S. and European analysts originally speculated that Mughniyah's wife, Khadigah, and her family had pressured him to act on Badreddin's behalf. In fact, however, it was just the other way around. The cousins were also longtime friends, having lived near each other in Beirut's southern slums and having fought in the same militias, according to Lebanese Shia sources. Mughniyah's marriage to Badreddin's sister was, in some ways, a byproduct of their friendship.

## Lethal Combination

They proved to be a lethal combination. Mughniyah was the planner, Badreddin the explosives specialist. Reagan Administration sources tie them both to the Marine barracks bombing in which 241 U.S. servicemen died.

There is also strong speculation about their role in the 1983 U.S. Embassy bombing in Beirut, in which 17 Americans were killed. Badreddin developed what U.S. sources called a "trademark," a technique using gas to enhance the power of already sophisticated explosives.

Their teamwork was terminated with Badreddin's capture in Kuwait.

"Mughniyah's not crazed," says former hostage David P. Jacobsen of Huntington Beach, Calif., one of the few Americans to have seen him. "But he is obsessed."

"The captors believe that America is so powerful that we could call the Emir of Kuwait and get the 17



released. They believe that the United States has blocked efforts to win their release."

The first American hostages were abducted in Beirut shortly before the 1984 trial of the terrorist suspects in Kuwait. After Badreddin was sentenced to death, the pace of abductions quickened. The execution has not been carried out.

#### Jacobsen's Encounters

Jacobsen, who was one of the three persons released in the Administration's arms-for-hostages swap with Iran, believes that he had two encounters with Mughniyah. The first was when he was asked to make a videotape, the only time the hostages were allowed to take off their blindfolds in the presence of their captors.

"He is a tall, slender, well-dressed and handsome man in his mid-30s, with not plaintive eyes, but penetrating eyes," Jacobsen recalls.

The second meeting was on Nov. 1, 1986, just before Jacobsen's release. "He came and sat on the pad [that the hostages used as beds] and gave me instructions. Though I was blindfolded, I knew it was him."

"He started in English and then asked if I spoke French as he was more fluent in French. He wanted his brother-in-law out of jail. The issue had remained constant. That's what he told me."

Mughniyah succumbed to Iranian pressure in the release of the three Americans in the arms-for-hostage deal. But some U.S. officials now fear that even Iran may not be able to squeeze Mughniyah into releasing the other Americans.

"Mughniyah's never, ever changed his position," says a Justice Department official. "As long as he's in charge of the hostages, as long as that's his single issue, and as long as Kuwait and the U.S. refuse to make any deals, then resolution is going to be difficult."

"Someone is going to have to usurp his power for there to be any improvement in the situation."

Mughniyah and his partners may also want to use some of the hostages as insurance against retribution, some officials believe. "He already knows we're looking for him, and he's become more circumspect in his actions," says a U.S. counterterrorism specialist.

A sealed indictment was issued last year listing Mughniyah as the fourth person in the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in 1985, during

which 39 Americans were held hostage for 17 days.

#### Hamadi on Trial

He was not publicly named at the time, however, because the United States feared the impact on the hostages. One of the other three, Mohammed Ali Hamadi, is now on trial in West Germany for his involvement in the hijacking and the killing of U.S. Navy diver Robert Dean Stethem.

The Hamadi family is another of Lebanon's clans. Four brothers are tied to the abduction of at least two American and two German hostages as well as to the TWA skyjacking, according to European officials.

The tightly knit clan structure makes the cells difficult to penetrate. Jacobsen and other former American and French hostages believe that only a handful of men, about a dozen, are members, with about another 40 in their pay as guards.

Mughniyah and the Hamadis are said by Reagan Administration sources to work together closely, although often with different goals.

"It's like an association of street gangs. Sometimes their interests converge, sometimes they compete," says a source who has closely followed Mughniyah's career.

U.S. officials refuse to say whether Mughniyah has been secretly indicted for other crimes, specifically the Marine bombing or the 1984 hijacking of a Kuwaiti plane during which two U.S. Agency for International Development workers were slain. He has been linked to this episode as well as to the prolonged hijacking last April of another Kuwaiti aircraft to Cyprus and Algeria.

Like most of the Middle East's most notorious extremists, Mughniyah rose from relative obscurity. He grew up in the southern Lebanese village of Tir Dibba. As with many of the early Shia activists, he received his first training in Palestine Liberation Organization camps.

Lebanese sources say, however, that he was always as religious as he was political. A relative, Sheik Mohammed Mughniyah, was a leading local Shia cleric. After the younger Mughniyah moved to Beirut, he became a bodyguard to Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, the spiritual mentor of Hezbollah.

After the 1982 Israeli invasion and PLO evacuation, Mughniyah also became close to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards deployed in the eastern Bekaa Valley, according to other Lebanese Shias.

"The watershed in his life was the killing of his brother Jihad as the result of shelling of the Muslim suburbs by the Lebanese army," said a Lebanese Shia academic who has interviewed former Mughniyah contacts and friends.

The Lebanese army was at that stage being trained by the United States, which was at the height of its involvement in Lebanon. Mughniyah reportedly then became part of an Iranian-backed network that undertook attacks on U.S. facilities and personnel.

Although U.S. sources say Mughniyah has twice spent long periods in Iran this year, they note that he has increasingly acted independently.

"The Revolutionary Guards seem genuinely surprised by some of what he has done," says a State Department official. At one stage, U.S. officials believe he was under virtual house arrest in Iran. His trips to Iran may be attributable in part to a rift with Syria, which is reportedly now trying to track him down.

And an Arab government that has tried to deal directly with Mughniyah over the hostage issue has suggested that he masterminded the April Kuwaiti hijacking in defiance of Iranian orders.

Iran's recent cutback in financial aid to Hezbollah factions also may have diminished its influence over Mughniyah and other hostage holders.

U.S. officials now are hoping that Iranian support will further evaporate as part of that nation's efforts after its cease-fire with Iraq to better its diplomatic standing and that Shia Muslim factionalism will further isolate him in Lebanon.

"Bringing him to justice is not just a hope, it's an intention," says Revell. "We're going to be sure he has no place to hide. And if he's going to operate, he'll have to come out in the open, which makes him vulnerable."

But others are less optimistic. "Mughniyah has become part of Lebanese folklore," says a British counterterrorism official. "He is now so legendary he can do pretty much what he wants."

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## SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM

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# CURRENT NEWS

## SPECIAL EDITION



22 FEB 1989 TERRORISM NO. 1780

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Washington Times

29 December 1988

p. 11

## Lone grenade-lobber seen outside USO club before blast

Christian Science Monitor 29 December 1988 p. 3

### Toughness with terrorists is bringing results, US official says

By E. A. Wayne  
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

For the last two years, international terrorism has declined, says L. Paul Bremmer III, the United States ambassador at large for counterterrorism.

This reflects an increasingly solid counterterrorism network among concerned countries, Mr. Bremmer says, and a growing consensus that terrorists should be treated as criminals, not political activists.

He calculates that incidents of international terrorism (as distinguished from terrorism carried out by domestic groups in their country) declined about 6 percent in 1986 and have so far dropped about the same amount this year. This stands in sharp contrast with the 20 to 30 percent annual increases in the early 1980s, he says.

Despite this cautious optimism, Bremmer says the war is far from won. This week's terrorist attack on US servicemen in Barcelona, in which a US sailor was killed, demonstrates the continuing threat. Hostage taking remains a particularly troublesome and effective form of terrorism, he says. The pressures on governments to make deals creates divisions in the international front against terrorists, Bremmer says, and may be making it more difficult for the US to get its eight hostages out of Lebanon.

States, such as Libya, Iran, and Syria, also continue to support and use terrorism despite international pressures to desist, Bremmer says. (See related story, next page.) Thus, closer and better international cooperation is needed, but the trends are in the right direction, he adds.

Western publics just got fed up with terrorism, Bremmer argues, and started demanding that their governments develop ef-

fective counterstrategies. "We are now beginning to see the benefits," he says. One example is air safety. Twenty years ago, Bremmer says, there were 15 to 20 international hijackings a year; there were two each in 1986 and '87.

This reflects international cooperation on security and criminal prosecution. Work continues on ways to better detect bombs in hand luggage and baggage, he says, and just this month the International Civil Aviation Organization ordered all airlines to institute checks to ensure that all luggage is matched to passengers before takeoff.

More generally, the degree of police and intelligence cooperation among countries has multiplied, Bremmer says. Rather than seeking to cut deals, countries are now saying, "Let the cops do their job," he adds.

Cooperation in Europe has improved markedly in the last two years, he says, with the traditionally reluctant French acting as a motor force. The result has been a sharp drop in terrorist actions in Europe and the crippling of many terrorist groups.

Similarly, governments have begun to make the tough decisions needed to bring terrorists to justice, with new laws and successful trials, Bremmer says. Britain, Italy, West Germany, France, and others have convicted terrorists with stiff sentences.

The one area of real concern, Bremmer says, is hostage taking. In recent months, four foreign hostages have been freed in Lebanon. Western intelligence sources say more than \$1 million each was paid for a West German and for a Korean. Two French hostages were released in what appears to be part of a deal with Iran.

Bremmer declines to comment directly on the ransom reports, but he says "the impression is around that hostages are being ransomed in one way or another, not necessarily with money but with some kind of promises or whatever. . . . If hostage holders, particularly the people holding the eight American hostages, get the impression that governments will be willing to make concessions to get their citizens out, that will only prolong the agony of the Americans held hostage. It will only make it more difficult for our government to get our hostages out."

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

BARCELONA, Spain (AP) — An attacker shouted "Long live Lebanon!" before lobbing two hand grenades that killed a U.S. sailor and wounded nine others in a USO club, police said yesterday.

The assailant then fled.

"As far as we know there was only one person involved," said a police spokesman. He said an unidentified witness heard the attacker shout "Long live Lebanon!" in Spanish.

Witnesses described the man who threw the grenades into the club as young, dark-skinned, with curly hair.

The Barcelona daily La Vanguardia said police had doubts about claims by an obscure separatist group, the Red Army of Catalanian Liberation, that it was responsible for the attack Saturday night in this Mediterranean port city.

The newspaper said police were investigating the possibility that the attacker belonged to some Islamic terrorist group.

In 1985, a group calling itself Islamic Jihad-Islamic Resistance claimed responsibility for the worst attack directed against Americans in Spain, the bombing that year of a Madrid restaurant frequented by U.S. military personnel. That attack killed 18 Spaniards and injured 80 people, including several Americans. Basque separatists also claimed responsibility.

Doctors at Barcelona's Hospital del Mar said they completed an autopsy yesterday on the body of Petty Officer Ronald Strong, 22, a motor specialist from Reeder, Pa. The sailor died Sunday after surgery for shrapnel wounds suffered in the blast at the United Services Organization club.

A hospital morgue official said arrangements were made to take the body to the U.S. air base at Torrejon outside Madrid to await shipment home.

Petty Officer Strong was in the club, which the USO rents out when

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



## Grenade-lobber... CONTINUED

U.S. Navy ships anchor in Barcelona, with other sailors when grenades exploded in the doorway.

Four of the other nine were hospitalized overnight.

Petty Officer Strong was on liberty from the destroyer USS Thorn, which left Barcelona ahead of schedule yesterday for Naples, Italy, along with the frigate USS Donald B. Beary. Their flags flew at half-mast.

The two ships, with the Navy's 6th Fleet, arrived in Barcelona on Dec. 21. They originally planned to leave at the end of the week, said Rafael Jerez, a U.S. Embassy official.

The Spanish news agency Europa

Press said security was stepped up around U.S. warships at the Mediterranean island of Majorca after the attack.

In a note, Spain's Foreign Ministry yesterday condemned the attack as "lamentable and intolerable."

The Red Army of Catalanian Liberation earlier claimed responsibility for three previous attacks against U.S. targets in Barcelona. It has never released a declaration of aims and beliefs. A telephone caller claiming to speak for the Red Army demanded that U.S. soldiers get out of Spain.

Police said they believed the Red Army is a splinter group of Terra

Lliure — Free Land in the Catalanian language — a better-known separatist organization that reportedly carried out 15 attacks in the last three years.

Both groups said they planted a bomb Oct. 14 outside the U.S. Consulate in Barcelona, the capital of the four-province autonomous region of Catalonia.

In a telephone call to the Spanish national news agency, EFE, a woman identifying herself as a Red Army member demanded that Terra Lliure withdraw its claim of authorship of the consulate bombing, which injured eight Spaniards.

Washington Times 29 December 1988 p. F1

## HARRY SUMMERS

## Terrorism: Kicking the wind?

In participating by phone in a Pittsburgh radio talk show on Christmas Eve concerning the crash of Pan Am Flight 103, one thing was obvious to me. Terrorism had won another round.

This was so even though the cause of the crash was not known at the time. Although the evidence of a terrorist bomb has now been pronounced conclusive by the British Transport Ministry, that fact is almost immaterial. Even if the midair breakup of the Boeing 747 had turned out to be the result of structural or mechanical failures, the damage to American morale and confidence has already been done.

Past terrorist attacks directed against Americans — hijackings, assassinations, bombings and the like — have sensitized us to the point where when a disaster occurs that has no immediate explanation the terrorists get the "credit" whether they were involved or not. Such acts magnify our frustration and heighten our feelings of helplessness and rage.

As the host of the Pittsburgh radio show and his call-in guests made

clear, they were themselves already convinced, evidence or no evidence, that terrorists were responsible. And the fact that the "terrorist warnings" in Finland that had sparked an American Embassy alert in Moscow, airport precautions in Frankfurt and London and (after the fact) newspaper and television headlines here at home turned out upon investigation to be a tragic coincidence, has not

altered those perceptions one whit. (The "warnings" turned out to have been sparked by a feud between two Arab expatriates in Helsinki who evidently routinely accuse each other of impending acts of terrorism.)

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## Toughness... CONTINUED

Hostage situations are among the most difficult for governments to handle, Bremmer says, because of the immense humanitarian and political pressure to free citizens. But the best way to win their freedom and prevent more hostage taking, Bremmer argues, is through a "solid front" by concerned countries not to make concessions. Washington has made this point clear to countries with hostages in Lebanon, he says. The US government's message to hostage holders is that "they cannot achieve their objectives by taking Americans hostage... They're not going to get their way," Bremmer says. The administration learned a lesson in wrongly trying to sell arms to Iran, he says; firmness has to be the policy.

Bremmer argues that the US has to use the full range of tools available to fight terrorism. This includes quiet diplomacy, public statements and accords, covert action, and overt military action, as in the

1986 attack on Libya.

The threat of escalation adds to the efficacy of more quiet methods, other counterterrorism officials say. They note, that the US has had significant success in closing down operations of several terrorist groups, including the one headed by Palestinian renegade Abu Nidal (the nom de guerre of Sabri Banna), with quiet diplomacy. The US approaches a country with information about an activity or individual and says, "We are concerned about this terrorist-related activity that your government may not be aware of." In most cases, officials say, the government concerned has reacted constructively.

US counterterrorism strategy is succeeding, Bremmer concludes, but success depends on credible firmness by the US and other governments in bringing terrorists to trial, not ceding to their demands, and pressuring all states to stop supporting terrorism.

Harry G. Summers Jr., a retired U.S. Army colonel, is a contributing editor for U.S. News & World Report, editor of Vietnam magazine and a nationally syndicated columnist.



Los Angeles Times

29 December 1988

p. 9

# Israelis Reportedly Kill 6 Presumed Terrorists

By DANIEL WILLIAMS, Times Staff Writer

JERUSALEM—In a pair of separate clashes, Israeli troops shot and killed six Palestinian guerrillas trying to infiltrate from the north and south Wednesday, including three

Kicking the wind...CONT'D

**M**irroring the feelings held by many Americans in their revulsion over this Christmastime tragedy, the anger of the Pittsburgh radio audience was remarkably high. They wanted something done and done now. What they wanted to know from me, a "military expert," was where and how such action should be taken. But I'm afraid my answers were not what they wanted to hear.

As any military professional would have told them—and as I'm sure the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if asked, would tell the president—the biggest stumbling block to a military response is the first principle of war, the Principle of the Objective. "Every military operation," it states, "should be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective." And the fundamental problem with counterterrorism is precisely the lack of such an objective.

Many Americans wished immediately after the incident that the United States would strike known terrorist groups such as Libya or the Iranian-backed factions in Lebanon or the Iranians themselves or even the PLO on the off chance that one of these groups might have been the one responsible. But such a reaction would be like that of the man described by the redoubtable Mr. Dooley at the turn of the century who got mad at a hurricane for damaging his house and went outside and kicked the wind. It may have made him feel better, but it surely didn't do him much good.

Such an action would violate the principle that any response must be "clearly defined." And that's not an easy task in the convoluted and contradictory world in which international terrorist groups operate. Even when terrorists are obviously to blame, is it the terrorist faction that

who succeeded in breaching the border in the Negev Desert, military sources said.

In the Negev, in Israel's far south, two members of the group of infiltrators were still at large, according to unconfirmed reports. A pursuing Israeli soldier was wounded in the clash that killed the three presumed terrorists, the reports said.

The latest incidents brought to four the number of attempted infiltrations since Saturday. At least three of the efforts, Israeli officials said, were made by Palestinian groups who oppose moves by the Palestine Liberation Organization to open peace talks with Israel.

## Climate of Unease

The attacks, coupled with the sabotage of a Pan American jetliner blown up as it flew over Britain with 259 people aboard, led observers to ponder whether radical Palestinian groups were trying to create a climate of unease in order to undermine diplomacy aimed at settling the Middle East conflict.

appears most guilty or is it the work of another faction that wants to make them look guilty?

In the most recent incident, could it be the work of a terrorist splinter group of the PLO? Could it be the work of those opposed to the dialogue that is beginning between the PLO and the United States? Or could it be neither? To strike the wrong target or to take the wrong action could serve the terrorist's interests far more than our own.

That's why the decision not to broadcast terrorist warnings to the general public was the correct response. The terrorist's objective is not to kill people per se—like all acts of war their objective is political, to kill people or threaten to kill people in order to frighten others to do their will and to sensitize the public to their political goals. We ought not to help them do that by serving as a sounding board for their threats and demands.

It was not clear whether the guerrillas in the Negev came from Jordan or Egypt, both of which border Israel in the south. The penetration occurred between 6 and 7 p.m., sources said, with one unconfirmed report putting the crossing point at Ein Yahav, a settlement halfway between the Dead Sea and the Red Sea resort of Eilat along the Jordanian border.

Infiltration from Jordan would be unusual. The Jordanian army keeps a close watch on its frontier to prevent guerrillas from entering Israel bent on violence that might invite an Israeli retaliation against Jordan.

Attacks on Israeli settlements have originated from Egypt in the past, although Israeli officials are careful to point out that neither Egypt nor Jordan does anything to encourage attacks on Israel.

The Negev intrusion—for which no group has taken responsibility—followed by about 12 hours an attempt by three armed Palestinians to enter northern Israel from Lebanon. Israeli troops thwarted that assault, shooting the three as they approached the border fence near the Lebanese village of Meiss el Jabal, close to the Israeli farm

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If a military response is not appropriate, then what is to be done? The answer is in more and better intelligence so that the objectives can indeed be clearly defined. And once those objectives are defined, the United States ought to be absolutely ruthless in exacting revenge—not for the sake of revenge itself but for the sake of discouraging such terrorist acts in the future.

And that's exactly the kind of action we have not taken. Although we know who they are, those who several years ago took William Buckley, the CIA's station chief in Lebanon, hostage and then slowly tortured him to death are still walking the streets of Beirut. If we want to retaliate against terrorists, they would be a most deserving group with which to start. Not only would they get what's coming to them, their elimination might do wonders by demonstrating that America is truly serious about its anti-terrorist efforts.



New York Times 30 Dec 89 p.1

# U.S. IS TIGHTENING SECURITY CHECKS ON FLIGHTS ABROAD

DELAYS ARE ANTICIPATED

Response to Pan Am Blast — Nation's Lines in Europe and Mideast Affected

By RICHARD WITKIN

Israelis...CONTINUED

settlement of Kibbutz Manara. "Kalashnikov rifles, missiles, anti-tank launchers, ammunition and wire cutters were found on the terrorists," an Israeli military spokesman said.

In the Lebanese port of Sidon, a spokesman for the Palestine Liberation Front, a PLO guerrilla faction, took responsibility and claimed that the infiltrators actually succeeded in entering Israel in the north. "The fighters clashed with the enemy, tens of meters inside Israel," the official said.

On Monday, another heavily armed group of three Arabs tried to cross the border near Kibbutz Manara. All were killed by Israeli troops. The Jerusalem Post attributed the attack to the Revolutionary Council of Fatah, which is headed by the terrorist Abu Nidal and operates outside the PLO.

The day before, a rubber dinghy carrying four guerrillas sank in rough seas south of Beirut, Palestinian sources and news reports said. Three of the guerrillas drowned, but the fourth was saved.

The four guerrillas, from a radical pro-Syrian group called the Palestine Popular Struggle Front, one of the so-called "rejectionist" Palestinian groups within the PLO that are more committed to terrorism than to diplomacy, apparently intended to sail south to attack Israeli targets.

The Federal Aviation Administration yesterday announced strict new security measures, including emptying and searching the luggage of more passengers, for flights of United States airlines from 103 airports in the Middle East and Western Europe.

T. Allan McArtor, the head of the F.A.A., said the mandatory new measures were imposed in response to the bombing of a Pan Am jumbo jet over Scotland last week, an attack that he said has "tragically upset" the balance between security and the processing of travelers. He said the new measures would go into effect within 48 hours.

## X-Ray Inspections of Baggage

Mr. McArtor said the new rules might well result in more passenger delays and inconvenience, suggesting that passengers might have to check in earlier, "perhaps as much as an hour."

Another new measure called for X-ray or physical inspection of all checked baggage, as distinguished from the carry-on parcels that are already X-rayed. Small shipped parcels would also be inspected.

The new rules followed the announcement by British investigators Wednesday that a powerful plastic explosive blew apart Pan American World Airways Flight 103 at 31,000 feet on Dec. 21. The crash killed all 259 people on the Boeing 747 and apparently 11 more on the ground, scattering wreckage in a wide arc up to 80 miles from the main impact in the town of Lockerbie.

## Few Reservations Canceled

Despite the initial shock of the disaster and the confirmation of suspicions that the plane had been sabotaged, airlines in the United States reported no spate of cancellations of flight reservations nor any falloff in the normal rate of advance bookings.

Asked why similar new rules were not being imposed at airports in the United States, Mr. McArtor said at a news conference in Washington: "The threat appears to be more interna-

Most of the extremist Palestinian groups are allied with Syria, which has harshly criticized statements by PLO leader Yasser Arafat this month that implicitly recognized Israel and renounced terrorism.

Recently, the United States opened contact with the PLO after judging that Arafat's latest declarations had satisfied its conditions.

The PLO also has declared an independent Palestinian state as a basis for accommodation with Isra-

el.

Israeli and Arab analysts consider the spate of border incidents and the possibility that the Pan Am crash was the result of Mideast terrorism, to be indications of radical Palestinian dissent from the PLO's diplomatic offensive.

"It should be assumed that radicals would try to undermine the peace activity," said Sari Nussejbeh, a sociologist at Birzeit University on the West Bank.

tional in scope. We are encouraging our carriers to be more vigilant domestically."

The British Government moved even more quickly than the F.A.A. in imposing tougher security procedures. At airports handling United States airlines, travelers on these carriers were required, beginning yesterday, to submit their luggage for examination with X-ray machines. They also were subjected to intense questioning about who packed their bags and when, whether bags had been out of their sight and whether other people had given them parcels to carry.

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Journal of Commerce 30 Dec 89 p.9B

# GAO Report Cites Shortfalls in Security At Overseas Airports

Knight-Ridder Newspapers

WASHINGTON — More than half of the overseas airports deemed at risk to terrorism in 1986 and 1987 had inadequate security, according to U.S. inspectors whose work was summarized in a General Accounting Office study released Wednesday.

The overseas inspections, mandated by a 1985 law, revealed 100 unspecified security lapses among 33 of the 54 airports on the Federal Aviation Administration's list of foreign airports most likely to be the subject of terrorism, the report said.

The lapses ranged from inadequate fencing around plane-loading

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GAO...CONTINUED areas to a failure color of security bag GAO officials said.

The study by the watchdog agency was after a New York American jetliner crashed in the English Channel, killing all 258 people and at least 17 people on the ground.

The flight originated in Frankfurt, West Germany, and ended at London's Heathrow Airport. Government officials refused to name the 54 airports, saying whether Heathrow was among them.

Overall, the GAO report said the FAA program to monitor terrorism steps taken at airports — and alert airlines of potentially dangerous airports — was working well.

But the agency criticized the FAA's failure to test the systems at the airports and witness tests to determine if the systems worked.

"FAA recognizes the importance of testing but believes it is inappropriate for FAA inspectors to conduct tests in foreign countries of sovereignty concerns and the danger to inspectors," the report said.

The release date of the report was set more than two weeks ago, according to a letter to Congress, dated Dec. 15.

"When we first heard of the crash, we didn't think it was a bomb," said Victor Rezek, a GAO official.

Security In addition for exami small ship rules req denied acc tional scr destination sengers an panied bag lines take thORIZED ac Saying th ceeded ex ards, Mr. M other longe chances tha an attack lik He said hi delivery of on order, so

GAO, PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 203



## SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM

In addition to the stricter measures for examining checked baggage and mail through X-rays, the new F.A.A. rules require that passengers be searched before boarding the aircraft. The new measures also require that airlines match passengers and baggage to keep unaccompanied bags off planes, and that airlines take new steps to prevent unauthorized access to baggage.

Saying the new measures for examining checked baggage and mail through X-rays, the new F.A.A. rules also announced two other major steps to minimize chances that terrorists could carry out an attack like the one last week.

The new agency would hasten the delivery of five bomb-detection units in order, so that the first will be in

operation at an unidentified airport next summer and the rest by the end of the year.

This means the units would be delivered six months earlier than originally planned. The detectors, which bombard checked luggage with neutrons and can detect the presence of all known military or chemical explosives, were said to cost from \$750,000 to \$1 million each.

Mr. McArthur also said he would increase his agency's force of security inspectors by 35 percent over the next 20 months. There are 560 inspectors now in the force.

## Trade Group Vows Compliance

The Air Transport Association, the trade group of the nation's major scheduled airlines, said its members would fully comply with the new security measures.

"However, more must be done than simply placing additional security requirements on the airlines," Stephen Hayes, a spokesman, said. "The Government itself must become more directly involved in meeting the threat that international terrorism presents."

"We believe the F.A.A. should assign more of its security personnel to Europe and the Middle East," he said.

## No Decrease in Bookings

It is commonplace for airline disasters to cause at least a brief drop in passenger travel and bookings for future travel. But a sampling of United States carriers yesterday indicated that this had not occurred in the aftermath of the Pan Am crash.

Pamela Hanton, a spokeswoman for Pan Am, said that since Saturday bookings for future flights had been above what they had been in the same period a year ago. But she acknowledged that the holiday week was not typical. She also said that any drop in current travel had been "very minor."

Mary O'Neill, a spokeswoman for American Airlines, said, "We have not seen any flurry of cancellations or fall-off in bookings."

## Airlines Welcome New Steps

The imposition of additional security rules overseas appeared to be welcomed by airline officials. They echoed Mr. McArthur in noting that many of the measures were already being followed voluntarily.

The new procedure considered likely to impose considerable inconvenience was the one requiring many more passengers to empty their luggage when going through the check-in process.

Up to now, passengers judged by secret criteria to be potentially dangerous have been pulled aside and asked to open their luggage for intensive search. Now this group will be supplemented by additional passengers chosen at random.

The F.A.A. announcement said: "Checked baggage of persons identified for enhanced screening will be emptied and all contents physically examined. The empty bag will then be X-rayed."

## GAO... CONTINUED

was to a failure to change the color of security badges regularly, GAO officials said.

The study by the congressional watchdog agency was issued a day after a New York-bound Pan American jetliner crashed in Scotland, killing all 258 people aboard and at least 17 people on the ground.

The flight originated in Frankfurt, West Germany, with a change of planes at London's Heathrow Airport. Government officials refused to name the 54 airports or to say whether Heathrow or Frankfurt was among them.

Overall, the GAO reported that the F.A.A. program to monitor anti-terrorism steps taken at overseas airports — and alert Americans to potentially dangerous airports — was working well.

But the agency criticized the F.A.A.'s failure to test the security systems at the airports or even to witness tests to determine whether the systems worked.

"F.A.A. recognizes the importance of testing but believes it is inappropriate for F.A.A. inspectors to make tests in foreign countries because of sovereignty concerns and possible danger to inspectors," the study said.

The release date of the GAO report was set more than two weeks ago, according to a cover letter to Congress, dated Dec. 7.

"When we first heard the news of the crash, we didn't think it was a bomb," said Victor Rezendes, a GAO official.

Washington Post

30 December 1988 p. 22

## Consultant Says He Warned Pan Am

By Glenn Frankel

Washington Post Foreign Service

JERUSALEM, Dec. 29—An Israeli security consultant charged today that Pan American airlines ignored his firm's warnings two years ago that the company was "almost totally vulnerable to midair explosive charges concealed in the cargo"—the same kind of bomb that blew up a Pan Am Boeing 747 over Scotland last week.

The consulting firm's report concluded that "under the present security system, Pan Am is highly vulnerable to most forms of terrorist attack. The fact that no major

"It wasn't until later that we realized it might be a bomb, and we knew the coincidence of our report was going to be shocking."

disaster has occurred to date is purely providential."

"We were shocked by the tragedy but I'm sorry to admit we were not surprised," Yossi Langotsky, head of KPI Ltd., an Israeli firm hired in 1986 to review security at 25 Pan Am centers, said in an interview. "We tried very hard to convince Pan Am's people that if they did not change drastically their security system, it was going to happen sooner or later."

"There is no real 100 percent fail-proof security system and I'm not claiming that if they had adopted our program no disaster would have happened," said Langotsky, a retired Israeli intelligence colonel who served as defense attache at the Israeli embassy in Washington.

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Washington Post

30 December 1988

p. 21

# Terrorists Release 2 Girls

*French Sisters Held  
A Year by Abu Nidal*

By Charles P. Wallace  
Los Angeles Times

NICOSIA, Cyprus, Dec. 29—The Palestinian terrorist group headed by Abu Nidal released two kidnaped French girls in Benghazi, Libya, today, the official Libyan news agency reported.

The French Foreign Ministry later said that Libyan authorities delivered the two sisters, kidnaped more than a year ago, to their father, Pascal Bettle, and they were immediately flown home in a French government plane, landing

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Warning... CONTINUED  
from 1976 to 1979. "But the chances of a disaster occurring would have changed drastically."

Jeff Kriendler, Pan Am's vice president for corporate communications, said in New York today that he was "sick and tired" of Langotsky "bad-mouthing us," and he said that "Pan Am did indeed act on several of the recommendations that the consulting group had made."

Kriendler said, however, that Langotsky's company was "one of several firms that we used, and we've had no contact with him for several years." He added that because of the time that had passed since KPI Ltd. studied Pan Am, "they're not in a position to comment about our current procedures."

Langotsky refused to elaborate on Pan Am's response to his company's two reports, which were issued in September and November 1986. But he said he hoped U.S. authorities would conduct a full re-

view of industry-wide airline security procedures and said he would be willing to cooperate with such a review.

Asked whether his findings might apply to other airlines or to the airline industry in general, Langotsky would not comment for publication.

The security consultant said he had been reluctant to speak about his former client Pan Am, but changed his mind following last week's mid-air explosion, which killed 259 passengers and crew and 11 residents of a Scottish village where the wreckage hit.

"I would feel terrible if I kept silent and another event of this kind happens," he said. "And if something is not changed, I am afraid it is going to happen again."

He said he was also motivated by an incident last February when a woman who boarded a Pan Am flight in Houston flew to JFK airport in New York and then on to Tel Aviv with a handgun and ammunition undetected in her luggage. She was caught only after she arrived at Ben-Gurion airport here, by a security guard who noted she was acting erratically.

Pan Am's Kriendler acknowledged that there had been a "violation" in the woman's failure to declare the handgun, but he stressed that "she did not carry it on the plane. . . . It was in her checked luggage."

Pan Am hired KPI to do its security analysis in May 1986 after four passengers were killed and nine wounded in an April 2 mid-air explosion aboard a TWA jetliner en route from Athens to Rome. At the time of the study, some 900 people had lost their lives in airliner incidents since the late 1960s, 50 of them customers or employees of Pan Am. Since then, 18 Pan Am passengers and crew were killed in an August 1986 hijacking in Karachi, Pakistan.

Langotsky's consulting team included a former head of protection and security for the Shin Bet, the Israeli internal security agency, and the former security chief of Israel's El Al airlines. It concentrated in its first stage on operations at nine airports in the United States and Western Europe, including Frankfurt, where last week's ill-fated flight began, and London, where it stopped to pick up passengers before taking off for New York.

The team reported finding serious security flaws at all of the Pan Am stations.

It said the airline was operating under "a misguided security concept" that included "the absence of appropriate counter measures to potential terrorist courses of action, an over-reliance on technical appliances which inherently cannot serve today but as instrumental aids and inadequate effort to mark out suspects."

It alleged that the company suffered from "a lack of authority for various [security] functions, occasional unsuitable choices of functionaries and an alarmingly low level of training/instruction. There is hardly a control or testing procedure for the security system."

The report concluded that Pan Am could obtain a better security system for approximately the same amount of money it was spending on the current one. "The required resources are not money but authorization, management and resolve," it said.

## Israelis Say U.S. PLO Talks Prompt Terrorist Attacks

From News Services

JERUSALEM, Dec. 29—Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir charged today that the U.S. decision to open a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization has "encouraged the tendency of violent acts against Israel."

Earlier today, Deputy Foreign Minister Binyamin Netanyahu also complained about the move, saying, "American talks with the PLO have given hope to terrorist movements all over the world that they, too, can be rewarded by American recognition."

Netanyahu, speaking at a news conference announcing a seminar on aviation security to be held here in February, said the sophistication of the bombing of the Pan Am jetliner last week pointed to the PLO or Middle East countries such as Syria.

"Whoever committed this can draw heart and encouragement from the fact that the organization that pioneered this very form of barbarism is a trusted, legitimate interlocutor in the leading capitals of the world," he said of the PLO.



# Plane Crashes and Questions of Security

HENRY MITCHELL

**2 Girls...CONT'D**  
at a military base near Marseilles late tonight.

The girls' mother and five Belgians seized at the same time remain in captivity.

"France welcomes the children's release and recognizes this humane gesture as such," the Foreign Ministry said. "It thanks the foreign authorities who have contributed to it."

The Abu Nidal group said the release of the two girls, Marie-Laure Bettle, 7, and her sister Virginie, 6, was made for humanitarian reasons. The group, which calls itself the Revolutionary Council of Fatah, is believed to have close links with the Libyan government of Moammar Gadhafi.

"Following the appeal by the Guide of the Revolution [Gadhafi] on the occasion of Christmas for the release of hostages detained in Lebanon, the two little French girls have been released," the Libyan news agency JANA said.

The release comes as Gadhafi is trying to win world support in the face of charges from the United

States that Libya has completed work on a factory near Tripoli, the capital, designed for the production of chemical weapons.

The Abu Nidal group also has been trying to deflect suggestions that it may have had a role in placing a bomb aboard the Pan Am jumbo jet that crashed in Scotland last week killing all 259 people aboard and at least 11 on the ground. British authorities reported yesterday that they had found conclusive evidence that the plane was brought down by a bomb.

The French girls were taken hostage along with their mother, Jacqueline Valente, and five Belgians in November 1987, reportedly as they cruised in a yacht off the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip.

The Revolutionary Council of Fatah, an extremist faction that broke with the Palestine Liberation Organization in the early 1970s, has

**M**any things can be done to prevent terrorist explosions causing great loss of life on planes.

Authorities have "concluded" the downing of the Frankfurt plane over Scotland was the result of a bomb, but how firm those conclusions are we do not yet know. Last week four American planes were found to be possibly dangerous because of metal fatigue or other consequences of age, and while investigators of the dreadful crash over Scotland have not found "evidence" of structural collapse in that case, one wonders whether evidence would readily be found in the wreckage.

This investigation, which appears to be given the priority it certainly deserves, is of peculiar importance because of floating and probably increasing public anxiety about terrorists.

If an aviation authority investigates a crash it is probably more reassuring to conclude in favor of a bomb explosion than of an old plane falling apart. The bombs can be prevented more easily than a rebuilding of a large part of the air fleet. Thus the

pressure will always be to find a bomb rather than a hole in the roof. In this particular investigation the evidence of sabotage must be made overwhelming if it is to be taken as authoritative by the public, and the evidence should be reviewed by authorities other than the original British investigators and other than those directly concerned with the aviation industry.

Assuming a bomb caused the disaster, and assuming present safeguards against bombs do not work, as they did not work in this case, one can think of many safeguards we do not yet use.

To start with an extreme plan, passengers can be separated completely from their baggage, which would be flown or otherwise shipped to their destination. This would mean great inconvenience and cost, but if planes carried no baggage at all, it would prevent explosives hidden in luggage. Passengers, in addition, could be stripped and searched with extreme care. This would be offensive to almost anybody, but it could be done.

Access to the plane before takeoff could also be made impossible to all except the

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accused the six adults of being agents for the Mossad, Israel's secret service. Since their capture, virtually nothing had been heard of the hostages until Abu Nidal's spokesman in Lebanon announced Saturday that the two girls were to be released.

The Palestinian organization, which is believed to have camps in Lebanon's eastern Bekaa Valley, said the girls were visited by Abu Nidal, whose real name is Sabri Banna, before their release at a secret post in Lebanon.

There has been speculation for some time that Abu Nidal had moved the prisoners to Libya, now the only Arab state willing to openly tolerate the presence of Abu Nidal's people.

A number of western diplomats said they believed that the announcement of the release, which was said to involve a boat trip

across the Mediterranean from Lebanon, was a hoax aimed at disguising the fact that the hostages were being held in Libya.

In what was seen as a rare disavowal of a terrorist act, an Abu Nidal spokesman, Atef Abu Bakr, earlier extended condolences to the families of those on board the Pan Am plane, expressing "deepest sorrow for this tragedy."

Because of the allegations about the chemical warfare factory and the suspicions raised by the Pan Am crash, there are growing concerns in the Arab world that the United States might mount a retaliatory strike against Libya.

U.S. warplanes attacked military sites at Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986, in retaliation for the terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque that killed two U.S. servicemen and a Turkish woman.



Los Angeles Times

31 December 1988

p. 14

## Caller Claiming Jet Bombing Warns of New Action; Threat Discounted

From Wire and Staff Reports

LONDON—A caller claiming to represent the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, the pro-Iranian group that last week claimed responsibility for the bombing of Pan American World Airways Flight 103, telephoned American news agencies here Friday and threatened more action unless the United States deports the son of the late Shah of Iran.

Questions of security... plane crew and carefully screened maintenance workers. (The mere fact that you work for the airline would not mean you could get to any plane except the one you were prepared to fly.)

All these measures, apart from being distasteful, would cost both time and money, but if they were adopted then bomb explosions would be prevented. It is conceivable that airlines could offer two kinds of flight—one with today's "reasonable" security measures and another with extreme security measures at much higher fares. The public could choose which type to support.

There is another factor in plane bombings, the obvious growth of hostility against Americans in the Arab and Moslem world, where it is concluded that our client state, Israel, has much to answer for. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the American support of Israel, it is unarguable that the Arab world sees us as the chief ultimate cause of Palestinian misery. If that view could be changed, a great deal of the terrorism problem could be ended.

As Americans we easily understand such terrible accidents as the shooting down of the Iranian Airbus loaded with civilians. If we were Iranians we would suspect it was shot down deliberately.

If we were they we would not accept it as true that either our vastly advanced naval technology did not work, or else we did not have men who can work it. We would say, if we were they, that any fool could see by just looking up that the Airbus was not a war plane, and that either malice or negligence so gross as to amount to that had caused the downing of their civilian transport plane. In either case, if we were Iranian, we would want revenge.

If you assume (an arguable point) that America has done and is doing all things possible to settle the Palestinian question,

The anonymous male caller, who spoke with a Middle Eastern accent, repeated the claim that the group he represents blew up the jumbo jet that killed all 259 people aboard and perhaps another 11 people on the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland. He said if Prince Reza Pahlavi, the shah's son, is allowed to continue to live in the United States then "there will be another present in the New Year for America."

Pahlavi, 28, lives at an estate in Virginia, just outside Washington. Iranian authorities have appeared uneasy about what they say is a campaign by Pahlavi to try to spark an overthrow of Khomeini.

However, intelligence officials discounted the caller's claims, the Times of London reported Friday.

The newspaper also said that the team investigating the Dec. 21 crash told Scottish police that they are now certain that the bomb was placed on board in Frankfurt, where it said a Palestinian terrorist cell had been operating for the past 18 months. Flight 103 originated in Frankfurt.

In addition, investigators are looking into the possibility that a sophisticated device with two separate detonating systems was used to trigger the bomb, the newspaper said.

"The double-detonator theory has increased suspicion about the involvement of the PFLP-GC [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command], a Palestinian group led by Ahmed

and if it is ever proved (it has not been proved) that Arab or Iranian terrorists brought down the Frankfurt plane, then airport security must be increased, even to the point of greatly increased cost and delays to passengers.

One of the things the government might have done decades ago (and would have done if government were wiser than it is) was to insist the rail system be kept intact. Unlike England and Japan, often pointed to as models of train traffic, we are an enormous nation. Even if all our trains went at Japanese speeds, it would take forever to get across our continent on trains. We naturally chose planes and

railroads fell into disuse for passenger traffic. Even if our train system were superb, instead of outrageously bad, it would have nothing to do with terrorist bombing on planes, but it would offer an alternative to domestic travelers.

There is no reason, of course, there could not be bombs on trains and buses as well as planes. The ultimate security is a nation that foreigners do not wish to retaliate against. Maybe that is an absurd dream? We are not helped toward that dream by those who let their enthusiasm for Israel override reason and who make their business to inflame an American public against an Islamic world.

Oril that has been noted in the past for using barometric devices against aircraft," the paper added. A spokesman for the pro-Syrian group denied Friday that it was involved in the bombing.

"Our front opposes such kind of operations, which target innocent civilians," PFLP-GC official Talal Naji said in a statement issued in Damascus, Syria, and published by the independent Beirut newspaper An Nahar.

At the same time, Israel condemned as "repugnant libel" an Egyptian newspaper's claim that its secret service, the Mossad, was responsible.

Another group cited as possibly behind the bombing—the U.S.-based Jewish Defense League—also denied involvement.

At a Los Angeles news conference, JDL national director Irv Rubin reacted angrily to the report that the JDL was listed as one of four suspect groups should terrorism turn out to be the motivation behind the bombing, according to a U.S. government source close to the Pan Am investigation.

"It would be a cold day in hell before we would kill Americans," said Rubin, who attributed his group's inclusion to an attempt to "balance" the list of suspects.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

Los Angeles Times

## Bloodier Standard

## Pan Am Escalate

By ROBIN WRIGHT and

WASHINGTON—The bloodier destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 may set a new bloodier standard for international terrorism, a grim escalation of already-growing trend to large-scale acts of indiscriminate

Journal of Commerce

## New Bomb

WASHINGTON — While machines are severely limiting keeping modern explosives on liners, researchers say they developed a device that can bombs inside luggage with unregularity.

But no airline has ordered of the devices, and with the explosion of two prototype machines used in a yearlong test program at San Francisco and Los Angeles airports have put the machine operation.

The disclosure Wednesday that a bomb detonated aboard a Pan Am jumbo jet last week over Scotland, killing all 259 people aboard, likely to spur interest in the explosives detection device, industry officials said.


The machine goes by the name of Thermal Neutron Analysis, or TNA, and is about the size of an airport X-ray machine. During the yearlong test under a contract from the Federal Aviation Administration it demonstrated a 95% detection rate with few false alarms, the agency said.

The FAA recently ordered more TNAs at a cost of \$8.4 million. The agency plans to put them into other U.S. airports beginning next summer.

"We are now in the production phase. The research and development is over," said Hadi Bozormani, a vice president for Science Applications International



## WRONG TURNS



## PLUTONIUM PERIL

Imagine a terrorist atop the Empire State Building in New York City threatening to detonate a suitcase-sized atomic weapon unless his million-dollar ransom demand is met. While this may seem far-fetched, recent developments in the nuclear power field are increasing the chances such a scenario could one day unfold.

One of the most worrisome trends is the expanding quantity of weapons-grade materials being produced by civilian nuclear power programs around the globe. As these materials flood international commerce, the risk grows that they will be diverted to a black market, where they will be available to nations and sophisticated terrorist groups with an inclination to make a nuclear bomb.

Some contend that a black market in weapons-grade materials already exists. In August 1987, Prime Minister Sadek Mahdi of Sudan announced at a news conference that a batch of enriched uranium had been smuggled into his country and offered for sale to international bidders.

Accomplices to the alleged plot claimed in a Better World Society television documentary titled *The Terror Trade* that numerous countries known to be seeking a bomb had participated in this nuclear flea market, possibly including Israel, Iran, Iraq and Libya. This uranium was not weapons grade but could have been made so with further enrichment—a technology that

these countries might well have access to.

Because deceit is common in the world of illicit arms dealers, this story is far from conclusive evidence that a black market exists, but there have been many other rumored diversions of nuclear materials and several known attempts. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency blames Israel for diverting 529 pounds of enriched uranium from the United States in 1965 and suspects that country of hijacking a cargo of U.S. uranium in 1968. Leonard Spector, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., has reported attempts by Iraq and the Palestine Liberation Organization to purchase fissionable materials, although to his knowledge none of the attempts has been successful.

Definite proof of a diversion—albeit of material not directly usable in a weapon—came in November when Norwegian officials announced that 15 tons of heavy water (an essential ingredient in nuclear reactions fueled by unenriched uranium) had been diverted to the black market in 1983, ending up in India, which has been capable of producing nuclear weapons since the mid-seventies.

Of the weapons-grade materials in circulation, plutonium is the chief worry. In proliferation terms, this by-product of nuclear reactions is relatively harmless as long as it remains ensconced in spent fuel. But when separated out—a procedure dubbed “reprocessing”—the plutonium can be used in a bomb. A handful of countries, most notably France, Great Britain, West Germany, Japan and India, have recently begun to do this in order to recover the plutonium for reuse in their nuclear power plants.


According to David Albright, senior staff scientist at the Federation of American Scientists, a Washington, D.C.-based science policy research group, some 100 tons of plutonium has already been separated from the spent fuel produced by civilian reactors in the non-Communist countries. If current reprocessing projections are met, the amount of plutonium separated out by the mid- to late-nineties

will exceed the 220 tons now in the combined nuclear weapons stockpiles of the United States and the Soviet Union (see figure).

Because separated plutonium travels long distances from reprocessing facility to fuel fabrication plant to nuclear power plant, there are numerous opportunities for theft. By the mid-nineties, hundreds of shipments of separated plutonium will be traveling by a combination of land, sea and air transport—sometimes across international borders. The challenge is to prevent this material from falling into the wrong hands.

The United States has shunned reprocessing within its borders both because of concerns over proliferation and because the practice has not been deemed profitable. It has also generally discouraged other countries from embarking on the plutonium path.

Separated Plutonium Production  
(Non-Communist Countries)



However, the Reagan administration ignored the advice of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Defense Department—and possibly violated federal nonproliferation law—in recently granting Japan permission to reprocess nuclear waste that nation's reactors create with U.S.-supplied uranium. According to the Nuclear Control Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based research organization specializing in nuclear proliferation, this action will enable Tokyo to produce at least 150 tons of weapons-usable plutonium over the next three decades.

Until Japan completes its own facility, it will send spent fuel to Europe for reprocessing. The recovered plu-



New York Times

31 December 1988

p. 3

# 2-Trigger Device Seen in Pan Am Blast

By SHEILA RULE

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Dec. 30 — Investigators believe that the powerful explosive that blew apart a Pan Am jumbo jet last week was triggered by a sophisticated device with two separate detonating systems. The Times of London reported today.

The newspaper, in a front-page report attributed to unidentified sources, said experts were working on the theory that one detonating system was a barometric device triggered by altitude, which then activated an electronic timer. The newspaper said the use of two detonators was developed by terrorists to frustrate decompression chambers installed at some airports, including Frankfurt, West Germany, where some passengers and luggage on the Pan Am flight originated.

The Times of London reported that the reduced pressure in the chambers sets off bombs prepared with barometric detonators. If there were two detonators, however, the pressure would set off the timing device, which would then set off the bomb hours later.

British and American authorities have not officially made public any leads into their investigation since British investigators said Wednesday that a powerful plastic explosive device caused the Pan American World Airways Boeing 747 to break apart at 31,000 feet, spreading wreckage over the Scottish town of Lockerbie and the surrounding countryside.

## 'Conclusive Evidence'

While they said they had "conclusive evidence of a detonating high explosive," they had not established what sort of device was used, what it was contained in, where it was placed in the plane and what happened immediately after the explosion. Plastic explosives can be easily molded inside luggage and are extremely difficult to detect.

About half of the passengers on the Frankfurt-to-London leg of the flight, which was on a smaller 727, ended their trip at Heathrow Airport outside London, while the others transferred to the larger plane. Baggage for passengers scheduled to continue to New York was transferred directly to the 747.

As investigators began questioning baggage handlers at both Heathrow and Frankfurt airports to determine where luggage and other items were stowed on the plane, The Times reported that experts had not yet determined whether baggage carrying the explosive passed through Frankfurt's pressure chamber and set off the timing device, or whether the timer was activated while the plane was in flight.



The New York Times/Dec. 31, 1988

Almost 1,000 Lockerbie residents volunteered for self-help effort.

The newspaper quoted a "security source" at Frankfurt airport as saying that a low-pressure simulation chamber had been used there since 1984 to check luggage "from time to time."

## A New Threat Is Made

"Its use is subject to special rules," the report quoted the source as saying, adding that he declined to say whether the chamber had been used to check luggage for the Pan Am flight from Frankfurt to London. "It will be used, for example, in the case of suspicion about a piece of luggage, or more in the event of a warning about danger to a particular flight."

An unidentified man speaking English with a foreign accent telephoned news agencies in London today and repeated a claim that the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, a pro-Iranian group, had downed the jet. He also threatened further, unspecified action.

The caller refused to provide any way of authenticating his statement but said the group was concerned about the activities in the United States and Europe of Riza Pahlevi, the 28-year-old son of the late Shah of Iran.

"We would like to ask America to throw him out of America as soon as possible or, in the new year, America will have another present from us," the caller said.

The Shah's son, who lives in a suburb of Washington, issued a statement saying, "If this is true, it is clearly a fresh indication that Khomeini's terrorist agents are still hard at work around the globe."

## Charge by Egyptian Paper

In Cairo, the semi-official newspaper Al Akhbar said in an editorial today that Israel's intelligence service might have carried out the Pan Am bombing because it had a "past record in murdering such crimes, which aim at casting suspicion on Palestinian or Arab elements." The Israeli Foreign Ministry denounced the statement as "repugnant libel."

American intelligence officials have all but discounted involvement by the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution and have focused instead on other Middle Eastern groups that have a history of using advanced explosives.

The Jerusalem Post

## Navy chief warns of terror from the sea

By YAACOV FRIEDLER

HAIFA — OC Navy Aluf Avraham Ben-Shoshan warned last week that "a large number of terror actions from the sea have been prepared for launching against Israel, Europe and other countries."

"The sea looks calm but there is lots going on," he said.

31 December 1988 p. 6

Ben-Shoshan said that since Israel had succeeded in closing its coastline to attacks from the sea, the terrorists were developing new skills and buying the latest equipment in the East and West to improve their capability.

They would continue to use civilian ships and fishing boats for terror attacks, claiming protection of the international maritime law, he cautioned.

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## WRONG TURNS



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
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The United States has shunned reprocessing within its borders both because of concerns over proliferation and because the practice has not been deemed profitable. It has also generally discouraged other countries from embarking on the plutonium path.

Separated Plutonium Production  
(Non-Communist Countries)



However, the Reagan administration ignored the advice of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Defense Department—and possibly violated federal nonproliferation law—in recently granting Japan permission to reprocess nuclear waste that nation's reactors create with U.S.-supplied uranium. According to the Nuclear Control Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based research organization specializing in nuclear proliferation, this action will enable Tokyo to produce at least 150 tons of weapons-usable plutonium over the next three decades.

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Washington Post 2 January 1989 p. 10

## Pan Am Bomb Put in Forward Hold

By Robert J. McCartney  
Washington Post Foreign Service

FRANKFURT, Jan. 2—Investigators have concluded that the bomb that destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland last month and killed 270 persons was placed in the Boeing 747 jet's forward luggage compartment, a West German judicial spokesman said today.

That compartment held luggage that had been put aboard the flight in both London and Frankfurt, so investigators still do not know for certain in which city the bomb was planted, Hubert Harth, spokesman for the Frankfurt state prosecutor's office, said in a telephone interview.

Investigators are closely examining wreckage from the crash in search of clues. They have not yet determined what kind of explosive was used or what type of container held the bomb, Harth said.

Harth, whose office is heading the West German side of the crash investigation, said that his information came from Scotland Yard.

A Pan Am spokesperson in Lockerbie declined to say how many suitcases were in the forward luggage compartment, or where they came from.

British and West German authorities have disputed whether Frankfurt or London was the site where the bomb most likely was placed aboard Flight 103.

The flight originated in Frankfurt on a Boeing 727, then switched in London to the Boeing 747 that subsequently crashed. Of the 259 persons aboard the plane at the time of the crash, 49 were passengers who had come from Frankfurt. All died.

In a separate development, Harth confirmed a West German magazine report that the plane was carrying four sacks of U.S. military mail and a container of U.S. bank documents that were not subjected to security screening before takeoff.

Pan Am has said that every piece of passenger luggage that went aboard the 727 in Frankfurt was scanned with modern screening de-

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### Plutonium peril...

Plutonium will probably be returned by sea, a route extremely vulnerable to terrorist attack. Because plutonium is among the most poisonous substances known, an accident or act of sabotage during transit could seriously threaten the environment and human health.

The handling of highly enriched uranium, another weapons-grade nuclear material, is also a source of concern. Found most frequently in research reactors, highly enriched uranium was the material used to bomb Hiroshima. It is particularly vulnerable to theft because most research reactors have minimal security, particularly on university campuses, where in some instances only a locked door separates the weapons-grade material from a nuclear thief. Tighter security is an obvious remedy, as is the creation of fuels that could substitute for highly enriched uranium in all research reactors. Unfortunately, a relatively low-budget research program funded by the U.S. government to find such alternatives is being phased out just as it was beginning to produce results.


Some theft protection is afforded by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970, which was designed to minimize the danger of civilian nuclear power programs being utilized clandestinely for bomb production. It places strict guidelines and careful tracking procedures on the production and export of fissionable materials, and mandates inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure compliance.

But the system is not tight enough. To begin with, nuclear facilities in China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States are generally not monitored by the IAEA, as are facilities belonging to nonsignatory nations, such as India, Israel and South Africa.

Where safeguards are imposed, a significant margin of error accompanies the procedure. It is thus impossible to know whether material that is unaccounted for has been stuck in power plant pipes, miscounted or diverted. Thus, according to NRC estimates, Japan will not know the

whereabouts of between 440 and 600 pounds of plutonium in any given year when its reprocessing plant starts in the mid- to late-nineties. It takes just 22 pounds of plutonium to create a Nagasaki-sized bomb.

Because inspecting the nuclear installations of much of the world on a timely basis is a gargantuan task, glacial in implementation are perhaps unavoidable, particularly when resources are stretched thin. Indeed, inspection goals were not attained at 37 percent of IAEA-monitored facilities in 1988, according to a confidential agency report just released by Green Party members of the European Parliament.



While the threat of weapons-grade material diversion provides a strong argument for limiting the spread of nuclear power, there are steps short of this that would minimize the danger of fissionable materials winding up on the black market. They include abandoning civilian reprocessing, developing substitutes for highly enriched uranium in research reactors, and tightening the international safeguards system. These are relatively noncontroversial, achievable steps that could head off catastrophe.

— Hilary F. French

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
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— Hilary F. French



1 JANUARY 1989

Pg. 10

# Four groups on suspect list as big

IT HAS been the biggest and most concentrated manhunt that anyone in the American intelligence community can remember, write James Adams and Marie Culvin. For 10 days, agents in place in terrorist organisations have been questioned, tape recordings of intercepted conversations have been transcribed and forensic evidence examined.

News of the Pan Am disaster was received in the State Department on Wednesday, December 21. Since then a crisis task force under the control of Ambassador Paul Bremer, the head of counter terrorism, and including representatives from intelligence agencies, the State Department, the National Security Council and the Pentagon, has been in session.

In the counter terrorism world such crises are given a Domino rating after the name of the local pizza service which guarantees 24-hour delivery. The seriousness of a crisis is judged by the size of the pile of empty red and white pizza boxes. According to US intelligence sources, this time the Domino rating is high.

This weekend the task force, working on the 7th floor of the State Department headquarters in Washington, has narrowed to four the shortlist of terrorist candidates responsible for bombing flight 103.

"We have a number of strong leads as the people who did this have not covered their tracks very well. We will know who they are in days rather than weeks," said a source.

The four on the shortlist are:

- The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, formed as an offshoot of the PLO by Ahmed Jibril in 1959 and based in Syria, which finances and arms the organisation. The group is firmly opposed to PLO chairman Yasser Arafat's negotiations for a settlement of the Palestinian question.

West German police arrested a man belonging to the PFLP-GC two months ago. Hafer Kassem Dallamouni, 41, was one of 14 Palestinians picked up in Frankfurt on October 26. Large quantities of arms and Semtex explosive were found during raids on five flats. The German police believe that the PFLP-GC was responsible for attacks on two trains carrying American servicemen.

Any attack on Pan Am by the PFLP-GC would have needed the approval of the Syrian government. But since the discovery in London of an attempt to blow up an El Al jet at Heathrow in 1986, which was clearly linked to Syrian intelligence, Damascus has tried to distance itself from terrorism. However, the recent rapprochement between Arafat and the United States threatens the position of President Assad of Syria as the Middle East peace

Forward hold...CONTD

vices.

Both Harth and a Lockerbie police spokesman emphasized that the investigation still was in an early phase. "There is still wreckage being gathered, [and] each and every bit will have to be examined," a po-

lice spokesman in Lockerbie said.

Today, helicopters and search teams discovered small pieces of the airplane's tail section at Langholm, a town 15 miles east of Lockerbie.

*Washington Post correspondent  
Jonathan C. Randal in London  
contributed to this report.*

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LONDON SUNDAY TIMES

1 JANUARY 1989

Pg. 10

# Four groups on suspect list as big

IT HAS been the biggest and most concentrated manhunt that anyone in the American intelligence community can remember, write James Adams and Marie Colvin. For 10 days, agents in place in terrorist organisations have been questioned, tape recordings of intercepted conversations have been transcribed and forensic evidence examined.

News of the Pan Am disaster was received in the State Department on Wednesday, December 21. Since then a crisis task force under the control of Ambassador Paul Bremer, the head of counter terrorism, and including representatives from intelligence agencies, the State Department, the National Security Council and the Pentagon, has been in session.

In the counter terrorism world such crises are given a Domino rating after the name of the local pizza service which guarantees 24-hour delivery. The seriousness of a crisis is judged by the size of the pile of empty red and white pizza boxes. According to US intelligence sources, this time the Domino rating is high.

This weekend the task force, working on the 7th floor of the State Department headquarters in Washington, has narrowed to four the shortlist of terrorist candidates responsible for bombing flight 103.

"We have a number of strong leads as the people who did this have not covered their tracks very well. We will know who they are in days rather than weeks," said a source.

The four on the shortlist are:

- The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, formed as an offshoot of the PLO by Ahmed Jibril in 1959 and based in Syria, which finances and arms the organisation. The group is firmly opposed to PLO chairman Yasser Arafat's negotiations for a settlement of the Palestinian question.

West German police arrested a man belonging to the PFLP-GC two months ago. Hafez Kassem Dalkamouni, 41, was one of 14 Palestinians picked up in Frankfurt on October 26. Large quantities of arms and Semtex explosive were found during raids on five flats. The German police believe that the PFLP-GC was responsible for attacks on two trains carrying American servicemen.

Any attack on Pan Am by the PFLP-GC would have needed the approval of the Syrian government. But since the discovery in London of an attempt to blow up an El Al jet at Heathrow in 1986, which was clearly linked to Syrian intelligence, Damascus has tried to distance itself from terrorism. However, the recent rapprochement between Arafat and the United States threatens the position of President Assad of Syria as the Middle East peace

Forward hold...CONT'D

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Both Harth and a Lockerbie police spokesman emphasized that the investigation still was in an early phase. "There is still wreckage being gathered, [and] each and every bit will have to be examined," a po-

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Today, helicopters and search teams discovered small pieces of the airplane's tail section at Langholm, a town 15 miles east of Lockerbie.

*Washington Post correspondent  
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**Dec. 1-2, 1988:** Five Soviet hijackers seized a bus full of schoolchildren and demanded a plane and \$3 million in ransom. Soviet authorities decided to provide the Aeroflot cargo plane and the money in order to save the lives of 30 fourth-grade children. The plane flew to Israel, where the hijackers surrendered quietly.

Washington Times

3 January 1989

p. D3

# The subtle consequences of terrorist attacks

**PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS**

**T**he U.S. response to the bomb that downed Pam Am Flight 103 over Scotland and murdered 270 people is almost certain to be feeble, thereby guaranteeing new economic burdens for taxpayers and air travelers.

Some of the costs of terrorism are obvious; others are subtle. Among the former are the actuarial costs of the lost lives and the cost of the airliner and Scottish homes. To that can be added the economic and career impact on relatives of the victims.

*Paul Craig Roberts, an economist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is a columnist for The Washington Times.*

Some have lost opportunities, and others will be emotionally scarred.

Other costs are less obvious, such as the business deals that won't be made as businessmen curtail their travel or fly circuitous routes to avoid targeted airlines. Fearful of hijacking, many seasoned American travelers already avoid flights of U.S. carriers that originate in the Middle East, and some avoid using U.S. airlines to return from Europe.

The fact that the bomb was placed on board either in Frankfurt or in London, airports with good security systems, sends a message that no potential target is safe. Now everyone is waiting for a terrorist bomb to bring down an American airliner departing from New York.

Unlike anywhere else in the world, large North American and European cities today have polyglot populations. Airport security per-

sonnel and airline food caterers and maintenance crews are as likely to be Palestinian, Iranian, Libyan or Iraqi as to be native-born Americans, Canadians, Germans or Englishmen. Many of these people have fanatical qualities that liberal education has removed from the West's psychological makeup.

Moreover, these recent immigrants, legal or illegal, have been given rights, both legislatively and by judicial dictate, that prevent them from being screened from occupations that allow terrorists to breach airport security. Today federal judges in the United States rou-

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USA TODAY • TUESDAY, JANUARY 3, 1989 • 7A

## 'Usual' terrorist act is airliner hijacking

*Although there have been two instances in recent years in which bombs have been suspected in airplane explosions, the most common form of terrorism has been airliner hijacking. Some recent terrorist incidents:*

**June 14-July 1, 1985:** Trans World Airlines plane departing from Athens to Cairo hijacked, landed in Beirut. One American Navy seaman, Robert Dean Stethem, beaten and killed; 39 passengers held hostage for 17 days. Hijackers believed to be members of a military Lebanese Shiite group, the Imam Hussein Brigade.

**June 23, 1985:** Air India Boeing 747 crashed off coast of Ireland killing 329. Bombing suspected.

**Oct. 8-10, 1985:** *Achille Lauro*, Italian cruise ship, hijacked. Hijackers were members of the Palestine Liberation Front; demanded the release of over 50 Palestinian prisoners jailed in Israel. American Leon Klinghoffer, 69, was killed.

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either Palestinian or Libyan radicals.

**Feb. 5, 1986:** In Texas, a knife-wielding man commandeered a Delta Air Lines jet as it landed and held the 232 people aboard hostage for two hours. No one was harmed.

**Sept. 19, 1986:** Two armed men seized plane in the Urals, shooting and killing two pursuing policemen and two passengers before being killed themselves by Soviet police. It was later revealed that the hijackers were drug addicts; no motive discernable.

**Dec. 26, 1986:** An Iraqi Airlines flight carrying 91 passengers, 15 crew members and a security guard crashed during hijacking. One of the gunmen threw a grenade that started a fire; 62 reported dead.

**March 9, 1988:** A flight attendant, three passengers and five hijackers were killed during an attempt to force a Soviet airliner to fly out of the country; 20 more were injured. The hijacking was led by a woman and her sons — jazz musicians who hid weapons in their instrument cases.

**April 5-20, 1988:** A Kuwaiti airliner was hijacked on a flight from Bangkok to Kuwait and forced to land in Iran. Hijackers, believed to be pro-Iranian Lebanese Shiite Moslems, demanded the release of 17 Shiite Moslems held by Kuwait. Three members of Kuwait's royal family among the 112 people on board. Plane was refueled, flew to Beirut, where it was not granted permission to land. Hijackers continued to Cyprus. During incident, 64 passengers released sporadically. Two Kuwaiti passengers executed. Plane refueled, continued to Algiers; 12 more hostages released, one of whom carried an American passport. All prisoners released on April 20, the third day of Ramadan, the Moslem holy month.

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# The subtle consequences of terrorist attacks

PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS

Some have lost opportunities and

Long Island

## Salvador

By Chris Norton  
Newsday Special Correspondent

San Salvador, El Salvador — In his first public address on the subject, President Rafael Angel Fournier said, "Company for the Externals." It carried the message of a new death squad, the Central American Anti-Terrorism Unit, which was one of several groups surfacing in recent months.

Early that morning, a powerful bomb had ripped through the offices of the Lutheran Church. Days earlier, on Dec. 30, 30 men had cut through the streets surrounding the National Assembly, gunned down a guard and set off a flash of light. The sound of the bombs that left the building in ruins.

The rightist border guard, an anticommunist, was seen to be a response to the leftist guerrillas, which began their strongest push in the last two years.

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Newday Special Correspondent

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St. Louis Post Dispatch 6 January 1989 p. 4B

# Gadhafi Brought Woes On Himself

*His History Of Supporting Terrorism Is Only Part Of Justification For U.S. Action*

By Barry Rubin

**C**ol. Moammar Gadhafi's combination of outdated ideology and state-of-the-art weaponry makes him a threat to America's interests and Libya's neighbors. The latest U.S.-Libyan clash — in which American F-14s shot down two Libyan MiG-23s over the Mediterranean — is another periodic and necessary reminder for him to curb his ambitions and trouble-making.

According to the Department of Defense, the aerial battle took place during routine U.S. maneuvers when the Libyan planes threatened the American patrol over international waters. Although the incident occurred 600 miles away from its new chemical-weapons factory, the Libyan action was no doubt related to a fear that the United States would soon attack the plant.

Ever since he took power in September 1969, just before his 30th birthday, Gadhafi has persisted in his megalomaniacal ambition to be the leader of the Arab world. His hero is the late Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, whose efforts to unite the Arabs and destroy Israel led to tragedy throughout the Middle East. Gadhafi's imitation would be farcical if not for the bloody trail left by Libyan-backed terrorism.

Gadhafi has repeatedly failed in his attempts to undermine or take over other states. Neighboring Chad, with French assistance, beat back his invasion after several years. His blatant and bullying interference in other parts of Africa has made him an unpopular figure, particularly when his promises of aid were never fulfilled.

Gadhafi has no real allies in the Arab world. Money and arms have been supplied to terrorist and guerrilla groups ranging from the Irish Republican Army to the Moslem nationalists of the southern Philippines, without any appreciable gains for either Libya or its clients. If one considers only Gadhafi's lack of political victories or strategic gains, he is not a threat to the United States.

But Gadhafi's activities do pose a serious threat because of his responsibility for terrorist deeds that kill or wound people, including Americans, and destabilize other states. In the areas of terrorism, the proliferation of chemical weapons and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Gadhafi does jeopardize vital U.S. interests.

Along with Syria and Iran, Libya is the leading sponsor of state terrorism. It has supplied training sites, false documents, safe haven, weapons, money and transport for a wide variety of terrorists. During the last two decades dozens of murderous attacks would never have taken place if not for Libyan assistance and, in some cases, direction. The Libyan government tried to assassinate exiled dissidents, even on American soil. The United States tried to deter Gadhafi by commercial embargoes, and pressured its allies to follow suit. Nothing worked.

After a particularly blatant terrorist attack on a club frequented by Americans in West Berlin, the United States intercepted radio communications proving Libyan involvement. In May 1986, the United States retaliated with a bombing raid on Libya. The results were dramatic: A badly shaken Gadhafi virtually ceased all of his terrorist efforts.

This lasted about two years. But there were increasing reports that Gadhafi wanted to renew his activities, using ter-

rorists from the Japanese Red Army — a group that would be harder to trace back to Libya.

The reinstitution of Libyan-backed terrorism was timed to coincide with the second anniversary of the raid on Tripoli. Last April the Japanese terrorists, probably acting in concert with Lebanese colleagues, attacked a USO club in Naples. Five people, including an American servicewoman, were killed. About the same time, a Red Army terrorist, Yu Kikomura, was arrested on the New Jersey Turnpike, apparently en route to bomb a U.S. target.

Libya has also been mentioned in connection with the bombing last month of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland. If there is firm evidence of Gadhafi's involvement in that crime, the United

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



## Airline security...CONT'D

been received sometime last week by the U.S. Embassy in Oslo, Norway, a bomb would be placed aboard a U.S. jet bound from New York to Los Angeles on Tuesday, Jan. 3.

The attendants realized that theirs was the last United flight of the day going from the New York area to Los Angeles (although there was a later TWA flight out of Newark that went off without incident) and, according to one source, it "spooked" them.

A State Department spokesman said yesterday that he "could not confirm" whether the Oslo embassy had ever received such a threat, or if it had, whether the threat had been passed along to U.S. carriers. "We don't publicize all threats," the spokesman said.

"The union has looked into it and we are satisfied that it was a real, legitimate bomb threat," Yeast said. "It was nobody's imagination."

The flight attendants remained in Newark overnight, but returned Wednesday morning to Los Angeles, where they are based. Yeast, who declined to identify the seven women, said they have an average of 10 years of experience in the air.

PHILADELPHIA

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By Susan Ber...

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

6 JANUARY 1989

Pg. 4

# U.S. agents were killed in crash, sources say

By Susan Bennett  
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — A high-level CIA official assigned to Beirut and at least two U.S. counterterrorism specialists based in the Middle East died in the crash of Pan American Flight 103, Reagan administration sources have confirmed.

Manchester Guardian Weekly  
8 Jan 89

## A smell of Semtex

THE bomb which destroyed PA 103 must have been highly sophisticated. The most advanced material known and capable of use in such an evil device is generally held to be Semtex. This plastic explosive is unusual for being completely odourless as well as safe to handle, even near naked flame; only a detonator can ignite it. It has obviously fallen into the wrong hands in alarming quantities and is particularly favoured by the IRA, which gets it from Libya, as recent police finds have shown. It has also been used in the Middle East, where at least one of the Palestinian extremist organisations, prime suspects in the international investigation, is known to be funded and equipped by Colonel Gadaffi. There will, in time, be an answer. A system has already been developed which can detect the previously undetectable; but the prototype is hugely unwieldy.

There is, though, no need to wait for science, and miniaturisation. Semtex comes from Czechoslovakia. As a Communist state it owns all the means of production of arms on its soil. It exports and profits from its invention. The Foreign Office has asked Prague to adulterate Semtex so it can be detected by dogs and other means, just as suppliers can add a smell to natural gas for safety reasons. Each batch could also be made unique, and traceable. Semtex seems about as necessary to human progress as the new non-metal pistols so piously defended by their proud makers. But if it is uniquely useful for military or industrial purposes, making it detectable need not affect performance or put out legitimate users. The Czechoslovak Government has now offered to send explosives experts to Britain to help in the investigations but it has not yet offered to doctor Semtex to make it more detectable. This is not good enough — Prague should think again.

Investigators are trying to determine whether the U.S.-bound flight, which originated in Frankfurt, was bombed by terrorists because of the sensitive intelligence assignments of these men, according to two private aviation-security consultants with knowledge of the probe.

A CIA source who asked not to be identified said the complexities of international travel — cancelled flights, unexpected delays and transfers of passengers — make it difficult logistically to target individuals on a specific flight.

But one security consultant called such targeting "an excellent possibility," and the other said it was "quite likely" that terrorists had chosen the Pan Am flight because of who was on it. Both recalled that Middle East terrorists had assassinated at least nine CIA personnel assigned to Leba-

non — including two chiefs of station in Beirut — during the last five years.

One Pan Am crash victim was described by officials as a high-level CIA Mideast specialist assigned to Beirut. Two others were State Department counterterrorism security specialists. One was based in Beirut, the other in nearby Nicosia, Cyprus, according to passenger logs.

A second CIA official whose duties were unknown also was a passenger aboard the Boeing 747 that exploded in midair Dec. 21, according to intelligence community sources, State Department officials and private aviation-security specialists.

In addition, an Army intelligence

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

### Gadhafi...CONTINUED

States would seriously consider retaliation.

A more immediate issue is the news that Libya has constructed, with the assistance of West German companies, a factory capable of making chemical weapons.

Gadhafi denied this accusation, claiming that the plant makes only medicine. But his hollow alibi underestimates the effectiveness of American intelligence, including satellite surveillance of the installation. Iraq's blatant use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and Kurdish civilians has dangerously lowered the threshold for employing such weapons. Gadhafi is scarcely a responsible leader — he has long sought nuclear weapons, and the Egyptians have accused him of once planning to sink the ocean liner Queen Elizabeth II — and the prospect of his having mustard gas or nerve gas is quite chilling.

While protesting his innocence, Gadhafi announced the building of a "defense system" around the factory to protect it from "American terrorism" that, he says, is aimed at destroying all Arab civilian industrial capacity. Obviously fearful of another U.S. attack, he dubbed President Reagan a "stupid child" and an "insane and mad dog."

While the Libyan leader offered to

allow international inspection of the plant, U.S. intelligence sources reported that the Libyans were moving the chemicals used in preparing poison gas so that the plant would appear to be clean. That nervousness may persuade Gadhafi to back down to diplomatic pressure. The United States is also trying to mobilize international forces, at a conference on chemical weapons taking place this weekend in Paris, for that purpose.

Gadhafi is one of Israel's most stubborn and ruthless foes, and is trying to torpedo any progress on negotiations to resolve the Middle East conflict. He has opposed tentative moves toward moderation by Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

It can well be argued that Libya is an easy target for American military power. It is weaker than Syria or Iran, and it lacks the degree of Soviet and Arab support enjoyed by Syria.

But Libya should be aware of that fact, and its very vulnerability should make it more cautious. Since Gadhafi refuses to act in even a marginally responsible manner, the United States will have to keep up the pressure to force him either to compromise peacefully or to back down in the face of force.

Barry Rubin, a senior research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is the author of the forthcoming book, "Istanbul Intrigues."

Los Angeles Times



Washington Post 7 Jan 89

P- 14

# Jet Crash Probe Said To Narrow

## Bonn Report Points To Heathrow Worker

By Robert J. McCartney  
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, Jan. 6—West German security sources said today that British investigators suspect that the bomb that blew up Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, probably was planted by a worker at London's Heathrow airport, according to a report by the Reuter news agency here.

The sources, who spoke to Reuter on condition of anonymity, said here that the British had provided that information to West Germany's Federal Intelligence Service.

A British police spokesman in Lockerbie denied the West German report, saying there was "nothing to substantiate" it. A West German judicial spokesman and the Bonn Foreign Ministry declined comment, saying they had "no information" about the report.

The Dec. 21 crash killed all 259 persons aboard the flight and 11 on the ground.

According to West German intelligence sources quoted by Reuter in Bonn, the British investigators are working on the assumption that

a Heathrow airport worker probably planted the bomb in an area near the forward baggage compartment.

Investigators have estimated that the bomb must have weighed about 66 pounds to have caused the explosion, the agency quoted the sources as saying. A suitcase

weighing more than 44 pounds would not have been placed in the forward baggage compartment, leading to the suspicion that it was planted in the limited-access passageway nearby, Reuter said.

The West German news agency Deutsche Presse-Agentur quoted security sources as saying that

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PAGE

—has damaged U.S. intelligence capabilities in the Middle East and intimidated sources and operatives there, according to published reports and counterterrorism experts. As a consequence, the CIA has come to depend increasingly on Israeli, French and British intelligence services, according to knowledgeable Middle East analysts.

Shortly after the Dec. 21 crash in Lockerbie, Scotland, several news agencies, including NBC News, reported that the CIA's Beirut station chief was aboard the plane.

FBI executive assistant director Oliver B. Revell 3d broke with a government tradition of silence on intelligence matters to flatly deny those reports. "The station chief from Beirut was not on that aircraft," he said on Christmas.

At that time Revell refused to comment further, because "we cannot comment on the intelligence community personnel." This week, State Department and FBI spokesmen said the same.

"I cannot confirm whether there were any agency people on board," said CIA spokeswoman Sharon Basso.

The two State Department counterterrorism specialists were identified as Ronald A. Lariviere of Holyoke, Mass., and Daniel E. O'Connor of Boston. Lariviere was the security specialist at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, according to a spokesman for the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security. O'Connor held the same job at the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia.

Personal bodyguard service to American diplomats was the normal responsibility for the two, according to State Department officials, as was the development of counterterrorist and counterespionage tactics.

Both men were on official travel status for the flight, a State Department spokesman said. But he would not describe their assignments and did not know whether they had boarded Flight 103 in Frankfurt or London, or how they had reached their boarding point.

Lariviere, 33, who lived in Alexandria, Va., with his wife and 2-year-old daughter, joined the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in May 1987 and was assigned to Beirut in July 1988, ac-

cording to State Department officials.

O'Connor, of Boston, went to work for the security bureau in 1986 and was assigned to Nicosia in April, according to the State Department.

Until recently, security and counterterrorism personnel with bodyguard responsibilities in hot spots such as Lebanon and El Salvador were drawn from the Army's elite Delta Force unit and assigned to special State Department duty.

McKee, 40, the Army intelligence officer and a native of the Pittsburgh suburb of Trafford, normally worked at the Intelligence and Security Command in Washington, but had been lent to the Defense Intelligence Agency, according to Army spokeswoman Paige Eversole. She would not comment on McKee's mission in the Middle East.

Of terrorist assaults on CIA agents, the deadliest was the April 17, 1983, bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. At least seven agents attending a meeting convened by Robert Clayton Ames, director of the agency's Office of Analysis for the Near East and South Asia, died in the blast.

Ames, Beirut station chief Kenneth Haas, and six of his subordinates perished in that assault, according to *Best Laid Plans*, an account of the U.S. war on terrorism by David C. Martin and John Walcott, national security correspondents for CBS News and the Wall Street Journal, respectively.

Investigators theorized that Ames and his colleagues were targets fingered by an insider, because Ames was making his first official visit to the Beirut embassy in five years. Because of security concerns, such gatherings of CIA officials from the field rarely take place.

The Muslim Holy War, an underground group of Shiite Muslim fundamentalists who support the Iranian revolution of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, claimed responsibility for the embassy attack.

A kindred Iranian-backed Lebanese group, Hezbollah, claimed responsibility for the capture, torture and 1985 slaying of Haas' successor, William Buckley.

### Crash...CONTINUED

officer, Maj. Charles McKee, who had been assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency for a four-week stint in the Middle East, perished in the crash.

Federal law forbids the identification of CIA officers, and the sources for this story, five in all, declined to be identified by name.

The loss of at least a dozen American experts since 1983 — including the three killed on the Pan Am flight

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ROME, Jan. 6—Pan Am Flight 103, which was shot down by a terrorist group, was carrying out a mission of terror, group demonstrators said.

Among the greatest successes of the group was the bombing of the Pan Am plane, which was carried out by a group of terrorists, many of whom are now in prison.

Investigations of the bombing of the Pan Am plane, which was carried out by a group of terrorists, many of whom are now in prison.

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A major objective of the group is to determine the political situation in the Middle East, which has changed in the last few years. Mr. Arafat is to seek a new basis of power. Among the group's members are Arafat's sons, who are known to be involved in the bombing.

In interviews with the group, it was said that the group is now in a position to emerge as a major force in the Middle East.

"We have now we do not need to half of what we want," said an official of the group, who was involved in the deaths of a number of people.



8 JANUARY 1989

# Hunt for Pan Am Bomber: New Shapes and Shadows

By ROBERTO SURO  
Special to The New York Times

ROME, Jan. 7 — The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 does not bear the trademark of any one terrorist group, and so investigators are speculating that it was carried out either by a new coalition of terrorists or by a radical group demonstrating previously unknown capabilities.

Among the individuals under greatest suspicion are a master bomb maker not known to have practiced his craft for almost two years and a terrorist field commander, held responsible for many operations and presumed dead only a few months ago.

Investigators are examining Palestinian factions long opposed to Yasir Arafat along with some that were once assumed loyal to the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

## The Shifting Politics

A major issue for investigators is to determine how the shifting politics of the Middle East has changed the face of terrorism, particularly in the aftermath of Mr. Arafat's announced decision to seek a negotiated peace on the basis of recognition of Israel. Among the hypotheses is that Mr. Arafat has lost control of elements known to have sophisticated bomb-making capabilities.

In interviews this week, Government investigators and terrorism experts in the United States, Europe and the Middle East described the Dec. 21 explosion over Scotland as a series of mysteries but said a few shapes are beginning to emerge from the shadows.

"We have to assume that for now we don't know half of what we need to know and that maybe half of what we think we know is wrong," said a senior American official taking part in the international investigation to determine who was responsible for the deaths of at least 270 people.

## Focus of Investigation

Investigators said they hope for a breakthrough within days, when laboratory examination of the wreckage determines the kind of the plastic explosive used in the bomb. The more difficult task will be to identify the bomb's trigger and detonating mechanism. These findings should narrow the range of suspects.

As the analysis of evidence proceeds, specialists are trying to determine which groups had the means, motive and opportunity to carry out the operation, the senior American official said. So far, available information points in several directions.

The Pan Am investigation has focused the renewed attention on a man that anti-terrorism specialists in several nations consider one of the world's most mysteri-

## The changing politics of the Mideast shifts path of inquiry.

ous and efficient killers, Samir Kadar.

Mr. Kadar rose through the ranks of Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council to become commander of a terrorist network in Europe that struck frequently when Mr. Arafat pursued diplomatic moderation as he did in the weeks immediately preceding the Pan Am bombing.

Anti-terrorism officials expressed relief last summer when Mr. Kadar's fingerprints were found in the wreckage of an automobile that blew up, killing at least two men. The explosion took place in Athens on July 11, the day a terrorist squad attacked an excursion ship in the Saronic Gulf.

But Greek officials said that after extensive forensic analysis they have not matched any of the mangled body

## Probe narrows...CONTD

there was "no firm and sure information" to confirm the suspicions that the bomb was planted at Heathrow. The Federal Intelligence Service had not reached any firm conclusions of its own on the matter, the West German news agency said.

British and West German authorities already have squabbled over British newspaper reports last week that said investigators were convinced the bomb was put aboard the flight where it originated, in Frankfurt.

West German officials have said there was "no evidence" so far indicating the bomb was planted in Frankfurt, and that initial results of the inquiry have indicated instead that the explosive went aboard in London.

Flight 103 originated in Frankfurt on a Boeing 727, which flew to Heathrow. There, 49 passengers from Frankfurt and their luggage were transferred to the Boeing 747 that subsequently blew up over Scotland on a flight destined for New York.

Passengers and luggage from several flights, besides the one from Frankfurt, were transferred to the 747 at Heathrow.

Investigators have concluded from scientific analysis of the wreckage that a bomb caused the explosion, and that it was placed in

or near the forward luggage compartment.

The spokesman in Lockerbie for the police office investigating the crash said the West German reports were "purely speculative."

"There's nothing to substantiate that. We have no knowledge of that. It sounds like someone is out to muddy the waters," the British spokesman said in a telephone interview.

Hubert Harth, spokesman for the Frankfurt prosecutor's office that is conducting the West German end of the investigation, said in a telephone interview that he had no information about the reports. The Foreign Ministry said the same.

Washington Post correspondent Jonathan C. Randal in London contributed to this report.

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Shadows...CONTINUED

points to Mr. Kadar.

"He is more alive than ever," said an Italian law enforcement official who has hunted Mr. Kadar for years because of the Palestinian's purported role in organizing several operations in Rome, including the 1985 airport attack. The official said that intelligence information, which he would not describe, points to Mr. Kadar's survival.

Evidence found in Athens exposed some of Mr. Kadar's operations and led investigators to an arms cache in Stockholm that included a supply of plastic explosives.

Looking at a computer printout listing the entry and exit stamps on Mr. Kadar's several passports, the Italian official said, "This man repeatedly appeared places days or weeks before a major Abu Nidal operation and in between he regularly traveled to Libya and Syria."

The official concluded, "He was a veteran coordinator of terrorist actions, and you have to ask yourself what role he could have played in Pan Am 103."

Bombing, however, is not Mr. Kadar's or Abu Nidal's specialty.

If Abu Nidal had the motive but not the means to blow up the jumbo jet, then the group known as May 15 had the bombs but seemingly lacked the motive.

According to a State Department report issued last October, the long list of May 15 operations includes the bombing of American airliners in 1982 and 1986. The report also charges that May 15 was loyal to Mr. Arafat.

It would seem contradictory for Mr. Arafat to order a terrorist operation so soon after winning respectability. But, some experts note signs that he previously engaged in terrorism to show hard-liners he was still tough even as he proclaimed moderation.

#### Accomplished Bomb Maker

The attention of investigators now seems focused on another possibility.

Terrorist operatives loyal to Mr. Arafat have repeatedly bolted from his ranks when the P.L.O. chairman followed peaceful paths. Investigators speculate about the possible defection to an anti-Arafat group by a May 15 commander known by the code name of Abu Ibrahim. He is considered the most accomplished bomb maker in the terrorist underground.

American and Italian officials believe he created what appears to be the only bomb found unexploded, which would have been capable of breaking a jumbo jet into pieces.

According to Italian court records, two men, who later confessed they worked for May 15, were arrested in Rome on Oct. 15, 1985, shortly after ar-

riving on a flight from Damascus. Each of them was carrying a hard plastic suitcase with more than seven pounds of an odorless plastic explosive carefully molded and painted so that it was virtually indistinguishable from the suitcase walls. A detonation device was built into the suitcases' closures and locks so as to be equally undetectable. The triggering mechanism was a miniaturized energy cell.

#### T.W.A. Flight to Athens in 1986

No trace of Abu Ibrahim's work has been seen since the bombing of a T.W.A. flight to Athens in April 1986 that killed four people.

The investigation of the Pan Am bombing may test a relatively new approach to terrorist crimes that looks for collaboration between nations, diverse groups and even individuals.

"We are used to applying Western logic to Mideastern crimes," said a senior Italian judicial official, "and this has sometimes blinded us to certain realities."

The official, who has investigated numerous terrorist acts and has lent a hand to the Pan Am investigation, added: "We expect terrorist organizations to each have a distinct ideology, structure and membership. However, evidence is mounting that the situation is more fluid, that there are trades of people and matériel, that different groups are capable of forming alliances even for the purpose of carrying out a single operation."

Terrorists attacks as diverse as the 1983 bombing of the United States Marine barracks in Beirut and the 1986 assault on an Istanbul synagogue are now described by some American officials as collaborative ventures.

#### Suspects and Capabilities

Given these terrorist coalitions, the senior American official involved in the Pan Am investigation said, "We are being careful to avoid wrapping things in neat little packages."

For example, pro-Iranian groups seeking revenge for the downing of an Iranian airliner last summer are suspected, but no such groups are known to have been in Europe, officials said, since several top operatives were arrested last year. But support from an element of the Iranian Government or a temporary alliance with a Palestinian group would have given either Iranian radicals or their surrogates the ability to hit the Pan Am flight.

One Palestinian group that maintains a variety of terrorist alliances is

New York Times

8 January 1989

p. 15

## Pro-Iranian Terror Groups Targeting Saudi Envoys

By IHSAN A. HIJAZI

Special to The New York Times

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Jan. 7 — Newly formed underground organizations believed linked to Iran say they have mounted a campaign of terror against Saudi diplomats abroad.

Two factions, the Soldiers of Justice and the Islamic Holy War in Hejaz, have claimed responsibility for the murder of Salah Abdullah al-Maliki, the third secretary at the Saudi Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand.

Mr. Maliki, 35 years old, was shot to death Wednesday by an unknown gunman while walking to his residence on a Bangkok street. That police said they had not ruled out political motives in the killing.

The two groups made their claims in separate statements released Wednesday night in predominantly Muslim West Beirut.

#### Boasts of Previous Violence

The Soldiers of Justice organization had earlier said it carried out the attack last month against a Saudi diplomat in Karachi, Pakistan. Ahmed al-Amri, 30, a second secretary at the

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the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command led by Ahmed Jabril, a former Syrian military officer.

The Jabril group, according to experts, is richly funded and equipped by Libya, enjoys Syrian protection, has good relations with pro-Iranian Lebanese groups and has worked with Abu Nidal before. It has also frequently taken aim at Mr. Arafat's efforts at moderation. The group bombed airplanes in Europe in 1970 and 1972, but had not been known to conduct operations outside of the Mideast in recent years.

#### Arrests of 14 in Germany

But just two months before the Pan Am bombing, West German police rounded up 14 members of the group along with an arms cache, including a bomb designed for use on an airplane.

The bomb was concealed in a small radio and contained about half a pound of plastic explosive, not nearly enough to bring down a jumbo jet. A sophisticated trigger passed first through a barometric pressure device and then a clock.

This device might not have worked on the Pan Am flight, but an American official said Jabril's organization remains an important suspect because "if they could rig a small bomb that way, we have to assume they could have set up a big bomb differently."



Shadows...CONTINUED

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One Palestinian group that maintains a variety of terrorist alliances is



# 'Peacemaker' Arafat can't control the darker side

By JEANE KIRKPATRICK

A NY Palestinian leader who proposes an end to the *intifada* (uprising) exposes himself to the bullets of his own people and endangers his life. The PLO will know how to deal with him," said Yasser Arafat, peacemaker, last week on Radio Monte Carlo in response to the proposal by Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij for a one-year cease-fire on the West Bank.

Freij got the message. Like many other moderate West Bank Palestinians, he would rather live than die.

"I do not think that Arafat was making any threats directed

against any particular person," said Freij as he withdrew his proposal. "I have the right to make a proposal, but the PLO has the right to make decisions. If they have decided that the time is not suitable or that the idea is not suitable, I certainly respect that," he said.

Not since Munich has a "peace offensive" been surrounded by so much violence and threat of violence as that launched by Arafat with his famous "concessions" concerning terrorism, Israel's right to exist, and United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338.

The Reagan Administration's acceptance of Arafat's formulations as adequate grounds for the United States to talk to the PLO set in motion what George F. Will has called a "snowball of appeasement" among those determined that there should be an end to the long-smoldering conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Few of those rushing to "recognize" the new Palestinian "state," to elevate its representation, or to associate themselves with Arafat's initiative, seem to have noticed that his moves toward peace take place in a context saturated with threats of violence.

No sooner had Arafat renounced terrorism than other purveyors of PLO violence dissociated themselves from the posi-

tions of their titular leader.

From Lebanon, Abu Musa announced that his PLO faction utterly rejected Arafat's policies. He noted that, in any case, actions of the Palestinian National Council (which Arafat heads) are not binding on the Palestinian people.

Also from Lebanon, Abu Adnan of Achille Lauro fame announced that his military operations against Israel would continue without regard to Arafat's commitments.

From Damascus, George Habash and Nayif Hawatmeh joined in denouncing Arafat's "recognition" of Israel.

In fact, Arafat himself has soft-pedaled the extent of his change. "I have not changed. It is the Americans who have moved," he told *Der Spiegel* the day after Christmas.

In his view, the PLO recognizes the right of all parties in the Middle East to "live in peace and security" — but not yet. Arafat has made it clear that peace will come on the PLO's terms, or not at all.

Precise details of those terms are still somewhat ambiguous. But they include the demand for a sovereign state with its capital in Jerusalem, the right of refu-

## ENVOYS... CONTINUED

Saudi Embassy there, was shot and seriously wounded by an assailant. He was sent to a hospital in his own country, where his condition was said to be stable.

The Holy War organization in Hejaz said it assassinated Mr. Maliki to avenge the execution of four of its members in Saudi Arabia on Sept. 30.

The Saudi authorities said the four, all Shiite Muslims, had been convicted of involvement in subversive activity against the Government in the oil-producing eastern province.

The province is part of the Hejaz, which, with the district of Nejd, forms the Saudi kingdom. An estimated 100,000 Shiites live in the Hejaz.

The four executed Shiites were earlier described as members in a Saudi branch of the Iranian-sponsored Party of God.

The claim by the Holy War organization in Hejaz is seen here as confirming the link between the group and the Party of God. Islamic Holy War in Lebanon has been engaged in kidnapping Westerners. It says it is holding two of nine Americans believed kidnapped by pro-Teheran groups: Terry A. Anderson, chief Middle East correspondent of The Associated Press, and Thomas M. Sutherland, dean of agriculture at the American University of Beirut.

A weekly news magazine here known to be well informed on Iranian affairs, reported this week that certain elements within the Iranian Government, who were not identified, set up the Soldiers of Justice group to mount violence against the Saudis. The weekly, *Al Shiraa*, said the organization is

made up of Lebanese and Saudi Shiites. It did not identify the members.

The formation of the Soldiers of Justice group reflects a growing power struggle between those in the Iranian Government who are seeking to improve relations with Saudi Arabia and those opposed to such a move, the magazine said.

### Disclosed Iran-Contra Story

Two years ago, As Shiraa disclosed the story about the arms-for-hostages deal between Washington and Teheran. It hinted then it had obtained its information from dissidents inside the Teheran regime.

Moderate allies of the Speaker of Iran's Parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani, are known to favor normal ties with the Saudis now that the war with Iraq is over. Saudi Arabia had contributed

funds to the Iraqi war effort. Baghdad and Teheran accepted a United Nations-sponsored cease-fire in August.

Saudi Arabia broke diplomatic relations with Iran, accusing it of engaging in activity to destabilize the Government of King Fahd.

Most Saudis are Sunni Muslims. In the summer of 1987, the two countries exchanged accusations of responsibility for the death of 400 pilgrims, most of them Iranians, in Mecca.

The Holy War Organization in Hejaz said it has "declared war" against all those working "for the House of Saud," meaning the royal family. The Soldiers of Justice group claimed that those employed by the Saudi Government "are devils serving the interests of the United States and Israel."

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Los Angeles Times 9 Jan 89  
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# Tough Talk on Terrorism a Hypocrisy

By JEFF COHEN

No sooner was it established that Pan Am Flight 103 had been destroyed by a bomb than the American press went into its predictable ritual. Journalists peppered President Reagan and President-elect Bush with all the usual questions: How can we bring terrorists to justice? Will we retaliate against any country harboring those responsible for bombing passenger planes?

Reagan and Bush responded with the expected tough-sounding rhetoric. Reagan: "We're going to make every effort we can to find out who was guilty of this savage thing and bring them to justice." Bush pledged to "seek hard and punish firmly, decisively, those who did this, if you can ever find them."

What's wrong with this all-too-familiar script? In a word, hypocrisy.

As many in the media and in the Reagan-Bush Administration know, the United States has harbored an accused jet-bombing terrorist. Our government has done nothing to bring him to justice, nor have the media clamored for justice. And there's no doubt, Mr. Bush, about whether "you can ever find him." Folks working for the Reagan Administration, in close association with your office as vice president, hired him—long after he was linked to a murderous jet bombing.

The terrorist's name is Luis Posada, a right-wing Cuban exile who worked for the Central Intelligence Agency for years after the Bay of Pigs invasion. Posada says the CIA trained him in the use of explosives. In October, 1976, he was the reputed mastermind behind the explosion of a civilian passenger jet that killed all 73 people on board. The Cubana Airlines DC-8 blew up soon after taking off from Barbados en route to Jamaica and Havana.

Posada and other members of the Cuban terror group, Command of United Revolutionary Organizations, were charged in Venezuela with the crime. The two men who admitted planting the bomb identified Posada as a mastermind of the plot. Posada, however, whose trial was never completed, mysteriously escaped in 1985 from a high-security Venezuelan prison. To this day, he

is wanted for terrorism.

Since the Command of United Revolutionary Organizations was led by CIA veterans, the agency learned within days of the jet bombing that Posada and his associates were involved. But the CIA, according to investigative reporter Scott Armstrong, did nothing to bring the men to justice. Bush was then director of the CIA.

After Posada escaped from jail, instead of hunting Posada down, the United States apparently found him a job. Posada was discovered two years ago in El Salvador working as a key overseer in the U.S. operation (Oliver North, William Casey & Co.) to resupply the Nicaraguan Contras. In May, 1986, a Venezuelan television reporter interviewed Posada from "somewhere in Central America." "I feel good here," Posada exclaimed, "because I am involved once again in a fight against international communism."

Posada was recruited to the Contra supply program and was supervised in El Salvador by longtime CIA operative Felix Rodriguez. During this period, Rodriguez reported regularly to Vice President Bush's office. According to reports from a Senate subcommittee and the Wall Street Journal, Posada was one of four leaders of the Command of United Revolutionary Organizations who found work in the Contra operation. This despite the fact that the command's members had been involved in bombings and assassination plots, including one in 1976 targeted at Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

What did the United States do after major American dailies identified Posada as a Contra operative in El Salvador? Not much. He was allowed to disappear again.

Instead of clamoring at Bush for hypothetical responses to still-unidentified terrorists behind the Pan Am explosion, journalists would do better to ask Bush why the United States has protected Posada and friends.

Other questions need asking. If it's terrorism to blow up innocent civilians in the fight against "international Zionism" or "Western satanism," isn't it also terrorism to perform the same acts in the struggle against "international communism"? Or is blowing up civilians acceptable as long as the target is Cuba?

And if it's justified for the United States to retaliate militarily against a foreign country linked to the Pan Am terrorists, would Cuba have had the right to launch an air strike against Washington because of our relations with Posada and his Command of United Revolutionary Organizations?

The stories of Luis Posada and the CIA's

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

Arafat...CONTINUED

gees to return to the new state, the removal of all Jewish settlements on the West Bank and Gaza, and Israel's attendance at an international conference that would negotiate the still-undefined borders of the proposed state.

Arafat's demands go beyond those generally reported in the Western press. Even Israel's return to its 1967 boundaries would not satisfy these demands. In his view, Israel's right to exist is based on U.N. Resolution 181. That means Israel has a right to exist within its 1947 borders.

"We can negotiate on this at the peace conference. Many compromises are conceivable. But we will demand a corridor between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. And we will not compromise on Jerusalem," he has said.

Arafat's confidence rests in part on his expectation that the next U.S. Administration will be more friendly to PLO demands. That view is widely shared in the Arab world and has been recently voiced by Arab leaders at the highest levels, including those in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. All expect that the Bush Administration will pressure Israel into an international conference.

Will it happen?

Israelis recently have played the dangerous game of Middle East politics with less skill than their more-Machiavellian adversaries — because they have been preoccupied with internal affairs as democracies are wont to do because they believe that a deal (such as Camp David) is a deal and have stuck to its terms; because they have underestimated European ties to the Arab world. And because, perhaps, they cannot quite conceive of the possibility of abandonment.

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# High-Tech Alone Can't Bar Plane Bombs

*Profiling the passengers and 'black hat' teams to test security are needed.*

By Noel Koch

**T**HE BOMBING of Pan American Airways Flight 103 prompts a single overriding question: Can such tragedies be prevented in the future? The answer is yes. But it is not an easy yes, and it is precisely the search for an easy answer (and a quick one) that confounds efforts to arrive at the right answer.

In June, 1985, Shiite radicals hijacked TWA Flight 847 and held it long enough for those of us engaged in dealing with the incident to receive a number of desperately well-intentioned suggestions. One was that we should fly a large helicopter over the aircraft, lift the plane in a sling and carry it to a neighboring country, where commandos could rescue the victims.

These and similar notions ("Why can't you pump an odorless gas into the plane and put them all to sleep?") spring from the hope that these difficulties can be addressed through some James Bondian technique the government must surely have at its disposal. Scientifically advanced nations look to technology for answers to their problems.

But in confronting terrorism, we must not allow technology to become our Maginot line: an expensive illusion by which we render ourselves more vulnerable to the threat than we were before, even as we abandon other defenses and think ourselves more secure. Today, we are almost entirely reliant

on technology to defend against the principal security threats to aircraft.

Security devices in most U.S. air terminals consist of frame-mounted magnetometers and X-ray machines. The atmospheric pressure chamber, used in the attempt to trigger barometric detonators, merely offers an interesting challenge to the bomb maker (a gadgeteer at heart, anyway). The thermal neutron activator and gas "sniffing" devices are promising, though costly and still developmental, and we may be certain someone in Damascus, Baghdad or Tripoli is mulling how to defeat these devices.

And if he can't, what? Why, the terrorists will just go around them entirely.

When used against aircraft, bombs are most commonly concealed in baggage intended for the

hold, rather than carried into the aircraft cabin. Depending on the security procedures followed, hold baggage may be checked once at the point of origin and never again. Thus, the security of a flight, such as 103 originating in Frankfurt, is only as good as the least rigorous procedures followed at the various terminals from which Pan Am gathered its connecting passengers.

The other sure-fire method of circumventing

these devices is to get one of the hundreds of people who have access to the aircraft to put the bomb in place. These include baggage handlers, caterers, groomers, even security personnel. British investigators last week were increasingly seeing this as the way the bomb was smuggled aboard Flight 103.

Less certain methods also exist. Whatever else the Palestine Liberation Organization may be, it is most certainly a business. Among the PLO's holdings are a number of duty-free shops. Duty-free shops are inside the security perimeter at many airports, and purchases are delivered to planeside in bags and other containers closed and rarely re-examined before being stowed in the cabin.

None of this is intended to suggest we should scrap our technological barriers to terrorist acts. Quite the contrary, we should continue to improve what we have, and encourage new initiatives. These devices deter the frivolous and the disturbed, help channel serious threats in ways that

aid interception and may yet save an aircraft.

But technology must be integrated into a fuller and more flexible array of defenses against terrorism. Two nations, Israel and the Republic of Korea, have both done exemplary work in this regard.

Israel has maximized "profiling": the intense scrutiny of those flying El Al to narrow the focus of inspectors on prospective problems. To be sure, El Al carries an annual average of 150,000 passengers; Pan Am, as an example of only one U.S. flag carrier, may carry as many as 6 million people in a year, 40 times the annual El Al load. Whether the Israeli approach remains valid after scaling up to U.S. sizes remains to be proven, but the government of Israel should be willing to assist the Federal Aviation Administration in developing a model tailored to those conditions.

The Republic of Korea (South Korea), in preparing for the Seoul Summer Olympics, and with the hard experience of the bombing of KAL Flight 858 in November, 1987, behind it, has also fashioned a superb airline security system. Korean Air Lines is close to U.S. carriers in size, close to El Al in the threat posed by terrorism.

Korean procedures combine detection technol-

*'The security of a flight is only as good as the least rigorous procedures followed at the terminals.'*

ogies and passenger search and review procedures that are as thorough at the airline's gateway cities as they are at Kimpo Airport in Seoul.

One characteristic that links the security procedures of Israel and the Republic of Korea is that both constantly test those procedures. It is too soon to know what investigation will reveal about the security attending Flight 103. But no matter how well conceived, an airline's security is only as good as those who manage and operate it on a day-to-day basis.

If airline and airport security are to be maintained at an appropriately high level, they must be exercised and evaluated regularly by independent "black hat" teams attempting to penetrate or circumvent security procedures and, where successful, providing guidance in how to eliminate those vulnerabilities that permitted the breaching of security. Such procedures would include exploiting interline transfers, privileged access and employee clearances.

Finally, the U.S. government must itself take responsibility for the safety of its flag carriers. It is sadly instructive to hear discussions of culpability and calculations of liability always beginning with "The airline . . ." We cannot protect U.S. flag carriers without the assistance of foreign governments, to help isolate governments supporting terrorist activities. And if retaliation for what was done to 103 is thought to be inappropriate, as Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said a few days ago, then at least indemnification and reparations should not be.



Noel Koch, who supervised the Pentagon's antiterrorism program, is president of International Security Management.

## Procris...CONTINUED

Historic links to right-wing terror groups overseas have been under-reported because much of the U.S. media is content presenting a simplistic view of the world where Americans in white hats police the globe of black hats—usually worn by Middle Eastern terrorists.

In some countries of Western Europe and Latin America—where the terrorism issue is analyzed with fewer ideological blinders—people don't automatically see us in white hats. They are as familiar with Luis Posada's U.S. links as we are with Abu Nidal and Libya.

American journalists could begin cutting through the fog by asking George Bush a simple question: If we're serious about punishing terrorists, shouldn't we start with our own?

Jeff Cohen is the executive director of FAIR, a media-watch group based in New York.



Washington Post

9 January 1989

p. 13

# Radical Palestinians Deny Bomb Role

By Nora Boustany  
Washington Post Foreign Service

DAMASCUS, Syria—Officials of radical Palestinian factions based here strongly deny any role in last month's Pan Am bombing, contending that such an act of international terrorism would betray the uprising in the Israeli-occupied territories and would not be permitted by Syria, their patron and host.

A belated but firm Syrian condemnation of the bombing by its foreign minister in talks with U.S. Ambassador Edward Djerejian last week was seen by diplomats and observers here as reinforcing the Palestinians' contention.

"This brand of operations such as that against Pan Am has been stopped for some time," a spokesman for the Marxist-oriented Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) said. "There is not one group that can go off on a tangent and take such a step on its own in the shadow of victories scored by women and children and the hard-earned symbol of the stone" in the year-old Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza.

Fadl Shrourou, chief spokesman for Ahmed Jibril, leader of the radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, argued that his faction, which has been accused by some U.S. intelligence sources in the attack, has prided itself on operating against Israeli military targets and on guerrilla missions inside occupied territories.

"The PFLP-GC has not committed such acts in the past," he said, referring to the Pan Am bombing. "It is not our style of doing things."

Spokesmen for these groups and others based here—both foes and allies of Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat—appeared eager to dispel suspicions that they were behind the Dec. 21 terrorist bombing that blew the Pan Am Boeing 747 out of the sky over Scotland and killed 270 people.

The PLO has said publicly that it wants to help solve the bombing—a move that many analysts saw as an indication that it believed the attack was the work of radical splinter factions opposed to Arafat's moves toward Middle East peace and political dialogue with the United States.

Jibril has denied that his group was linked to the Pan Am disaster and his spokesman Shrourou argued that, far from benefiting extreme Palestinian factions who oppose the U.S.-PLO dialogue, the tragedy has served to boost links between Arafat and the Americans.

"Such acts are not going to stop the dialogue," Shrourou said. "On the contrary, relations have been reinforced. There is more ground for cooperation now. Arafat is offering more services" to the United States, home of most of the victims.

Spokesmen for the DFLP, a PLO group that has endorsed Arafat's new blueprint for peace, said they found it highly unlikely that any guerrilla organization would venture to go against the grain of the *intifada*, the year-old Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation, in which stone-hurling men, women and children are facing armed soldiers.

Political ideologues in George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine said here that no Palestinian group would dare stage an operation as dramatic as the Pan Am bombing at this juncture, as Syria is carefully attempting to move out of Arab isolation and broaden its regional and international influence.

Habash, whose faction is separate from the PFLP-GC, was among the radical PLO minority that voted against the Palestine National Council resolutions in Algiers in November accepting U.N. Resolution 242, which recognizes the right of all nations in the region to live within secure borders.

Habash and Nayef Hawatmeh, chairman of the DFLP, have agreed to give Arafat a six-month grace period to test the effectiveness of his

new policy before challenging him. Palestinian sources said the other factions—even some outside the PLO—are expected to do the same.

The most notorious Palestinian terrorist organization, however, the Fatah Revolutionary Council led by Sabri Banna, also known as Abu Nidal, long ago broke with the PLO and was expelled from Syria in September 1987 to satisfy U.S. conditions for the return of William Eagleton as ambassador after a 10-month absence.

Eagleton had been recalled to Washington after a British jury convicted a Palestinian linked to senior Syrian intelligence officials of attempting to use his girlfriend to smuggle a bomb aboard an El Al jet. Syrian officials countered at the time that their intelligence network had been infiltrated by agents of Mossad, the Israeli secret service.

Western diplomats here say, however, that it would not make sense now for Syria to back an operation such as the Pan Am bombing when it is trying to get off the U.S. list of countries that support terrorism and is seeking to engage the United States in talks for the revival of commercial and cultural exchange between the two countries.

Although Israel and some terrorism specialists have pointed their fingers at Palestinian groups such as the PFLP-GC, analysts here tend to rule out the involvement of guerrilla organizations enjoying Syrian support. "Even the remote involvement of a Syrian-backed Palestinian faction will implicate Syria by association," one Palestinian official said.

"No Palestinian group here, not even the PFLP-GC, would dare defy Syria. Look what happened to Abu Nidal's people. They were thrown out of Damascus overnight," said another Palestinian, Ghazi Masoud, chief of political relations in Habash's faction.

The mandate of Djerejian, the new U.S. ambassador here, is to

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

Palestinian

pursue Syrian relations in the light of the diplomats and were puzzled by the failure to prevent the bombing.

The Syrian incident last week with some Syrian bombings, terrorism.

In the investigation, officials blamed, but in silence in the storm. "To unify the accusations against western d

A local "this is a licence," a volunteer to it is too late

Thursday meeting in the Syrian Foreign Ministry, Charaa, condemned the act of international terrorism, said

"We have a government dialogue" of Djerejian's discussions not elaborate

Four days before it has been a bomb. Pentagon said on the substantial evidence suggested that might have been and that by the P

Terrorism the PFLP's participation in the addition were an October send Palestinian said that



Palestinians...CONTINUED

pursue Syria's quest for improved relations and cooperation, and in the light of this new approach, diplomats and other observers here were puzzled at Syria's two-week failure to denounce the Pan Am bombing.

The Syrian press reported the incident largely without comment, with some editorials merely saying Syria has always opposed hijackings, bombings and similar acts of terrorism.

In the initial stages of the investigation, sources here said, Syrian officials feared they would be blamed, but maintained a cautious silence in hopes of riding out the storm. "They did not want to dignify the suspicions nor any possible accusations by commenting," one western diplomat here said.

A local analyst suggested that "this is Syria's diplomacy of silence," adding, "Syrians never volunteer to take a stand except when it is too late."

Thursday, however, during a meeting between Djerejian and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Charaa, the Syrian "categorically condemned the explosion as an act of international terrorism," Djerejian said later.

"We have engaged the Syrian government in an important dialogue" on the issue of terrorism, Djerejian said, "and the initial discussions have been positive." He did not elaborate.

Four days after the crash and before it had conclusively been found to be a bombing, Noel Koch, a former Pentagon counterterrorism official, said on U.S. television that "circumstantial evidence and precedent" suggested that the Syrian government might have been behind the bombing and that it may have been carried out by the PFLP-GC.

Terrorism specialists believe that the PFLP-GC has both motivation and a possible political motive to be considered a suspect. In addition, two PFLP-GC members were arrested in West Germany in October on charges of trying to send plastic explosives to the Israeli-occupied territories. Jibril has said that the two were on a mission

New York Times  
**ON MY MIND**  
A. M. Rosenthal

10 January 1989 p. 23

## The Conquest of Terrorism

**O**ne day perhaps the West will summon the moral and political courage to face the truth about terrorism. On that day, the conquest of terrorism will begin — but not until that day.

It is not that the West is ignorant of the truth. It has been known for years — to every intelligence branch, every diplomat, every national leader.

But whenever a plane is hijacked or blown up by a bomb or a hostage is snatched off the streets, the Western nations mill around as if it had never happened before, swearing to hunt the criminals down and make them pay.

It never happens. The reason is not the brilliance or bravery of the terrorists. It is the hypocrisy and cowardice of the West in refusing to acknowledge the truth — that we have known all along who the major criminals are and exactly where they live.

So, for once, let us look at reality squarely: The important criminals are not the men and women who sneak the bombs on board the plane, or chain a hostage to the wall, but the top officials of the states that provide the money, the training, the camps where the ter-

to track down Israeli agents and a spokesman for West Germany's federal criminal office has said that investigators have found no link between the Pan Am crash and the October arrests.

While Syria has clearly been uncomfortable with Arafat's concessionary approach to Middle East diplomacy and Syrian President Hafez Assad hopes to influence any international peace effort in order to regain for Syria the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, analysts here argue that the Syrian leader cannot afford to alienate other Arabs or the Soviet Union.

With efforts toward an Arab summit meeting under way, one of Syria's primary concerns is to break out of an isolation brought on by rival Iraq's warm relations with

rorists are mustered, the guarded safe houses where they live and the platforms and meeting halls where they are allowed to strut in triumph.

Terrorism makes anybody anywhere a potential victim every time he buys a plane or ship ticket or she enters her own embassy abroad. It would be totally impossible without the money, weapons and succor that these countries and their leaders provide.

At one time or another, at least 20 states have fostered or promoted terrorism: Middle Eastern countries that gave terrorists money, Soviet bloc states that provided training, and Western countries that allowed them to escape on legal technicalities.

But at the moment, Western officials know these men are at the heart of international terrorism:

• Hafez al-Assad, President of Syria, who has made his country a headquarters and jumping-off place for a variety of Palestinian terrorists. American and other hostages are kept in apartment-prisons in Lebanon on streets patrolled by Syrian soldiers. Every time Mr. Assad arranges for one hostage to be released

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most other Arab nations and Arafat's new diplomacy.

"Assad is willing to attend an Arab summit meeting in which Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak will participate and noises have been heard about a reconciliation. That is how far the Syrians will go in staying on top of the Arab heap," an Arab diplomat here said. "The Syrians are not going to gamble with their antipathy to Arafat right now. Besides, they do not want to upset the Soviet Union, their main ally and major arms supplier."

The Soviet Union is known to have encouraged Arafat to show flexibility and moderation to pave the way for an international Middle East peace conference favored by Moscow as the best forum for settling the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Syria might not mind seeing the PLO-U.S. dialogue disrupted. But with Israeli leaders such as Yitzhak Shamir and Shimon Peres flatly opposed to dealing with the PLO, analysts here suggest, Syria does not have to rely on terrorism by groups such as the PFLP-GC to create obstacles to Arafat's diplomatic efforts.



Washington Times

11 January 1989

P. 5

# Pentagon report calls Abu Nidal most lethal group

By Bill Gertz  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The radical Palestinian group known as the Abu Nidal Organization is the most lethal terrorist band because it attacks a wide range of targets, the Pentagon said in a report released yesterday called "Terrorist Group Profiles."

A Pentagon terrorism expert added: "If you look at the history of Abu Nidal attacks and the indiscriminate nature of the casualties, that's what makes him, in our eyes, more lethal. It is a very lethal, dangerous group."

The report lists the size, scope, operating methods and actions of 52 terrorist groups and their sponsors.

In formulating the report, Pentagon intelligence analysts defined terrorism as "premeditated, politi-

## The report lists 52 terrorist groups and their sponsors.

cally motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets" by groups or clandestine state agents "usually to influence an audience."

Terrorist groups can be tight-knit politically motivated cells, ethnic or separatist insurgents, or state-sponsored groups working closely with a government, the Pentagon said.

Among the sponsors and supporters of international terrorism listed in the report, the Pentagon singled out as major offenders the governments of Libya, Iran, Syria and Afghanistan. North Korea, South Yemen, Cuba, Nicaragua and other Soviet bloc countries are also listed as terrorist supporters.

The Abu Nidal group, formed in 1974, has its headquarters in Libya

and is funded by patron states, graft, blackmail and "its own network of business companies and front organizations," the report said.

The Pentagon listed the 1985 machine-gun attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna, when 16 persons were killed and 60 others wounded, and the 1986 attack on a synagogue in Istanbul, Turkey, which killed 22 worshippers, among the 34 major terrorist actions carried out by Abu Nidal between July 1980 and May 1988.

The Pentagon official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the Abu Nidal Organization is regarded as the most dangerous group because it does not limit attacks to public figures or specific targets.

By contrast, the government of Iran and its surrogate terrorist group, Islamic Jihad, have conducted actions that were "very goal-oriented and discriminate," the official said. "Iran wields terrorism as an instrument of state policy." The Islamic Jihad, responsible for the bombing deaths of 241 Marines and 56 French soldiers in 1983 and the kidnapping of several Americans in Lebanon, are among the most deadly terrorists, "if you're talking body count," the official said.

The official also said "the potential use of chemical weapons by terrorist groups is a great concern of the administration," although such weapons were still "above the threshold" of the capabilities of most terrorists.

"On the other hand, biological weapons are easier to produce," he said. "It wouldn't take much to whip up a batch of anthrax, but I wouldn't want to be the one handling it."

The official also said intelligence analysts have not determined if the plastic explosive used in the Dec. 21 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland was Semtex, or some other

## Conquest...CONTINUED

the world swoons with gratitude.

• Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran and the men trying to squiggle to the top of the mound of hatred that is the Government of Iran. It is in his name that hostages are taken and in his name that they are held.

• Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya, paymaster of terrorism in all parts of the world from the Middle East to the Philippines and even sometimes in Belfast.

Most terrorist atrocities are carried out in the name of statehood for Palestine. But those Palestinians who yearn for a decent settlement with Israel are not blowing up planes.

And the men psychotic enough to blow them up — long before the unsolved Pan Am disaster — will not call off their horrors unless they achieve the goal to which they are sworn, the death of Israel.

Nor is Palestinian statehood the goal for the criminals who pay the criminals. Mr. Assad, for instance, still dreams of Greater Syria, which would swallow up not only Jordan, Lebanon and Israel, but the territory on which a separate Arab Palestine is supposed to be created.

The West knows all this. But in 1986 President Mitterrand forbade U.S. bombers to cross French territory en route to Libya. Prime Minister Thatcher, brave in the Falklands, exudes nervousness at the very idea of American action against terrorist nations. Bonn rushes into automatic denial when Washington says West German companies are involved in building a Libyan chemical weapons plant.

And the United States itself? So far, mostly whimpering about how we cannot go it alone without our allies, as if we were Luxembourg.

Why all this evasion of the plain truth about where terrorism has its roots? Why the refusal to take economic and political action that would hit the terrorist states and their leaders hard enough to show them that terrorism does not pay? Such as:

A total economic boycott of states financing or giving refuge to terrorists. A total ban on all weapons sales to these states. A total closing of Western airports to all traffic to and from any of their cities. A warning that military action would follow if economic steps were not persuasive enough.

The reason for Western refusal to act is money — money to be made from selling weapons, equipment and factories to the terrorist states.

Maybe one day we will change our values and decide that lives of the innocent are more important. If not, let us at least have enough self-respect not to run around whining that we do not know the names and addresses of the terrorists.

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## Abu Nidal...CONTINUED

type of explosive.

The Pentagon report on terrorist groups identifies eight that have used bombs against airliners and includes a picture of a Semtex explosive captured from Lebanese terrorists.

The 131-page publication was released by the Pentagon to inform experts and the public better about the nature of the threat posed by terrorism, said Charles Whitehouse, assistant defense secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict.

The recently formed Counterterrorism Joint Task Force under his control "is well-manned and well-equipped" to deal with any terrorist attack around the world, Mr. Whitehouse said.

Washington Times 11 Jan 1989 p. 6

## 3 accused of plotting overthrow of the U.S.

SPRINGFIELD, Mass. (AP) — Three self-styled revolutionaries plotted to bomb courthouses, military offices and corporations in an attempt to overthrow the U.S. government, a federal prosecutor said yesterday.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Loucks also told a federal jury that the three defendants, plotted robberies from Maine to Virginia and attempted to murder an off-duty policeman "to further the conspiracy's personal, political goals." They are accused of seditious conspiracy, or conspiring to overthrow the government; racketeering conspiracy; and racketeering enterprise.

Mr. Loucks described the 1976 bombing of the Suffolk Superior Courthouse in Boston, which blew down walls and injured several people, as an attempt by the group "to cripple the Massachusetts penal system."

Opening arguments from defendant Raymond Luc Levasseur, 42, of Maine, who is presenting his own case, and attorneys representing Mr. Levasseur's wife, Patricia Gros Levasseur, 40, and Richard Williams, 41, of Boston, were to follow.

Mr. Loucks maintained that Mr. Levasseur and his wife were core members of the group that claimed

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

## MAJOR TERRORIST GROUPS

These are some of the top international terrorist groups as identified yesterday by the Pentagon in its new report "Terrorist Group Profiles"

### Abu Nidal Organization

Date formed: 1974

Estimated membership: 500

Headquarters: Libya (previously Syria and Iraq)

Leadership: Sabri Khalil al Banna (Abu Nidal)

Sponsors: Previously Syria and Iraq, currently Libya, also self-sustaining economic operations

Political objectives: An extremely violent Palestinian terrorist group, the Abu Nidal Organization is committed to placing the "armed struggle" against the "Zionist enemy" as the top priority of the Palestinian resistance movement, seeks the destruction of Israel.

Methods: Machine-gun attacks, hijackings, bombings.

### Hezbollah (Islamic Jihad)

Date formed: 1983

Estimated membership: Approximately 3,000 full-time members, with perhaps as many as 500 directly involved in terrorist activity.

Headquarters: West Beirut and Bekaa Valley, Lebanon.

Leadership: A Consultative Council (Shura) that reports to Iran. Leading officials are Husayn Musawi, Abbas Musawi and Iranian Revolutionary Guards personnel stationed in Lebanon. Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah is overall spiritual leader of the movement.

Sponsor: Iran.

Political objectives: Establish a revolutionary Shi'ite Islamic state in Lebanon modeled after Iran; eliminate non-Islamic influences and force Western interests out of the region.

Methods: Suicide truck-bombings, kidnappings, shootings, hijackings.

### Provisional Irish Republican Army

Date formed: 1970.

Estimated membership: 200-400 hard-core members.

Headquarters: Northern Ireland; Irish Republic.

Leadership: Gerry Adams; Martin McGuinness.

Sponsor: Libya.

Political objectives: Establish a unified Ireland under a 'socialist' government; undermine British support for Northern Ireland remaining in the United Kingdom through a campaign of attrition and terror.

Methods: Bombings, assassinations.

### Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)

Date formed: 1980.

Estimated membership: 700.

Headquarters: Various locations inside El Salvador, with other key offices in Managua, Nicaragua.

Leadership: Joaquin Villalobos, Jorge Shafik Handal.

Sponsors: Nicaragua, Cuba, Soviet Union and Vietnam. Various 'solidarity' and fund-raising support groups throughout Latin America, Europe and North America.

Political objectives: Create and sustain a war of attrition against the elected government of El Salvador to cause its destruction and replacement by a pro-Cuban, pro-Soviet and anti-U.S. state.

Methods: kidnappings, assassinations, grenade attacks.

### 19th of April Movement (M-19)

Date formed: April 19, 1970.

Estimated membership: 1,000.

Headquarters: Cali, Colombia.

Leadership: Carlos Pizarro Leon-Gomez; Antonio Navarro, Otty Patino.

Sponsors: Cuba, Nicaragua and Libya.

Political objectives: Struggle against Colombian "bourgeoisie" and American "imperialism"; extort funds from narcotics producers.

Methods: Hijackings, bombings, kidnappings, assassinations.

### African National Congress

Date formed: 1912, renamed ANC, 1923.

Estimated membership: 4,000 to 5,000.

Headquarters: Lusaka, Zambia.

Leadership: Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela.

Sponsors: Receives support from Soviet bloc, Cuba and a number of African nations, in addition to contributions from the West.

Political objectives: Overthrow current South African regime and dismantle system of apartheid; establish socialist government in South Africa.

Methods: Bombings, rocket attacks.

The Washington Times



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Estimated membership: Approximately 3,000 full-time members, with perhaps as many as 500 directly involved in terrorist activity.

Headquarters: West Beirut and Bekaa Valley, Lebanon.

Leadership: A Consultative Council (Shura) that reports to Iran. Leading officials are Husayn Musawi, Abbas Musawi and Iranian Revolutionary Guards personnel stationed in Lebanon. Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah is overall spiritual leader of the movement.

Sponsor: Iran.

Political objectives: Establish a revolutionary Shi'ite Islamic state in Lebanon modeled after Iran; eliminate non-Islamic influences and force Western interests out of the region.

Methods: Suicide truck-bombings, kidnappings, shootings, hijackings.

### **Provisional Irish Republican Army**

Date formed: 1970.

Estimated membership: 200-400 hard-core members.

Headquarters: Northern Ireland; Irish Republic.

Leadership: Gerry Adams; Martin McGuinness.

Sponsor: Libya.

Political objectives: Establish a unified Ireland under a 'socialist' government; undermine British support for Northern Ireland remaining in the United Kingdom through a campaign of attrition and terror.

Methods: Bombings, assassinations.

### **Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)**

Date formed: 1980.

Estimated membership: 700.

Headquarters: Various locations inside El Salvador, with other key offices in Managua, Nicaragua.

Leadership: Joaquin Villalobos, Jorge Shafik Handal.

Sponsors: Nicaragua, Cuba, Soviet Union and Vietnam. Various 'solidarity' and fund-raising support groups throughout Latin America, Europe and North America.

Political objectives: Create and sustain a war of attrition against the elected government of El Salvador to cause its destruction and replacement by a pro-Cuban, pro-Soviet and anti-U.S. state.

Methods: kidnappings, assassinations, grenade attacks.

### **19th of April Movement (M-19)**

Date formed: April 19, 1970.

Estimated membership: 1,000.

Headquarters: Cali, Colombia.

Leadership: Carlos Pizarro Leon-Gomez; Antonio Navarro, Otty Patino.

Sponsors: Cuba, Nicaragua and Libya.

Political objectives: Struggle against Colombian "bourgeoisie" and American "imperialism"; extort funds from narcotics producers.

Methods: Hijackings, bombings, kidnappings, assassinations.

### **African National Congress**

Date formed: 1912, renamed ANC, 1923.

Estimated membership: 4,000 to 5,000.

Headquarters: Lusaka, Zambia.

Leadership: Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela.

Sponsors: Receives support from Soviet bloc, Cuba and a number of African nations, in addition to contributions from the West.

Political objectives: Overthrow current South African regime and dismantle system of apartheid; establish socialist government in South Africa.

Methods: Bombings, rocket attacks.



Los Angeles Times

15 January 1989

p. 3

# Pan Am Probe Focuses on Iran Faction

## Sources Cite Evidence Tying Lebanon-Based Terrorists to Bomb

By KNUT ROYCE and PATRICK J. SLOYAN, *Newsday*

Bekaa Valley

WASHINGTON—An investigation of the midair bombing of Pan American Flight 103 is focusing on a Lebanese-based Iranian terrorist faction that had been plotting retaliation for the American downing of an Iranian airliner last year, according to U.S. and diplomatic officials.

According to these sources, the investigation has produced evidence indicating that the terrorists—a combination of Lebanese and Iranian Shiite Muslim extremists—used agents from Paris to carry out the Dec. 21 bombing, which killed all 259 aboard the New York-bound Pan Am Boeing 747 and 11 people on the ground in Scotland.

The group—part of the Hezbollah fundamentalist movement in Lebanon—has been a leading suspect since last month's crash. U.S. intelligence reported last year that the faction ordered its foreign agents to plan an attack on "U.S. or western interests" four days after the missile-cruiser Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655 over the Persian Gulf on July 3. In that incident, all 290 aboard were killed.

The investigation now points toward a small but formidable band

of religious zealots known variously as the Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Amal and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The group, headquartered in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, is believed by U.S. intelligence officials to control the fate of many of the nine U.S. hostages in captivity.

The faction also remains the primary suspect in the 1983 Beirut bombings that destroyed the U.S. Embassy, killing 63 people including 17 Americans, and the Marine barracks, killing 241 U.S. service personnel.

The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, refused to discuss the precise nature of the evidence and a spokesman for the State Department's counterterrorism unit said the Pan Am investigation has not gone far enough "to point fingers right now."

But according to the sources, the new evidence has tended to reduce suspicions that a dissident Palestinian faction staged the attack to disrupt the U.S. dialogue with PLO leader Yasser Arafat. The Palestine Liberation Organization leader had taken a more moderate stance toward Israel—a key step in achieving a Mideast peace agreement—shortly before the Pan Am

incident.

Officials at the State Department and the Defense Department had differing estimates on the quality of the new evidence, ranging from "hard" to "spotty."

But these officials agreed that it pointed toward the Iranian faction's agents based in Paris, where a so-called "sleeping network" of terrorists was used in the past to bomb both French and American targets.

After a Vincennes missile destroyed the Iranian plane in July, Tehran publicly opposed retaliation by terrorists.

But on the same day, U.S. intelligence reported that Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon had ordered foreign-based agents to attack U.S. or Western targets. One report indicated the attacks could come in Italy or West Germany.

The Pan Am flight originated in Frankfurt, carrying passengers in a Boeing 727 to London, then switched planes to the ill-fated 747.

The investigation also has determined that a plastic explosive was used. Said one U.S. intelligence official: "Constructing that kind of bomb is not difficult. The real skill is getting it aboard the plane."

Philadelphia Inquirer

16 January 1989

p. 7

# Soldier may have carried plane bomb, report says

United Press International

LONDON — The Sunday Express newspaper has said an American serviceman may have been duped into taking a bomb on board Pan American Flight 103, which exploded over Scotland and killed 270 people last month.

The newspaper said British and American investigators were pursuing the U.S. connection following Pentagon reports that U.S. troops in

West Germany had been offered thousands of dollars to take packages of diamonds to New York.

In Washington, a Pentagon spokesman said "we have no information" on the report of the serviceman taking the bomb aboard the plane or of a scheme to smuggle diamonds to the United States.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

Baltimore Sun 16 Jan 1989 p. 2

## TERRORISM

### KGB said to offer cooperation with West

A Radio Moscow statement aired in Jerusalem yesterday quoted the deputy chief of the KGB as saying the Soviet intelligence service would work with its U.S., British and Israeli counterparts to fight terrorism.

The offer, thought to be unprecedented, was attributed to Lt. Gen. Vitaly Ponomarev, second-in-command at the KGB. It was first aired by Radio Moscow's Hebrew-language division Saturday. The report was recorded by an Israel Radio monitor, Mickey Gurdus, and retransmitted on the station yesterday.



Los Angeles Times

19 January 1989

p. 11

## U.S. Details Libya's Involvement in Terrorism

By ROBIN WRIGHT, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—In an attempt to maintain international pressure on the regime of Col. Moammar Kadhafi and expand concern over its new chemical weapons plant, the United States on Wednesday issued its most detailed account to date of Libyan involvement in international terrorism.

The State Department statement accused the Kadhafi regime of being "implacably committed to ending U.S. and other Western influence in the Third World . . . and to destroying the state of Israel."

"Despite a public posture of moderation" recently, the report by the Counterterrorism Office said, "Libya has employed threats,

terrorism and military aggression" on five continents.

The State Department accused Kadhafi of propounding a deliberately two-faced policy. "To recoup lost influence, Libya has undertaken a concerted diplomatic campaign to improve relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, with its Arab neighbors and with key African states." At the same time, it has preserved "its traditional contacts with dissident, subversive and terrorist groups in such countries."

A State Department official said that the release of the position paper "is not related to the Pan Am bombing or the shutdown of the

MIGs or the Libyan chemical warfare plant."

But other U.S. sources said the timing indicates that the Reagan Administration wants to ensure that foreign action on Libya's plant, which the Administration says is to produce chemical weapons, does not dilute the attention paid to Kadhafi's other activities.

The report cites Libyan involvement in four assassination plots against Arab and black African presidents in Egypt, Sudan, Zaire and Chad, all of whom are close allies of the United States.

In Europe, the position paper charges, Libya has sought to improve its image and to expand its influence "by using the promise of economic and commercial benefit—principally in the petroleum sector—as political leverage."

However, the report said, Kadhafi has continued to aid groups such as the Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army. A shipment of surface-to-air missiles bound for the Irish nationalist group was uncovered by French authorities just over a year ago.

\* The renegade Palestinian group led by Abu Nidal, who is based in Libya, also has resumed terrorist acts in Europe and elsewhere.

In the Pacific and Asia, Kadhafi has sought to expand his influence at the expense of the West "by sponsoring radical individuals and groups whose activities exacerbate local problems," the report said. Tripoli has provided funding and training to groups in Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan and New Caledonia, the statement said.

In Latin America, the counterterrorism document traces Libyan support to insurgents and terrorists as far back as 1973. "Several Latin groups Libya supports are prime suspects in recent strikes against U.S. targets," the report charged.

The position paper also suggested that Libya "may have been involved in possible acts of subversion" in the United States over the last 14 months.

\* The strongest case involved five

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

Philadelphia Inquirer 18 January 1989 p. 10E

## Iran: Influence is limited

By Charles Ridley  
United Press International

ROME — Iranian Prime Minister Hussein Moussavi said yesterday that Iran could exert little influence over whether Western hostages in Lebanon were released, primarily because the matter was an "internal question" for Lebanese authorities.

Moussavi made the observation at a news conference winding up a two-day official visit to Italy devoted mostly to increasing trade and economic aid for the reconstruction of Iran's war-shattered industry.

Earlier, rival groups of Iranian demonstrators clashed as Moussavi met with the Pope during the first visit of an Iranian prime minister to Europe since the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolution ousted the shah 10 years ago.

Left-wing parliamentary groups also protested the Italian government's reception of the Iranian delegation at a time when Iran is under international criticism for flouting human rights.

Western intelligence agents believe that the hostages in Lebanon, nine of them Americans, are held by pro-Iranian Islamic militants.

Asked about the possibility of Iran pressuring its Lebanese supporters to release their hostages, Moussavi said: "The fragmentation of politics in Lebanon makes Iranian influence in that country limited. Furthermore, the problem of the hostages remains an internal question for Lebanon."

Moussavi also said he hoped that "the pressure of international public opinion" could help break the deadlock in peace talks with Iraq. Iran and Iraq agreed to a cease-fire last summer in their eight-year war, but have not agreed on terms for a formal end to the conflict.

Moussavi met yesterday with Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, met with Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita on the issue of human rights in Iran, and had a private audience in the Vatican with Pope John Paul II — the first such visit since Shah Reza Pahlavi's 30 years ago.

Washington Times  
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By Nicolas Mile  
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS

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PLO and rivals...CONTINUED

## The P.L.O. Radicals

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#### Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

**Nayef Hawatmeh:** Born in Salt, Jordan, in 1935 to Greek Catholic parents... degree in social psychology from Arab University in Beirut... helped found Popular Front, but broke away to create Democratic Front, which considers itself more pragmatic... in

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#### Palestine Communist Party

**Suleyman Najab:** Grew up in what are now occupied territories... has generally supported Arafat peace initiative.

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**Abdul Rahim Ahmed:** His movement formed as Iraqi response to Syrian support of other Palestinian groups... does not support Arafat peace initiative.

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## Parties Opposed to P.L.O.

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**Ahmed Jebril:** Broke with Popular Front over its emphasis on class conflict... closely aligned with Syria... some in group linked to technologically sophisticated acts of terrorism, such as discovery in West Germany of a barometrically triggered bomb, apparently designed to attack an airplane, late last year.

#### Popular Struggle Front

**Samir Goshah:** Broke with Mr. Habash in 1960's... leads splinter group committed to Arab nationalism... thought to display greater independence from Syria than Mr. Jebril.

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a military hero because of actions in Lebanon during its civil war and 1982 Israeli invasion.

#### Saiqa

Considered an integral part of Syrian military machine with only nominal Palestinian identity.

#### Communist Party

**Arabi Awad:** Leader of a splinter group from Mr. Najab's Communist Party, with little following.

### LIBYA

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Los Angeles

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Organization. The findings have questions at a time when Turkish interest in joining the European Community is high. Eight years after the military coup, a civilian government came to power. A year after its reelection, Amnesty International has not observed any fundamental change in the nature of human-rights abuses in Turkey," the new report says. Investigations by Amnesty International indicates that hundreds of those responsible for torture, especially in the south where death resulted, have been convicted. Despite the fact that torture is outlawed in the Turkish constitution. A substantial number of prisoners now on Death Row have testified that they were convicted solely on the basis of statements made under torture. Almost all of the 250 political prisoners detained since 1980 have been tortured, Amnesty reported.

Turkey is an important and loyal ally of the West, occupying a crucial strategic location. But nothing can excuse silence about the perpetuation of human-rights violations. The European Parliament has been speaking forthrightly about the need for reform. So should Washington.

Christian Science Monitor 24 Jan 89 p.1

## Experts Suspect Terrorists United to Bomb Airliner

*Groups met in December to condemn Arafat, block US-PLO dialogue*

**By E. A. Wayne**

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON

**A**S experts search for clues while piecing together the jumbo jet destroyed last month over Scotland, specialists say the bombing may have been a joint operation by all or some of the suspect groups.

By WILLIAM D. MONTALBANO, Times Staff Writer

MADRID—Jose Amedo was a well-dressed, high-living traveler with a weakness for casinos and a liking for fish, but as a secret agent he proved fatally flawed.

Calling himself Genaro Gallego, he hosted a 1986 dinner at O Pescador, a restaurant near Lisbon, paying the \$86.25 bill with a credit card in his real name. Investigators quickly discovered that Gallego was Amedo and that Amedo was deputy superintendent of a police intelligence unit in Bilbao, Spain.

Amedo, 42, is now in jail. An investigating magistrate charges that he hired Portuguese gunmen to murder suspected Basque terrorists in France. More, Amedo traveled and conspired on secret

These specialists point to indications that an unholy alliance among Palestinian and pro-Iranian radicals may be emerging out of the chaos in Lebanon.

The prime suspects to the bombing remain the same: some element of the Iranian government and/or their Lebanese Shiite allies, the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), also known as the Fatah Revolutionary Council.

Investigators are looking particularly carefully at the possible PFLP-GC link and the pro-Iranian path, informed officials say. But they are also keeping an eye on other possibilities, some of which could lead to even more obscure groups, such as the PFLP-Special Command, another Palestinian dissident group.

The United States, Britain, and West Germany are pressing hard for the full cooperation of a

funds of the Spanish

Magistrate Baltazar Garzon's attempt to politically charged the judiciary against the branch in a melee that both for the socialist government and for Spanish society. Just when Spain seemed to lay to rest its fascist democracy must consider the possibility that a secret war was mounted with off to combat suspected terrorism.

"This is clearly a terrorism. The question is whether institutions are involved at what level," said Ferraz.

Madrid lawyer representing private Spanish citizens joined the case as first court.

With his case at a Magistrate Garzon is expected. Last week he asked the court to compel the (Police) Ministry to disclose source of funds and swell his bank account, gambling debts and to who shot at least six Bayonne, France, in 1984.

Treading gently in a complex issue," Garzon it is essential to establish was a "fraudulent use of public funds to underpin anti-terrorism plan. I know who authorized travels, and who signed accounts.

The ministry says reserved funds is protected by national security laws suggests that personal ministry officials is more than national security.

"It is ridiculous to say Amedo acted alone. A

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## Torture in Turkey

A chilling report from Amnesty International charges that torture persists in Turkey despite the country's adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights and its full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The findings raise grave questions at a time when Turkish leaders speak of their interest in joining the European Community.

By late 1988, eight years after the military coup, five years after a civilian government came to power and one year after its reelection, Amnesty International has not observed any fundamental change in the nature of human-rights abuses in Turkey," the new report says. Investigation by Amnesty International indicates that only a handful of those responsible for torture, even in cases where death resulted, have been punished despite the fact that torture is outlawed by the Turkish constitution. A substantial number of the persons now on Death Row have testified that they were convicted solely on the basis of statements extracted under torture. Almost all of the 250,000 political prisoners detained since 1980 have been tortured, Amnesty reported.

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## Spain Case Raises Fears of Anti-Terror 'Dirty War'

By WILLIAM D. MONTALBANO, Times Staff Writer

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funds of the Spanish government. Magistrate Baltazar Garzon asserts.

Garzon's attempt to unravel a politically charged tangle of intrigue and violence pits the Spanish judiciary against the executive branch in a melee that is troubling both for the socialist government of Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez and for Spanish society at large. Just when Spain seemed to have laid to rest its fascist past, a young democracy must consider the possibility that a secret "dirty war" was mounted with official sanction to combat suspected terrorists.

"This is clearly a case of state terrorism. The question is what institutions are involved, and at what level," said Fernando Salas, a

Madrid lawyer representing 104 private Spanish citizens who have joined the case as friends of the court.

With his case at a critical point, Magistrate Garzon is more circumspect. Last week he asked a superior court to compel the Interior (Police) Ministry to disclose the source of funds Amedo used to swell his bank account, to cover his gambling debts and to pay gunmen who shot at least six people in Bayonne, France, in 1986.

Treading gently in what he describes as a "thorny, delicate and complex issue," Garzon insists that it is essential to establish if there was a "fraudulent deviation" of public funds to underwrite a secret anti-terrorism plan. He wants to know who authorized Amedo's travels, and who signed his expense accounts.

The ministry says scrutiny of its reserved funds is precluded by national security laws. Garzon suggests that personal security of ministry officials is more at stake than national security.

"It is ridiculous to suppose that Amedo acted alone. Absurd," said

These specialists point to indications that an unholy alliance among Palestinian and pro-Iranian radicals may be emerging out of the chaos in Lebanon.

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## Spain...CONTINUED

Salas in a recent interview.

The Gonzalez government has shown little disposition to aid the judge's quest. Jose Barrionuevo, interior minister when Amedo and Bilbao Police Inspector Michel Dominguez were arrested, at one point ordered ministry officials not to answer the magistrate's questions. Barrionuevo became minister of transport in a subsequent Cabinet shake-up.

## Sought to Meet Informant

Last April, National Police Chief Jose Maria Rodriguez acknowledged that Amedo's visit to Lisbon as Gallego in February, 1986, had come on official business and at government expense. But, Rodriguez insisted, Amedo made the trip only to meet an informant in an arms case.

There is compelling testimony, however, that Amedo embarked on a free-spending recruiting mission for the so-called Grupos Anti-Terroristas de Liberacion, universally known here by its Spanish acronym as GAL.

Between December, 1983, and February, 1986, when a Portuguese gunman who said he was hired by Amedo was arrested by French police, GAL waged a private war against ETA, the Basque terrorist group that Gonzalez has called 'the last threat to Spanish democracy.'

Twenty-seven people died in GAL kidnappings, bombings and murders, most of them in the Basque region of southwestern France, where ETA members have maintained bases safe from official Spanish pursuit.

French sympathy for ETA was considerable when it opposed Gen. Francisco Franco. The support began to erode when ETA violence continued against the democratic government that came to power after Franco's death in 1975, but until 1982, France did not extradite ETA members.

ETA, the initials for Basque Homeland and Freedom in the Basque language, seeks independence for three provinces in northern Spain. Since the separatists turned to violence in 1968, ETA terror has killed about 600 people, 19 of them last year.

ETA supports itself with pro-

## Experts...CONTINUED

range of parties, including Syria and Czechoslovakia, believed to have manufactured the explosive used in the bombing.

The signs of a possible new terrorist coalition in Lebanon is attracting particular attention, even if it is not directly linked to the Dec. 21 bombing of Pan American Flight 103.

"What we're seeing is a realignment of forces in Lebanon to adjust to the new political realities in the Middle East. [PLO chairman Yasser] Arafat's decision to talk to the US and the end of the Iran-Iraq war have shaken things up," says a well-placed US specialist. "The process is not unusual in Lebanon, but the new combination could be lethal because of the deadly histories of each of these groups."

French terrorism expert Xavier Raufer says Palestinian hardliners, including the ANO and the PFLP-GC, met in northern Lebanon last November. Their aim was to derail PLO leader Arafat's moves toward moderation and a dialogue with the United States.

Mr. Raufer says the Palestinian groups met Dec. 20 in Beirut with pro-Iranian groups, including several associated with the Shiite Hizbullah. This conference of "rejectionists" confirmed their support for the Palestinian uprising, condemned Arafat as a traitor, and threatened the US, according to Raufer's sources.

US specialists confirm that the

ceeds from kidnappings and robberies. Garzon believes that GAL's financing, by contrast, came from the public till.

With its militants now actively sought by both Spain and France, ETA is hurting. Two weeks ago, its top leader, Jose Antonio Urutigoechea, 38, was arrested by French police as he rode a motorcycle on a towpath along the River Nive in southwestern France. Spain is now seeking extradition of the man described by one Madrid newspaper as "ETA's staunchest, longest-active leader."

GAL, whose marauding began in

Beirut meeting took place, apparently with some Iranian sponsorship. But they are unsure what, if anything concrete, was decided.

Nevertheless, these experts point to ample evidence of converging interests between these philosophically diverse terrorist groups. All oppose any lessening of the armed struggle with Israel, none are friends of the US, and all are feeling isolated.

Hizbullah is under sharp military pressure from Syria's Lebanese Shiite allies, Amal. Syria is not willing or able to stop the fighting. Reportedly, a number of Hizbullah's factions are alienated from the more moderate line taken by the majority in Tehran. These Lebanese are linked to more radical Iranians, such as the Revolutionary Guards.

ANO is a long-committed enemy of Arafat. Its record since 1973 includes more than 100 terrorist attacks. It has in recent years recruited Islamic fundamentalists for some of its operations and last year offered its services to Iran, according to well-placed Western intelligence sources. With political headquarters in Libya, ANO runs several military bases in Lebanon and maintains an international network of terrorist cells.

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1983 not long after Gonzalez' government took power, was not the first shadowy group to match ETA terror with counterterror. A late 1970s predecessor called the Spanish Basque Battalion also seemed to French magistrates and detectives to have been organized and financed by the Spanish secret services, according to Spanish reporter Javier Garcia in a new book profiling the GAL.

Documents submitted to Spanish courts by magistrate Garzon show that Amedo left a broad paper trail after recruiting three Portuguese gunmen and promising them 5

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experts... well-informed Western specialists say operational cooperation among the ANO and elements of Hizbullah may already extend to recent kidnappings in Lebanon and attacks elsewhere on Saudi Arabian diplomats. The PFLP-GC is also a longtime opponent of Arafat.

But since Arafat's agreement to the US conditions for dialogue, the PFLP-GC has been more critical than has its main state benefactor, Syria. The PFLP-GC has adopted a much more fundamentalist tone in its language of late, which one US expert says "appears to reflect unhappiness with being under Syria's thumb," and a cozying up to Islamic radicals.

Washington and others investigating Flight 103 are particularly eager for full cooperation from Syria. It has close ties to the PFLP-GC and other dissident Palestinian groups which would have an interest in disrupting the US-PLO dialogue.

Syria plays a major role in Lebanon, where the plot against Flight 103 may well have been hatched. And, despite recent tensions, it still maintains relatively close relations with Iran. Iran's Revolutionary Guards and secret services operate in Syria and Syrian-dominated Lebanon.

The PFLP-GC has its political headquarters in Syria's capital and its bases in Lebanon. It has long been funded by Syria and Libya, though it is more inde-

pendent than several of the other Palestinian groups which Damascus backs.

Western investigators want Syria to vigorously investigate the PFLP-GC's operations in West Germany. Several operatives were arrested last fall with detonating devices and explosives for mid-air attacks and on suspicion of bombing US military trains.

German investigators originally thought the PFLP-GC operatives arrested were planning to blow up an Air Iberia jet flying to Israel. But as a US specialist notes, "The Germans could easily have missed one PFLP cell, and that cell's target could have been the Pan Am jet."

PFLP-GC leader Ahmad Jibril has denied responsibility for the attack, but in early 1986 he specifically threatened to attack US airliners. His group has hijacked and blown up US and Israeli airliners in the past. Top Syrian officials have accused Israel of inciting the attack on Flight 103.

"The motive here holds together completely," a ranking US specialist says. The only claim for the downing of Flight 103 was issued in the name of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution - a cover name previously associated with Iranian special services, according to Western specialists. The caller claimed the attack as revenge for the US accidental downing of an Iranian passenger jet last July.

US specialists point out that though a bomb attack would be inconsistent with the more moderate line now being followed in Tehran, it could fit well into the plans of Iranians or Lebanese Shiites who want to keep the revolution and its anti-American flavor alive.

French specialist Rauffer suggests the attack on Flight 103 may have been a joint operation, with a strong role by the ANO.

ANO has organized such joint ventures before, Rauffer says. It provided supplies and logistics; others provided personnel.

ANO also has a well-developed terrorist network in Europe. Plus, Rauffer's contacts say, the ANO picked up some of the expert bombmakers from the infamous May 15 Organization - a Palestinian terrorist group that broke up in the early 1980s. This cadre could have helped make the device that downed the plane.

US experts agree that some cooperation may have taken place. The trick will be to find the proof.

It is the GAL saga, though, that is particularly worrying Spanish democrats just now.

"Who formed the GAL? Who else is involved?" asked Madrid lawyer Salas in echoing questions asked by the Spanish press.

Spain... CONTINUED



Journal of Commerce 31 January 1989 p. 1

# Japan: US Issues Air Terror Alert

By A.E. CULLISON  
and LEO ABRUZZESE

Journal of Commerce Staff

The Federal Aviation Administration warned U.S. airlines and airports worldwide in late December of possible terrorist actions in Greece against U.S., Greek and Israeli airline facilities, according to Japanese aviation officials in Tokyo.

Sources at the New Tokyo International Airport in Narita said the FAA on Dec. 28 warned that terrorists of unknown nationality are planning attacks in Greece. Airport officials worldwide were advised to increase security against possible sabotage by extremists.

The Federal Aviation Administration in Washington refused to say whether it issued such a warning. Fred Farrer, a spokesman for the agency, said the FAA does not comment on its security bulletins.

Sources in Tokyo said the FAA gave airport officials the names and serial numbers of 137 passports that might be used by terrorists. Most of the names on the list

seemed to be Arabic, Japanese officials said.

The FAA urged Japanese and other airlines to check thoroughly all passengers, their luggage and their companions for any link to the names on the list, sources said.

Aviation officials in the United States said the FAA often issues bulletins when it believes airlines or airports are at risk.

U.S. intelligence agencies relay information on aviation threats to the FAA, which then notifies airlines, airports and some aviation trade associations.

Officials said the agency issued 23 or 24 such bulletins last year.

Security experts in Washington said it was unusual for agency warnings to include such specific information as names and serial numbers of passports.

The terrorist bombing of a Pan American World Airways airliner over Scotland on Dec. 21, with the loss of 270 lives in the air and on the ground, had been preceded by an FAA warning of possible terrorist action.

Sinn Fein...CONTINUED

IRA to "get its house in order" after one of its bombs killed two of his Roman Catholic constituents in West Belfast.

Sinn Fein supports the mainly Roman Catholic IRA's fight to unite predominantly Protestant Northern Ireland with the predominantly Catholic Republic of Ireland. But even IRA supporters have criticized the group for blunders that killed at least 20 civilians in the last 14 months.

"You have a massive responsibility," Adams said. "At times, the fate of this struggle is in your hands. You have to be careful and careful again."

But he said the use of violence was necessary because the British government "understands only the argument of force."

"Nothing I say should be interpreted as a condemnation of the IRA," Adams told delegates.

Danny Morrison, another senior Sinn Fein official at the weekend conference, said that the party may set up pirate radio stations in Northern Ireland to circumvent a British government ban on broadcast interviews with its members.

deportation provisions unconstitutional. The First Amendment, he explained, protects the speech and association activities of aliens on a parity with citizen protections. Under the Supreme Court's decision in *Brandenburg vs. Ohio* (1969), Judge Wilson asserted, the government may penalize speech only when it is both intended to cause imminent lawless violence and likely to succeed. The McCarran-Walter Act stretched much further, he insisted, "to prohibit an alien from wearing a PFLP button, attending a PFLP lecture, distributing a PFLP newspaper or teaching a PFLP viewpoint."

In addition, according to the district judge, the act was flawed by punishing an alien's membership in an organization that advocates lawlessness, even if he disavows its teachings. That type of membership proscription violated the First Amendment, Judge Wilson declared.

He further accused the govern-

Washington Times 31 January 1989 p. F1

## Free speech sanctuary for terrorists?

BRUCE FEIN

On Dec. 22, 1988, Federal District Judge Stephen Wilson in *American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee vs. Meese* held unconstitutional time-honored provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act authorizing deportation of resident or non-immigrant aliens who advocate totalitarian government in the United States or the unlawful destruction of property.

Judge Wilson's novel ruling dis-

plays an innocence of international preceptions and neglect of the Supreme Court's axiom that the Constitution is not a suicide pact.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings against Palestinian aliens who lead fund-raising efforts for The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a terrorist organization directed by George Habash. Various McCarran-Walter Act provisions authorize alien deportation for advocacy or affiliation with a group that advocates doctrines that denounce civilized constitutional government: namely, world communism, totalitarian dictatorship, or unlawful destruction of property.

With a terseness alien to most of his brethren, Judge Wilson held the

Bruce Fein is a lawyer and freelance writer specializing in legal issues.

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free speech...CONTINUED

ment of "trying to stifle certain ideas from entering our society from certain aliens through its immigration power," contrary to the constitutional premise "that only through the free flow of ideas can our nation grow and prosper."

The intellectual elan displayed in the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee opinion contrasts sharply with its sparseness of contemplative subtlety. On the latter score, infirmities are manifold.

Deportation is not criminal punishment. Thus, the Supreme Court has frequently permitted the government more leeway in imposing a deportation sanction than in prosecuting crime. Thus, in *INS vs. Lopez-Mendoza* (1984), the court permitted the use of illegally obtained evidence in a deportation proceeding, evidence that would have been excluded at a criminal trial. In *Flemming vs. Nestor* (1960), the court sustained retroactive application of a statute to justify deportation of a former Communist Party member and termination of his Social Security benefits, although former party membership could not justify criminal punishment. Accordingly, Judge Wilson erred in applying the Brandenburg free speech restraints on criminal prosecutions to deportations.

Further, aliens do not enjoy the same constitutional protections as citizens, contrary to Judge Wilson's understanding. Aliens may be denied the right to vote and excluded from the teaching or police professions without offending the Constitution, as the Supreme Court declared in *Ambach vs. Norwick* (1979), and *Foley vs. Connelie* (1978).

Indeed, in *Harisades vs. Shaugnessy* (1952), the court upheld deportation founded on Communist Party membership. It explained: "To arm all men for orderly change, the Constitution put in their hands a right to influence the electorate by press, speech and assembly. This means freedom to advocate or promote communism by means of the ballot box, but it does not include the practice or incitement of violence."

Moreover, the PFLP aliens confronting deportation before Judge Wilson were alleged organizational leaders engaged in raising funds to further the PFLP's terrorism.

Unlike Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat, George Habash of the PFLP has not

The Nation 6 February 1989

THE C.I.A. EXPLOSIVE

p. 153

## Did It Blow Up Flight 103?

DAVID CORN

When E. Lawrence Barcella Jr. heard about the explosion of Pan American Flight 103, he immediately thought of Edwin Wilson, the Central Intelligence Agency's infamous renegade. In particular, Barcella, the former Assistant U.S. Attorney who tracked down Wilson and put him behind bars, pondered the 40,000 pounds of C-4 plastic explosive that Wilson, well schooled by the agency in intrigue and arms dealing, sold to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in 1977. "That was the largest illegal shipment of U.S.-manufactured plastic explosives ever," Barcella recalls. And, unless someone has outdone Wilson and kept it quiet, that remains the largest black market source of the deadly, long-lasting, easily concealed material.

A week after the Boeing 747 aircraft exploded and fell to the Scottish countryside around Lockerbie, British investigators announced that a plastic explosive had caused the blast. There are two principal types: C-4, made in the United States, and Semtex, which is manufactured in Soviet bloc countries. By studying residue on parts of the wreckage, demolition experts can determine which of those it was,

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proclaimed either a permanent or provisional cessation of wanton violence against civilians.

Only a hyperactive imagination could equate financial support of a terrorist organization under the First Amendment with wearing a PFLP button. But Judge Wilson did, despite the absence of any INS deportations founded on the display of membership emblems.

The United States would sense no deprivation of even a single idea pertinent to democratic dialogue or individual educational development by the deportation of alien fundraisers for the PFLP. To protect lawless attacks on lawful government by invoking the First Amendment is to permit a part of the Constitution to swallow the whole. As Justice Arthur Goldberg emphasized in *Kennedy vs. Martinez-Mendoza* (1963), "while the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact."

Finally, Judge Wilson overlooks that making the United States a sanctuary for aliens who support

terrorism would convey to all other nations a tolerance or neutrality toward that despicable violence. That message would confound the announced foreign policy of President George Bush by making international sanctions against terrorists more difficult to negotiate.

In contrast, that confounding message is avoided when the First Amendment is employed to safeguard the receipt from abroad of literature or political doctrines of the PFLP that augment the marketplace of ideas in the United States.

Notwithstanding the fabled ideological inquisitions of ex-President Reagan's Department of Justice in federal judicial appointments, Judge Stephen Wilson is a 1985 Reagan appointee. The former president might find solace in his wayward judicial judgment by reflecting on the words of similarly embarrassed Justice Robert Jackson in *McGrath vs. Kristensen* (1950): "I can only say that I am amazed that a man of my intelligence should have been guilty of giving such an opinion."



## Flight 103...CONTINUED

or if some other, less common plastic explosive ripped apart the aircraft.

There is, however, no way of tracing a particular batch of C-4. A few years ago, there was a proposal that manufacturers be required to mark C-4 with identifying chemical traces, but the idea was never adopted. Still, if the wreckage of the Pan Am jet tests positive for C-4, a strong possibility will exist that Flight 103 is part of the Wilson legacy, a painful reminder of the C.I.A.'s inability to control a dangerous former agent.

Wilson joined the C.I.A. in 1955. During his sixteen years of service, his assignments ran the gamut of spycraft. He worked on security for the U-2 program, guarded a K.G.B. defector, ran wiretaps, penetrated the U.S. labor movement and Hubert Humphrey's 1964 vice-presidential campaign, and paid off Corsican mobsters who kept Communist dockworkers in check. He reached Shangri-La when the agency assigned him to Special Operations. There he set up a string of C.I.A. "proprietarys," which shipped secret cargoes for the agency, including supplies of weapons. Running these companies undercover as an independent businessman, he was able to earn thousands of dollars beyond his government pay.

In 1971, however, the C.I.A. conducted a cost-control review and killed a number of overly independent proprieties, including Wilson's group. He then left the agency and jumped to Task Force 157, a top-secret Navy operation, where he again managed undercover enterprises. In 1976, after his freewheeling ways became too noticeable, the Navy shut down Task Force 157. But Wilson had plenty of profitable skills to peddle on his own and soon found a client with deep pockets and a keen appreciation for his unique talents: Qaddafi. Wilson became a full-service center for the Libyan leader, providing him with bomb detonators, explosives and instructors—all for thousands in cash.

Wilson's new customer also wanted C-4, the explosive of choice for military and paramilitary operatives. It is highly malleable and difficult to detect. It will not detonate when struck by a bullet, unlike dynamite. It is widely used in conventional weaponry and occasionally in commercial demolition work. Kept under the right conditions, it maintains its charge for up to twenty years. According to Barcella, a large portion of the C-4 Wilson sold to Qaddafi was improperly stored and it degraded, but a substantial amount was distributed by Qaddafi to others with violent intent.

Barcella, now an attorney in private practice, fears that some of this C-4 may have reached the hands of those responsible for destroying Flight 103. He is waiting to see if British and U.S. investigators announce what brand of plastic explosive was detonated, once the chemical analysis is completed. If C-4 was used, the Wilson specter would be raised; if Semtex, then the Soviet Union would be embarrassed and détente muddled.

There is a precedent for official silence on this question, according to Peter Maas, who chronicled Wilson's exploits in his book *Manhunt*. On April 2, 1986, nine days after U.S. and Libyan jets clashed over the Gulf of Sidra, four people were killed and nine injured when a bomb detonated on a Trans World Airlines flight approaching Athens. A Palestinian group, the Arab Revolutionary Cells, claimed credit for the action. Subsequent news reports cited an F.B.I. finding that the bomb had been made up of about one pound of plastic explosives, but what kind was not specified. Maas says that after he finished his book agents of the F.B.I. and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms told him privately it was C-4.

If C-4 did down Flight 103 and Wilson was the original supplier, it may not be the only instance of a U.S. intelligence operative abetting a major air disaster. In little-noticed testimony before a Senate subcommittee last summer, Franklin Joseph Camper, who ran a private school for mercenaries in Alabama, tied the 1985 crash of an Air India jetliner to a member of his staff and graduates of his academy—and to C-4. Camper, whose business trained Americans and foreigners in assassination and bombing techniques, including the use of plastic explosives, was an informant and sometime operative for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the F.B.I. and Army Intelligence. These agencies, he said, used his school for recruiting foreign agents and for collecting information on foreign mercenary and intelligence operations.

In November 1984, Camper testified, four Sikh nationalists who had enrolled in his school asked him to assist in their guerrilla war against India. Camper's F.B.I. control told him to stick close to the Sikhs. He did, and in May 1985 the F.B.I. rounded up five Sikhs for plotting to murder Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and another high-ranking Indian official.

But some members of the conspiracy, Camper noted, slipped the F.B.I. noose and escaped into Canada with a cache of C-4. Camper testified that these Sikhs had obtained the C-4 from one of his instructors, who had somehow acquired it from a licensed commercial user. On June 23, 1985, several weeks after the escape, an Air India Boeing 747, flying from Toronto to Bombay, blew up over the Atlantic Ocean, killing everyone aboard. After the crash, Sikh groups claimed responsibility for the bombing. In what appeared to be a related event, on the day of the crash a second bomb exploded in Tokyo's Narita International Airport.

Tom Moore, a special agent in the Birmingham, Alabama, F.B.I. office, verifies that Camper was involved in the Bureau's probe of the Sikhs but will not comment on the specifics of the episode, especially the possibility that the Sikhs had obtained plastic explosives via Camper's program and used it in the bombings. "Let's just say there was a less-

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than-ideal conclusion" to the affair, Moore says. Camper, who is serving time for his involvement in a car-bombing, believes the C-4 the Sikhs procured from his instructor blew the Air India 747 out of the sky. He also told the Senate subcommittee that Japanese forensic experts notified the F.B.I. that they had found C-4 residue in the wreckage at Narita, and that they had identified one fingerprint on the booby-trapped luggage as belonging to one of the Sikhs who had fled to Canada. "There were 329 people who died on that airplane, and they died because of a failure in our operation,"

Camper said. If he's right, it's not just because the F.B.I. failed to collar everyone involved but also because some Federal agencies encouraged Camper's entrepreneurial endeavor.

Edwin Wilson is serving three sentences totaling fifty-seven years in Federal prison, but his C-4 is still at large. By breeding agents like Wilson and sanctioning—even if only informally—operations like Camper's, U.S. intelligence and Federal law enforcement agencies aid the netherworld of spooks, extremists and mercenaries. In playing this shadowy game, they perhaps pick up some useful information once in a while. But in these cases, at least, they may have done so only at the cost of downed airliners and scattered bodies. □



DRAWINGS BY GUTO LINS





# CURRENT NEWS SPECIAL EDITION SELECTED STATEMENTS



THIS PUBLICATION IS PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE (SAF/AA) AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL SELECTED STATEMENTS REFLECTING GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES PERTAINING TO NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS.

DECEMBER 1985

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Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense  
(Effects of defense spending cutbacks on  
national security)

Interview in US News & World  
Report 25 November 1985

Q But in spite of all arguments to the contrary, if Congress  
does take action to reduce spending for defense, what would  
be the consequences?

A First of all, it would send a very bad signal to allies  
that we harass regularly to increase their own military  
spending.

It also would send a very bad signal to the Soviets—that  
America has pretty well lost its will.

It would mean we would have to make very drastic  
reductions in a number of weapons systems, in number of  
personnel, in the training time and the readiness factors  
and in the compensation for the personnel who remain.

Q Would it mean closing some military bases around the

country?

A It takes about 22 months to close a base. And it costs  
you money because you've got to relocate. You don't  
get any immediate savings.

But these are not the only kind of cuts Congress is talking  
about. If you cut 5 billion dollars in outlays, you've got to  
cut around 12.5 to 14 billion in spending authority.

Basically, people aren't saying you don't need the  
and other weapons; they're saying, "We can't afford it. The  
deficit's too large. Put it off, delay it." But when you do  
that, you're agreeing to spend more in the years ahead  
because the cost of the things you need will go up.

Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense  
(Discussion of the Gramm-Rudman bill)

Interview on MacNeil/Lehrer News  
Hour 12 December 1985

Q: Along those lines, it was reported at one point that you were not even  
consulted before the White endorsed Gramm-Rudman?

A: We were in constant contact, all the time, through the whole process.

\* \* \* Q: Let's talk about what's going to have to be cut as result of this?  
Eleven point seven billion dollars out of this year's budget, half of that out of  
defense. Where is it going to come from?

A: Well, we don't know. We are going to have to look at that. One of the  
things that is important to bear in mind is that the Congress in passing this  
amendment has given us very little flexibility. You know, in our defense  
budget is not only very big from the point of view of dollars, but is  
very big from the point of view of activity. We have 3220 accounts in that  
defense budget and Congress has said in this amendment that we have to make  
reductions in all of those. Now we can make some reductions a little larger in  
one than in another. Everything will have to be touched. We don't have any  
options.

Q: Where would be across the board?

A: We have to make reductions in all of these accounts, in one way or  
another. I have to leave one slight bit of uncertainty there because this is a  
very long and a very complex bill. It is like reading the Internal Revenue  
Code. It makes references to a lot of other sections elsewhere, etc. We are  
analyzing it now. Our best information now is that we will have to make some  
reduction in all of these accounts, except for one thing. There is a very  
interesting exception that the Congress carved out -- under no circumstances can  
we close any bases in any kind of expedited fashion. So you see that the attach-  
ment to economy wasn't quite all that firm.

Q: As you know, it is thought that it is going to be very difficult to cut  
out any major weapons systems, just because of the way those are structured,  
because of their constitutencies...

A: But when you go across the board and you're told you have to make  
reductions in all 3200 accounts, then you are going to have to make some slow

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SELECTED STATEMENTS

MILITARY BUDGET

General Paul X. Kelley  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
(Cuts hurt the Marine Corps)

Interview in Seapower  
November 1985

Are you concerned, after having seen that no one really has taken much action to reduce the budget, that the appropriations committees may not fund enough to fulfill the authorization bill?

KELLEY: I think there is somewhere around \$10 billion between what the authorization bill contains and what some people on the appropriations committees are discussing. Heaven only knows where that will come from. I suspect they will be looking for big-ticket items, high-priced

items that have had some shaky performance. We get hurt because of our relatively small size when they make what I call undistributed cuts. In other words, they automatically cut each service across the board 10 percent of O&M [operations and maintenance]. We are very heavily oriented toward readiness, so when you cut 10 percent of O&M dollars from the Marine Corps you really are doing us a lot of damage. I believe the Congress has to be cautious about such cuts.

Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense  
(Effects of Gramm-Rudman on defense spending and national security)

Remarks at Brigham Young  
University, Provo, Utah  
8 November 1985

FIRST THE DEFENSE BUDGET IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFICIT. SOME PEOPLE WANT TO SAY IT IS, BUT THE FACTS SPEAK DIFFERENTLY. CONSIDER, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SINCE THE LAST YEAR OF A BALANCED BUDGET--1969--THE DEFENSE BUDGET'S SHARE OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT DECREASED FROM ABOUT NINE PERCENT TO ONLY SIX PERCENT IN 1985. THOSE WHO WISH TO ATTACK THE DEFICIT BY BLAMING DEFENSE ARE SADLY MISTAKEN ABOUT THE REAL CAUSES OF THE DEFICIT.

UNFORTUNATELY, TOO MANY IN CONGRESS IGNORE THIS SIMPLE FACT. CONSEQUENTLY, THEY HAVE PERMITTED THE GRAMM-RUDMAN DEFICIT REDUCTION LEGISLATION TO BE AMENDED INTO A DISTORTED AND BADLY FLAWED CONDITION. SPECIFICALLY, I AM REFERRING TO THE LANGUAGE TACKLED ONTO THE BILL THAT ELIMINATES ALL DISCRETION OF THE PRESIDENT IN CARRYING OUT HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ADMINISTERING THE GOVERNMENT.

ONE ASPECT OF PENDING LEGISLATION WOULD FORCE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ALL DEPARTMENTS TO APPLY BUDGET REDUCTIONS ACROSS THE BOARD, WITHOUT ANY CONCERN FOR DEFENSE PRIORITIES OR THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE NATION. THIS IS A DANGEROUS PROPOSITION. IN DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING THE MOST EFFECTIVE DEFENSE POSSIBLE WITHIN FISCAL CONSTRAINTS, WE MUST MAKE JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE RELATIVE PRIORITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF VARIOUS SYSTEMS. THIS LEGISLATION WOULD SUBSTITUTE AN ARBITRARY FORMULA FOR THOSE DECISIONS. IN A TIME OF REDUCED BUDGETS, THE PRUDENT COURSE OF ACTION IS TO APPLY CUTS WHERE THEY WILL HURT THE LEAST--TO PROTECT THOSE PROGRAMS MOST VITAL TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND REDUCE THOSE PROGRAMS THAT ARE LESS URGENT. THIS LEGISLATION WILL NOT ALLOW US TO DO THAT.

FURTHER, DELAYING PRODUCTION AND ACQUISITION OF ALREADY PLANNED WEAPON SYSTEMS MEANS A HIGHER UNIT COST FOR SYSTEMS WE ALL AGREE WE NEED AND A RISKY DELAY IN ACQUIRING THEM. THE NET RESULT OF THIS LEGISLATION IS LIKELY TO BE INCREASED COST FOR THE SAME AMOUNT OF DEFENSE NOW PLANNED--AND NEEDED NOW. /



\* \* \* \*

The final point is the length of command tours. I think that decision was long overdue. You just can't keep having commanders rotating in and out of jobs in short periods of time. It is tough on the troops, and the units suffer from a lack of continuity. Command is a very awesome responsibility, and one that does not necessarily mature in a revolving door. Our policy has been accepted now throughout the field; people understand why we are doing it. The intention is to maintain continuity within units, to put good commanders in command and allow them to stay there for a reasonable period of time. That reasonable period of time, we all have agreed, is about two years.

In wartime as well as peacetime?

KELLEY: I heard it expressed very eloquently several years ago by Gen. [Lewis] Walt [one-time commander of Marine forces in Vietnam and later assistant commandant of the Marine Corps]. Someone asked Gen. Walt: "What is the ideal time in combat for a commander?" He gave the most articulate answer to that question that I have ever heard: "If you have a good commander, you keep him as long as

necessary until such time as you see him getting tired, but don't change him just for the sake of change because that is totally unfair to the troops." The troops deserve to know who their leader is and to have confidence in him. We had a period in the early to mid-1950s when the Marine Corps went from 75,000 to 265,000 almost overnight for the Korean War, and we brought back officers in the lieutenant colonel rank who had the basic infantry MOS. They weren't qualified infantry officers. To be qualified as an infantry officer you had to have 90 days on the job. When I was in Japan as a young officer in 1954, battalion commanders were being rotated, in some instances, every 90 days. \* \* \*

KELLEY: It's not a good way to do business. Today, there are exceptions to the two-year tour, of course. If a commander is selected for a top-level school, as an example, we obviously are going to make an exception. We allow commanding generals to make exceptions to 18 months on a case-by-case basis. Anything below 18 months must come back to me for an exception, and it has to be pretty well-justified.

General Paul X. Kelley  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
(Retention goals)

Interview in Seapower  
November 1985

In his posture statement, [Navy] Secretary [John] Lehman made a fascinating observation about personnel: "The past four years have seen the most dramatic change in the manning of the Navy and Marine Corps in the 209 years of our history. From the worst retention and recruiting in postwar history in 1979 and 1980, we have risen to the highest figures achieved since we began keeping records."

Would you amplify that statement so far as Marine Corps manning is concerned, and also look into the crystal ball with regard to future manning of the Corps?

KELLEY: By every standard of measurement, the Corps of 1985 is the most ready combat force in our history.

Our young officers are bigger, tougher, and smarter than I have seen in my 35 years of service, and they are remaining on active duty in unprecedented numbers.

Our young enlisted Marines are, by every standard, the best we have ever seen. As an aside, the commanding general of our recruit depot at Parris Island [S.C.] recently told me that the average recruit today is one inch taller and five pounds heavier than when I became commandant two years ago.

Our Marines are reenlisting at unprecedented rates.

In short, those of us who have been around for a few years "knock on wood" when we realize how fortunate we are to have the Marines we have filling our ranks today.

When we interviewed Adm. Lawrence [Vice Adm. William P. Lawrence, deputy chief of naval operations (manpower, personnel, and training)] recently, he was rather pessimistic about some aspects of manning the Navy because of the decreasing pool of available and qualified manpower and the enticements of life in the civilian sector. He also observed that he was seeing a slight falling off of the quality of personnel being recruited. Are you seeing the same thing?

KELLEY: Bill Lawrence is absolutely correct about the decrease in available and qualified manpower. Demographic studies show that our prime resource of eligible Marine prospects, the 17- to 21-year-old male with no prior service, is declining and will continue to decline into the early 1990s. Additionally, our improving economy, lower unemployment rates, and intensified college recruiting all impact on the available manpower pool.

With that said, I am still confident that our Corps can weather the storm. During the last fiscal year, as an example, two of the other services experienced declines in the number of non-prior-service high school graduates they recruited. The Marine Corps, on the other hand, has 96 percent of its FY 1985 recruits with high school diplomas, the highest level in our history. If that's not enough, over 96 percent of the recruits are Mental Group III and above, and 97 percent presently enlist for four or more years. Within our Delayed Entry Program, we have already reached 59 percent of our fiscal year 1986 goal.



General Paul X. Kelley  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
(Military retirement)

Interview in *Seapower* magazine  
November 1985

Despite some unusually eloquent pleas by all members of the Joint Chiefs not to alter the current military retirement system, Congress agreed on a cut of \$2.94 billion in the retirement account. Since you were to present specific recommendations for, in essence, a new retirement system, we recognize you can't discuss specific details. But in a general sense what do you envisage the new system will look like, and what adverse effects do you foresee from a reduction of the magnitude of that taken?

KELLEY: As I stated in Congress in April, I feel very strongly that the retirement system that we have today is sound and not overly generous, particularly when you consider the tremendous sacrifices that our young people who are wearing uniforms make on a day-to-day basis. To compare what we do with the civilian community is a real apples-and-oranges situation. So I think that if you do have changes, and they are congressionally mandated changes, then it is the Congress which must take the full responsibility for any degradation that we have in the quality of young people coming in, and the resultant decrease in the readiness of our armed forces. So I lay the responsibility squarely on the Congress of the United States. The [service] chiefs are absolutely united in their belief that the current retirement system is sound. \* \* \* \*

Does Chairman [Les] Aspin [D-Wis., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee] have any understanding of what the dollar cost might be from personnel turnover if the retirement system is changed?

KELLEY: You just hit it right on the head. We are looking at a single facet of the DOD budget, and that's the retirement accrual account. We are not looking at all the other things that could result from a change in the retirement system. I don't think that anyone up on the Hill has taken these into consideration.

We speak about readiness because we know what it takes to be ready, and above all it takes quality people. We work in a very competitive society right now. The economy is good. Unemployment is down. All the economic factors that might influence a young person without an alternative income to join the armed forces are no longer with us. The indicators in the civilian side are good, and we have to be competitive.

There are other factors to be considered, too. For example, the deployment pattern for the Navy right now is 2:1. In other words, a ship is in home port technically for 12 months out of every 18. It is forward-deployed for six months. But while the ship is in port, the operations tempo is such that a sailor is at sea away from his home port about 50 percent of the time. Then, if you take into consideration

the fact that a sailor, or a Marine assigned to shipboard duty, stands a one-in-three watch, that means in a period of 18 months he is home with his family only four months. How do you pay a man for that kind of separation from his family? And most of them live in a fairly dangerous world. They are doing all sorts of things that have an element of danger. How do you pay them for that? Each service has its own peculiar requirements for retirement. We Marines are and always have been a youthful service. The bulk of our Marines are in the younger ranks. Therefore, if you make the 20-year retirement less attractive, it's going to hurt us. We need that 20-year retirement, because you don't want a 45- or 50-year-old squad leader.

On the other hand, we have a few particular MOSs and skills for which we want people to stay past 20 years so as to capitalize on their skills. But when you have a force that is predominantly composed of skills that are not readily marketable on the outside, you have to provide some incentive such as the 20-year retirement.

When we interviewed [Vice Adm.] Bill Lawrence, we asked him what the Navy's investment would be in an ET1 [electronics technician first class] after 10 years. The answer was astounding. Counting pay, it was \$349,000! That's a lot of money to lose if that man elects to get out and go to work for an electronics company.

KELLEY: And it's also the leadership that matures over that period of 10 years. You have lost that and have to replace it. It's not just the money, it's experience, leadership, and all the other things that go to make up a man's experience level after 10 years.

You say each of the services has a different requirement for its people. But I suspect you aren't having much success in selling that philosophy on the Hill right now.

KELLEY: No, it is a very difficult one to understand. As an example, 75 percent of our enlisted personnel are between the ages of 17 and 25. You have to take that into consideration, because we have a significant number of people who are down at the squad level, at the fire-team levels. You can't have old men down there. That is the place for a young, very vigorous, very virile guy. So we have to keep that level of youthfulness in the service—particularly in the Marine Corps. We have a philosophy that may be somewhat different from the other services, and I sum it up with a little cliché: "Some of the other services man the equipment, but we equip the man." There is a subtlety there that we have never lost sight of.



SELECTED STATEMENTS

FOREIGN POLICY  
(ASIA & THE PACIFIC)

Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense  
(Europe v. the Pacific)  
25 September 1985

Interview with Peter Krogh  
of the Public Broadcasting  
System

Q: Do you see us, as others do, that our strategic interests are moving incrementally away from Europe and in the direction of Asia; that as Asia becomes more of an economic force, as it develops other interests for the United States, that we will be looking and deploying more in Asia than on the continent of Europe?

A: No, I don't think it's a comparative thing at all. I think that we can't ever move away from a very close association and alliance with the western countries of Europe. We can't live in a world in which Europe is overrun. But, the Pacific is an enormously important part of the world. It's importance to the United States has been to some extent, I think, either over looked or not sufficiently appreciated. It's not a question of either/or, it's a question of bringing the Pacific into proper perspective while maintaining the kinds of relationships and commitments we have in Europe. The Pacific is a very vital part of America's future. They're our largest trading partner in many ways. The strategic importance of them is overwhelming. We will certainly have, without any question, the importance of the Pacific before us for all the rest of our lives and many generations to come. That doesn't mean we're giving up Europe.

President Ronald Reagan  
(US interests in the Pacific  
and in Europe)

Responses to questions submitted  
by Le Figaro  
26 September 1985

Q. The interest of the United States for the Pacific nations is more and more obvious and geopolitically somehow natural. Does this mean that in the future, Europe and Africa have a chance of losing the major role they have had in American diplomacy since World War II?

**The President.** The NATO alliance remains the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. It not only embodies a fundamental security interest; it represents a community of moral and political values. It is no accident that one of America's most durable peacetime alliances is with our fellow democracies of the Atlantic world.

The Pacific nations are indeed growing in importance in political, security, and especially economic terms, but our strengthened relations with Asia have not diminished our traditional ties to Europe. Indeed, a major

foreign policy accomplishment of this administration is its success in encouraging the industrialized democracies in Europe, Asia, and North America to cooperate in developing global, not parochial, solutions to our common economic and security problems.

The United States has sought not merely to strengthen our bilateral ties with Asia and Europe but to encourage greater interaction among all members of the community of advanced industrialized democracies. This new and more cohesive allied consensus has been in evidence in the economic summit meetings, where the leaders of the seven largest industrialized democracies of North America, Europe, and Asia meet to discuss a vast range of political, economic, and security problems.



But regional peace in Central America is threatened by the rulers of Nicaragua and their Soviet and Cuban allies. Behind a cloak of democratic rhetoric, the Nicaraguan Communists have betrayed the 1979 revolution and embarked on a course of tyranny at home and subversion against their neighbors.

How can this crisis be resolved? The Central American nations, together with their nearest neighbors, the Contadora group, have subscribed to a Document of 21 Objec-

tives. These include noninterference in the affairs of one's neighbors, serious dialogue with domestic opposition groups, free elections and democracy in each country, removal of foreign military personnel, and a reduction of armaments. My Government supports a verifiable treaty based on full and simultaneous implementation of the 21 objectives. We welcome the resumption of talks next month in Panama and hope they lead to a final agreement. Contadora is the best forum for pursuing a settlement.

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State  
(US must support its ideals abroad)  
(printed in the New York Times, 3 Oct 85)

Remarks before the National  
Committee on American Foreign  
Policy

The political reality of our time is that America's strategic interests require that we support our ideals abroad.

Consider the example of Nicaragua. We oppose the efforts of the Communist leaders in Nicaragua to consolidate a totalitarian regime on the mainland of Central America — on both moral and strategic grounds. Few in the United States would deny today that the Managua regime is a moral disaster. The Communists have brutally repressed the Nicaraguan people's yearning for freedom and self-government, the same yearning that had earlier made possible the overthrow of the Somoza tyranny.

But there are some in this country who would deny that America has a strategic stake in the outcome of the ideological struggle under way in Nicaragua today. Can we not, they ask, accept the existence of this re-

gime in our hemisphere even if we find its ideology abhorrent? Must we oppose it simply because it is Communist?

The answer is we must oppose the Nicaraguan dictators not simply because they are Communists, but because they are Communists who serve the interests of the Soviet Union and its Cuban client, and who threaten peace in this hemisphere. The facts are indisputable. Had the Communists adopted even a neutral international posture after their revolution; had they not threatened their neighbors, our friends and allies in the region, with subversion and aggression; had they not lent logistical and material support to the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in El Salvador — in short, had they not become instruments of Soviet global strategy, the United States would have had a less clear strategic interest in opposing them.



gigantic effort there. For example, as a corps commander there, I commanded 83,000 soldiers. Here, I command under 10,000 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines combined. My whole Marine contingent here in Southern Command HQ is 13 Marines.

**AFJ:** What percentage of that 10,000 are combat-ready troops?

an airborne battalion, and an intelligence battalion. That set-up provides a pool from which I can draw small teams for training, assistance, and professional interface with military in the countries of Latin America. We are not sending fighting soldiers to these countries. We are sending people who are developers and instructors—people who can provide what we like to call the professional interface.

to specify what kind of assistance is going to be given to countries down here. That gives us clout, and clout is one of the big changes that I have seen.

Also, for the first time in this century, we are wearing the white hats in Latin America, especially in Central America. These people see what Cuba is, and they see what Nicaragua is, and they are afraid. They want our help more than they did before. Therefore, our military-to-military interfaces tend to be more productive.

General John R. Galvin, USA  
Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command  
(SOUTHCOM's mission)

Interview in Armed Forces Journal  
December 1985

**AFJ:** If the problems here are primarily political and economic, does SOUTHCOM have a military mission?

**Gen. Galvin:** Yes, it does. The first is the defense of the Panama Canal in conjunction with the defense forces of Panama. That's the primary mission. In addition to that, our mission is the military interface under the Alliance from the Rio Treaty. We are the military side of the OAS. We have a program of military assistance and

cooperation with just about every country in Latin America. We try to assist in providing military equipment or military training based on an analysis of the country by the ambassador and the country team. In each country, we support the ambassador in his program.

One of the very important things that I do down here as a military officer is serve as an example of what the military is like in a democratic country like the United States. The first thing is that it is subordinate to the civilian leadership. It always has been.



General Paul X. Kelley  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
(Reform proposals)

Interview in Seapower  
November 1985

We know that you have some strong feelings about proposals to radically change the existing Joint Chiefs of Staff system. However, those proposals for change just won't go away. In your view, do any of the proposals now under consideration on the Hill contain elements which could strengthen the current system and therefore warrant being incorporated into it, or are they basically proposals that would weaken the system no matter how good the leadership?

KELLEY: I truly believe that many of the critics of the current JCS organization are behind the times. Under the able leadership of Jack Vessey [Gen. John W. Vessey, USA (Ret.), who retired last month as JCS chairman] a number of changes have been made, to the point where all of the current service chiefs now believe that our system is working well. That's not to say that we should relax on our oars and get complacent, for there is always room for improvement in any organization.

In answer to your specific question, there are several proposals floating around which concern me.

First, there is a notion that the members of the JCS should not be the service chiefs. No responsible person who truly understands the nature of our duties could ever make such a recommendation. Our duties are such that it would be virtually impossible to separate them between JCS and service responsibilities. The nature of war these days is so complex that the national command authorities need to hear advice from the Army chief of staff, the Air Force chief of staff, the chief of naval operations, and the commandant of the Marine Corps. The only one who can give truly meaningful advice is the service chief, not some remote four-star "eunuch" sitting in an ivory tower over the Pentagon. As you may have gathered, I believe that an arrangement whereby you have anyone but the service chief himself as a member of the JCS is a dumb idea.

I think the people who are endeavoring to give the chairman a chance to "speak for himself" don't understand the system. The chairman *does* speak for himself. The chairman has today as much authority as he really needs to do his job, and Jack Vessey would be the first to tell you that. What you want to ensure is that you don't create a system that destroys the corporate structure of the JCS. We all can speak for ourselves; the law provides for that. I can speak to the secretary of defense any time I want to speak to him. In point of fact, the chairman meets every day with the secretary of defense for about an hour. He speaks for himself, but he's always very careful to present any conflicting view from any of the chiefs as well. To suggest that we should emasculate the JCS as a corporate structure would be like General Motors saying that it was going to do away

with its board of directors, and its chairman was going to have complete decision-making authority, and only he would speak for General Motors.

President Eisenhower warned about the military/industrial complex. The strength of the current corporate system is that you have checks and balances. We all speak with equal voice, with the chairman having a little more than an equal voice. If you do away with the corporate structure, and put all that power in one guy, you could, in my opinion, move toward something like a military/industrial complex.

Any other aspects of the various reorganization proposals that particularly bother you?

KELLEY: The other area in the debate over whether there should be a reorganization of the Joint Chiefs that disturbs us all—and the chiefs are uniform in their disagreement—is the notion of having a deputy chairman. First of all, we don't know who he would be or what he would do. We all have examined the day-to-day duties of what a deputy chairman would do, and we came up with a big blank—a zero. We have in the past several years changed the system with regard to the acting chairman. Each of us now becomes the acting chairman for a quarter per year. This means that, when the chairman is out of town, we act on his behalf. This makes us much better service chiefs, because we understand the nature of the job of the chairman. It makes the secretary of defense a far better secretary of defense because he gets to know all the service chiefs in a little different environment. It allows the president, when we go to the White House for meetings as acting chairmen, to get to know all of his service chiefs.

I have yet—and I mean this sincerely—to hear a well-articulated argument as to why we need a deputy chairman. I have now had two three-month tours as acting chairman, and they have occurred during some very interesting times. I am a far better commandant of the Marine Corps for having had that experience. The system has worked well, and we truly don't understand what a deputy chairman would do.

Who is he? What would he do? The chairman has an assistant to the chairman who is a three-star general. And that has been the rank that has always worked within the interagency groups in Washington. That's one of his primary functions, to work with the other agencies. He is the chairman's guy, representing the JCS. If you elevate the position to the four-star level, all you have done is create another layer. I can see nothing but problems by having a permanent deputy chairman.



John F. Lehman  
Secretary of the Navy  
(Reform)

"JCS Reorganization Idea is Not  
New or Improved" in Navy Times  
16 December 1985

When in doubt — centralize. That's been the congressional approach to every defense problem for the past 25 years. Whether the trendy issue of the day was the missile gap, targeting in Vietnam, TFX (proposed all-service tactical fighter plane) or even health care, the answer since McNamara has always been to create another centralized staff.

Today, there are 10 central defense agencies employing 85,000 staffers, 30 linear feet of centralized military staff charts which require a magnifying glass to decipher, 1,152 linear feet of law library statutes and regulations governing the accumulated defense bureaucracy, and 44 congressional committees and subcommittees to make sure that the whole system is running just fine. Needless to say the result of such centralizing and bureaucratizing has been the opposite of improved management; it has resulted in bureaucratic bloat fast approaching gridlock.

And, even though successful private enterprise is today marching in the exact opposite direction — towards smaller staffs, greater line accountability, and removing management layers — the centralizers have advanced still another big government "solution" — this time to improve defense management and the quality of military advice. Their idea is to replace the Joint Chiefs with a single, dominant National Chief of Staff who would assume the advisory role that JCS now has and exercise command authority over our forces, as well.

That is neither a new idea, nor one that has improved with age. In its various manifestations, it is usually presented as a "reorganization," and under that name, has enlisted the interest of a number of Congressmen and others who genuinely care about national security and seek the improvement of our defenses.

But JCS "reorganization" would have quite a different effect. It would increase bureaucracy and layers of organization. It would decrease policy control by elected leadership. It would strip our national decision-making

process of needed information and expertise. And it would make no contribution whatsoever to the crucial question of efficient defense spending. In any other sphere of federal policy, such a trend would be seen for what it is: bad government. And bad government is bad for defense.

\* \* \* Today's five-member JCS still reflects the World War II lessons that led to its founding. In that conflict, the U.S. and its allies faced a powerful axis of enemies, possessing multiple offensive capabilities and a global reach. In planning our war effort, a single-track perspective on strategy, or an inadequate grasp of our actual capabilities, would have doomed us to failure. Thus, the JCS deliberately combined the expertise and knowledge of our different services: providing information and advice on land, sea, and air threats as well as U.S. capabilities — the essential groundwork for a sound national and allied strategy.

Moreover, the JCS system ensured that the authority to plan for the employment of our forces, under civilian direction, was lodged with those who had the responsibility to train, equip and maintain those forces — the service chiefs. As former Vice President Hubert Humphrey once noted in his opposition to the kind of reorganization now proposed, this reflects the "sound principle" of combining authority and responsibility — a principle of organization which is, "in every walk of life . . . an accepted and fundamental concept."

Today, our adversary has changed, but the necessity for truly joint military advice as well as fully responsible military planning has not. Yet, if the military's best professional views on national strategy are an essential part of national security decision-making, they are not the whole. In the American Republic, despite the apparent wishes of some of our defense experts, every decision that so seriously affects the future of our nation or the lives of our people — from the conduct of a military operation, to the composition of the defense

budget, to the structure of our global forces — must reflect the will of elected leaders, not just Pentagon whiz-kids or uniformed staffs. Thus, we come to what the JCS is not and should not be: the final arbiter of national strategy. Nor, in my experience, has any serving American military officer ever desired such a role.

Today, we see the spiritual progeny of the defense centralizers again advancing many of the old proposals. These range from making the Chairman of the JCS the equal of the Secretary of Defense on the National Security Council; to making him the supervisor of the operational commanders, with full powers in the chain of command; to giving him complete control of the Joint Staff; to anointing him as principal adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense. Other proposals, more explicit than most, completely abolish the title "Chairman" — which, after all, becomes a misnomer in all the schemes, since this officer no longer serves the Joint Chiefs as a whole. In these more explicit proposals, the new Defense Czar is called the "Chief of Staff of the National Command Authorities;" the Joint Chiefs are disbanded; and a new "Council" of retired or soon-to-be-retired military officers — totally lacking touch with or accountability for the day-to-day realities of military capability, much less having any responsibility for our forces — is created to pontificate on national strategy.

Consider proposals to make a single senior officer — title him what you will — the principal military adviser the President and Secretary of Defense. Such a scheme is intended to "streamline" advice, lessening the influence of service points of view. But suppressing the full range of ideas and information the Joint Chiefs provide will isolate civilian authorities from the critical issues and thus hamper, rather than enhance, wise decision-making.

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John F. Lehman  
Secretary of the Navy  
(Reform...CONTINUED)

"JCS Reorganization Idea is Not  
New or Improved" in Navy Times  
16 December 1985

The effect of these schemes would be radically to reduce civilian control of the military, and eliminate the freedom of choice of the President in making defense decisions. Instead of differing perspectives and options he would be faced with one military view — that of the new super-chairman. That military officer would become the de facto commander-in-chief with the Secretary of Defense made irrelevant and the President kicked upstairs as a kind of Chairman of the Board on military matters.

The corporate JCS provides essential protections against this kind of error: the history of experiments with single chief-of-staff systems in other nations is a record of failures. The German General Staff, for example, was rightly renowned for its development of tactical expertise — but controlled by staff not line officers, it was unable to handle combined operations and proved a disaster at national strategy: failures witnessed in two World Wars.

Japan's Imperial General Headquarters staff withheld war plans and operational results even from civilian leadership; dominated by purely uniformed staff officers, it failed to provide balance, coordination, and even information, between the army and navy. In World War I, Britain, a single chief of staff, Sir William Robertson, was able to suppress all military alternatives to his trench-war policy of attrition: a policy that contributed to the loss of a generation of youth.

Those who proposed creating a single Chief here in the United

States do not stop with the advisory powers that would lead to a recap of this record of disaster. They also contemplate giving the Chief the power to serve in the chain of command between civilian authorities and this country's operational commanders, from Europe to the Pacific, in land, sea and air combat. The United States has strongly resisted such an anointment of a single supreme military chief, and for more than one reason.

First, our system of operational command is wisely premised on the need effectively and forcefully to integrate the services in truly joint operations, but to lodge this power in the joint theater commander in the location where the action takes place, not within the bureaucratic safety of the Pentagon. In theory the current system places authority where it should be — in the hands of those to be held accountable. In practice more can be done to give those theater CINCs more control over their service components. To interpose a super-chairman and his general staff in Washington between the CINCs and the Secretary of Defense and President, adds yet another layer of bureaucracy to the chain of command and encourages second-guessing by remote, over-eager Pentagon staffers who lack both the on-scene judgment and the ultimate responsibility for our forces.

Moreover, enabling the "principal adviser" to civilian authorities to serve simultaneously in the chain of command severs the direct, objective lines of communication and responsibility be-

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John F. Lehman  
Secretary of the Navy  
(Reform...CONTINUED)

"JCS Regorganzation Idea is Not  
New or Improved" in Navy Times  
16 December 1985

tween the operational commanders and their civilian superiors — diminishing necessary control.

And finally, in those instances where the President, as Constitutional Commander-in-Chief, does indeed choose to delegate authority to a Washington-based commander, his ability to do so should never be bound by inflexible provisions mandating the choice of a specific officer.

This whole scheme is speciously referred to by proponents as a simple "substitution" of the Chairman for the corporate Joint Chiefs, who currently manage the Secretary of Defense's channel of communications. But any ensign can tell you there is a significant difference between serving in the chain of command and communicating someone else's orders.

Hand in hand with these proposals is the recommendation that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or the "National Chief-of-Staff," should possess exclusive control of the Joint Staff. As Congress remarked in 1958, "Were this to happen, it would constitute a long, and probably final, step toward an overall Armed Forces general staff" — a type of organization whose fundamental flaws have already here been noted.

But there are other problems with making the Joint Staff the personal preserve of a single officer. Rather than ensuring that the staff provides genuinely joint perspectives to its Chief, the structure of his authority over personnel and promotion decisions ensures that the staff will reflect his personal perspective. By

controlling the resource of joint staff assistance, only the Chief will be able to offer fully staffed authoritative recommendations; the service chiefs, promoted to those jobs because they have proven that they are the best the service has to offer, are relegated to mere kibitzers under such a system — of considerably less power than the anonymous 2,000 members of the new general staff.

And as the Joint Staff has grown every year so too will the new general staff grow; an inexorable growth in Pentagon deskmen that will be recapitulated in the staffs of the various entities that must report to or consult with this new bureaucratic center. Then, as central staffs grow, responsibility and expertise will diminish: "bureaucracy" will become even more of a speciality than it already is, displacing the real business of the military — skill in combat. In all, it is a massive move in the wrong direction.

Behind this conglomeration of bad ideas lie three real issues: joint strategy, defense management, and military spending. But joint strategy is not advanced by removing from the deliberative arena those who have the greatest expertise in operations and the capabilities of our services. Nor is defense management advanced by adding new layers of bureaucracy. And civilian leaders, in the executive and Congress, cannot make wise spending decisions without access to the alternatives and ideas that the services provide.

Those who are directly responsible for the United States' defense must go in a different direction. In making joint strategy,

we must emphasize genuine operational expertise in every service — stress strategic thinking in our war colleges — and most important, continue to put national strategy at the forefront of consideration by those who bear the ultimate authority and responsibility: America's elected leadership.

In managing the Defense Department, we must slash the number of desk-warmers in non-countable central agencies and staffs, and return authority to those who can be held accountable: in management affairs, the services, under the appointed, politically responsible Secretaries of the Military Departments; in operational affairs, the responsible commanders of our combatant forces, whose strict accountability for their actions should be paralleled by real authority to plan and execute.

Finally, with respect to military spending and procurement, we must adopt the applicable lessons of private industry, and unlearn the lessons of big government. Nothing can substitute for the vigorous competition of ideas that lays the basis for sound decisions and efficient programming.



SELECTED STATEMENTS

FOREIGN POLICY  
(ASIA & THE PACIFIC)

Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense  
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System

Q: Do you see us, as others do, that our strategic interests are moving incrementally away from Europe and in the direction of Asia; that as Asia becomes more of an economic force, as it develops other interests for the United States, that we will be looking and deploying more in Asia than on the continent of Europe?

A: No, I don't think it's a comparative thing at all. I think that we can't ever move away from a very close association and alliance with the western countries of Europe. We can't live in a world in which Europe is overrun. But, the Pacific is an enormously important part of the world. It's importance to the United States has been to some extent, I think, either over looked or not sufficiently appreciated. It's not a question of either/or, it's a question of bringing the Pacific into proper perspective while maintaining the kinds of relationships and commitments we have in Europe. The Pacific is a very vital part of America's future. They're our largest trading partner in many ways. The strategic importance of them is overwhelming. We will certainly have, without any question, the importance of the Pacific before us for all the rest of our lives and many generations to come. That doesn't mean we're giving up Europe.

President Ronald Reagan  
(US interests in the Pacific  
and in Europe)

Responses to questions submitted  
by Le Figaro  
26 September 1985

Q. The interest of the United States for the Pacific nations is more and more obvious and geopolitically somehow natural. Does this mean that in the future, Europe and Africa have a chance of losing the major role they have had in American diplomacy since World War II?

*The President.* The NATO alliance remains the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. It not only embodies a fundamental security interest; it represents a community of moral and political values. It is no accident that one of America's most durable peacetime alliances is with our fellow democracies of the Atlantic world.

The Pacific nations are indeed growing in importance in political, security, and especially economic terms, but our strengthened relations with Asia have not diminished our traditional ties to Europe. Indeed, a major

foreign policy accomplishment of this administration is its success in encouraging the industrialized democracies in Europe, Asia, and North America to cooperate in developing global, not parochial, solutions to our common economic and security problems.

The United States has sought not merely to strengthen our bilateral ties with Asia and Europe but to encourage greater interaction among all members of the community of advanced industrialized democracies. This new and more cohesive allied consensus has been in evidence in the economic summit meetings, where the leaders of the seven largest industrialized democracies of North America, Europe, and Asia meet to discuss a vast range of political, economic, and security problems.



FOREIGN POLICY  
(CENTRAL AMERICA)

General John R. Galvin, USA  
Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command  
(Role of SOUTHCOM)

Interview in Armed Forces Journal  
December 1985

**AFJ:** It sounds as if the threat here is unique compared to other unified commands. How would you describe your specific military responsibility here, and how is it different from those in other commands?

**Gen. Galvin:** Well, I don't know the situation in all those commands well, but I know Europe. Europe is an industrialized and relatively stable entity where we are faced with a great threat, the Warsaw Pact, and we oppose that with NATO. We ourselves contribute 400,000 soldiers, so we have a gigantic effort there. For example, as a corps commander there, I commanded 83,000 soldiers. Here, I command under 10,000 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines combined. My whole Marine contingent here in Southern Command HQ is 13 Marines.

**AFJ:** What percentage of that 10,000 are combat-ready troops?

**Gen. Galvin:** The majority of them are not maneuver battalions.

We used to have a mechanized brigade here in Panama. We have changed that because our job is different. Instead of providing a combat fighting force for defense, we are providing the kind of unit that we can draw on to assist others in something that is not combat.

For example, where that brigade was, we now have a signal battalion, a medical battalion, a logistical battalion, a special forces battalion, a light infantry battalion, an airborne battalion, and an intelligence battalion. That set-up provides a pool from which I can draw small teams for training, assistance, and professional interface with military in the countries of Latin America.

We are not sending fighting soldiers to these countries. We are sending people who are developers and instructors—people who can provide what we like to call the professional interface.

A lot of people question the military-to-military interface. They say, "What does it do for us? We sent Somoza to West Point. What did that do for us?" It is true that in the past our military-to-military interface wasn't always good. That was because we didn't have or didn't exercise any influence over the countries in Latin America in terms of simple things like public opinion.

Public opinion is a very powerful force, especially when it influences the US Congress, and then Congress exercises its right to specify what kind of assistance is going to be given to countries down here. That gives us clout, and clout is one of the big changes that I have seen.

Also, for the first time in this century, we are wearing the white hats in Latin America, especially in Central America. These people see what Cuba is, and they see what Nicaragua is, and they are afraid. They want our help more than they did before. Therefore, our military-to-military interfaces tend to be more productive.

General John R. Galvin, USA  
Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command  
(SOUTHCOM's mission)

Interview in Armed Forces Journal  
December 1985

**AFJ:** If the problems here are primarily political and economic, does SOUTHCOM have a military mission?

**Gen. Galvin:** Yes, it does. The first is the defense of the Panama Canal in conjunction with the defense forces of Panama. That's the primary mission. In addition to that, our mission is the military interface under the Alliance from the Rio Treaty. We are the military side of the OAS. We have a program of military assistance and

cooperation with just about every country in Latin America. We try to assist in providing military equipment or military training based on an analysis of the country by the ambassador and the country team. In each country, we support the ambassador in his program.

One of the very important things that I do down here as a military officer is serve as an example of what the military is like in a democratic country like the United States. The first thing is that it is subordinate to the civilian leadership. It always has been.



General John R. Galvin, USA  
Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command  
(Contras)

Interview in Armed Forces Journal  
December 1985

**AFJ:** What do you think of the Contras in Nicaragua? Do they have a chance?

**Gen. Galvin:** I think that this insurgency, the democratic resistance, is different from any of the ones that I have seen before. Normally, an insurgency takes years and years to build an infrastructure before it becomes truly a fighting organization, one that has strong political influence in the country. Here we have a group of people that started from absolute scratch in about 1980.

It is almost as if the bell rings for the first round, you are flat on your back in the middle of the ring, and the other guy is standing over you. The Contras started from there. They had no infrastructure. They had no logistic support. They had no strong ideological doctrine. They had no nothing, you might say. What they did have was a complete disappointment with what they saw come about in their country. They had hoped for a democracy after a long period of totalitarianism, and they didn't get it. And, they felt strongly enough about it to come up off their backs and fight.

They are now approaching 20,000 strong. They have doubled over the past year from 8,000, with no official support and very little unofficial support from the United States.

The level of contact between the Sandinistas and the democratic resistance is high in the country. My guess would be that there are more than 100 shooting contacts every month. There is all kinds of criticism that they don't fight well. I don't know about how well they fight. But to me, 100

contacts a month is pretty hard fighting.

It's also said they don't have an ideology. Well, one of our interesting characteristics as people who love democracy, is that we never consider it an ideology. We consider blathering about democracy a kind of propaganda. They were called Contras from the start because they are against something. But, they are against not being democratic.

They are also said to be disorganized, not able to support themselves, and to depend on sanctuaries, and so forth. I think again that we have to remember that there was not some 15 years of preparation of infrastructure. By the way, after the Sandinistas had been in Nicaragua for 15 years, their strength, even when they overcame Somoza, was only 5,000. The Contras are three times as big as that in the country. Does the democratic resistance have the capability of exerting political power for change in Nicaragua? I think not only that they do, but I think that that is the way change has to come. We are going to be standing by to protect our allies, but we hope that we will not be involved militarily at all in Nicaragua.

**AFJ:** How much of the Contras' success do you think they owe to the US military?

**Gen. Galvin:** Practically none. You know, I have never had anything to do with them, never met or talked to any of those people, so there are a lot of things that probably I don't know. But, one thing I do know is the American military has done absolutely nothing in support of the democratic resistance.



George P. Shultz, Secretary of State  
(US supports contradora goals)

Speech before the General  
Assembly of the United Nations  
24 September 1985

But regional peace in Central America is threatened by the rulers of Nicaragua and their Soviet and Cuban allies. Behind a cloak of democratic rhetoric, the Nicaraguan Communists have betrayed the 1979 revolution and embarked on a course of tyranny at home and subversion against their neighbors.

How can this crisis be resolved? The Central American nations, together with their nearest neighbors, the Contadora group, have subscribed to a Document of 21 Objec-

tives. These include noninterference in the affairs of one's neighbors, serious dialogue with domestic opposition groups, free elections and democracy in each country, removal of foreign military personnel, and a reduction of armaments. My Government supports a verifiable treaty based on full and simultaneous implementation of the 21 objectives. We welcome the resumption of talks next month in Panama and hope they lead to a final agreement. Contadora is the best forum for pursuing a settlement.

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State  
(US must support its ideals abroad)  
(printed in the New York Times, 3 Oct 85)

Remarks before the National  
Committee on American Foreign  
Policy

The political reality of our time is that America's strategic interests require that we support our ideals abroad.

Consider the example of Nicaragua. We oppose the efforts of the Communist leaders in Nicaragua to consolidate a totalitarian regime on the mainland of Central America — on both moral and strategic grounds. Few in the United States would deny today that the Managua regime is a moral disaster. The Communists have brutally repressed the Nicaraguan people's yearning for freedom and self-government, the same yearning that had earlier made possible the overthrow of the Somoza tyranny.

But there are some in this country who would deny that America has a strategic stake in the outcome of the ideological struggle under way in Nicaragua today. Can we not, they ask, accept the existence of this re-

gime in our hemisphere even if we find its ideology abhorrent? Must we oppose it simply because it is Communist?

The answer is we must oppose the Nicaraguan dictators not simply because they are Communists, but because they are Communists who serve the interests of the Soviet Union and its Cuban client, and who threaten peace in this hemisphere. The facts are indisputable. Had the Communists adopted even a neutral international posture after their revolution; had they not threatened their neighbors, our friends and allies in the region, with subversion and aggression; had they not lent logistical and material support to the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in El Salvador — in short, had they not become instruments of Soviet global strategy, the United States would have had a less clear strategic interest in opposing them.



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SELECTED STATEMENTS

FOREIGN POLICY  
(GENEVA SUMMIT)

Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense  
(Advice on negotiating position)

Letter to President Reagan,  
printed in the New York Times of  
16 November 1985

The Soviet violations put us in a particularly vulnerable and dangerous position when these violations are compared with the sharp reductions in our requests for Strategic Defense funding. We all feel that it is essential to move as rapidly and effectively as possible on S.D.I. because Soviet violations do give them an advantage which makes it very difficult for us to maintain a deterrence balance with them.

Of course, their violations also constitute a powerful argument for getting the deepest possible cuts in nuclear arms by agreement, if we can secure agreements that bring us to parity at these lower levels and are thoroughly verifiable. Also, as we approach budget time for next year, we may want to consider a supplemental for this year or more than 3 percent growth next year to compensate in specific ways for these violations.\* \* \*

In Geneva, you will almost certainly come under great pressure to do three things that would limit severely your options for responding to Soviet violations:

One is to agree to continue to observe SALT II.

The second is to agree formally to limit S.D.I. research, development,

and testing to only that research allowed under the most restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty, even though you have determined that a less restrictive interpretation is justified legally. The Soviets doubtless will seek assurances that you will continue to be bound to such tight limits on S.D.I. development and testing that would discourage the Congress from making any but token appropriations.

Third, the Soviets may propose communiqué or other language that obscures their record of arms control violations by referring to the "importance that both sides attach to compliance."

Any or all of these Soviet proposals, if agreed to, would sharply restrict the range of responses to past and current Soviet violations available to us. A pledge to continue to adhere to SALT II, even though the Soviets are violating it, could make it difficult, if not impossible, to do other things we should do to make up for their violations. We can, of course, continue to observe parts of SALT II, at your option, but a pledge to continue observing it all could put rigid constraints on your ability to respond to Soviet viola-

tions.

Also, such a pledge would require us to dismantle far larger numbers of modern weapons than the Soviets over the near-term.\* \* \* \*

Essentially, the United States would have to dismantle between 1,320 and 2,240 MIRVed ballistic missile warheads by 1991, whereas the Soviets would have to dismantle only about 558 ballistic missiles, of which just 112 would be MIRV systems. Because Soviet modernization processes can go on, the net effect would be thousands of additional U.S.S.R. warheads by the early 1990's.

Any agreement to limit the S.D.I. program according to a narrow and, I believe, wrong interpretation of the ABM Treaty — a treaty which the Soviets are violating under any interpretation — would diminish significantly the prospects that we will succeed in bringing our search for a strategic defense to fruition.

Communiqué or other language that enables the Soviets to appear equally committed to full compliance — even as they continue to enlarge their pattern of violations — will make the difficult task of responding to those violations even more problematic.



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Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense  
(What do the Soviets want)

Interview in US News & World  
Report 25 November 1985

**Q** Mr. Secretary, do you have any sense of what the minimum  
objectives of the Soviet Union will be at the Geneva summit?

**A** I think they want to stop our Strategic Defense Initia-  
tive at all costs, and I agree with the President that this  
would be a tragic mistake.

I suppose the Soviets would like to do what they've  
always done in the past: Get agreements to things that they  
already want to do. That has been the pattern in the past  
and it's worked quite well for them because we have been  
anxious to have agreements.

**Q** What sort of agreement do you think the Soviet Union has  
in mind?

**A** The Soviets, in working on an arms proposal, can say  
right now in 1985 that by 1991 they want to reduce to a

thousand numbers of warheads. What they may have in  
mind is that they want to modernize and make these war-  
heads even more accurate than they are now. They know  
perfectly well that they can accomplish that, step by step  
down to the last comma in 1991 or whatever.

On the other hand, we have a system under which we  
could make a similar agreement, and we haven't the faint-  
est idea what we can have tomorrow or the next day or  
1988 or '90 or '91. We've been debating the MX missile for  
12 years now, but we still haven't deployed it.

So this is a major difference. They know what they want,  
and they know they can get it. We often don't have an  
agreed idea of what we actually want, and even if we did, we  
have no ability to guarantee that we can come up with it.



MILITARY POSTURE & STRATEGY

General Robert T. Herres  
Commander-in-Chief, US Space Command  
(Dependability of NORAD computers)

Interview with the Denver Post  
Empire 17 November 1985 pg.22

**EMPIRE:** *Ford tells an alarming story about how a computer chip failed and, as a result, the Pentagon received faulty information that Soviet ICBMs were on the way. Could such an incident cause the United States to launch or to be ready to launch nuclear weapons at the Soviet Union?*

HERRES: Ford suggests that. And he really wants you to believe it. But the fact of the matter is that the system did not ever suggest that the United States was under attack. The computer did.

But the system is more than the computer. The system is the people who look at the computer. The other thing you should know, and this is important to remember, there are a whole lot of other sources

of information — streams of information flowing down other paths from other computers. We have a lot of redundancy in this system. It just took a few minutes for duty officers to realize that the faulty information didn't make any sense.

The chip should never have done what it did, and we have built a whole lot of precautionary, preventive measures into the system to prevent its happening again. We have a lot of redundancy in the system. When that chip failed in 1980, bomber and tanker crews followed procedures to ensure the crews could get off the ground more quickly than if they were in normal training status. But there was no way the bombers were just going to take off and start on an attack — not without an order from the president, and he waits for an assessment from NORAD, and NORAD never, ever assessed those events as threatening.

General Roscoe Robinson, Jr., USA  
US Representative to the NATO  
Military Committee

Interview in Army Times  
2 December 1985



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HERRES: Ford suggests that. And he really wants you to believe it. But the fact of the matter is that the system did not ever suggest that the United States was under attack. The computer did. But the system is more than the computer. The system is the people who look at the computer. The other thing you should know, and this is important to remember, there are a whole lot of other sources

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General Roscoe Robinson, Jr., USA  
US Representative to the NATO  
Military Committee

(Importance of strengthening conventional  
defenses)

Q: You've been quoted as saying the U.S. must strengthen its arsenal of conventional weapons if it is to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Can you expand on this?  
A: Well, the Soviets have continued to modernize their conventional forces and if we do not keep pace with them we may find ourselves having a nuclear confrontation. The only way we can maintain a credible deterrence is to improve our conventional defense

Interview in Army Times  
2 December 1985



SELECTED STATEMENTS

General Roscoe Robinson, Jr., USA  
US Representative to the NATO Military  
Committee (European contribution to NATO)

Interview with Army Times  
2 December 1985

**Q: We hear complaints from Congress that our NATO allies should be doing more to provide their own defense. Can and should our allies do more for their own defense?**

**A:** It is a valid criticism because we want all of our allies to do more. But criticism doesn't recognize what our allies in fact are contributing to the alliance. As an example, if war started in Europe tomorrow, 90 percent of all the ground forces in Europe would be European and 75 percent of the air and naval forces would be European. I don't think that we have a good appreciation for that in the United States when we make the calls for our allies to do more.

**Q: What more can the United States NATO allies contribute?**

**A:** Well, I think that they can continue to modernize just as we are continuing to modernize our forces to try to strengthen their conventional capability.

**Q: If you were to grade NATO, what mark would you give it on its ability to fight the Russians in a war?**

**A:** I think that the NATO forces are quite capable in fighting the Soviets. Certainly the biggest shortcoming is one of sustainability. If we're talking about meeting that initial Soviet thrust, I think there are good levels of preparation. The biggest problem, and this is certainly nothing that has not been said before, is in our ability to sustain ourselves — that is, having our supplies and so forth available for follow-on efforts.

Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense  
(Goal of resisting Soviet intimidation)  
6 December 1985

Remarks before the Commonwealth  
and Diplomatic Writers Association  
and the US Correspondents Assoc.  
London

WE MUST, IN THIS WORLD, KEEP A CRITICAL FACTOR IN MIND. IN WESTERN EUROPE TODAY, THE PRINCIPAL THREAT WE ALL FACE IS NOT SO MUCH AN OUTRIGHT SOVIET ATTACK, BUT RATHER SOVIET INTIMIDATION THAT COULD BRING ENORMOUS BENEFITS AND INCALCULABLE LOSSES TO THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM WITHOUT A SHOT BEING FIRED. PROPAGANDA HAS ALREADY



are not conclusive in the sense that no one is tried simply because of a failure of the polygraph examination. The experience of the people who work in these areas is that this is a very good way of trying to isolate or find in advance before they do all that damage to the nation's security, people who may have contacts or who have had actual contacts with the Soviet Embassy, for example, and try to cut off before something like 20 years elapses, which was the case as you know in the Walker case.

## MILITARY POSTURE & STRATEGY (STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE)

LtGeneral James Abrahamson, Director,  
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization  
(Testing the x-ray laser)

Interview with Defense Week  
12 November 1985

Q. There have been reports of serious problems with one of your key weapons programs, the X-ray laser. Is it true, as reported by Science magazine, that monitoring equipment for a test of the laser earlier this year was improperly calibrated and that you therefore don't know how much progress you've made?

Abrahamson: There was a problem with test equipment and that problem resulted in a lack of calibration on one test. But the

important thing is that one small problem does not invalidate both the promise and the potential danger of that X-ray laser. Unlike the... implication [that] there was a bad test, that was not the case. There was a very specific technical problem but it does not mean that the progress that has been made in that area is now in question. It does mean that there's some data that we would have liked to have known in absolute terms that we don't know in absolute terms. We only know it in relative terms.



NOT LEAD TO ANOTHER ARMS RACE DESPITE THE BEST EFFORTS OF SOVIET AND OTHER PROPA-  
GANDISTS TO HAVE US BELIEVE THE CONTRARY.

## MILITARY POSTURE & STRATEGY (TERRORISM)

Interview in Seapower, Nov 85

General Paul X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps (Measures to combat terrorism)

You devoted a sizable portion of your own posture statement to discussing terrorism and what was being done to make the Marine Corps better able to understand and cope with it. Can you be more specific than you did in that statement as to how the Corps is being better prepared to cope with terrorism?

KELLEY: First, let me emphasize what I said in my posture statement: The best deterrent to terrorism is an alert, aware, combat-trained Marine. To this end, every formal Marine Corps school now includes a terrorism-awareness program. The program of instruction at our Command and Staff College, as an example, includes some 25 hours specifically devoted to terrorism. Marine attendance at other service schools which deal with measures to combat terrorism has increased 177 percent from 1984 to 1985. For FY 1986, we are planning to send over 1,000 Marines to hard-skill schools where counterterrorism is taught. In addition, we have incorporated a chapter on military security into our Essential Subjects Manual. This will ensure that every enlisted Marine, from private to gunnery sergeant, is trained and tested annually on terrorism-related subjects.

Another important aspect of our program involves the dissemination of doctrine and tactics. Not only do we now have publications on combating terrorism at posts and stations, but we are developing others which are specifically tailored for our forward-deployed units. The operational performance standards that I mentioned in my posture statement are now in the hands of our Marine commanders. But the bottom line is that we intend to prove to terrorists that future attacks against Marines are not worth the price they would have to pay. One of the most insidious problems associated with terrorism is what I call the seduction of the environment. Let me give you an example. When I visited Lebanon not too long before we had the great tragedy, and rode through the streets of the city at night, there were neon lights glowing, a ferris wheel turning on the Grand Corniche, business as usual, it was: "ho hum." The cease-fire

was in effect. Five thousand cars were going through our Marine positions at a busy international airport every day. When one experiences that environment day after day, week after week, month after month, you become seduced. It is not a combat zone as we always have known it. So you have a tendency to relax on your oars. It is a natural reaction, but you can't do that. You must be prepared to expect the unexpected, and realize that any time you are in that sort of an environment the unexpected can happen. This requires an awful lot of leadership, an awful lot of emphasis about the threat on a day-to-day basis with the troops. There are some who would suggest that you tell our commanders only what the local threat is. I say give them the full spectrum of threats, and let the commander organize his position accordingly. Now we know, as an example, that the full spectrum of explosives is from a letter bomb to a 19-ton truck. In the future I wouldn't even rule out a terrorist attack with an aircraft loaded with explosives. Today's Marines are alert to the full spectrum of terrorist threats. So now we know that we must take all the precautions possible to counter that full spectrum—and even additional precautions which the local commander might think are also necessary. That way you don't get seduced by the environment.

Are you improving on your ability to counter terrorism and terrorists by upgrading your foreign language capability?

KELLEY: We have started an exchange program with personnel from our interrogator-translator teams—and I want to expand it—with the French. French is a common language in a lot of countries. We take a young Marine sergeant who has had school training in the language and speaks fundamental French, and send him to units within the French rapid deployment force. He stays there for a three-month period, and actually lives with the French and speaks nothing but French 24 hours a day seven days a week. The Marine Corps has a unique problem in that we are a worldwide global force. So we have to balance a number of languages against our requirements.



Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Soviet violations, CONTINUED)

Interview in International Combat Arms November 1985

the fate of the MX is uncertain and the U.S. small ICBM program lags well behind the SS-X-25. We also know that the Soviets have other new ICBMs under development, and these, too, could violate the qualitative restrictions of the SALT II Treaty on throw-weight and RVs.

The Soviet Union has already attained a three-to-one advantage in ballistic missile throw-weight and an almost comparable advantage in time-urgent hard-target kill capability. Soviet violation of the SALT II qualitative restrictions in this critical area will ensure growth that is contrary to treaty provisions. Likely Soviet violations of the TTBT will provide the warheads for these new missiles.

Perhaps the most important Soviet SALT-related noncompliance comes in the ABM Treaty arena. Soviet deployment of substantial levels of prohibited ABM defenses can have great military significance. Lack of an effective ABM defense today is really the missing link of the Soviet war-fighting potential. Only through the deployment of large-scale ballistic missile defenses can the Soviets hope to prevent rather than limit—retaliatory attacks against important military and political targets.

There is a fundamental difference between a unilateral Soviet ABM capability in addition to their great advantages in strategic ballistic missiles, especially ICBMs, civil defense and bomber defenses, and the strategic situation we hope will emerge from the Strategic Defense Initiative. A Soviet monopoly in ABM defense capability—or a base for a rapidly deployable one, covertly developed and deployed in violation of the ABM Treaty—is a serious threat to our security and the peace. We must deter such a Soviet development.

olitical treaties are atrocities. The apparent decline in use of lethal mycotoxins since the U.S. exposed Soviet complicity does little for the thousands who have died and nothing to absolve the Soviets from years of cruel and inhumane attacks with those weapons. Moreover, the Soviets still maintain an illegal biological warfare program and capability.

Soviet violations—and impending violations—of the qualitative restrictions of the SALT II Treaty will create threats in excess of even the permissive terms of SALT II. They are moving toward deployment of the SS-X-25, a new, small, mobile ICBM which will be capable of refire. This is the SS-X-25, the illegal second new type. They is hardly the last new Soviet ICBM. They will have the SS-X-24, a new MX-sized, rail-mobile missile capable of refire in a relatively short period of time. Meanwhile,

Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Compliance and verification are essential to arms control)

Interview in International Combat Arms November 1985

ICA: Even if a substantive agreement on Arms Control/Arms Reduction can be not, why? that the U.S. has continued to propose? If



...the bottom line... responses must be found; Soviet cheating must stop. Otherwise, arms control simply is doomed. For a treaty limitation respected by open societies and violated by closed societies is no treaty limitation at all. It is not arms control at all. Instead, it is unilateral disarmament in the guise of bilateral arms control.

Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Soviet violations)

Interview in International Combat Arms November 1985

ICA: Most Americans know little about the Soviet violations of various arms treaties. Why doesn't this receive a greater degree of publicity?

Perle: I suppose there is a certain irony that our news media, which generally thrives on reporting bad news, has paid much greater attention to hopes for a new arms agreement prompted by the recent Shultz-Gromyko meeting than it has to Soviet violations of existing agreements which undermined the arms control process. But I think you will find that public awareness about Soviet noncompliance is increasing and will continue to do so. Keep in mind that this is the first Administration to make Soviet violations of arms control agreements an important issue—which we have done in public reports to the Congress (three in the last year), as well as in diplomatic channels. The message, which is not always accurately conveyed in news coverage and commentary, is that this Administration is serious about compliance because it's serious about arms control. This is, after all, the first Administration to insist that the Soviets join us in a new and effectively verifiable agreement on significant nuclear arms reductions. (There has been nearly an 80 percent increase in Soviet nuclear warheads aimed at the U.S. since SALT II was signed in 1979.) It should also be kept in mind that these are complex

matters about which public discussion is necessarily limited to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods. Yet statecraft in a democracy requires effective public leadership. I believe the Administration is equal to the challenge. The American people will be hearing more of Soviet violations in the future.

ICA: What are some of the specific violations or probable violations that have been committed by the Soviets?

Perle: The Soviets have violated almost all of the most important arms control agreements signed since 1963. The President's February 1, 1985 unclassified report on Soviet noncompliance cited the Soviets on several counts, including: Violation of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act (failure to give the required notice of significant military exercises); violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (maintenance of an offensive biological warfare program and capability; involvement in the production, transfer and use of trichotecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan); violation of two provisions of the 1979 SALT II Treaty (encryption of telemetry to impede verification and testing of an illegal second new type ICBM), probable violation of SALT II's prohibition on

deploying the SS-16 ICBM, likely violation of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (underground nuclear tests in excess of 150-kiloton yield limit); violation of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (venting radioactive matter from underground nuclear tests, causing it to be present outside U.S.S.R.'s territory); violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (through the location, orientation and capability of the Krasnoyarsk Radar); and probable violation of the ABM Treaty restriction on concurrent testing of SAM air defense and ABM components. The report also found that the evidence regarding the U.S.S.R.'s compliance with the ABM Treaty's prohibition on mobile ABM components is ambiguous, but the aggregate of the U.S.S.R.'s ABM and ABM-related actions suggest that it may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. The ABM Treaty prohibits a "base" for such a defense.

The violations of the first significant arms control agreement—the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty—are deliberate and avoidable. I am personally appalled by the lack of press attention to this disclosure. In addition, the same individuals and organizations that have virtually waged war against the U.S. nuclear power industry are strangely silent about this willful contamination of our environment by the U.S.S.R.

Soviet violations of the chemical and bi-

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Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Compliance and essential to arms control)

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quantitative restrictions in this critical area will ensure growth that is contrary to treaty provisions. Likely Soviet violations of the TTBT will provide the warheads for these new missiles.

Perhaps the most important Soviet SALT-related noncompliance comes in the ABM Treaty arena. Soviet deployment of substantial levels of prohibited ABM de-

strategic ballistic missiles, especially ICBMs, civil defense and bomber defenses, and the strategic situation we hope will emerge from the Strategic Defense Initiative. A Soviet monopoly in ABM defense capability—or a base for a rapidly deployable one, covertly developed and deployed in violation of the ABM Treaty—is a serious threat to our security and the peace. We must deter such a Soviet development.

Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Compliance and verification are essential to arms control)

Interview in International Combat Arms November 1985

*ICA: Even if a substantive agreement on Arms Control/Arms Reduction can be brought about, how can the U.S. be sure it won't be another "Paper Treaty" only, one which the U.S. adheres to while the Soviets either ignore or find technical loopholes?*

*Perle: One way to help prevent a recurrence of such problems is to make Soviet noncompliance an important issue in the new round of arms control negotiations in Geneva. In addition, we must ensure that any new agreement is effectively verifiable. The goal of effective verification is to deter cheating by subjecting the would-be violator to a significant risk of detection and, upon detection, to the likelihood of a penalty at least equal to the advantage that would accrue from a violation.*

*ICA: Are the Soviets agreeable to any of the numerous "mutual verifiable" propositions*

*that the U.S. has continued to propose? If not, why?*

*Perle: If by "mutual verifiable" propositions you mean "cooperative measures," I would note that U.S.S.R. reactions vary. For example, the Soviets have generally opposed proposals for on-site inspection, which can enhance verification in some circumstances. However, the Soviets have been willing to accept certain measures which aid verification by National Technical Means, such as the provision in SALT II for giving prior notice of certain missile tests. On the other hand, the Soviets violated a crucial verification provision of SALT II by encrypting missile test telemetry, which is a practice we cannot accept now or in any future agreement. The variation in positions taken by the Soviets reflects their long-standing practice of doing what best serves their interests. ⑥*



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ously we'll never know if it did that or not, but it certainly  
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The President wants verifiable and very real reductions  
down to parity on both sides. You measure parity not by  
numbers of warheads but by their effectiveness and their  
ability to penetrate, their accuracy, the modernization of  
their launching systems, the throw-weight and all that. Un-  
fortunately, the SALT II Treaty didn't do that.

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realistic, hardheaded knowledge of what the past has been  
and therefore what you should try to avoid and what sort of  
better situation you should try to get from the negotiations.  
The Soviets have been very successful in the past in their  
ability to wait out impatient democracies, which like agree-  
ments and results right away.

## PROCUREMENT

William H. Taft, IV  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
(Co-production with NATO allies)

Remarks before the Center for  
Strategic and International  
Studies, 18 December 1985

THE HARD REALITY IS THAT WE ARE IN A CLIMATE OF CONSTRAINED DEFENSE RESOURCES  
WHILE FACING A PRESSING NEED FOR CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IMPROVEMENT IN NATO. AND  
COOPERATION IS A KEY TO MEETING OUR IMPROVEMENT NEEDS. \* \* \*

\* \* \* DESPITE THE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS ALREADY MADE, THE NEED FOR NATO'S RENEWED  
COMMITMENT TO ARMS COOPERATION IS READILY APPARENT FROM A REVIEW OF ANY INDIVIDUAL  
NATION'S DEFENSE R&D PROGRAMS. CONSIDER, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT 11 FIRMS IN 7 NATO  
COUNTRIES ARE WORKING INDEPENDENTLY ON ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, THAT 18 CONTRACTORS IN  
7 COUNTRIES ARE DESIGNING AND PRODUCING GROUND-TO-AIR WEAPONS, THAT 16 COMPANIES  
IN 7 COUNTRIES ARE WORKING ON AIR-TO-GROUND WEAPONS, AND--MOST TELLING OF ALL--  
NATO NATIONS ARE FIELDING SIX NEW TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS--WITHOUT CON-  
SIDERING THE ISSUE OF INTEROPERABILITY. OBVIOUSLY, IN EACH OF THESE CASES,  
ALLIANCE MEMBERS COULD WELL END UP SPENDING EVEN MORE MONEY TO MEET INTER-  
OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS.

FORTUNATELY, THE STEPS NOW BEING TAKEN BY NATO WILL GO FAR TOWARD REDUCING  
THIS KIND OF DUPLICATION IN ALLIED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND MAXIMIZE EACH NATION'S  
INVESTMENT. WORKING TOGETHER, WE CAN AFFORD THE WEAPON SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO  
MEET THE THREAT AHEAD--WITHOUT OVER-BURDENING OUR ECONOMIES AS THE WARSAW PACT  
DOES.

WHILE NATO ALLIES HAVE LONG REALIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATIVE DEVELOP-  
MENTS, THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN OBVIOUS TO US IN THE  
UNITED STATES. OUR PAST RELUCTANCE TO CONSIDER ALLIED SYSTEMS--IN ORDER, FOR  
EXAMPLE, TO REMAIN MILITARILY SELF-RELIANT--HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY THE ECONOMIC

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RESOURCES FOR THE  
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William H. Taft, IV  
Deputy Secretary of  
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SELECTED STATEMENTS

Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense  
(Soviet strategy)

Interview in US News and World  
Report 25 November 1985

Q Have any arms agreements with Moscow worked out to be beneficial to this country's national security?

A There have been problems with almost each one in the sense that we haven't had a proper ability to verify agreements such as SALT II and the ABM Treaty. SALT II allowed expansions. SALT II was not an arms-reduction agreement. It purported to limit what was presumed to be the growth that the Soviets would otherwise make. Obviously we'll never know if it did that or not, but it certainly didn't make any reductions.

The President wants verifiable and very real reductions down to parity on both sides. You measure parity not by numbers of warheads but by their effectiveness and their ability to penetrate, their accuracy, the modernization of their launching systems, the throw-weight and all that. Unfortunately, the SALT II Treaty didn't do that.

The ABM Treaty was based on an assumption that there would be further negotiations within a very short time that both sides and that neither side would do any work on defenses. Neither of those assumptions turned out to be valid. The Soviets embarked on a very large strategic-defense program that has been going on ever since.

This is not to say that you shouldn't try to make treaties or that I'm against the whole negotiating process. It is important, however, that you go into these talks with a very realistic, hardheaded knowledge of what the past has been and therefore what you should try to avoid and what sort of better situation you should try to get from the negotiations. The Soviets have been very successful in the past in their ability to wait out impatient democracies, which like agreements and results right away.

PROCUREMENT

Remarks before the Center for  
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William H. Taft, IV  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
(Co-production with NATO allies)

THE HARD REALITY IS THAT WE ARE IN A CLIMATE OF CONSTRAINED DEFENSE RESOURCES  
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# SELECTED STATEMENTS

## MILITARY BUDGET

Interview in Seapower  
November 1985

items that have had some shaky performance. We get hurt because of our relatively small size when they make what I call undistributed cuts. In other words, they automatically cut each service across the board 10 percent of O&M [operations and maintenance]. We are very heavily oriented toward readiness, so when you cut 10 percent of O&M dollars from the Marine Corps you really are doing us a lot of damage. I believe the Congress has to be cautious about such cuts.

General Paul X. Kelley  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
(Cuts hurt the Marine Corps)

Are you concerned, after having seen that no one really has taken much action to reduce the budget, that the appropriations committees may not fund enough to fulfill the authorization bill?  
KELLEY: I think there is somewhere around \$10 billion between what the authorization bill contains and what some people on the appropriations committees are discussing. Heaven only knows where that will come from. I suspect they will be looking for big-ticket items, high-priced

Remarks at Brigham Young  
University, Provo, Utah  
8 November 1985

Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense  
(Effects of Gramm-Rudman on defense  
spending and national security)

FIRST THE DEFENSE BUDGET IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFICIT. SOME PEOPLE WANT TO SAY IT IS, BUT THE FACTS SPEAK DIFFERENTLY. CONSIDER, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SINCE THE LAST YEAR OF A BALANCED BUDGET--1969--THE DEFENSE BUDGET'S SHARE OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT DECREASED FROM ABOUT NINE PERCENT TO ONLY SIX PERCENT IN 1985. THOSE WHO



## SELECTED STATEMENTS

Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense  
(Effects of defense spending cutbacks on  
national security)

Interview in US News & World  
Report 25 November 1985

**Q** But in spite of all arguments to the contrary, if Congress does take action to reduce spending for defense, what would be the consequences?

**A** First of all, it would send a very bad signal to allies that we harass regularly to increase their own military spending.

It also would send a very bad signal to the Soviets—that America has pretty well lost its will.

It would mean we would have to make very drastic reductions in a number of weapons systems, in number of personnel, in the training-time and the readiness factors and in the compensation for the personnel who remain.

**Q** Would it mean closing some military bases around the

country?

**A** It takes about 22 months to close a base. And it still costs you money because you've got to relocate. You get your savings in bases the third and fourth year out, but you don't get any immediate savings.

But these are not the only kind of cuts Congress is talking about. If you cut 5 billion dollars in outlays, you've got to cut around 12.5 to 14 billion in spending authority.

Basically, people aren't saying you don't need the MX and other weapons; they're saying, "We can't afford it. The deficit's too large. Put it off, delay it." But when you do that, you're agreeing to spend more in the years ahead because the cost of the things you need will go up /

Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense  
(Discussion of the Gramm-Rudman bill)

Interview on MacNeil/Lehrer News  
Hour 12 December 1985

**Q:** Along those lines, it was reported at one point that you were not even consulted before the White endorsed Gramm-Rudman?

**A:** We were in constant contact, all the time, through the whole process.

**\*\*\* Q:** Let's talk about what's going to have to be cut as result of this? Eleven point seven billion dollars out of this year's budget, half of that out of defense. Where is it going to come from?

**A:** Well, we don't know. We are going to have to look at that. One of the things that is important to bear in mind is that the Congress in passing this amendment has given us very little flexibility. You know, in our defense budget is not only...

Caspar W. Weinberger  
(Discussion of Gramm-Rudman)

down in weapons systems  
feel are essential

**Q:** Such as?

**A:** Such as...

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**Q:** As you know,  
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**A:** That's the  
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Q: Along those lines, it was reported at one point that you were not even consulted before the White endorsed Gramm-Rudman?

A: We were in constant contact, all the time, through the whole process. \*\*\* Q: Let's talk about what's going to have to be cut as result of this? Eleven point seven billion dollars out of this year's budget, half of that out of defense. Where is it going to come from?

A: Well, we don't know. We are going to have to look at that. One of the things that is important to bear in mind is that the Congress in passing this amendment has given us very little flexibility. You know, in our defense budget is not only very big from the point of view of dollars, but is very big from the point of view of activity. We have 3220 accounts in that defense budget and Congress has said in this amendment that we have to make reductions in all of those. Now we can make some reductions a little larger in one than in another. Everything will have to be touched. We don't have any options.

Q: Where would be across the board?

A: We have to make reductions in all of these accounts, in one way or another. I have to leave one slight bit of uncertainty there because this is a very long and a very complex bill. It is like reading the Internal Revenue Code. It makes references to a lot of other sections elsewhere, etc. We are analyzing it now. Our best information now is that we will have to make some reduction in all of these accounts, except for one thing. There is a very interesting exception that the Congress carved out -- under no circumstances can we close any bases in any kind of expedited fashion. So you see that the attachment to economy wasn't quite all that firm.

Q: As you know, it is thought that it is going to be very difficult to cut out any major weapons systems, just because of the way those are structured, because of their constituencies...

A: But when you go across the board and you're told you have to make reductions in all 3200 accounts, then you are going to have to make some slow

Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense  
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Interview on MacNeil/Lehrer News  
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Q: Would it mean closing some military bases around the and in the compensation for the personnel who remain personnel in the training-time and the readiness factors reductions in a number of weapons systems, in number of It would mean we would have to make very drastic America has pretty well lost its will

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costs you money because you've got to relocate. You got don't get any immediate savings But these are not the only kind of cuts Congress is talking about. If you cut 5 billion in outlays, you've got to cut around 12.5 to 14 billion in spending authority and other weapons. They're saying, "We can't afford it. The deficit's too large. Put it off, delay it." But when you do that, you're agreeing to spend more in the years ahead because the cost of the things you need will go up.



Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense  
(Discussion of Gramm-Rudman...CONTINUED)

Interview on MacNeil/Lehrer News  
Hour 12 December 1985

down in weapons systems that the Congress and the President and I and everybody feel are essential and when you do that...

Q: Such as?

A: Such as everything we're acquiring because every account is touched. That means that we're going to have a lot of these systems made more expensive and it will take longer to get it because these are systems by definition everybody says we need. But it will make some immediate reduction in the deficit and that, as I say, seems to be the overriding goal in the Congress' mind, not whether it adds to costs in later years, but make an immediate reduction now.\* \* \* \*

Q: As you know, the speculation is that what is going to suffer, what's more likely to suffer is readiness, spare parts, because they don't have the constituency on Capitol Hill.

A: That's the conventional wisdom, but when you have a requirement that every one of these 3200 accounts, including readiness and sustainability and personnel and salaries and weapons systems and maneuvers and testing and fuel and ammunition, everything has to be touched. So you don't have any opportunity to set any priorities. Again, this shows the enormous priority, the enormous importance, that the Congress attaches to getting some kind of deficit reduction now. But as I say, we're not allowed to touch bases, we can't close bases and that's a very interesting exception.

Q: I guess what I'm trying to get at, to what extent is our Defense establishment truly going to suffer?

A: If you delay the acquisition of important needed systems, systems that everybody agrees you need, and if you reduce training and do all of these things, then there is going to be some degradation, if you like, of our security capabilities. Now we are going to try to keep those to an absolute minimum. We're going to recognize, as the President has said many times, that we should not hurt national security in any way that we could possibly avoid while we pursue the deficit reduction goal and the President has also said...

Q: In other words, you're saying that it's possible, you agree with him that it will suffer?

A: You see, with 3200 accounts and with an enormously complex goal that we got last night for the first time, you do have some analysis to do before you make a lot of final...

Q: In other words, you won't want to answer the question?

A: I'm not able to, really. That's essentially what we're saying. But the other thing that I want to emphasize is that the President has said that we do have to make up for this as much as we can, as quickly as we can, within the balanced budget reduction of the total Gramm-Rudman pattern, and we're going to do that. So starting next year we will try to regain whatever losses we had to suffer this year.



## SELECTED STATEMENTS

### MANPOWER

Major General John W. Foss, US Army  
Chief of Infantry  
(Utilization of infantry officers)

Interview in Armed Forces Journal  
October 1985

**AFJ:** Along those same lines, there has been some criticism leveled at the Army's Officer Personnel Management System for doing essentially the opposite of what you've been talking about—via the dual-track system. They take an officer—infantry officer, artilleryman, whatever—and make him take a different specialty and pursue that for a number of years in his career. Does it make sense to you to have an infantry officer serve, arguably, some of the best years of his career in some totally unrelated field like public affairs?

**Gen. Foss:** Well, if he can't be an infantry officer all the time, then he has to be able to do something else. And you can't be an infantry officer all the time.

**AFJ:** Why not?

**Gen. Foss:** Because there are too many officers for the jobs that are available. And the percentage of jobs that you have in units or in critical infantry-type positions are very limited once you get above the grade of captain. So what do you do with the majors when you can only have about 20% of them serve in units?

**AFJ:** They're prisoners of the pyramid structure?

**Gen. Foss:** They are prisoners of that, because you also need majors with infantry experience to do the staff work; you need majors with infantry experience to teach ROTC; you need majors with infantry experience to teach at West Point; you need majors with infantry experience to develop weapons, whether it be on the user side or on the developer side. You're looking for experience that these officers have; otherwise you'd go on out and hire civilians to do all of those other jobs, and you wouldn't need soldiers to do them.

General Charles A. Gabriel  
Chief of Staff, US Air Force  
(Military retirement)

Interview in Air Reservist  
Summer 1985

**Q:** The military retirement system is currently being examined for possible changes. What do you see happening to active-duty military retirement? How

titement package. All other pieces of this package, like pay and benefits, have, in the past, eroded. The 20 and 30 year military

General Paul X. Kelley  
Commandant of the Marine  
(Length of command tours)

\* \* \* \*

The final point is the length of command. That decision was long overdue. You just have commanders rotating in and out of jobs too often. It is tough on the troops, and there's a lack of continuity. Command is a very important job, and one that does not necessarily rotate every door. Our policy has been accepted in the field; people understand why we are doing it. It is to maintain continuity within units. Commanders in command and allow them a reasonable period of time. That reason we all have agreed, is about two years.

In wartime as well as peacetime?

**KELLEY:** I heard it expressed very well ago by Gen. [Lewis] Walt [one-time commander of forces in Vietnam and later assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps]. Someone asked Gen. Walt for an ideal time in combat for a commander to serve. He gave an articulate answer to that question: "If you have a good commander,

General Paul X. Kelley  
Commandant of the Marine  
(Retention goals)

In his posture statement, [Navy] Secretary of the Navy made a fascinating observation about the last four years have seen the most dramatic change in the manning of the Navy and Marine Corps in our history. From the worst retention posture in the history of the Navy, we have seen a dramatic



EDP NEWS SERVICES  
3010 PROSPERITY AVE  
FAIRFAX, VA 22031

AFJ: Along those same lines, there has been some criticism leveled at the Army's Officer Personnel Management System for doing essentially the opposite of what you've been talking about—via the dual-track system. They take an officer—infantry officer, artilleryman, whatever—and make him take a different specialty and pursue that for a number of years in his career. Does it make sense to you to have an infantry officer serve, arguably, some of the best years of his career in some totally unrelated field like public affairs?

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(Military retirement)

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Summer 1985

Q: The military retirement system is currently being examined for possible changes. What do you see happening to active-duty military retirement? How might these potential changes affect the retirement systems of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard?

A: Many of the critics of the military retirement system compare it to private sector pension systems. However, these comparisons aren't appropriate because the purposes of the two systems are radically different. Private systems are primarily old age pension systems; the purpose of the military retirement system is readiness. Ours is a force management tool used to preserve a vigorous, combat-ready military force, and to ensure we maintain a base of retirees who can be mobilized quickly. The military retirement program is part of the overall military en-

titlement package. All other pieces of this package, like pay and benefits, have, in the past, eroded. The 20 and 30 year military retirement system is the one constant. It is the one thing our people can hang their hats on. Some of the changes being proposed could affect required military service, retirement compensation, cost of living adjustments, and the percentage of basic pay entitlements, to mention a few areas. I would expect that changes in any of these areas could carry over to the Air Forces' retirement system. The Reserve Forces retirement system has been, and continues to be, one of the strongest factors to attract and retain citizen-airmen. Changes in that program would have significant adverse impact on our Total Force Policy. They should not be made without a very careful and complete analysis of these impacts.

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Commandant of the Mari  
(Retention goals)

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## SELECTED STATEMENTS

General Paul X. Kelley  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
(Length of command tours)

Interview in Seapower  
November 1985

\* \* \*

The final point is the length of command tours. I think that decision was long overdue. You just can't keep having commanders rotating in and out of jobs in short periods of time. It is tough on the troops, and the units suffer from a lack of continuity. Command is a very awesome responsibility, and one that does not necessarily mature in a revolving door. Our policy has been accepted now throughout the field; people understand why we are doing it. The intention is to maintain continuity within units, to put good commanders in command and allow them to stay there for a reasonable period of time. That reasonable period of time, we all have agreed, is about two years.

In wartime as well as peacetime?

KELLEY: I heard it expressed very eloquently several years ago by Gen. [Lewis] Walt [one-time commander of Marine forces in Vietnam and later assistant commandant of the Marine Corps]. Someone asked Gen. Walt: "What is the ideal time in combat for a commander?" He gave the most articulate answer to that question that I have ever heard: "If you have a good commander, you keep him as long as

necessary until such time as you see him getting tired, but don't change him just for the sake of change because that is totally unfair to the troops." The troops deserve to know who their leader is and to have confidence in him. We had a period in the early to mid-1950s when the Marine Corps went from 75,000 to 265,000 almost overnight for the Korean War, and we brought back officers in the lieutenant colonel rank who had the basic infantry MOS. They weren't qualified infantry officers. To be qualified as an infantry officer you had to have 90 days on the job. When I was in Japan as a young officer in 1954, battalion commanders were being rotated, in some instances, every 90 days.\* \* \*

KELLEY: It's not a good way to do business. Today, there are exceptions to the two-year tour, of course. If a commander is selected for a top-level school, as an example, we obviously are going to make an exception. We allow commanding generals to make exceptions to 18 months on a case-by-case basis. Anything below 18 months must come back to me for an exception, and it has to be pretty well-justified.

General Paul X. Kelley  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
(Retention goals)

Interview in Seapower  
November 1985

In his posture statement, [Navy] Secretary [John] Lehman made a fascinating observation about personnel: "The past

When we interviewed Adm. Lawrence [Vice Adm. William P. Lawrence, deputy chief of naval operations (manpower, personnel, and training)] recently, he was rather pessimistic about some aspects of manning the Navy because of the



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Korean War, and we brought back officers in the lieutenant colonel rank who had the basic infantry MOS. They weren't qualified infantry officers. To be qualified as an infantry officer you had to have 90 days on the job. When I was in Japan as a young officer in 1954, battalion commanders were being rotated, in some instances, every 90 days. \* \* \*

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General Paul X. Kelley  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
(Retention goals)

Interview in Seapower  
November 1985

In his posture statement, [Navy] Secretary [John] Lehman made a fascinating observation about personnel: "The past four years have seen the most dramatic change in the manning of the Navy and Marine Corps in the 209 years of our history. From the worst retention and recruiting in postwar history in 1979 and 1980, we have risen to the highest figures achieved since we began keeping records." Would you amplify that statement so far as Marine Corps manning is concerned, and also look into the crystal ball with regard to future manning of the Corps?

KELLEY: By every standard of measurement, the Corps of 1985 is the most ready combat force in our history.

Our young officers are bigger, tougher, and smarter than I have seen in my 35 years of service, and they are remaining on active duty in unprecedented numbers.

Our young enlisted Marines are, by every standard, the best we have ever seen. As an aside, the commanding general of our recruit depot at Parris Island [S.C.] recently told me that the average recruit today is one inch taller and five pounds heavier than when I became commandant two years ago.

Our Marines are reenlisting at unprecedented rates.

In short, those of us who have been around for a few years "knock on wood" when we realize how fortunate we are to have the Marines we have filling our ranks today.

When we interviewed Adm. Lawrence [Vice Adm. William P. Lawrence, deputy chief of naval operations (manpower, personnel, and training)] recently, he was rather pessimistic about some aspects of manning the Navy because of the decreasing pool of available and qualified manpower and the enticements of life in the civilian sector. He also observed that he was seeing a slight falling off of the quality of personnel being recruited. Are you seeing the same thing?

KELLEY: Bill Lawrence is absolutely correct about the decrease in available and qualified manpower. Demographic studies show that our prime resource of eligible Marine prospects, the 17- to 21-year-old male with no prior service, is declining and will continue to decline into the early 1990s. Additionally, our improving economy, lower unemployment rates, and intensified college recruiting all impact on the available manpower pool.

With that said, I am still confident that our Corps can weather the storm. During the last fiscal year, as an example, two of the other services experienced declines in the number of non-prior-service high school graduates they recruited. The Marine Corps, on the other hand, has 96 percent of its FY 1985 recruits with high school diplomas, the highest level in our history. If that's not enough, over 96 percent of the recruits are Mental Group III and above, and 97 percent presently enlist for four or more years. Within our Delayed Entry Program, we have already reached 59 percent of our fiscal year 1986 goal.



General Paul X. Kelley  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
(Military retirement)

Interview in *Seapower* magazine  
November 1985

Despite some unusually eloquent pleas by all members of the Joint Chiefs not to alter the current military retirement system, Congress agreed on a cut of \$2.94 billion in the retirement account. Since you were to present specific recommendations for, in essence, a new retirement system, we recognize you can't discuss specific details. But in a general sense what do you envisage the new system will look like, and what adverse effects do you foresee from a reduction of the magnitude of that taken?

KELLEY: As I stated in Congress in April, I feel very strongly that the retirement system that we have today is sound and not overly generous, particularly when you consider the tremendous sacrifices that our young people who are wearing uniforms make on a day-to-day basis. To compare what we do with the civilian community is a real apples-and-oranges situation. So I think that if you do have changes, and they are congressionally mandated changes, then it is the Congress which must take the full responsibility for any degradation that we have in the quality of young people coming in, and the resultant decrease in the readiness of our armed forces. So I lay the responsibility squarely on the Congress of the United States. The [service] chiefs are absolutely united in their belief that the current retirement system is sound. \* \* \*

Does Chairman [Les] Aspin [D-Wis., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee] have any understanding of what the dollar cost might be from personnel turnover if the retirement system is changed?

KELLEY: You just hit it right on the head. We are looking at a single facet of the DOD budget, and that's the retirement accrual account. We are not looking at all the other things that could result from a change in the retirement system. I don't think that anyone up on the Hill has taken these into consideration.

We speak about readiness because we know what it takes to be ready, and above all it takes quality people. We work in a very competitive society right now. The economy is good. Unemployment is down. All the economic factors that might influence a young person without an alternative income to join the armed forces are no longer with us. The indicators in the civilian side are good, and we have to be competitive.

There are other factors to be considered, too. For example, the deployment pattern for the Navy right now is 2:1. In other words, a ship is in home port technically for 12 months out of every 18. It is forward-deployed for six months. But while the ship is in port, the operations tempo is such that a sailor is at sea away from his home port about 50 percent of the time. Then, if you take into consideration

the fact that a sailor, or a Marine assigned to shipboard duty, stands a one-in-three watch, that means in a period of 18 months he is home with his family only four months. How do you pay a man for that kind of separation from his family? And most of them live in a fairly dangerous world. They are doing all sorts of things that have an element of danger. How do you pay them for that? Each service has its own peculiar requirements for retirement. We Marines are and always have been a youthful service. The bulk of our Marines are in the younger ranks. Therefore, if you make the 20-year retirement less attractive, it's going to hurt us. We need that 20-year retirement, because you don't want a 45- or 50-year-old squad leader.

On the other hand, we have a few particular MOSs and skills for which we want people to stay past 20 years so as to capitalize on their skills. But when you have a force that is predominantly composed of skills that are not readily marketable on the outside, you have to provide some incentive such as the 20-year retirement.

When we interviewed [Vice Adm.] Bill Lawrence, we asked him what the Navy's investment would be in an ET1 [electronics technician first class] after 10 years. The answer was astounding. Counting pay, it was \$349,000! That's a lot of money to lose if that man elects to get out and go to work for an electronics company.

KELLEY: And it's also the leadership that matures over that period of 10 years. You have lost that and have to replace it. It's not just the money, it's experience, leadership, and all the other things that go to make up a man's experience level after 10 years.

You say each of the services has a different requirement for its people. But I suspect you aren't having much success in selling that philosophy on the Hill right now.

KELLEY: No, it is a very difficult one to understand. As an example, 75 percent of our enlisted personnel are between the ages of 17 and 25. You have to take that into consideration, because we have a significant number of people who are down at the squad level, at the fire-team levels. You can't have old men down there. That is the place for a young, very vigorous, very virile guy. So we have to keep that level of youthfulness in the service—particularly in the Marine Corps. We have a philosophy that may be somewhat different from the other services, and I sum it up with a little cliché: "Some of the other services man the equipment, but we equip the man." There is a subtlety there that we have never lost sight of.



# SELECTED STATEMENTS

General Paul X. Kelley  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
(Marine Corps Reserve)

Interview in Seapower  
November 1985

The last few years have seen a phenomenal increase in the capability of all the nation's Reserve forces over that which was existent during the Carter years. And the Marine Corps Reserve would appear to be adding immeasurably to its ability to wage war. What are your thoughts about its overall capability today, and what more do you consider must be done to improve upon its readiness to provide full support to the active Corps in time of emergency?

KELLEY: My first job as a new brigadier general was to command the 4th Marine Division—which, as you know, is the ground side of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve. Quite frankly, this was my first exposure to our Reserve component, and I was very impressed by the number of highly motivated professionals we have who give so much of their lives to serve our Corps.

The general consensus within the Marine Corps is that our Reserve establishment is in the best shape it has ever been when it comes to manpower, equipment, and readiness to fight. Some people in other branches talk about the total force concept, but we live by it!

To better understand the importance of our Reserves, you have to first understand how we plan to employ them. Our first priority in the event of mobilization will be to selectively augment our active forces, to flesh out our three active Marine amphibious forces to their full wartime structure. The next priority would be to reinforce our

active MAFs with selected units. And finally, if augmentation or reinforcement is not necessary, the reserves could provide a Marine amphibious brigade or a full division/wing team. In this regard, our current division/wing team contains 25 percent of our wartime structure.

How do the Reserves fare in equipment? And in training? KELLEY: In terms of equipment, our policy is that we try to modernize the Selected Marine Corps Reserve on roughly the same schedule as the active forces. Obviously, this is not always possible, and there are notable exceptions.

As far as exercises are concerned, during this current year some 18,000 Reservists have participated in 18 major exercises at locations such as Alaska, Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Panama, England, Canada, and Guam.

You asked what more needs to be done? Well, my highest priority at this juncture is to ensure that we program new aircraft for introduction into the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing. At present, the wing is getting aircraft such as F-4s, A-4Ms, and CH-53A/Ds from the active structure. We hope that in the 1990s we can provide F/A-18s, Ospreys, and other new and more modern aircraft. I'm not sure just how far we can go with brand new aircraft for our Reserves, but they know that I'm working the problem just as hard as I can.

I guess that my feelings about our Reserves can be summed up in a statement I have made many times during the past 10 years: They truly represent one-fourth of the combat power of our Corps.

General Paul X. Kelley  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
(Women in the Marine Corps)

Interview in Seapower  
November 1985

You still are adding to the numbers of women Marines? What is the ceiling for women Marines, and is there a limitation on their career opportunities?

KELLEY: As you probably know, one of the first studies we undertook when I assumed office was to look at the role of enlisted women Marines in the Corps. My guidance was simple—with certain restrictions, like no assignment to combat units and no transportation aboard Navy ships, take a hard look at all of our occupational fields to determine which ones an enlisted woman Marine could reasonably expect to be competitive in. Interestingly enough, we found

billets for 10,500, which is 2,000 over and above our previous goal.

Today we plan to have roughly 3,000 enlisted women Marines in the Fleet Marine Force and 7,500 in the supporting establishment. They will be able to serve in 35 or 39 current occupational fields, but will not serve in the infantry or artillery, on tanks and amphibious vehicles, or as pilots or naval flight officers.

From all indications I have received from the field, our enlisted women Marines now feel that they will be afforded fair and equitable career progression. I might add that a similar review is currently being conducted for our women Marine officers.



William Mayer, M.D.  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Health Affairs  
(Medical benefits)

"Defense Department Prescribes  
Cure for Ailing Health-Care System"  
*Atlanta Journal & Constitution*  
1 December 1985

The military health-care system is not ready for war.

If U.S. troops were involved in a conventional war in Europe today — or even if U.S. forces or civilians were the targets of a devastating terrorist attack — medical equipment and personnel shortages would enable scarcely three out of 10 wounded to receive prompt care.

What else is wrong with the system? Ask a substantial portion of the 10 million beneficiaries who are entitled to military health care, and they will tell you it also is not ready for peace.

Americans who looked forward to a lifetime of free health care in return for military service have found a system of overburdened medical facilities where care — especially outpatient primary care — too often is not accessible.

The \$12 billion-a-year military health-care system, the world's largest, handles 1 million admissions and 56 million outpatient visits a year in its more than 500 hospitals and clinics.

Military beneficiaries who turn to the private sector for care paid for by the Defense Department's self-insurance Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) (\$1.5 billion in 1986) find a complex, excessively costly and outdated reimbursement system.

It costs both beneficiaries and taxpayers more than it should; it's too slow in paying claims, and it often forces the patient to pay large chunks of out-of-pocket cash "up front" for medical care to avoid being turned away by civilian providers who won't put up with the frustration of fighting CHAMPUS for payment.

## Wartime and peacetime roles

The military health-care system is attempting to fulfill two vastly different important missions, and doing neither as well as it should.

Torn by competition for limited resources between its wartime and peacetime roles, and weighted down by a bureaucracy in which it can take up to 10 years to plan, design and build a hospital, it is a system badly in need of reform. For too long, the military medicine has been asked to do too much with too little.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger diagnosed the problems and outlined the Defense Department's prescription to make military health care better in a recent speech to commanders of Army, Navy and Air Force hospitals:

■ Restore the ability of the military to save lives during war.

■ Take advantage of the recent revolution in civilian health-care financing and delivery to pay less for whatever care is purchased from civilian providers.

■ Don't reduce or retreat from the moral and statutory obligation of the Department of Defense to provide quality health care to its beneficiaries.

To address medical readiness, the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs will make uniform determinations for all the services of the equipment, supplies and personnel needed for mobilization or response to a terrorist attack.

Medical training programs, which continue to churn out specialists not needed in support of a military mission at the expense of training more needed specialists, are to be redirected. Currently, we have only 32 percent of the active-duty surgeons needed in wartime, but we continue to train more doctors than we need in some other specialties.

Procurement of wartime deployable medical gear, including portable hospitals, has already been stepped up dramatically, and two 1,000-bed hospital ships (we have none now) are nearing delivery.

## Hospital decisions centralized

For the first time, decision-making on construction of all military hospitals will be centralized to make sure hospitals are built where the troops are and assure they don't exceed reasonable limits in size, function and cost.

Virtually all care for our 2.5 million active-duty members would continue to be provided in-house.

About two-thirds to three-quarters of the health-care needs of our other 7.5 million beneficiaries is now handled by military treatment facilities, with the rest obtained through our "back-up" CHAMPUS system from civilian providers.

There will be no substantial shift in the total proportion of care provided in-house to dependents of active duty personnel, retirees and their dependents.

But to relieve the overload and help us be better prepared, the kinds of services provided in-house at some locations may shift, increasing the availability of surgical



and more complex medical treatment services in military facilities.

We will establish more sensible patterns of health-care delivery that will allow our military treatment facilities to provide better access and greater beneficiary satisfaction in the types of services most relevant to wartime medical and surgical readiness, and also allow our beneficiaries who use civilian providers to receive quality care at significantly reduced costs.

### Civilian settings are being used

One of the most promising options is to place a large insurer at risk, through a competitive contract with the Defense Department, to provide care nationwide in high quality civilian settings to those beneficiaries who do not use military hospitals and clinics.

Under this arrangement, beneficiaries choosing to use the contractor's nationwide network of Preferred Provider Groups or Health Maintenance Organizations probably could consistently avoid all or a large part

William Mayer, M.D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (Medical benefits CONTINUED)

"Defense Department Prescribes Cure for Ailing Health-care System" Atlanta Journal & Constitution 1 December 1985

of the current CHAMPUS 20-25 percent co-payment requirement.

The Defense Department would use its substantial buying power to obtain the current health-care benefit at lower beneficiary and taxpayer cost than under the current CHAMPUS self-insurance system.

We must embark now on a partnership of excellence with civilian medicine.

General Richard G. Stilwell, (USA Ret.)  
Chairman, DoD Security Review Commission  
(Leadership)

Interview in Soldiers  
November 1985

### WHAT do you consider to be the most important qualities of leadership?

My last year in the service, while commander in chief in Korea, I received a letter from a graduating Korean cadet. He wanted my philosophy of soldiering. I told him two things.

The first was to adopt and adhere to an all-embracing concept of duty. The Army is a way of life. Professional soldiers have to recognize that duty has to be the lodestar of their entire lives. I told him that duty translates into mission, and mission translates into unit. Of fundamental importance is the ability of that team, consisting of the man in charge, the chain of command and all the other officers, non-commissioned officers, enlisted men and women. There is no room for personal ambition, although obviously there is room for personal performance.

The second thing was the leader's all-encompassing responsibility to those people entrusted to him, to his command. A leader owes superiors acceptance and discharge of lawful orders,

frank and full communication of things both good and bad. He owes them suggestions. He owes them understanding of the superior's problems. But he owes his subordinates far more than that, given his responsibilities for their readiness, their welfare and, under certain circumstances, their very lives. His soldiers are the beginning and end of his entire existence. The greatest satisfaction a leader can have is to earn and hold the respect of those under his command. That respect is engendered by competence, fairness, the ability to motivate by example, integrity and moral and physical courage.

That caring and commitment must be real. You may be able sometimes to fool your superiors and peers, but not your subordinates. They have a remarkable capacity to see through anything that suggests pretense or showmanship.

The personal attributes and professional qualifications of those who command boil down to a total commitment to duty and a total, undiluted sense of responsibility for the people under one's command.



# SELECTED STATEMENTS

Verne Orr, Secretary of the Air Force  
(Military retirement pay)

Remarks before the Air Force  
Association National Convention  
17 September 1985

Recently there was an article in the Washington Post by Howard Kurtz, who stated as follows: "There are three essential statistics to know about the military pension system. The average person retires at age 42, he receives half pay, and the program will cost the taxpayers \$18.3 billion next year." Now, there is only one statistic you need to know about Howard Kurtz, and that is he is wrong on all three counts. In the first place, the average person doesn't retire from the Air Force--the average person leaves long before retirement. Only 13 percent of our people stay in to retire--that's one out of eight. And if retirement is the great bonanza people talk about, how come about 87 percent of our smart young Americans don't think its good enough to stay around for? In the second place, as all of you know, the average retiree doesn't retire at half pay; he retires at half base pay, which is about 37 percent of pay. And in the third place, it does not cost the taxpayers \$18.3 billion. That is the amount we have to set aside in the Department of Defense budget, the only executive department budget that has to include retirement. But our actuaries, protected by 15 year terms, were born and bred in the dark ages of economics and allow us to plan on only 1.6 percent real interest over and above inflation. That's all we can take advantage of. Last year our investments earned us 8 percent over inflation, so it is not costing the taxpayers \$18 billion, although it is costing the Department of Defense that much.

James H. Webb, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
Reserve Affairs (Changes in military  
personnel since Vietnam)

Interview with the San Diego  
Union 13 October 1985

**Q: What changes do you see in the military as a result of Vietnam?**

**A:** First of all, you have a much more sophisticated officer corps. Having to go through, not only the difficulty of the way, but the conscious and agonizing reappraisal when the military became the whipping post for the nation's failure to win the war, the officer corps really analyzed and

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



SELECTED STATEMENTS

James H. Webb, Jr., Assistant Secretary  
of Defense for Reserve Affairs  
(Changes in military personnel since  
the Vietnam War, CONTINUED)

Interview with the  
San Diego Union  
13 October 1985

criticized itself to the point that I believe the senior leadership for many years to come is very strong and more familiar with the political process than it ever was before. We have a volunteer system, compliments of Vietnam. There was none of this anger at conscription until Vietnam started falling apart. Is that good or bad? I'm in contradiction with the administration here, but I believe conscription is healthy for the military. However, that doesn't in any way take away from the quality the of people we are able to get right now. We have good people now, although that wasn't true three, four or five years ago. We as a country are much more hesitant to inject our military into regions than we were before, and much more conscious of any type of military casualties than were before.

General John A. Wickham, Jr.  
Chief of Staff, US Army  
(Importance of mentoring young officers)

Interview in the Armed Forces  
Journal October 1985

"I'm urging our commanders to mentor the young people. I believe the most important legacy that any one of us leaves as a leader is the teaching of younger people, giving of experience to them. I challenge each battalion commander to sit down, one on one, every quarter with every lieutenant in his battalion and tell the lieutenant, 'Here are the good things you're doing. Here are areas where I think you can im-

prove. And let me give you my experience as a guide. It's not the last answer, but it may be helpful to you.' It's that kind of mentoring and that kind of atmosphere, I think, where you turn on young people, for them to be as bold and creative as they possibly can be. I'm trying to nurture that kind of environment.

One of the ways the Secretary and I do this is through oral guidance, as well as written guidance, to all brigadier general

and major general boards. I also approve written guidance to boards below that level. And part of the guidance that he and I have given deals with picking the leaders whom we feel provide for the greatest opportunity for growth of our younger officers and leaders. We're trying to pick leaders who are not careerists, who are not ruthless with regard to young people.

Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense  
(Medical readiness) 16 September 1985

Remarks before the DoD Health  
Conference, Springfield, Virginia

MEDICAL READINESS WILL BE THE PRIMARY CRITERION FOR DETERMINING THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF OUR MEDICAL CORPS, MEDICAL FACILITIES, AND TRAINING PROGRAMS. THE MECHANISM FOR ACCOMPLISHING THIS IS EQUALLY CLEAR: RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO THESE PURPOSES IS VESTED CENTRALLY IN THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS.

TO ACHIEVE OUR GOALS, WE ARE BEGINNING A TOP-TO-BOTTOM SURVEY OF ALL DoD HEALTH CARE FACILITIES AROUND THE WORLD. WE WILL DETERMINE PRIORITIES FOR THEIR REPLACEMENT OR REPAIR AS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE ARMED FORCES. THIS WILL END UNNEEDED MEDICAL CONSTRUCTION IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES AND CONSERVE OUR LIMITED RESOURCES FOR LOCATIONS ABROAD WHERE TROOPS ARE DEPLOYED. TOO OFTEN, THESE OVERSEAS MEDICAL RESOURCES HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO DECAY WHILE LARGE MEDICAL CENTERS IN CONUS HAVE FLOURISHED.

ANOTHER PRODUCT OF OUR CONCERN FOR MEDICAL READINESS WILL BE CHANGES BOTH IN THE SPECIALTY MIX OF OUR PERSONNEL AND IN THE TRAINING PROGRAMS THAT PRODUCE THEM. OUR CURRENT MEDICAL FORCE STRUCTURE DOES NOT MEET THE WARTIME NEEDS OF OUR PRIMARY MISSION --MEDICAL READINESS. WE ARE SERIOUSLY SHORT OF SURGEONS, NURSES, PSYCHIATRISTS, AND

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REFORM

General Paul X. Kelley  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
(Reform proposals)

Interview in Seapower  
November 1985

We know that you have some strong feelings about proposals to radically change the existing Joint Chiefs of Staff system. However, those proposals for change just won't go away. In your view, do any of the proposals now under consideration on the Hill contain elements which could strengthen the current system and therefore warrant being incorporated into it, or are they basically proposals that would weaken the system no matter how good the leadership?

KELLEY: I truly believe that many of the critics of the current JCS organization are behind the times. Under the able leadership of Jack Vessey [Gen. John W. Vessey, USA (Ret.), who retired last month as JCS chairman] a number of changes have been made, to the point where all of the current service chiefs now believe that our system is working well. That's not to say that we should relax on our oars and get complacent, for there is always room for improvement in any organization.

In answer to your specific question, there are several proposals floating around which concern me.

First, there is a notion that the members of the JCS should not be the service chiefs. No responsible person who truly understands the nature of our duties could ever make such a recommendation. Our duties are such that it would be virtually impossible to separate them between JCS and service responsibilities. The nature of war these days is so complex that the national command authorities need to hear advice from the Army chief of staff, the Air Force chief of staff, the chief of naval operations, and the commandant of the Marine Corps. The only one who can give truly meaningful advice is the service chief, not some remote four-star "eunuch" sitting in an ivory tower over the Pentagon. As you may have gathered, I believe that an arrangement whereby you have anyone but the service chief himself as a member of the JCS is a dumb idea.

I think the people who are endeavoring to give the chairman a chance to "speak for himself" don't understand the system. The chairman *does* speak for himself. The chairman has today as much authority as he really needs to do his job, and Jack Vessey would be the first to tell you that. What you want to ensure is that you don't create a system that destroys the corporate structure of the JCS. We all can speak for ourselves; the law provides for that. I can speak to the secretary of defense any time I want to speak to him. In point of fact, the chairman meets every day with the secretary of defense for about an hour. He speaks for himself, but he's always very careful to present any conflicting view from any of the chiefs as well. To suggest that we should emasculate the JCS as a corporate structure would be like General Motors saying that it was going to do away

with its board of directors, and its chairman was going to have complete decision-making authority, and only he would speak for General Motors.

President Eisenhower warned about the military/industrial complex. The strength of the current corporate system is that you have checks and balances. We all speak with equal voice, with the chairman having a little more than an equal voice. If you do away with the corporate structure, and put all that power in one guy, you could, in my opinion, move toward something like a military/industrial complex.

Any other aspects of the various reorganization proposals that particularly bother you?

KELLEY: The other area in the debate over whether there should be a reorganization of the Joint Chiefs that disturbs us all—and the chiefs are uniform in their disagreement—is the notion of having a deputy chairman. First of all, we don't know who he would be or what he would do. We all have examined the day-to-day duties of what a deputy chairman would do, and we came up with a big blank—a zero. We have in the past several years changed the system with regard to the acting chairman. Each of us now becomes the acting chairman for a quarter per year. This means that, when the chairman is out of town, we act on his behalf. This makes us much better service chiefs, because we understand the nature of the job of the chairman. It makes the secretary of defense a far better secretary of defense because he gets to know all the service chiefs in a little different environment. It allows the president, when we go to the White House for meetings as acting chairmen, to get to know all of his service chiefs.

I have yet—and I mean this sincerely—to hear a well-articulated argument as to why we need a deputy chairman. I have now had two three-month tours as acting chairman, and they have occurred during some very interesting times. I am a far better commandant of the Marine Corps for having had that experience. The system has worked well, and we truly don't understand what a deputy chairman would do.

Who is he? What would he do? The chairman has an assistant to the chairman who is a three-star general. And that has been the rank that has always worked within the interagency groups in Washington. That's one of his primary functions, to work with the other agencies. He is the chairman's guy, representing the JCS. If you elevate the position to the four-star level, all you have done is create another layer. I can see nothing but problems by having a permanent deputy chairman.



John F. Lehman  
Secretary of the Navy  
(Reform)

"JCS Reorganization Idea is Not  
New or Improved" in Navy Times  
16 December 1985

When in doubt — centralize. That's been the congressional approach to every defense problem for the past 25 years. Whether the trendy issue of the day was the missile gap, targeting in Vietnam, TFX [proposed all-service tactical fighter plane] or even health care, the answer since McNamara has always been to create another centralized staff.

Today, there are 10 central defense agencies employing 85,000 staffers, 30 linear feet of centralized military staff charts which require a magnifying glass to decipher, 1,152 linear feet of law library statutes and regulations governing the accumulated defense bureaucracy, and 44 congressional committees and subcommittees to make sure that the whole system is running just fine. Needless to say the result of such centralizing and bureaucratizing has been the opposite of improved management; it has resulted in bureaucratic bloat fast approaching gridlock.

And, even though successful private enterprise is today marching in the exact opposite direction — towards smaller staffs, greater line accountability, and removing management layers — the centralizers have advanced still another big government "solution" — this time to improve defense management and the quality of military advice. Their idea is to replace the Joint Chiefs with a single, dominant National Chief of Staff who would assume the advisory role that JCS now has and exercise command authority over our forces, as well.

That is neither a new idea, nor one that has improved with age. In its various manifestations, it is usually presented as a "reorganization," and under that name, has enlisted the interest of a number of Congressmen and others who genuinely care about national security and seek the improvement of our defenses.

But JCS "reorganization" would have quite a different effect. It would increase bureaucracy and layers of organization. It would decrease policy control by elected leadership. It would strip our national decision-making

process of needed information and expertise. And it would make no contribution whatsoever to the crucial question of efficient defense spending. In any other sphere of federal policy, such a trend would be seen for what it is: bad government. And bad government is bad for defense.

\* \* \* Today's five-member JCS still reflects the World War II lessons that led to its founding. In that conflict, the U.S. and its allies faced a powerful axis of enemies, possessing multiple offensive capabilities and a global reach. In planning our war effort, a single-track perspective on strategy, or an inadequate grasp of our actual capabilities, would have doomed us to failure. Thus, the JCS deliberately combined the expertise and knowledge of our different services: providing information and advice on land, sea, and air threats as well as U.S. capabilities — the essential groundwork for a sound national and allied strategy.

Moreover, the JCS system ensured that the authority to plan for the employment of our forces, under civilian direction, was lodged with those who had the responsibility to train, equip and maintain those forces — the service chiefs. As former Vice President Hubert Humphrey once noted in his opposition to the kind of reorganization now proposed, this reflects the "sound principle" of combining authority and responsibility — a principle of organization which is, "in every walk of life . . . an accepted and fundamental concept."

Today, our adversary has changed, but the necessity for truly joint military advice as well as fully responsible military planning has not. Yet, if the military's best professional views on national strategy are an essential part of national security decision-making, they are not the whole. In the American Republic, despite the apparent wishes of some of our defense experts, every decision that so seriously affects the future of our nation or the lives of our people — from the conduct of a military operation, to the composition of the defense

budget, to the structure of our global forces — must reflect the will of elected leaders, not just Pentagon whiz-kids or uniformed staffs. Thus, we come to what the JCS is not and should not be: the final arbiter of national strategy. Nor, in my experience, has any serving American military officer ever desired such a role. \* \* \*

Today, we see the spiritual progeny of the defense centralizers again advancing many of the old proposals. These range from making the Chairman of the JCS the equal of the Secretary of Defense on the National Security Council; to making him the supervisor of the operational commanders, with full powers in the chain of command; to giving him complete control of the Joint Staff, to anointing him as principal adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense. Other proposals, more explicit than most, completely abolish the title "Chairman" — which, after all, becomes a misnomer in all the schemes, since this officer no longer serves the Joint Chiefs as a whole. In these more explicit proposals, the new Defense Czar is called the "Chief of Staff of the National Command Authorities," the Joint Chiefs are disbanded, and a new "Council" of retired or soon-to-be-retired military officers — totally lacking touch with or accountability for the day-to-day realities of military capability, much less having any responsibility for our forces — is created to pontificate on national strategy.

Consider proposals to make a single senior officer — title him what you will — the principal military adviser the President and Secretary of Defense. Such a scheme is intended to "streamline" advice, lessening the influence of service points of view. But suppressing the full range of ideas and information the Joint Chiefs provide will isolate civilian authorities from the critical issues and thus hamper, rather than enhance, wise decision-making.

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...the Navy  
...continued

"JCS Reorganization Idea is Not  
New or Improved" in Navy Times  
16 December 1985

...of these schemes  
...to reduce civil-  
...of the military and  
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...of differing per-  
...options he would  
...with one military view—  
...the new super-chairman.  
...military officer would be  
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The current JCS provides  
...protections against this  
...the history of ex-  
...with single chief of  
...in other nations is  
...of failures. The German  
...for example, was  
...for its develop-  
...expertise—but  
...staff officers.  
...to handle com-  
...and proved a di-  
...strategy. Mil-  
...two World Wars.

Japan's General General  
...with field war  
...operational results  
...civilian leadership,  
...by purely uniformed  
...failed to provide  
...and even  
...between the army  
...In World War I, Brit-  
...chief of staff Sir Wil-  
...was able to sup-  
...military alternatives to  
...policy of attri-  
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There was proposed creating  
...in the United

States do not stop with the advi-  
...power that would lead to a  
...of this record of disaster.  
...contemplate giving the  
...the power to serve in the  
...of command between civil-  
...authorities and this coun-  
...operational commanders,  
...from Europe to the Pacific, in  
...land, sea and air combat. The Unit-  
...States has strongly resisted  
...anointment of a single su-  
...military chief, and for  
...more than one reason.

First, our system of operation-  
...command is wisely premised on  
...the need effectively and force-  
...to integrate the services in  
...joint operations, but to  
...lodge this power in the joint the-  
...commander in the location  
...where the action takes place, not  
...within the bureaucratic safety  
...of the Pentagon. In theory the cur-  
...rent system places authority  
...where it should be—in the hands  
...of those to be held accountable.  
...In practice more can be done to  
...give those theater CINCs more  
...control over their service compo-  
...nents. To interpose a super-  
...chairman and his general staff in  
...Washington between the CINCs  
...and the Secretary of Defense and  
...President, adds yet another lay-  
...er of bureaucracy to the chain of  
...command and encourages sec-  
...ond-guessing by remote, over-ea-  
...ger Pentagon staffers who lack  
...both the on-scene judgment and  
...the ultimate responsibility for  
...our forces.

Moreover, enabling the "prin-  
...cipal adviser" to civilian authori-  
...ties to serve simultaneously in  
...the chain of command severs the  
...direct, objective lines of com-  
...munication and responsibility be-

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John F. Lehman  
Secretary of the Navy  
(Reform...CONTINUED)

"JCS Regorganzation Idea is Not  
New or Improved" in Navy Times  
16 December 1985

tween the operational commanders and their civilian superiors — diminishing necessary control.

And finally, in those instances where the President, as Constitutional Commander-in-Chief, does indeed choose to delegate authority to a Washington-based commander, his ability to do so should never be bound by inflexible provisions mandating the choice of a specific officer.

This whole scheme is speciously referred to by proponents as a simple "substitution" of the Chairman for the corporate Joint Chiefs, who currently manage the Secretary of Defense's channel of communications. But any ensign can tell you there is a significant difference between serving in the chain of command and communicating someone else's orders.

Hand in hand with these proposals is the recommendation that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or the "National Chief-of-Staff," should possess exclusive control of the Joint Staff. As Congress remarked in 1958, "Were this to happen, it would constitute a long, and probably final, step toward an overall Armed Forces general staff" — a type of organization whose fundamental flaws have already here been noted.

But there are other problems with making the Joint Staff the personal preserve of a single officer. Rather than ensuring that the staff provides genuinely joint perspectives to its Chief, the structure of his authority over personnel and promotion decisions ensures that the staff will reflect his personal perspective. By

controlling the resource of joint staff assistance, only the Chief will be able to offer fully staffed authoritative recommendations; the service chiefs, promoted to those jobs because they have proven that they are the best the service has to offer, are relegated to mere kibitzers under such a system — of considerably less power than the anonymous 2,000 members of the new general staff.

And as the Joint Staff has grown every year so too will the new general staff grow; an inexorable growth in Pentagon deskmen that will be recapitulated in the staffs of the various entities that must report to or consult with this new bureaucratic center. Then, as central staffs grow, responsibility and expertise will diminish: "bureaucracy" will become even more of a speciality than it already is, displacing the real business of the military — skill in combat. In all, it is a massive move in the wrong direction.

Behind this conglomeration of bad ideas lie three real issues: joint strategy, defense management, and military spending. But joint strategy is not advanced by removing from the deliberative arena those who have the greatest expertise in operations and the capabilities of our services. Nor is defense management advanced by adding new layers of bureaucracy. And civilian leaders, in the executive and Congress, cannot make wise spending decisions without access to the alternatives and ideas that the services provide.

Those who are directly responsible for the United States' defense must go in a different direction. In making joint strategy,

we must emphasize genuine operational expertise in every service — stress strategic thinking in our war colleges — and most important, continue to put national strategy at the forefront of consideration by those who bear the ultimate authority and responsibility: America's elected leadership.

In managing the Defense Department, we must slash the number of desk-warmers in non-accountable central agencies and staffs, and return authority to those who can be held accountable: in management affairs, the services, under the appointed, politically responsible Secretaries of the Military Departments. In operational affairs, the responsible commanders of our combatant forces, whose strict accountability for their actions should be paralleled by real authority to plan and execute.

Finally, with respect to military spending and procurement, we must adopt the applicable lessons of private industry, and unlearn the lessons of big government. Nothing can substitute for the vigorous competition of ideas that lays the basis for sound decisions and efficient programming.

Caspar V  
(Europe  
25 Sept

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Three wings are shown in the illustration. The first wing is the most common and is the most effective. The second wing is the most common and is the most effective. The third wing is the most common and is the most effective.

A: I can't even remember the Berlin Wall's fall. It happened so long ago.

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SELECTED STATEMENTS

FOREIGN POLICY  
(ASIA & THE PACIFIC)

Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense  
(Europe v. the Pacific)  
25 September 1985

Interview with Peter Krogh  
of the Public Broadcasting  
System

Q: Do you see us, as others do, that our strategic interests are moving incrementally away from Europe and in the direction of Asia; that as Asia becomes more of an economic force, as it develops other interests for the United States, that we will be looking and deploying more in Asia than on the continent of Europe?

A: No, I don't think it's a comparative thing at all. I think that we can't ever move away from a very close association and alliance with the western countries of Europe. We can't live in a world in which Europe is overrun. But, the Pacific is an enormously important part of the world. It's importance to the United States has been to some extent, I think, either over looked or not sufficiently appreciated. It's not a question of either/or, it's a question of bringing the Pacific into proper perspective while maintaining the kinds of relationships and commitments we have in Europe. The Pacific is a very vital part of America's future. They're our largest trading partner in many ways. The strategic importance of them is overwhelming. We will certainly have, without any question, the importance of the Pacific before us for all the rest of our lives and many generations to come. That doesn't mean we're giving up Europe.

President Ronald Reagan  
(US interests in the Pacific  
and in Europe)

Responses to questions submitted  
by Le Figaro  
26 September 1985

Q. The interest of the United States for the Pacific nations is more and more obvious and geopolitically somehow natural. Does this mean that in the future, Europe and Africa have a chance of losing the major role they have had in American diplomacy since World War II?

*The President.* The NATO alliance remains the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. It not only embodies a fundamental security interest; it represents a community of moral and political values. It is no accident that one of America's most durable peacetime alliances is with our fellow democracies of the Atlantic world.

The Pacific nations are indeed growing in importance in political, security, and especially economic terms, but our strengthened relations with Asia have not diminished our traditional ties to Europe. Indeed, a major

foreign policy accomplishment of this administration is its success in encouraging the industrialized democracies in Europe, Asia, and North America to cooperate in developing global, not parochial, solutions to our common economic and security problems.

The United States has sought not merely to strengthen our bilateral ties with Asia and Europe but to encourage greater interaction among all members of the community of advanced industrialized democracies. This new and more cohesive allied consensus has been in evidence in the economic summit meetings, where the leaders of the seven largest industrialized democracies of North America, Europe, and Asia meet to discuss a vast range of political, economic, and security problems.



General John R. Galvin, USA  
Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command  
(Role of SOUTHCOM)

Interview in Armed Forces Journal  
December 1985

**AFJ:** It sounds as if the threat here is unique compared to other unified commands. How would you describe your specific military responsibility here, and how is it different from those in other commands?

**Gen. Galvin:** Well, I don't know the situation in all those commands well, but I know Europe. Europe is an industrialized and relatively stable entity where we are faced with a great threat, the Warsaw Pact, and we oppose that with NATO. We ourselves contribute 400,000 soldiers, so we have a gigantic effort there. For example, as a corps commander there, I commanded 83,000 soldiers. Here, I command under 10,000 Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines combined. My whole Marine contingent here in Southern Command HQ is 13 Marines.

**AFJ:** What percentage of that 10,000 are combat-ready troops?

**Gen. Galvin:** The majority of them are not maneuver battalions.

We used to have a mechanized brigade here in Panama. We have changed that because our job is different. Instead of providing a combat fighting force for defense, we are providing the kind of unit that we can draw on to assist others in something that is not combat.

For example, where that brigade was, we now have a signal battalion, a medical battalion, a logistical battalion, a special forces battalion, a light infantry battalion, an airborne battalion, and an intelligence battalion. That set-up provides a pool from which I can draw small teams for training, assistance, and professional interface with military in the countries of Latin America.

We are not sending fighting soldiers to these countries. We are sending people who are developers and instructors—people who can provide what we like to call the professional interface.

A lot of people question the military-to-military interface. They say, "What does it do for us? We sent Somoza to West Point. What did that do for us?" It is true that in the past our military-to-military interface wasn't always good. That was because we didn't have or didn't exercise any influence over the countries in Latin America in terms of simple things like public opinion.

Public opinion is a very powerful force, especially when it influences the US Congress, and then Congress exercises its right to specify what kind of assistance is going to be given to countries down here. That gives us clout, and clout is one of the big changes that I have seen.

Also, for the first time in this century, we are wearing the white hats in Latin America, especially in Central America. These people see what Cuba is, and they see what Nicaragua is, and they are afraid. They want our help more than they did before. Therefore, our military-to-military interfaces tend to be more productive.

General John R. Galvin, USA  
Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command  
(SOUTHCOM's mission)

Interview in Armed Forces Journal  
December 1985

**AFJ:** If the problems here are primarily political and economic, does SOUTHCOM have a military mission?

**Gen. Galvin:** Yes, it does. The first is the defense of the Panama Canal in conjunction with the defense forces of Panama. That's the primary mission. In addition to that, our mission is the military interface under the Alliance from the Rio Treaty. We are the military side of the OAS. We have a program of military assistance and

cooperation with just about every country in Latin America. We try to assist in providing military equipment or military training based on an analysis of the country by the ambassador and the country team. In each country, we support the ambassador in his program.

One of the very important things that I do down here as a military officer is serve as an example of what the military is like in a democratic country like the United States. The first thing is that it is subordinate to the civilian leadership. It always has been.



General John R. Galvin, USA  
Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command  
(Contras)

Interview in Armed Forces Journal  
December 1985

**AFJ:** What do you think of the Contras in Nicaragua? Do they have a chance?

**Gen. Galvin:** I think that this insurgency, the democratic resistance, is different from any of the ones that I have seen before. Normally, an insurgency takes years and years to build an infrastructure before it becomes truly a fighting organization, one that has strong political influence in the country. Here we have a group of people that started from absolute scratch in about 1980.

It is almost as if the bell rings for the first round, you are flat on your back in the middle of the ring, and the other guy is standing over you. The Contras started from there. They had no infrastructure. They had no logistic support. They had no strong ideological doctrine. They had no nothing, you might say. What they did have was a complete disappointment with what they saw come about in their country. They had hoped for a democracy after a long period of totalitarianism, and they didn't get it. And, they felt strongly enough about it to come up off their backs and fight.

They are now approaching 20,000 strong. They have doubled over the past year from 8,000, with no official support and very little unofficial support from the United States.

The level of contact between the Sandinistas and the democratic resistance is high in the country. My guess would be that there are more than 100 shooting contacts every month. There is all kinds of criticism that they don't fight well. I don't know about how well they fight. But to me, 100

contacts a month is pretty hard fighting.

It's also said they don't have an ideology. Well, one of our interesting characteristics as people who love democracy, is that we never consider it an ideology. We consider blathering about democracy a kind of propaganda. They were called Contras from the start because they are against something. But, they are against not being democratic.

They are also said to be disorganized, not able to support themselves, and to depend on sanctuaries, and so forth. I think again that we have to remember that there was not some 15 years of preparation of infrastructure. By the way, after the Sandinistas had been in Nicaragua for 15 years, their strength, even when they overcame Somoza, was only 5,000. The Contras are three times as big as that in the country. Does the democratic resistance have the capability of exerting political power for change in Nicaragua? I think not only that they do, but I think that that is the way change has to come. We are going to be standing by to protect our allies, but we hope that we will not be involved militarily at all in Nicaragua.

**AFJ:** How much of the Contras' success do you think they owe to the US military?

**Gen. Galvin:** Practically none. You know, I have never had anything to do with them, never met or talked to any of those people, so there are a lot of things that probably I don't know. But, one thing I do know is the American military has done absolutely nothing in support of the democratic resistance.



How can this crisis be resolved? The Central American nations, together with their nearest neighbors, the Conadora group, have subscribed to a Document of 21 Objectives.

and simultaneous implementation of the 21 objectives. We welcome the resumption of talks next month in Panama and hope they lead to a final agreement. Conadora is the best forum for pursuing a settlement.

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State  
(US must support its ideals abroad)  
(printed in the New York Times, 3 Oct 85)

Remarks before the National  
Committee on American Foreign  
Policy

The political reality of our time is that America's strategic interests require that we support our ideals abroad.

Consider the example of Nicaragua. We oppose the efforts of the Communist leaders in Nicaragua to consolidate a totalitarian regime on the mainland of Central America — on both moral and strategic grounds. Few in the United States would deny today that the Managua regime is a moral disaster. The Communists have brutally repressed the Nicaraguan people's yearning for freedom and self-government, the same yearning that had earlier made possible the overthrow of the Somoza tyranny.

But there are some in this country who would deny that America has a strategic stake in the outcome of the ideological struggle under way in Nicaragua today. Can we not, they ask, accept the existence of this re-

gime in our hemisphere even if we find its ideology abhorrent? Must we oppose it simply because it is Communist?

The answer is we must oppose the Nicaraguan dictators not simply because they are Communists, but because they are Communists who serve the interests of the Soviet Union and its Cuban client, and who threaten peace in this hemisphere. The facts are indisputable. Had the Communists adopted even a neutral international posture after their revolution, had they not threatened their neighbors, our friends and allies in the region, with subversion and aggression, had they not lent logistical and material support to the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in El Salvador — in short, had they not become instruments of Soviet global strategy, the United States would have had a less clear strategic interest in opposing them.



## SELECTED STATEMENTS

### FOREIGN POLICY (MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA)

Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary  
of Defense for International Security Affairs  
(Favors arms sales to Jordan)

"The Strategic Value of Arming  
Hussein" in New York Times  
2 October 1985

In the wake of President Reagan's decision to go forward with a package of defensive arms for Jordan, searching questions are being raised in Congress about Jordan's readiness to make peace with Israel, about its trustworthiness with advanced technologies and about its need for new American arms in the years ahead. Lobbyists for Israel, Jordan and the American defense industries alike are pressing partisan arguments on behalf of their respective special interests.

President Reagan cannot, however, take a parochial view of what is in fact a strategic issue and one that involves significant American interests. The Middle East peace process is sometimes characterized as an inconsequential diplomatic game, to be followed or shunned at Washington's whim. Nothing could be further from the truth. Progress toward Arab-Israeli peace, or lack of it, is intimately related to the prospects for unrest, armed conflict and the spread of Soviet power in the region. \* \* \* \*

King Hussein has been working assiduously during the past year to steer the Palestinian movement toward a negotiated peace settlement. The absence of any redress for the political aspirations of the Palestinian people has been one factor underlying its 37 years of armed hostility

toward Israel. In the absence of a solution, the 1.2 million inhabitants of the occupied territories — a notably quiescent population until now — are increasingly susceptible to the appeal of rejectionist Palestinian leaders and, as a result, increasingly prone to violence against Israelis.

The cycle of violence could easily spread to the Palestinians living in Jordan. When the Palestine Liberation Organization threatened just that in 1970, King Hussein and the Jordan armed forces drove the organization out. The King has put forward his peace initiative precisely so that this time bomb will no longer threaten the existence of his nation. Jordan's diplomacy is a natural complement to its strategic and military outlook.

A rash of terrorist attacks, probably emanating from extremist groups in Syria, have been carried out against Jordanian officials and property in recent months. Jordan continues nevertheless to press its effort to initiate Jordanian-Palestinian peace negotiations with Israel. Despite Syria's adamant opposition, the Jordanians are cracking down hard on the terrorists they apprehend. Every step Jordan takes toward peace with Israel will virtually guarantee greater tension with Syria. Here is a cycle of violence for which

Jordan has no diplomatic antidote — only the deterrence of its armed forces.

At present, the Jordanian Air Force probably could not hold off a Syrian attack for more than a few days, perhaps less. Jordanian ground forces would put up determined and capable resistance, but Syria's air power would operate with relative ease against Jordanian armored units and installations. Jordan could, however, probably deter such an attack entirely with a modest modernization in its air defenses, including interceptor aircraft and mobile air defense systems. Israel would then be spared the Hobson's choice of either intervening in a war between Arabs or standing by as its Soviet-armed enemies took control of its longest front.

Jordan's military needs new weapons to redress its acute vulnerability to attack from the air. King Hussein and his senior military commanders, most of whom have been trained in the United States and are well-known to their American counterparts, will do whatever they must to rectify this glaring weakness. The United States should maintain its 35-year arms supply role in Jordan, or be prepared in the years ahead to endure a steady, measurable decline in our ability to pursue basic American policy objectives in the Middle East.



secure agreements at these lower levels and are parity at these lower levels and are thoroughly verifiable. Also, as we approach budget time for next year, we may want to consider a supplemental for this year or more than 3 percent growth next year to compensate in specific ways for these violations. \* \* \*

In Geneva, you will almost certainly come under great pressure to do three things that would limit severely your options for responding to Soviet violations:

One is to agree to continue to observe SALT II.

The second is to agree formally to limit S.D.I. research, development,

violations by referring to the "importance that both sides attach to compliance."

Any or all of these Soviet proposals, if agreed to, would sharply restrict the range of responses to past and current Soviet violations available to us. A pledge to continue to adhere to SALT II, even though the Soviets are violating it, could make it difficult, if not impossible, to do other things we should do to make up for their violations. We can, of course, continue to observe parts of SALT II, at your option, but a pledge to continue observing it all could put rigid constraints on your ability to respond to Soviet viola-

U.S.S.R. warheads by the early 1990's.

Any agreement to limit the S.D.I. program according to a narrow and, I believe, wrong interpretation of the ABM Treaty — a treaty which the Soviets are violating under any interpretation — would diminish significantly the prospects that we will succeed in bringing our search for a strategic defense to fruition.

Communiqué or other language that enables the Soviets to appear equally committed to full compliance — even as they continue to enlarge their pattern of violations — will make the difficult task of responding to those violations even more problematic.

Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense  
(What do the Soviets want)

Interview in US News & World  
Report 25 November 1985

**Q** Mr. Secretary, do you have any sense of what the minimum objectives of the Soviet Union will be at the Geneva summit?

**A** I think they want to stop our Strategic Defense Initiative at all costs, and I agree with the President that this would be a tragic mistake.

I suppose the Soviets would like to do what they've always done in the past: Get agreements to things that they already want to do. That has been the pattern in the past and it's worked quite well for them because we have been anxious to have agreements.

**Q** What sort of agreement do you think the Soviet Union has in mind?

**A** The Soviets, in working on an arms proposal, can say right now in 1985 that by 1991 they want to reduce to a

thousand numbers of warheads. What they may have in mind is that they want to modernize and make these warheads even more accurate than they are now. They know perfectly well that they can accomplish that, step by step, down to the last comma in 1991 or whatever.

On the other hand, we have a system under which we could make a similar agreement, and we haven't the faintest idea what we can have tomorrow or the next day or 1988 or '90 or '91. We've been debating the MX missile for 12 years now, but we still haven't deployed it.

So this is a major difference. They know what they want, and they know they can get it. We often don't have an agreed idea of what we actually want, and even if we did, we have no ability to guarantee that we can come up with it.



Letter to President Reagan,  
printed in the New York Times of  
16 November 1985

Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense  
(Advice on negotiating position)

Also, such a pledge would require us to dismantle far larger numbers of modern weapons than the Soviets over the near-term \* \* \* \* \*  
Essentially, the United States would have to dismantle between 1,320 and 2,240 MIRVed ballistic missile warheads by 1991, whereas the Soviets would have to dismantle only about 556 ballistic missiles, of which just 112 would be MIRV systems. Because Soviet modernization processes can go on, the net effect would be thousands of additional U.S.S.R. warheads by the early 1990's.  
Any agreement to limit the S.D.I. program according to a narrow and, I believe, wrong interpretation of the ABM Treaty — a treaty which the Soviets are violating under any interpretation — would diminish significantly the prospects that we will succeed in bringing our search for a strategic defense to fruition.  
Communiqué or other language that enables the Soviets to appear equally committed to full compliance — even as they continue to enlarge their pattern of violations — will make the difficult task of responding to those violations even more problematic.

and testing to only that research allowed under the most restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty, even though you have determined that a less restrictive interpretation is justified legally. The Soviets doubtless will seek assurances that you will continue to be bound to such tight limits on S.D.I. development and testing that would discourage the Congress from making any but token appropriations.

Third, the Soviets may propose communiqué or other language that obscures their record of arms control violations by referring to the "importance that both sides attach to compliance."

Any or all of these Soviet proposals, if agreed to, would sharply restrict the range of responses to past and current Soviet violations available to us. A pledge to continue to adhere to SALT II, even though the Soviets are violating it, could make it difficult, if not impossible, to do other things we should do to make up for their violations. We can, of course, continue to observe parts of SALT II, at your option, but a pledge to continue observation, but a pledge to continue observing it all could put rigid constraints on your ability to respond to Soviet violations.

The Soviet violations put us in a particularly vulnerable and dangerous position when these violations are compared with the sharp reductions in our requests for Strategic Defense funding. We all feel that it is essential to move as rapidly and effectively as possible on S.D.I. because Soviet violations do give them an advantage which makes it very difficult for us to maintain a deterrence balance with them.  
Of course, their violations also constitute a powerful argument for getting the deepest possible cuts in nuclear arms by agreement. If we can secure agreements that bring us to parity at these lower levels and are thoroughly verifiable. Also, as we approach budget time for next year, we may want to consider a supplemental for this year or more than 3 percent growth next year to compensate in specific ways for these violations. \* \* \*  
In Geneva, you will almost certainly come under great pressure to do three things that would limit severely your options for responding to Soviet violations:  
One is to agree to continue to observe SALT II.  
The second is to agree formally to limit S.D.I. research, development,

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(What do the Soviets want)

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# CURRENT NEWS SPECIAL EDITION



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## BMD and US Limited Strategic Employment Policy

Kevin N. Lewis

After a decade of relative dormancy, the question of whether to deploy antimissile defenses has reemerged as the subject of intense debate. Several factors account for new interest in active defense; perhaps most important are President Reagan's 1983 call for an advanced 'Strategic Defense Initiative' and widespread concern with the future viability of the land-based ICBM force.

Before any key decisions on active strategic defense are made, it is necessary to compare the benefits of US defensive deployments with a number of military problems that might materialize if the USSR were to follow suit with a new ABM of its own. To date, most such cost-benefit evaluations have focussed on major SIOP-level operations.<sup>1</sup> To the extent that the implications of an energetic US-Soviet ABM competition for limited nuclear employment policy have been reviewed, the political turmoil that might follow from the neutralization of the independent European deterrent arsenals and similar diplomatic complications have been in the spotlight. While these effects will figure centrally in our defensive deployment calculations, any near-term US ABM decisions should also pay heed to the consequences of an expanded Soviet ABM system for US and NATO planning for *small, theater conflict-oriented strategic attacks*.<sup>2</sup> Since ballistic missiles are now the instrument of choice for such limited strategic strikes, expanded Soviet ABM deployments could partially undermine the current Western nuclear strategy of 'Flexible Response'.

True, the collapse of one component of our flexible response strategy is just one issue to be considered in our ultimate decision on active missile defense. Moreover, we can influence only some of the most important variables: in particular, the Soviets may deploy new missile defenses no matter what we do. Even so, some probability exists that Soviet abrogation of existing ABM treaty restrictions will be influenced by US BMD decisions. Given the strategic importance of our limited attack capability, continuing restraint of certain defensive initiatives may, depending on other factors, be a wise US policy over the near term. The following sections will consider the adverse military repercussions of BMD deployments. Given those costs, restraint in BMD deployment might be one leading determinant of our ultimate strategic modernization plan.

### The Evolution of a Strategy of Flexible Nuclear Employment

To set the stage, it is useful to ask what role limited nuclear attacks play in the West's overall deterrent concept. For at least two decades, many Western

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strategists have believed that credible deterrence depends in part on the availability of selective nuclear options. A US war plan containing only an all-out blow against a full spectrum of enemy targets may have been tolerable in the 1950s when the USSR could not retaliate utterly against the US and when the willingness to devote sufficient resources to conventional defense was nowhere in sight. But by the later 1950s – with a survivable Soviet intercontinental force on the horizon, with a series of limited military crises brewing, and with the discrediting of the dogma that non-nuclear defense could never be a feasible Western defense option – it began to seem to many that a new strategy was needed.

New nuclear plans, some suggested, should be designed in part to support specific military objectives, as opposed to attempting to deter Communist aggression by threatening single-action massive attacks should certain 'trip-wires' be sprung. Analysts pointed out that a massive deterrent strategy increasingly lacked credibility. The Kennedy Administration agreed with these advocates. Secretary McNamara noted:<sup>3</sup>

Even if very substantial exchanges of nuclear weapons were to occur, the damage suffered by the belligerents would vary over wide ranges, depending upon the targets that are hit. If both sides were to confine their attacks to important military targets, damage, while high, would nevertheless be significantly lower than if urban-industrial areas were also attacked. . . . In light of these findings the United States has developed its plans in order to permit a variety of strategic choices. We have also instituted a number of programs which will enable the Alliance to engage in a controlled and flexible nuclear response in the event that deterrence should fail.

The transition from Massive Retaliation to a strategy based on employment flexibility spawned a number of painful political and military controversies. But eventually, and despite the fact that it has never been clear exactly how the use of nuclear weapons could reliably support practical politico-military ends (particularly a speedy end to fighting on acceptable terms), the need for strategic flexibility none the less came to be widely accepted, if only as a kind of insurance policy. For as repellent as the notion of 'nuclear warfighting' may be, in consideration of the alternatives, logic must triumph over visceral impressions. While the heart may reject the desirability of any kind of strategy that could include attempts to use nuclear weapons in a controlled way, the head tends to prevail, since if the worse were to come to the worst in a major conventional or tactical nuclear war, the President simply must have choices other than to say either 'stop' or 'go' to the strategic forces.<sup>4</sup> In the early 1960s, then, a few 'flexible options' were drawn up.

Progress in designing truly limited attacks was, of course, slow. In 1974, for example, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger reported that the SIOP still consisted of a collection of 'massive preplanned strikes in which one would be dumping literally thousands of weapons on the Soviet Union'. Indeed, the *smallest* option available during this period is said to have included some one thousand weapons.<sup>5</sup>

Eventually, policy initiatives and analytic work was to lead to new SIOPs that included highly refined counter-military options. In addition, small counter-military strike options were approved for non-SIOP-committed US strategic forces.<sup>6</sup> And SACEUR's NATO nuclear plan began to feature some small attack packages of its own, known as SEPs.<sup>7</sup>

At the same time, pertinent new military capabilities were also acquired, primarily as a result of US MIRV programs. Indeed, simply the availability of more sophisticated forces to some extent motivated greater exploration of new option possibilities, but other factors were at work as well. Anxiety over the implications of emerging US-Soviet nuclear parity was a powerful stimulant to limited option planners.<sup>8</sup> Given both sides' ability to escalate in lock-step fashion, it would, many thought, be prudent to insert as many extra rungs as possible into the hypothetical 'escalation ladder' said to connect the onset of a superpower conflict with a total catastrophe. Within this framework, the execution of tailored options would hopefully force the Soviets to reappraise their inimical goals by dramatizing the risks of continued conflict.

At the same time, many analysts contended that small attacks should accomplish useful military tasks, thereby further disabusing our adversaries of the notion that they could gain their campaign goals at an acceptable price. Deliberately constrained attacks would try to influence the progress of some aspects of an ongoing battle as well as signal the West's resolve to go as far as was necessary to terminate a war on acceptable terms.

Thus has selective nuclear employment become a pivot of Western defense over the past decade and a half.<sup>9</sup> But not only has NATO's entire defense strategy – as it relates to forces and planning for conventional, limited nuclear, and general nuclear war – come to revolve around the twin devices of appropriate military response and threats of further escalation. In addition, if there exists a 'balance' of limited nuclear attack capabilities, parity or, ideally, a NATO advantage must exist for two reasons. The first relates to the theoretical deterrent role small nuclear attacks are supposed to play in compensating for the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority. Second, on the assumption that the Soviets will start a war to achieve some set of tangible military ends, small yet effective *theater-oriented* attacks would probably be the best deterrent to continuing Soviet aggression and, possibly, unchecked escalation.<sup>10</sup> In this way, a strategy of flexible nuclear employment might at the same time enhance deterrence and, should deterrence fail, serve as an insurance policy against extreme and unacceptable results: namely conventional fiasco and global holocaust.

#### The Difference Between Planning for Large and Limited Attacks

As the US and its NATO allies assimilated the flexible response strategy, planners on both sides of the Atlantic developed substantially richer option menus. As noted, what has made some of the more recent options quite different from those of the 1960s and 1970s is, among other things, their very small size. As Secretary Schlesinger noted in 1974, 'what the [refined strategy] does is give the President . . . the option of limiting strikes down to a few



weapons'.<sup>11</sup> It has also been said that some offensive packages consist of just 'three to five weapons'.<sup>12</sup>

As new plans became operational, the ICBM began to emerge as the primary system for limited strategic contingencies for several reasons. The mix of accuracy, penetrativity, and yield of MINUTEMAN III meant that option objectives could be destroyed with relatively high confidence and reduced collateral damage. Missile weapons could be on target promptly and so could exploit ephemeral tactical situations and/or instantly communicate the aims of a US strike to Soviet leadership. The ICBM force could be closely controlled and retargeted as needed, thanks to such technical advances as the Command Data Buffer. And the launch of a single MINUTEMAN would not place other weapons at risk. Proposals were even advanced to set aside and modify some MINUTEMEN as an 'elite' Limited Nuclear Option force.

Whatever the characteristics of the weapon involved in the preparation of limited nuclear options might be, different principles and rules than those that would ordinarily govern the creation of large strikes obviously must be used. A large attack seeks to inflict some overall statistical level of damage on the enemy in order to destroy some important aspect of his ability to sustain his war effort. Damage levels are commonly described in terms of the fraction of all targets (or fraction of the value represented by a collection of targets) surviving or destroyed,<sup>13</sup> for a variety of reasons. First, in a massive nuclear strike, so much damage would be done that it would not generally matter whether particular targets survived.<sup>14</sup> Second, consistent statistical measures of success make it easier to coordinate thousands of weapons arriving on a highly disciplined schedule. Third, this approach derives from traditional techniques for assessing the often poorly understood effects of large-scale bombing campaigns. Fourth, in a two-sided general war, our communications, reconnaissance, and other capabilities may degrade to the point where we would not be able to put to much practical use a deluge of attack assessment and other data.

In limited attack planning, the situation is very different. The role that general purpose forces can play in an ongoing fight would not have been dissipated in an orgy of nuclear violence. Enough eyes, ears, and other resources would be intact that we would continue to have considerable understanding of, and control over, the ongoing course of events. Since some hope would remain that war might be ended short of mutual disaster, it might very well pay to spare many kinds of targets, whether the purpose in so doing was to demonstrate restraint or hold valuable 'hostages'.

We clearly would not, under these circumstances, unleash a small attack in order to accomplish some grand strategic design. Instead, we would deliberately constrain the attack to serve always limited – but often conflicting – ends. On the one hand, our strike should do something useful.<sup>15</sup> Since we would be doing our best to, say, defeat a Soviet invasion somewhere, strategic strikes might seek to support our conventional forces. On the other hand, a small attack has to be unambiguously seen as such. Yet once a decision to use nuclear weapons in support of theater objectives is made, there are understandable upward pressures on attack size. After all, if the destruction of

five enemy air bases or divisions would shore up an unraveling theater position somewhat, a hammer-blow against fifty could potentially decide the war. As their rhetoric would lead us to believe, moreover, if there is a chance that the Soviets would respond to a deliberately limited strike with a 'no holds barred' counter-blow, then cannot a strong case be made that NATO should, at the very least, get in the first comprehensive attack?

Such tendencies obviously must be suppressed or opportunities to retard escalation may be lost. In fact, very firm ground rules for small attack planning must be laid out. Arriving at such rules is clearly as arbitrary a task as it is an essential one. For instance, those rules will have to reflect a veritable multitude of unpredictable scenario features. Suspended over many other uncertainties are the facts that we have always lacked a very clear understanding of the practical side of 'nuclear warfighting' and that we may not have very much time to modify canned plans as the specifics of a limited use contingency became clear. And to make things even more confusing, our guidance must also anticipate possible Soviet responses to an attack.<sup>16</sup>

Here, then, is a grim picture indeed. No amount of preparation could ever change the fact that planning for selective nuclear employment is fraught with major uncertainties and grave risks. The uncertainties are so vast that it is by no means apparent that the right constellation of factors would ever combine to favor resort to small attacks. But if the worse comes to the worst and NATO's default options were reduced to touching off a global nuclear mêlée or accepting conventional defeat, we have to act on the assumption that small strikes *can* be carried out effectively. As Secretary Schlesinger put it:<sup>17</sup>

Even if there is only a small probability that limited response options would deter attack or bring a nuclear war to a rapid conclusion without large-scale damage to cities, it is a probability which, for the sake of our citizens, we should not foreclose.

Like it or not, we would, under those awful circumstances, have to adhere faithfully to strict ground rules for the design and execution of small nuclear attacks.

### Hypothetical Ground Rules for Limited Option Planning

What ground rules might guide planning for small attacks? Any number come to mind, but three seem especially noteworthy: (1) limited attacks should not rely on defense suppression for their success; (2) the size and effects of an attack must be formally constrained; and (3) limited attacks must have a high probability of accomplishing their intended purpose. Note that these rules may, depending on the specifics of the scenario, interact considerably. They also are by no means always internally consistent guidelines for planners.

Currently, major attack options include provisions for destroying key Soviet strategic defenses to improve the penetration chances of other US forces. Such an attack, presumably aimed against key intercepter bases, SAM sites, GCI centers, radars, and similar targets, may account for a non-trivial portion of a massive US strike.<sup>18</sup> Be that as it may, I stipulate here as a small



attack ground rule the proviso that limited options should not rely for their success on active defense suppression.

Such a rule seems logical for several reasons. Given the depth and redundancy of Soviet and Pact air defenses, to open up bomber penetration corridors might require substantial barrages. Defense suppression may also betray the aims of an ongoing US option, while possibly denying the USSR enough early information about an attack to interpret accurately US intentions. Critical timely intelligence about whether precursor suppression attacks had succeeded might not be available with adequate reliability. Finally, skittish Soviet commanders might view piecemeal suppression attacks in support of sequential small options as a series of 'on the house' raids or probes before a massive blow, increasing the likelihood of accelerated escalation or Soviet resort to a launch on warning policy.

Given current Soviet anti-bomber defenses, we might surmise that ballistic missiles remain the instrument of choice in limited attacks against targets much inside the periphery of the contiguous Soviet bloc. Accordingly, the presence of a large Soviet ABM system would almost by definition change the way we approach small attack planning.

It is impossible to say before the fact just how big an attack must be to be no longer considered 'limited' (in the then-applicable context) by our adversaries. In addition to the size of an attack (which could be measured by a variety of means - numbers of delivery vehicles, weapons, megatons, etc. involved), a Soviet reaction would also take into account their perceptions of our attack's purpose, the timing of the attack, any corresponding communications of nuclear intent (CNI), and other related factors. Naturally, the smaller the attack, the more important these various other factors will be: certainly, in very substantial attacks, the size, or in other words, destructive potential, of a US attack would be the primary determinant of any subsequent retaliatory decision.

Even so, it is clear that some formal guidelines must be prepared for day-to-day use by operational planners. The bases for these numbers are many - and often highly classified. Specification of maximum 'small attack' size must, for instance, draw on sensitive intelligence data on the ability of Soviet sensors to size and characterize an incoming raid. US option planning should also be mindful of Soviet damage assessment capabilities.

Other sorts of constraints can be conceived, but for the sake of routine planning, all relevant indications would be lumped together to yield arbitrary numerical top-line restrictions.<sup>19</sup> For the purposes of this article, let us assume that 150 warheads (not by any means a tiny attack) is the largest strike we think can fall under the rubric of a 'limited option'. (The reader can select another number, but none of the following conclusions will vary substantially as a result of an analogous alternative ceiling).

The weapons in a small nuclear option must also be laid down so as to avoid inflicting excessive or inappropriate collateral damage. Most important, we should try to avoid the indiscriminate destruction of population and leadership. Thus, some very important military targets would undoubtedly reside within 'target exclusion' areas. In other cases, we might send smaller

weapons, offset aim-points from targets, or change heights of bursts (HOBs) in order to hold down collateral damage. Note that in most, if not all, cases we would sacrifice some degree of attack effectiveness for the sake of reduced collateral damage.<sup>20</sup>

Finally, let me reiterate the assumption that most of our options will ordinarily be aimed at militarily significant targets. As suggested above, the decision to launch a small nuclear option would probably be made in light of a deteriorating situation in NATO or some other vital theater. Under the circumstances, a nuclear blow should communicate to Soviet leadership our intention to see fighting through to an acceptable conclusion, come what may. The best way to do so would be to concentrate on target packages that, if destroyed, could appreciably influence, ideally in short order, the Soviets' estimates of the likelihood of achieving their hostile aims. Hence, attacks against many remote targets may be ruled out, because of delay in the onset of effects.

The most important ground rule to be applied in limited option planning is that an attack should have a very high probability of accomplishing its intended mission. This does not necessarily require us to build options with precisely stated aims (for example, 'move the FEBA back 50 kilometers'). Rather, we require that, whatever the purpose of the option, we should be very confident that it will produce predicted results - or put in more technical terms, we should realize very high Damage Expectancies on all the enemy targets we attack. For the sake of planning, in short, we do not necessarily plan to accomplish certain tactical results with high probability: instead we use the Damage Expectancy notion as a surrogate yardstick for offensive performance.

There are excellent reasons for this particular ground rule. Given the fact that neither side has much practical experience with the 'full up' employment of modern strategic systems, both may understandably be inclined to derive important inferences from the other side's early use of its nuclear forces. Here, we should avoid advertising our strategic arsenal in a bad light. If a US limited attack failed in a profound way, it might buoy up Soviet confidence and it would definitely undercut ours.

Moreover, a reasonably successful attack is vital if the Soviets are to recognize our aims: if every other warhead arrives and the target set is a varied one, our strike may make no sense. Preserving high Damage Expectancies on targets also may help to restrict collateral damage for if a weapon fails to destroy its target it may be because it has fallen in a regrettable adjacent place. Finally, we should avoid launching a limited attack unless we are quite sure that it would produce a military and/or political payoff commensurate with the grave risks involved.

#### Consequences of Soviet ABM Deployments on this Scheme of Option Planning

Taken together, these ground rules probably limit significantly the scope of allowable limited nuclear options. For the time being, it would seem that



targets in or near cities or far removed from the front, extremely hard installations, highly proliferated and/or redundant assets, or moving forces spread out over a large area probably will not normally qualify as strategic options. But crucial line of communication modes, pipelines, airfields, depots, and combat formations massing for breakthrough operations or concentrated as a result of interdiction or logistics failure would often be attractive and

FIGURE 1  
EFFECT OF ABM ON POINT TARGET COVERAGE  
( $K\#/I\#$  = OFFENSIVE PROBABILITY OF KILL/DEFENSIVE PROBABILITY OF KILL)





FIGURE 2  
NUMBER OF WEAPONS REQUIRED TO DESTROY A SINGLE TARGET WITH  
PROBABILITY = 0.90  
(GIVEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE PERFORMANCE)



'legal' strategic targets under our ground rules.

Subject to the spirit of the three ground rules, we can proceed to sketch out the consequences of Soviet missile defenses for small ballistic missile options. It is useful to begin with a broad brush statistical portrayal of the issues. Figure 1 shows how ABM can influence the number of missile weapons required to destroy a target given a required probability of success. A few curves are displayed: they are of the format  $K_{xx}/I_{yy}$ , where the probability




that a single offensive shot will, in the absence of any defense, kill its target is  $O.xx$ , and the probability that the defense will shoot down the attacker is  $O.yy$ . We see that, for low required damage expectancies, results are not very sensitive to the presence of defenses. However, the curves tend to turn upward sharply when, as is specified by the third ground rule, our desired probability of kill is high.

To focus on this phenomenon, Figure 2 shows the relationship between offensive and defensive performance when a very ambitious DE (0.90) is demanded. If offensive probabilities of kill decline (a result of target hardening, missile unreliability, reduced yield, offset weapons or nonoptimal HOBs, etc.) and/or if defensive Pks improve, the number of weapons required to generate desired high DEs can rise precipitously. If the defense's leakage rate is on the order of one half, the number of high quality offensive weapons required can even quadruple. When a relatively poor US showing is expected, required attacking numbers only double; but because the doubling can add so many weapons to a single target package, one would suppose that such numerical compensation might sometimes lead to option disqualification under our small attack size top-line rule.

For high required DEs, in short, our ability to carry out small missile attacks can disappear abruptly in the face of reasonably competent ABM defenses. Figure 3 shows how options can be disqualified as a function of reduced US probability-to-penetrate performance. Given an overall option ceiling of 150 reentry vehicles, and a required DE against each targeted

FIGURE 3  
IMPLICATIONS OF ABM FOR MOSCOW (AREA) TARGET COVERAGE  
(100 KT WEAPONS) PROBABILITY OF RV ARRIVAL



installation of 0.90, we see how missile defenses constrain the domain of allowable options. Three leakage rate curves (50 per cent, 70 per cent, and 90 per cent) are shown; given a combination of 1/2 size and a target package size, an option is prohibited if it falls below the leakage curve selected. Figure 3 suggests that even modest defenses can force some many 1/2 small attack options - unless attack size top-lines are adjusted substantially upward or required DEs are lowered significantly.

Barring such adjustments, one of the most important effects of Soviet missile defense deployments would be to drive us toward options built around relatively small target sets. Even when targets are hard to destroy and the defense is fairly effective, we can tolerate the presence of an ABM system when there are only a few targets in the package. Even so, our limited option menu might be a rather sparse one, for in a large-scale war it might be hard to find very many very small target packages the destruction of which would be either worth the escalation risks assumed or likely to yield significant results.

Much more important, the restrictions of our option coverage to veritable handfuls of aim-points would deprive us of the flexibility on which our entire limited employment strategy depends. To best deter the Soviets, we need to be able to carry out meaningful limited attacks that accomplish useful goals and indicate our resolve to do whatever is necessary to end fighting on acceptable terms. In some cases, attacks on only a few targets may be just the best way to make these points, but in other cases, larger strikes (involving from a few dozen to, in this case, 150 weapons) may be needed. Under the circumstances, to be able to attempt only very size-constrained attacks is tantamount to basing a strategy almost entirely on the unproductive and dangerous expedient of symbolic and demonstrative attacks.

Another response to the appearance of a Soviet ABM would be to enhance US offensive performance. This, however, is a problem of many troublesome dimensions. Improving US missile capabilities across the board will inevitably be a politically difficult, expensive, and lengthy effort. At the same time, the USSR would presumably strive toward better defensive performance (either with improved systems or by allocating multiple shots to each attacking warhead). Indeed, given the increased difficulty of key portions of the Soviet target base (as a result of mobility, hardening, concealment, etc.) simply to remain where we are - defense or no - will, over time, require more, and higher performance, warheads than have been available lately.

The reader might contend that Soviet ABM systems could never achieve the sorts of performance levels that would compel the US to revise its limited option planning in any major way. True, if Soviet defenses remain downright incompetent (leakage rates in excess of, say, 70 per cent), we would lose little sleep over them. However, we would not, one supposes, be inclined to dismiss Soviet missile defenses until we understood them very well; and actual Soviet capabilities may never be well known in peacetime with very much confidence. Even if the Soviets tested their systems extensively, cover and deception techniques could deny us critical knowledge about true defense characteristics. Given the requirement for high confidence in small attack planning, such



uncertainty would probably inspire our planners to err on the side of caution and be at least as conservative in their planning as they might be if defensive capabilities were presumed a priori to be good.<sup>21</sup>

### What Size Soviet ABM Deployment Will Affect US Small Attacks?

By this brief discussion it is clear (barring extraordinary disparities in the performance of both sides' forces) that, say, just several hundred ideally located ABM launchers could disqualify perhaps a large percentage of US options. But how sensitive is this assessment to the siting and range of Soviet ABMs? Obviously, a scattering of interceptors would not bother us, especially if they were short-ranged ones. But as the number of interceptors and/or their range increases, how fast is our penetration problem compounded?

Two of the most important-determinants of this problem from a US limited option planner's perspective are Soviet defensive priorities and interceptor range. The USSR clearly will not defend every possible target. A number of installations might be 'non-targets' at the time nuclear attacks would probably arrive. Other targets would be within obvious exclusion zones. We can, of course, never know for sure what defensive priority the Soviets would assign to their various military assets or what scenarios they use for planning, but to get a ballpark estimate of defensive needs let us simply assume that the USSR is interested in defending an even thousand targets which are uniformly distributed over Eastern Europe and the USSR's Western Military Districts. If we take that total surface area to be a square, we can make a very crude estimate of the number of sites and weapons needed to defend, let us say, at least 90 per cent of those targets. Table I gives order of magnitude estimated requirements for launch sites, given various interceptor ranges.

TABLE I  
BACK-OF-THE-ENVELOPE SOVIET MISSILE  
DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS

Approximate Interceptor Range, kilometers	Number of Discrete Defensive Sites	Hypothetical Number of ABMs per Site
200	30	30-35
100	85	10-12
50	275	3-5
20*	1000	1-2

Note: \*Limiting case: all targets individually defended.

From the vantage point of a US small attack planner, it seems prudent to assess the strategic consequences if the USSR deploys missiles of relatively long range. In fact, a number of factors other than caution supports this assumption. In so doing, Soviet sensor, command, and related infrastructure requirements would be eased. With a longer-range ABM, a layered defense concept - a favored Soviet approach - is easier. Furthermore, fairly long-

range interceptors would more efficiently defend against the large Euro-strategic threat azimuth, and would probably be somewhat more effective against maneuvering and other advanced threats. Because incoming raid size would not be a serious problem in a limited attack scenario, a short engagement distance (to compensate for system overload in the process of decoy discrimination) is not a critical defense attribute. As defense suppression is generally disallowed, the Soviets could count more on powerful tracking and battle management radars.

Based on the back of the envelope data presented in Table I, to defend on the order of 1000 Western area targets, the USSR might deploy 150-200 interceptor sites equipped with 50-75 km range interceptors or 25-50 sites mounting 150+ km interceptors. Not every target in a complex would be attacked in each option, but let us assume that the Soviets program one interceptor for each priority target. Here, the Soviets might have a reasonably formidable small attack defense with only four or five medium-range or 15-35 long-range interceptors per site (600 to 900 missiles overall), a deployment that does not defy imagination. Any number of analytic excursions beyond this casual sketch are possible; my point here is only to suggest that, from the perspective of a Western small attack planner, bothersome operational conditions might emerge when interceptor deployments number in the hundreds, not thousands.

Another question of interest from an offensive planner's point of view is how much limited fighting might precede escalation to more intense exchanges in which the strategic restraints called for by our limited employment doctrine would be invalidated. Now, some observers contend that the use of any number of nuclear weapons would inevitably precipitate holocaust; others allege that many hundreds or even thousands of weapons could be expended in a limited nuclear campaign. Although it is impossible to say for sure, it is not unreasonable to assume again that the cumulative weapons used by either side in the strictly limited phase of a nuclear conflict would probably run into the hundreds, as opposed to thousands. The point made earlier about the size of a reasonably effective Soviet anti-option defense would still seem to apply, even for a multi-volley limited nuclear campaign.

All things considered, it is not outrageous to suppose that the sensible siting of just a hundred or two long-range interceptors could seriously disrupt the United States' freedom to shoot limited option into areas of special military interest (such as the Kola Peninsula or Baltic or Black Sea littorals) or that a one or two thousand interceptor deployment might neutralize US missile options aimed into an entire theater of operations. Barring a high-confidence intelligence bonanza, moreover, this would seem to be the case even if Soviet systems did not work very well. Regrettably, deployments on this scale are not at all implausible - as the scope of the present Soviet strategic anti-aircraft defense effort dramatically attests.<sup>22</sup> Although anti-missile weapons are perhaps more expensive on a 'flyaway' basis than some other strategic defensive systems, the additional outlays needed to support a fielded ABM are not wildly out of line with demonstrated Soviet budgetary and doctrinal priorities.



## Other Measures to Maintain Flexible Response Even With New ABM Deployments

The degradation of our ability to carry out limited attacks as described above does not rule out the possibility that viable alternatives to current policies, systems, or tactics may exist. If the effects of Soviet ABM could be so liquidated, the US could have its cake and eat it too: we could deploy BMD as needed while remaining intact the Flexible Response strategy. However, it may very well be the case that suitable and timely alternatives cannot be found.

The most simple candidate anti-ABM 'countermeasures' would be to amend the ABM Treaty. Suppose that the number of interceptors allowed could be increased from 100 to, say, 300 or 400. Since few Soviet ICBM sites are located in the far Western USSR, and since we are probably ill-advised to shoot limited options into the Moscow metropolitan area under any circumstances, a continuing restriction on defensive coverage to an ICBM wing or one's NCA would probably serve our purposes.

There is, unfortunately, almost no reason to believe that such an amendment could be successfully negotiated. The USSR has revealed that its defense interests extend to a broad range of military targets, command and control nodes, and cities, not strategic offensive launchers. This is consistent with long-standing Soviet doctrine and their concern with the small arsenal of Britain, France, and the PRC. Moreover, the Soviets do not, at least over the near term, really need to defend their sites against US missile attack. If and when a substantially more capable US prompt counterforce threat comes on line, the Soviet Union could select undefended survivability options, particularly ICBM mobility. Even were the USSR to buy a BMD system of its own, moreover, the Kremlin probably would not be very interested in such a slight Treaty change since, for one thing, the USSR's sites are spread out over vast areas and effective BMD would require thousands of interceptors. And finally, why should the USSR ratify an amendment that benefited so disproportionately the United States? All in all, it does not seem reasonable to hope for such a tailored Treaty adjustment.

Another way around a Soviet ABM deployment would be to revise the basic ground rules for limited attack planning. Yet the only rule that can probably be changed without totally compromising our current strategic philosophy of limited employment is the restriction on defense suppression. If the US was able - subject to collateral damage and timing constraints - to neutralize pertinent defense sites, small attacks could ride through uninter-

rupted. Unfortunately, this approach too seems to be entangled with difficulties. An ABM site usually would protect itself as a first priority: hence, one attack would have to either exhaust the defense or knock out key radar and control centers. But either tactic would drive up total nuclear killing rates, depending on the number and range of interceptors and extent of overlapping defense coverage. We might also consider mobile defenses and varied control centers, and some suppression attacks may be prohibited if targets were in vulnerable areas. Other objections could be listed - all in all, fairly stout active defenses

suppression prohibitions are likely to remain in force.

One possible technique that holds out some promise would be to generate soft kills of ABM systems. Proactive bursts in ionosphere with radars could in principle defeat some kinds of interceptors, but among other things this tactic overloads the prospect of beyond defenses, increases the chance that the USSR will misinterpret the size and aim of an attack, and relies on highly questionable intelligence and nuclear effects data. Therefore, this probably is not a good solution. Perhaps selective jamming of ABM system radar components could help the necessary warheads get through. But again, the offensive measures likely result in an inherent disadvantage. In any case, and regardless of the technical possibilities, such a highly sophisticated and often clandestine measures-countermeasures race would be marked by great uncertainty, and this development is contrary to our requirement for ensuring sufficiently high confidence in the outcomes of limited attacks.

Now consider some operational means for defeating an ABM system in a small attack context. One would assign portions of the limited attack mission to air-breaching vehicles that would only on a desperate defense means to penetrate Soviet defenses. At first glance, the prospect is daunting: the Soviet anti-aircraft net is formidable and is constantly being improved. However, new possibilities - in low observables, cruise missiles, and ECM techniques, among others - hold out some hope that limited numbers of vehicles could penetrate a well defended facility. But many such advances might not come on line until the 1980s, perhaps even after the testing of a first generation extended Soviet ABM.

A number of other problems also remain which probably reduce the air-breaching leg of the TRAD to a fairly minor role in small attack planning over the near term. It is clearly advantageous (with respect to the aims of a small attack to Soviet leadership, as the effects of options might be diluted or misunderstood otherwise). Even with measures to enhance the 'promptness' of launch when the Soviets discovered they were being attacked. Moreover, even small successful penetrations might divulge key operational techniques, ECM and other technical specifications, and tactics that could make life much less pleasant for subsequent bombers and ALCM waves.

Future technological possibilities notwithstanding, the most important implication against the use particularly of bombers in small options, of course, has been and will remain for some time the attrition risk. Manned aircraft are only have to penetrate to targets, they have to recover successfully, which, given estimated low altitude exposure to alerted, unsuppressed defenses, a quantity of necessary bases, and, perhaps, disrupted tanker support, yields a set of thereby operational problems. The critical question of confidence in individual sortie success looms, while we might be more or less confident that a certain percentage of bombers at some number would reach their targets, estimating which specific Soviet installations would be hit is a different matter altogether. All in all, air-breaching from options should probably be confined to the near term to somewhat (probably naval and tactical targets, or for the case of some situations to targets that can be struck with great delay and risk.



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Unfortunately, this approach too seems to be saturated with difficulties. An ABM site usually would protect itself as a first priority; hence, our attack would have to either exhaust the defense or knock out key radar and control centers. But either tactic would drive up raid size (at differing rates, depending on the number and range of interceptors and extent of overlapping defense coverage). We might also confront mobile defenses and netted control centers, and some suppression attacks may be prohibited if targets were in exclusion areas. Other objections could be listed - all in all, fairly strict active defense

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One possible technique that holds out some promise would be to generate soft kills of ABM systems. Precursor bursts to interfere with radars could in principle defeat some kinds of interceptors, but among other things this tactic overlooks the prospect of layered defenses, increases the chance that the USSR will misinterpret the size and aim of an attack, and relies on highly unpredictable intelligence and nuclear effects data. Therefore, this probably is not a good solution. Perhaps selective jamming of ABM system radar components could help the necessary warheads get through. But again, the offense necessarily finds itself at an inherent disadvantage.<sup>23</sup> In any case, and regardless of the technical possibilities, such a highly sophisticated and often clandestine measures-countermeasures race would be marked by great uncertainty, and *that* development is contrary to our requirement for assuring sufficiently high confidence in the outcomes of limited attacks.

Now consider some operational means for defeating an ABM system in a small attack context. One would assign portions of the limited attack mission to air-breathing vehicles that would rely on altogether different means to penetrate Soviet defenses. At first glance, the prospect is daunting; the Soviet anti-aircraft net is formidable and is constantly being improved. However, new possibilities - in low observables, cruise missiles, and ECM technologies, among others - hold out some hope that limited numbers of vehicles could penetrate a stiff defense reliably. But many such advances might not come on line until the 1990s, perhaps years after the fielding of a first generation extended Soviet ABM.

A number of other problems also remain which probably relegate the air-breathing leg of the TRIAD to a fairly minor role in small attack planning over the near term. It is clearly advantageous swiftly to transmit the aims of a small attack to Soviet leadership, as the effects of options might be diluted or misunderstood otherwise. Even with measures to enhance the 'promptness' of bombers (such as airborne alert), however, weapons might still be hours from target when the Soviets discovered they were being attacked. Moreover, even totally successful penetrations might divulge key operational techniques, ECM and other technical specifications, and tactics that could make life much less pleasant for subsequent bomber and ALCM waves.

Future technological possibilities notwithstanding, the most important injunction against the use particularly of bombers in small options, of course, has been and will remain for some time the attrition risk. Manned aircraft not only have to penetrate to targets, they have to recover successfully, which, given extended low altitude exposure to alerted, unsuppressed defenses, a paucity of recovery bases, and, perhaps, disrupted tanker support, yields a set of thorny operational problems. The critical question of confidence in individual sortie success looms; while we might be more or less confident that a certain *percentage* of bombers or cruise missiles would reach their targets, estimating which specific Soviet installations would be hit is a different matter altogether. All in all, airbreathing force options should probably be confined for the near term to accessible (probably naval and littoral) targets, or (in the case of cruise missiles) to targets that can be struck with some delay and risk to



attrition in a meaningful limited attack context.

Now there is no doubt that over the long run, technical and conceptual advances could open up new possibilities for manned aircraft in the limited employment role. Technological advances and strategic imperatives – especially the need to strike imprecisely located targets – may in fact combine to revive a *central* role for manned strategic aircraft in limited strategic war. But these developments are, at best, beyond the near-term planning horizon. By the same token, future ballistic missile technologies might make it possible to carry out limited attacks against some kinds of targets despite very capable defenses. (Improvements to missile front ends to enhance penetration prospects include RV hardening and maneuverability.) Yet again, the possibilities here seem to be relatively limited especially over the short run.

As a final alternative to current ICBMs in a limited role, strategic targeteers can take greater advantage of the inherent flexibility of submarine-launched missiles. For instance, some SLBM trajectories might fall outside of Soviet anti-ICBM system parameters, and flying missiles on depressed trajectories we might also degrade defensive performance. Some of these capabilities are, however, not now available. In any case, submarine-launched missiles are not a very attractive limited attack vehicle over the near term; among other things, it is inherently difficult to communicate with submerged SSBNs, we are understandably reluctant to expose a submarine by launching only a partial boatload of missiles, and we would probably prefer to reserve such securely based weapons for more grave general war contingencies.

#### Implications for Current US Policy

The current Western strategy of Flexible Response represents a delicate balancing of the various interests and concerns held by the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic. The West's ability to launch small nuclear attacks – including attacks by US central strategic systems – against a full range of militarily relevant targets currently is a keystone of the Flexible Response concept. To erode that strategy by undermining even in part our limited strategic attack capability could lead to a number of potentially severe political and military problems. For this reason, great caution is warranted as we consider certain strategic policy issues.

Since ICBMs probably will remain the instrument of choice for limited strategic attacks over the near term, it could very well be the case that even a fairly modest new Soviet ABM deployment could jeopardize our limited employment capability. Unfortunately, constraints on the azimuth of the ICBM threat to the USSR, the extended flight times of US land-based missiles (compared with some INF and SLBMs), and other factors would combine to render US land-based missiles incapable of some, perhaps many, limited employment missions should new Soviet ABM deployments take place. There are, moreover, few timely alternatives to our land-based missile force when it comes to our ability to execute small strategic attacks. Finally, while predicting the nature of an ABM/ICBM countermeasure duel is beyond the scope of such a brief assessment as this, one might suppose that advantages

gained by either the offense or defense will be partial, ambiguous, ephemeral, and above all, subject to unacceptable uncertainty. In short, we should accept the fact that a vigorous ABM competition would adversely affect our limited employment capability for years to come.

Hence, we face a dilemma regarding the role and nature of our future ICBM force. On the one hand, force structure planners have been frustrated in their repeated efforts to find – and perhaps more important, to sell to Congress and the public – a permanent home for the MX missile.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, an ABM competition that could lead to the loss of one of the most attractive features of the ICBM would be virtually guaranteed if the US were to abandon existing Treaty limitations by deploying a BMD ring around new or existing ICBMs.<sup>25</sup> To reconcile this dilemma, we must make two estimates about the future strategic world and one determination about US strategic priorities.

The first estimate is whether a follow-on US ICBM basing system is bound to require active defense. Our approach to this issue has to date been strongly shaped by the unspoken but apparently generally accepted requirement that our initial basing solution for a fully deployed follow-on ICBM be viable over the life of the system. On account of the difficulties involved in designing such a system, the basing question has come to turn instead on political points (currently, the need to deploy even a highly vulnerable system in order to achieve a START treaty). But it has not yet been demonstrated that BMD should be a part of our basing system for any mix of new ICBMs. It is especially unclear whether BMD efforts (beyond the low-level technical demonstrations needed to discourage any Soviet expectations of possibly achieving some kind of 'break out' advantage) are needed in the near term.

The second estimate is whether the US can, by a number of steps (including deferring some of its own choices), make it more likely that Soviet missile defense deployments will occur later rather than earlier. Now it might be argued that the odds of influencing certain forms of Soviet behavior are negligible; certainly no one would argue that the USSR can be prevented from going ahead and deploying an ABM system of considerable size if the Kremlin wants to. But given the present strategic balance, it is not unreasonable to suppose that a Soviet decision to act earlier rather than later may very well be strongly influenced by actual or anticipated US defensive deployments.<sup>26</sup> By the same token, a number of US options exist to delay, if not prevent for all time, Soviet deployment of expanded missile defenses. The US need not, in other words, prepare to fight fire with fire. Rather, by concentrating on such programs as enhancing future ICBM penetration performance (for example, through pen aids, RV hardening, and maneuverable RV), the USSR may be deterred from making major defensive investments (at least in a first generation large-scale ABM system).

How one fashions these estimates is largely a function of one's priorities when it comes to the importance of being able to accomplish different strategic missions. Assuming that no politically acceptable undefended follow-on ICBM concept can be found – in other words, that active defense is essential to the survivability of the land-based leg of the TRIAD – we have to determine whether the overall costs to our small attack strategy of potentially



'premature' ABM deployment exceed the gains (measured largely in terms of increased US force survivability) achieved thereby.

In this article my own ordering of priorities has been based on the assumptions: (1) that, to a much greater extent than the Soviets, the United States will probably need a powerful and credible flexible response capability throughout the 1980s; (2) that the ability to carry out small attacks is at least as important over the near and mid-term as the survivability of a force optimized to enhance a not inconsiderable ability to execute major, SIOP-level nuclear strike options; and (3) that timely and competitively cost-effective counterforce substitutes to a *defended* follow-on ICBM deployment can be found. Now all of these assumptions might be rejected by those who prefer to view nuclear war in terms of so-called 'bang-bang' massive exchange scenarios and who believe that an actively defended MX system makes the most strategic and budgetary sense. However, if the reader does acknowledge the importance of flexible response capabilities or can visualize alternatives to active defense as a means of assuring some reasonable measure of land-based missile survivability, then forestalling new Soviet ABM deployments becomes a relatively high priority strategic objective over the next few years.

Not only would we reap a number of political, budgetary, and other dividends if we are successful in deferring an ABM competition over the near term. We might also be able to postpone an ABM arms race to a time when new technologies, changed alliance relationships, and an evolved strategic context would combine to render the effects of widespread missile defense deployments on our nuclear strategy less significant or relevant than would be the case today.

In sum, as we make critical strategic choices over the next few months and years, it is vital to recall that US and Soviet strategic aims and contexts are by no means symmetric ones. Certain key asymmetries – relating to the conventional theater balance, our need to achieve a political consensus for important weapons and strategy choices, and the like – should, in my view, inform our ICBM modernization and strategic defense development decisions in the near term. Based on the discussion presented here, it would seem that the net effect of such considerations would be to support every effort possible to devise an MX basing concept that does not rely on active defense.

## NOTES

The Rand Corporation, Washington, DC. The views expressed in this article are the author's, and not necessarily those of Rand or any of its sponsors.

1. Typical questions for analysis include the costs to both sides of defeating the other's defenses, synergisms between new ABM deployments and anti-airbreathing strategic defenses, etc.
2. In this article, I will concentrate solely on the role that US central strategic forces might play in deterring a theater war and, if necessary, helping to see fighting through to an acceptable conclusion. To be sure, shorter-ranged tactical nuclear forces (such as atomic artillery projectiles and nuclear weapons delivered by tactical aircraft) play an important role in NATO's defense strategy. However, since central forces – used in a limited attack role – are essential to the sound coupling of forward theater defense to the American nuclear deterrent,

- the neutralization of our ability to carry out small strikes with central systems could have profound results. Therefore, this article focuses exclusively on this issue.
3. Remarks by Secretary McNamara, NATO Ministerial Meeting, 5 May 1962, (the 'Athens Speech'), p.3 (Declassified, FOIA).
4. For an expanded discussion of these points, see the present author's *Nuclear Weapons Policy, Planning and War Objectives: Toward a Theater-Oriented Deterrent Strategy*, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, March 1982.
5. See James R. Schlesinger, 'Hearings on Strategic Doctrine', US Government Printing Office, March 1974, p.9. The 1,000 figure appears in Desmond Ball, 'Deja Vu: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration', California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Santa Monica, California, December 1974, pp.12-13.
6. See Henry S. Rowen, 'The Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Doctrine', in L. Martin (ed.), *Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1979. Nuclear forces held by the various nuclear C-in-Cs and not committed to the SIOP had occasionally been programmed for what used to be Regional and Limited Nuclear Options (RNOs and LNOs), and are today known as 'Non-SIOP Options' or NSOs.
7. A SEP is a Selective Employment Plan. It is, in effect, a limited option within the corpus of NATO's Scheduled (nuclear) Strike Program.
8. See James R. Schlesinger's FY 1975 and FY 1976-77 *Annual Defense Reports*, pp.3-6 and pp.1-13-1-17 respectively, for the official contemporary assessment of the implications of the changing balance.
9. For an informative discussion on the theater-based component of this evolution see J.M. Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response*, The Rand Corporation, R-2964-FF, March 1983.
10. For elaboration on this point consult Walter Slocumbe, 'The Countervailing Strategy', *International Security*, Vol.V, No.4, Spring 1981.
11. Cited in *Aerospace Daily*, 12 April 1974.
12. See Benjamin Lambeth, *Selective Nuclear Options in American and Soviet Strategy*, The Rand Corporation, R-2035-DRE, December 1976, p.28.
13. More precisely, we describe in terms of an index known as 'damage expectancy' (DE) the net probability that targets will be damaged (defined in terms of types, as well as degrees, of damage).
14. It makes little difference, for instance, whether some tank plant escaped destruction if the personnel, electric power, rail transit, and raw materials needed as inputs and supporting infrastructure had been decimated. True, there are some crucial exceptions to this rule. Obviously, we would have to be certain that we destroyed certain targets when we attack command and control, attempt to suppress defenses, and so on. Furthermore, there may be important 'bottlenecks' or 'Achilles' heels' among the list of both military and war supporting targets.
15. Some commentators have advocated 'symbolic' or 'demonstration' nuclear strikes. However, simply shooting at an irrelevant target (say, an iceberg) to 'make a point' could be quite a risky action. Such a stunt probably would not demonstrate resolve, but instead may indicate recklessness (shaking our allies' confidence, most likely), hint that we do not have the stomach for seeing the land campaign through to a successful conclusion, and provide an excuse for the Soviets to respond with a much larger retaliatory blow in the aftermath of 'provocative' or 'irresponsible' US first use.
16. Since, as noted above, the Soviets tend to deprecate 'limited nuclear employment' as a bourgeois self-delusion, the West undeniably runs the risk that its attempts at discriminating nuclear use would precipitate disaster.
17. *Annual DoD Report for FY1976-77*, op. cit., p.11-7.
18. Defense suppression attacks were said by Alton Quanbeck and Arch Wood in 1976 to use between 200-400 warheads, and by Congressman Les Aspin in 1978 to use from 400-500. See A. Quanbeck and A. Wood, *Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force, Why and How*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1976, p.67, and Congressman L. Aspin, 'The Mineshaft Gap Revisited', Mimeo, Office of Cong. Aspin, p.10, December 1978 (reprinted in *Congressional Record*, 15 January 1979).
19. Other factors than sheer size might constrain attack design. We might, for instance, be



- interested in launcher purity; depending on the capabilities of Soviet weapons, we might even want to launch out MINUTEMEN from selected wings so that the USSR will be even more confident that an attack is a deliberate one.
20. Certain other specialized exclusions come to mind. We might, for instance, want to avoid destroying nuclear power plants and other sites with a potential for regional environmental catastrophe (biological warfare plants, dams, etc.). We might also avoid destroying facilities of extraordinary cultural or political value.
  21. In major option planning, we can, obviously, compensate for sources of uncertainty like this by adding weapons to a target package. Given the natural conservatism of our war planning approach, for instance, one might speculate that Moscow is going to be worse off after a nuclear war on account of the presence of a missile defense system.
  22. For instance, the Soviets currently deploy more than 2,600 strategic air defense radars and more than 10,000 strategic SAM rails (not to mention thousands of specialized air defense aircraft, tactical SAMs, and naval SAMs).
  23. For instance, ground-based systems would not be constrained by the same size, weight, and power restrictions that would heavily influence the design of onboard or other ballistic front-end electronics packages.
  24. The deployment of the MX in MINUTEMAN silos, recommended by the Scowcroft panel, is considered an interim basing solution. As many members of Congress have noted, funding for full procurement has not yet been approved. The approval could be tied directly to the selection of a suitable basing system.
  25. It is nothing short of ironic that the basing mode designed to assure the survivability of the left of the TRIAD most suited for flexible employment could inadvertently lead to the failure of this strategy.
  26. After all, the Soviets have no present need for a BMD defense of their strategic forces; they probably harbor few delusions about removing the threat posed by US forces in an all-out retaliatory regime, and they respect US technological potential. Moreover, on the premise that they enjoy some margin of conventional superiority, they can, perhaps, leave the burden of first nuclear use to the West, while retaining a full ability to retaliate should such use occur.



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## Stability and Reduction of Nuclear Forces The Intercontinental and Theater Levels

Leon V. Sigal\*  
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### 1. Definitions

So long as the purpose of arms control is to reduce the likelihood of war, and especially nuclear war, the criterion for producing, deploying, and limiting nuclear forces will be military stability. Military stability takes three distinct but related forms: strategic stability, crisis stability, and arms race stability.

When rival states are secure in the knowledge that each has a second-strike capability – sufficient numbers of survivable nuclear weapons to threaten unacceptable damage to the other side even after suffering a nuclear attack – *strategic stability*, or mutual deterrence, exists. Under those conditions, the two sides will probably calculate that it does not pay to conduct premeditated nuclear war against each other.

Yet the threats posed by deterrents may not suffice to prevent nuclear war; indeed, under some circumstances they may provoke it. In August 1914, for instance, alliance obligations undertaken to deter war helped bring it about, and mobilization ordered as a precaution prompted preemption. In December 1941 the United States believed it was deterring war by building up a sizable fleet at Pearl Harbor; Japan, however, considered war with the United States inevitable and the American buildup spurred it to war sooner rather than later, when it might have been relatively worse off militarily. In the nuclear era, as in a conven-

tional balance of power, the possibility of preemptive or preventive war coexists with that of premeditated war.

Even if both superpowers have enough survivable warheads for a second-strike capability and know they do, either may still worry that a sizable portion of its nuclear forces may be vulnerable to attack. In a crisis in which nuclear war seems imminent and unavoidable, the side worried about its own vulnerability might see some advantage in preemptive attack. If either side sees itself in such a predicament, then both sides are less secure for fear of preemption. Moreover, once nuclear war seems imminent and unavoidable – and only then – each side has some incentive to shoot first even if it cannot completely disarm the other side, in order to limit the damage it will suffer when the inevitable happens.

When neither side has reason to fear a preemptive strike in a crisis, *crisis stability* exists. Crisis stability reduces the chances of preemptive war. It also reduces the likelihood of accidental nuclear war, for it is only under conditions of crisis instability that nuclear accident is likely to trigger nuclear war because of vulnerability and the resulting incentive to shoot first.

Each side may continue to test and deploy new weapons under conditions of strategic or crisis stability. Yet some weapons developments may threaten to undermine strategic or crisis stability. If so, they may give rise to concern that deterrence is likely to fail in the future, or worse still, that nuclear war with the other side is inevitable. *Arms race stability*

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